Domai v. Wooldridge

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS-granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The court also DENIES Mr. Domai's Motion for Leave to Amend 33 . Sergeant Wooldridge is directed to file his Answer on or before April 26, 2019. He is further directed to file his Notice on or before April 26, 2019. Signed by Judge Clark Waddoups on 3/28/19. (jmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

GUY M. DOMAI,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 2:17-cv-949
Judge Clark Waddoups

STEVEN B. WOOLDRIDGE,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Guy M. Domai asserts a claim against Sergeant Steven B. Wooldridge based on
an incident that occurred on Sunday, August 19, 2017 in a public park. Mr. Domai was detained,
questioned, and then transported to a hospital for a mental health evaluation. Mr. Domai asserts
his constitutional rights were violated during the incident. Sergeant Wooldridge filed a Motion to
Dismiss. On December 20, 2018, a Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, which
recommends that Mr. Domai’s Amended Complaint (ECF N. 9) be dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. Report & Recommendation, at 7 (ECF No. 28). Mr. Domai filed an
Objection to it (ECF No. 33). For the reasons stated below, the court declines to adopt the Report
and Recommendation and grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Dismiss.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Domai’s Allegations
Mr. Domai asserts he was at Liberty Park on Sunday, August 19, 2017, working on cases
he had filed in court. 1 Around 11:00 a.m., he took a break to eat. Shortly afterwards, he observed
Sergeant Wooldridge talking with two individuals who had been playing volleyball at the park.
The two individuals allegedly were pointing at Mr. Domai as they talked to Sergeant Wooldridge.
Mr. Domai further asserts that about five minutes later two other police cars arrived, and those
officers were then seen talking with Sergeant Wooldridge and the two volleyball players. Two
officers subsequently approached him “aggressively . . . as if they wanted to arrest him.” Amended
Complaint, at 2 (ECF No. 9).
Mr. Domai asserts he stood up from the park bench and started backing away from the
officers. In response, “[t]he officers started following him, telling him to not be scared, that
everything will be ok.” Id. Mr. Domai asserts he kept backing up and asking them why they were
“charging” him. Id. He then stopped and the officers immediately put him in handcuffs. When
he asked them why they were detaining him, the officers responded “that somebody called in and
claimed that the plaintiff was deliberately making threats to people there with a knife.” Id.
Mr. Domai denied the allegation “and asked who made that complaint.” Sergeant
Wooldridge, the “highest officer on duty, refused to provide that information.” 2 Id.

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Mr. Domai states in his Amended Complaint that he was working on three cases he had filed.
Amended Complaint, at 2 (ECF No. 9). He has filed at least twenty-three cases in this court alone.

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Before being transported to the hospital, Mr. Domai also asserts he asked if he could be released
to gather up his belongings and was denied that opportunity. He does not assert, however, that his
property was lost as a result of the encounter. Thus, the court focuses only on the claim of an
unlawful detention.
2

The Amended Complaint asserts one cause of action for a violation of due process.
Although not stated expressly, the claim appears to have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
based on the elements Mr. Domai asserts he has to prove. Mr. Domai asserts he has to show (1)
“a constitutionally protected property interest,” and (2) “[t]hat He was deprived of that interest
without due process.” Amended Complaint, at 3. He asserts he had the constitutionally protected
“right to know what He was being accused of.” Id. He further asserts he was deprived of his rights
because “the officers prevented the plaintiff the right to defend himself or offer an explaination
[sic] to the so called crime that He was being accused of.” Id.
CAD Call
When Sergeant Wooldridge filed his motion to dismiss, he attached a copy of the Salt Lake
City Police Department CAD Call to the motion on the basis that “Mr. Domai referred to the report
made to the police in his Complaint.” Mot. to Dismiss, at 2 n.3 (ECF No. 15). The CAD Call
stated a caller and a second-party caller were on scene reporting an incident in progress. CAD
Call, at 3 (ECF No. 15-1). The caller reported that a man was walking around with a kitchen knife
6 to 7 inches long. Id. at 1, 3. The caller then reported the man was sitting at a table near the
volleyball courts, and “was on his phone stating ‘I am right here, I can handle it.’” Id. at 1.
Sergeant Wooldridge arrived on the scene at 13:56:59. Id. He reported “walking in from north
end” at 13:58:06. Id. By 13:59:45 he had a “visual of susp w/of north men’s room.” Id. About a
minute later at 14:00:52, Sergeant Wooldridge reported “M was rambling talking about slashing
people in face.” Id. Four minutes later, Sergeant Wooldridge requested a different supervisor also
be on the scene because he and the “susp don’t have positive prior interaction.” Id. at 1–2. The

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report then confirms that Mr. Domai was transported to the University of Utah for a psychological
evaluation. Id. at 2.
Notably, the events in the CAD Call occurred on Sunday, August 14, 2016 around 2:00
p.m. Mr. Domai asserts the events in his complaint occurred on Sunday, August 19, 2017 around
11:00 a.m. The complaint and CAD Call differ as to the day of the month, year, and time.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sergeant Wooldridge filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2018 (ECF No. 15). Mr. Domai
asked for two extensions of time to respond, which were granted. Orders Extending Time (ECF
Nos. 18, 25). The orders extended the time to respond until August 30, 2018.
In the interim, Mr. Domai filed a 48-page document of proposed subpoenas to various
officers. Subpoena Requests (ECF No. 22). Among other items, the proposed subpoenas contain
interrogatories to various individuals, a request for the identity of the callers, and a request for the
audio or video recording of Sergeant Wooldridge’s conversation with the complainants because
the CAD Call had their information redacted. See e.g., id. at 4, 10, 13. Mr. Domai further sought
information to prove the incident at the park was “premeditated.” Id. at 15. He included “Notes
to Court” that allege Salt Lake City is racist, law enforcement “constantly track down” through
“scare and intimidation tactics,” and this court engages in “quick, systematic and early discarding
of cases by abusively using . . . court processes such as reports and recommendations” that deny
cases “regardless of the true nature of the case.” 3 Id. at 9. Sergeant Wooldridge objected to the

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In light of the extensions and allowances afforded to Mr. Domai in this case, his assertion is not
well-taken.
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subpoenas on the grounds that they were improper and outside the scope of Rule 45 (ECF No. 21).
On August 31, 2018, Mr. Domai filed a response contending that the subpoenas were
appropriate. He also referenced the Motion to Dismiss and asserted he “was handcuffed, detained
and taken to the University of Utah for psychological evaluation without his will, without probable
cause or any comprehensible reason.” Response, at 1 (ECF No. 26) (emphasis added). He further
asserted he needed discovery before he could respond to the Motion to Dismiss. Then, more than
two months late, Mr. Domai filed his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on
November 5, 2018 (ECF No. 27).
On December 20, 2018, the Report and Recommendation was issued recommending that
Mr. Domai’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Report &
Recommendation, at 7 (ECF No. 28). The Report was based on the same grounds stated in the
Motion to Dismiss and on the standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). It informed Mr. Domai he had
fourteen days to file an objection. Because the Report recommended dismissal, the Magistrate
Judge declined to address Mr. Domai’s proposed subpoenas Id. at 2.
On January 7, 2019, eighteen days after the Report was entered, Mr. Domai sent an email
to the court stating that he had not received the recommendation until January 4, 2019 because he
had moved to St. Louis, Missouri, and that he would be asking for a continuance. Email (ECF No.
29). The Motion for Extension was received on January 10, 2019, and the court granted an
extension until January 24, 2019 to file an Objection. Order, at 1 (ECF No. 32). Mr. Domai sent
his Objection by email on January 24, 2019, and the hard copy was received on January 28, 2019.
Objection (ECF No. 33).

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In his Objection, Mr. Domai alleges he filed suit not for the reasons stated in the Report
and Recommendation, but because he was detained and transported without probable cause. Id.
at 4. He asserts again the encounter was premeditated and racially motivated, and that Sergeant
Wooldridge also negligently directed officers to arrest him. Id. at 5, 7, 11. He seeks to amend his
complaint to assert claims against two officers, the Chief of Police, the Governor, and two entities
regarding abuse of process, conspiracy, aiding and abetting a conspiracy, infliction of emotional
distress, and excessive use of force. Id. at 16–18. Sergeant Wooldridge requests that the court
overrule Mr. Domai’s Objection and deny Mr. Domai’s untimely request for leave to amend.
Response to Objection (ECF No. 34).

ANALYSIS
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

In Forma Pauperis - 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Mr. Domai is proceeding in forma pauperis. The court therefore has an obligation to
determine whether Mr. Domai’s claim is “frivolous or malicious” or whether its “fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). In doing so, the court
typically cannot consider affirmative defenses sua sponte unless the complaint “provide[s] a
‘factual backdrop that clearly beckons’ dismissal on that basis.” Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 Fed.
Appx. 692, 696 n.5 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted); see also Trujillo
v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating sua sponte consideration of affirmative
defenses under a Section 1915 analysis should be “reserved for those extraordinary instances”
where the complaint “beckons the defense”).

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B.

Rule 12(b)(6)

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quotations and citation omitted). In other words, the “factual allegations in a
complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Kay v. Bemis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). When making
this determination, “all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint” are “accept[ed] as true”
and they are viewed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d
1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted).
Moreover, because Mr. Domai is proceeding pro se, the court must construe his complaint
liberally. Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). This means
the court “make[s] some allowances for deficiencies, such as unfamiliarity with pleading
requirements, failure to cite appropriate legal authority, and confusion of legal theories.” Lankford
v. Wagner, 853 F.3d 1119, 1121 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “Dismissal of a pro se
complaint is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has
alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Curley, 246 F.3d at 1281
(quotations and citation omitted).
II.

MOTION TO DISMISS
A.

Fourth Amendment versus Fourteenth Amendment

Mr. Domai asserts his cause of action arises from a Due Process violation. Sergeant
Wooldridge, however, asserts this case should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather

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than the Fourteenth Amendment because the case pertains to whether Mr. Domai was lawfully
detained. The court agrees.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that Ҥ 1983 is not itself a source of
substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (quotations and citations omitted).
Consequently, the court must begin its analysis “by identifying the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed.” Id. (citation omitted).
In the case of Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit
concluded that if a Fourth Amendment claim fails for unlawful detention and transport to a mental
health facility, a Fourteenth Amendment claim “also necessarily fail[s].” This is so because the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is a more specific
protection than the Fourteenth Amendment’s general guarantees. Id. Thus, a claim based on lack
of “probable cause must be brought under the specific guarantees of the Fourth Amendment rather
than the generalized guarantee of substantive due process.” Id. (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 273 (1994)).
Because Mr. Domai is proceeding pro se, the court makes an allowance for his failure to
plead his action under the proper legal theory. The facts of the complaint, however, are sufficient
to show this claim should be addressed as a Fourth Amendment claim. Since the Fourth
Amendment is the proper legal theory of this case, the court dismisses Mr. Domai’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim.

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B.

Face of the Complaint

Applying the Fourth Amendment analysis, Sergeant Wooldridge contends the complaint
fails to assert a cause of action against him. He identifies three allegations in the complaint that
are specific to him. First, he “talked to two individuals in the park.” Mot. to Dismiss, at 6 (ECF
No. 15). Second, he “declined to tell Mr. Domai the identity of the individuals that had called the
police.” Id. Third, he “told Mr. Domai that he would get help at the hospital.” Id. Sergeant
Wooldridge contends these are the only allegations that apply specifically to him, and they are
insufficient to show he personally participated in any alleged violation of Mr. Domai’s rights.
The allegations identified by Sergeant Wooldridge, however, are not the only allegations
against him in the complaint. Mr. Domai also asserts that when two other officers arrived on the
scene, they “headed straight to Sergeant Wooldridge and the two civilians” to whom he was
talking. Amended Complaint, at 2 (ECF No. 9). Shortly thereafter, the same two officers
approached and handcuffed Mr. Domai. He further asserts that Sergeant Wooldridge was the
“highest officer on duty.” Id. From these allegations and Mr. Domai’s later filings and Objection,
one may reasonably infer that Mr. Domai is asserting Sergeant Wooldridge gave a command to
the two officers to arrest Mr. Domai without probable cause.
Under supervisory liability, a person may be liable “where the plaintiff demonstrates an
‘affirmative link’ between the constitutional violation and the defendant’s actions.” Buck v. City
of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1287 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371
(1976)). Thus, in situations where the event occurred under the supervisor’s direction, a supervisor
may be personally liable. Id. (citing Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Because Mr. Domai asserted Sergeant Wooldridge was the “highest officer on duty,” a liberal

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reading of the complaint’s allegations allows for a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment
for supervisory liability on the basis of an unlawful arrest. 4

III.

PROBABLE CAUSE
A.

Authority to Transport for a Mental Health Evaluation

The Tenth Circuit has stated “‘[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty
will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted—
indeed, for every suspect released.’” Pino, 75 F.3d at 1469 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 145 (1979)). In Pino, a woman allegedly had locked herself in a room and had not eaten for
several days. Id. at 1463. She reportedly appeared despondent. Id. Concerned family members
called the woman’s therapist, who in turn called the police to investigate. Id. When the officers
arrived, they confirmed the woman was locked in her room and refused to come out. Id. Her
therapist recommended to one of the officers that she be transported for a mental health evaluation.
Id. Despite reporting to the officers that she was fine, they transported her for an evaluation against
her will. After two days at a facility, she was released because the staff “concluded that she was
not mentally ill.” Id. at 1464. The woman then filed a § 1983 action on the basis that her Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. In turn, the officers “moved for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.” Id. at 1467.

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As stated above,“[d]ismissal of a pro se complaint is proper only where it is obvious that the
plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity
to amend.” Curley, 246 F.3d at 1281 (quotations and citation omitted). Reading the complaint
liberally, the court concludes it adequately states a Fourth Amendment cause of action. Even if it
does not, however, the court would have to grant leave to amend because Mr. Domai expressly
asserts in his Objection that his action is based on lack of probable cause. That allegation is
sufficient to avoid the “futility” argument.
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The Court recognized that “[t]he state has a legitimate interest in protecting the community
from the mentally ill” who pose a risk of harm to others, “and in protecting a mentally ill person
from self-harm.” Id. at 1468. Thus, if an officer has probable cause “to believe the person, as a
result of mental illness, presents a serious likelihood of harm to [oneself] or others and that
immediate detention is necessary to prevent such harm,” that officer may “detain and transport a
person for an emergency mental health evaluation.” Id. (quotations, citation, and alteration
omitted).
B.

CAD Call and Affirmative Defense

As stated above, Sergeant Wooldridge attached a copy of a CAD Call to his Motion to
Dismiss. “A 12(b)(6) motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment if ‘matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court.’” Burke v. Holdman, 750 Fed.
Appx. 616, 620 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). “[T]he purpose of that rule is to
afford the plaintiff an opportunity to respond in kind” to information about which the person may
not have had notice. Inge v. McClelland, 725 Fed. Appx. 634, 638 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotations
and citation omitted).
“Notwithstanding these general principles, if a plaintiff does not incorporate by reference
or attach a document to its complaint, but the document is referred to in the complaint and is central
to the plaintiff’s claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be
considered on a motion to dismiss.” Burke, 750 Fed. Appx. at 620 (quotations and citation
omitted). “If the rule were otherwise, a plaintiff with a deficient claim could survive a motion to
dismiss simply by not attaching a dispositive document upon which the plaintiff relied.” Id.
(quotations and citation omitted).

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In this case, Mr. Domai alleges the officers “claimed that somebody called in.” Amended
Complaint, at 2 (ECF No. 9) (emphasis added). The CAD Call provides details about a call in and
subsequent encounter at Liberty Park. It states that Sergeant Wooldridge had a visual on the
suspect and that the person was rambling and talking about slashing people in the face. While this
may support that Sergeant Wooldridge had probable cause to detain and transport Mr. Domai for
a mental health evaluation, the court does not address whether the CAD Call may be considered
on the Motion to Dismiss without converting it to a summary judgment motion. This is so for two
reasons.
First, the day, year, and time of the event in the CAD Call are not consistent with the day,
year, and time alleged in Mr. Domai’s Amended Complaint. The court cannot resolve this
discrepancy without making assumptions of fact. Absent the CAD Call, there is no information
about a person “rambling” and “talking about slashing people in [the] face.” Hence, it becomes
unclear whether the detention and transportation for a mental health evaluation were appropriate.
Second, the Tenth Circuit has admonished that a court typically should not rule on an affirmative
defense sua sponte. Because Sergeant Wooldridge has not raised the issue of qualified immunity
based on probable cause, the court is not in a position to rule on the matter. More details about the
encounter at the park are needed for the court to address the issue. Accordingly, the court denies
the motion to dismiss Mr. Domai’s Fourth Amendment claim.
IV.

OTHER MATTERS AND SCHEDULING
A.

Motion for Leave to Amend

When Mr. Domai filed his Objection to the Report and Recommendation, he also included
proposed amendments to his complaint, both as to the number of parties and the causes of action.

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The issue at hand, however, is whether there was probable cause to detain and transport Mr. Domai
for a mental health evaluation. If probable cause existed, then there can be no liability against any
individual for conspiracy, infliction of emotional distress, and so forth. Moreover, there are no
asserted facts to support an excessive use of force claim. Accordingly, at this time, the court denies
Mr. Domai leave to amend his complaint.
B.

Answer and Discovery

The court directs Sergeant Wooldridge to file his Answer and any affirmative defenses on
or before Friday, April 26, 2019. If Sergeant Wooldridge asserts affirmative defenses, the court
requests that he state in detail the factual basis for each defense, including the date and time of the
events at issue. After his answer is filed, the court will address the scope of discovery, if any, that
will be allowed.
Mr. Domai has proposed subpoenas that include interrogatories and requests for
production. Some of the requests may be relevant at this stage of the litigation. Sergeant
Wooldridge filed a global Objection to the subpoenas (ECF No. 21).

Although the court

acknowledges the Objection may have been appropriate both in terms of timing and content, the
court requests that Sergeant Wooldridge re-review the proposed subpoenas and notify the court as
to which interrogatories and requests for production he objects to and why, in light of the present
posture of the case, and those to which he does not object, if any (hereinafter “Notice”). The court
directs Sergeant Wooldridge to file his Notice on or before Friday, April 26, 2019. After the court
has reviewed the Answer and Notice, the court will determine how the case shall proceed. Until
that time, the Attorney Planning Meeting and all further discovery is stayed.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) and declines to adopt the Report and Recommendation (ECF No.
28). In particular, the court grants the motion to dismiss Mr. Domai’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim. The court denies the motion to dismiss Mr. Domai’s Fourth Amendment claim. The court
also DENIES Mr. Domai’s Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 33).
Sergeant Wooldridge is directed to file his Answer on or before April 26, 2019. He is
further directed to file his Notice on or before April 26, 2019.
DATED this 28th day of March, 2019.
BY THE COURT:

_______________________________
Clark Waddoups
United States District Judge

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