Watson v. IHC Health Services et al
Filing
35
MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 27 Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 2/15/18. (jlw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
SUSAN M. WATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dba
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL CENTER;
MARK B. SHAH, M.D.; WILLIAM J.
HALDEN, M.D.; PETER MAUGHAN,
M.D.; PETER MAUGHAN, M.D., P.C.;
NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES,
L.L.C.; BRENT A. FELIX, M.D.; BRENT
A. FELIX, M.D., P.C.; SALT LAKE
ORTHOPAEDIC CLINIC, INC.; DOE
INDIVIDUALS 1 through 10; and ROE
ENTITIES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Case No. 2:17-CV-1141 TS
District Judge Ted Stewart
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant the Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Susan M. Watson filed her initial Complaint against Defendant IHC Health
Services and others in state court on September 29, 2017. 1 In her Complaint, Plaintiff referenced
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), a federal statute, as a
potential ground for a breach in Defendant IHC’s duty of care. 2 Defendant filed a Notice of
1
Docket No. 2 Ex. A.
2
Id. ¶ 21(f).
1
Removal on October 19, 2017, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 3
In November, Plaintiff amended her Complaint to remove any reference to EMTALA. 4 Plaintiff
then filed this Motion to Remand. 5
II.
DISCUSSION
Two issues are presented in the Motion to Remand and Defendant’s Response: whether a
federal question remains within the Amended Complaint and, if not, whether the Court is
stripped of its jurisdiction over the case because Plaintiff removed any reference to federal law.
A. FEDERAL QUESTION
Defendant asserts that although Plaintiff has omitted any reference to federal law in her
Amended Complaint, the substance and allegations of the initial Complaint remain unchanged. 6
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff continues to allege that doctors failed to properly respond
to an emergency medical condition, stabilize patient’s condition, and transport the patient. 7
Defendant argues that these requirements are regulated by EMTALA. 8 Because Plaintiff’s
allegations are substantially based on EMTALA’s protections, Defendant claims that the
Amended Complaint does arise under federal law. 9
3
Docket No. 2.
4
Docket No. 23.
5
Docket No. 27.
6
Docket No. 29, at 2.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 4.
9
Id.
2
Plaintiff claims that the sole cause of action in this case is medical malpractice under the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 10 Plaintiff states that EMTALA was only mentioned in the
original Complaint as a potential ground for breach of the standard care. 11 Because the Amended
Complaint removes any reference to EMTALA, Plaintiff argues there is no federal question to be
considered. 12 The fact that three potential grounds for breach correspond with EMTALA’s
requirements does not transform this cause of action from state to federal law. 13 Plaintiff points
out that claims for failures to treat, stabilize, and transport patients are not solely reserved for
EMTALA. 14 Thus, Plaintiff argues, a federal question does not remain in this case. 15
The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s position. Without a direct conflict, EMTALA does not
preempt state law. 16 Federal courts have oft held that state-law negligence claims do not directly
conflict with EMTALA’s purposes. 17 Claims for negligence in the treatment, stabilization, or
transport of patients, like those Plaintiff is asserting here, are actually not cognizable under
EMTALA 18 because its sole purpose is to stop the disparate treatment of uninsured patients. 19
10
Docket No. 27, at 2.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Docket No. 30, at 3–4.
14
Id. at 4.
15
Id.
16
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f).
17
See, e.g., Hardy v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792–93 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“EMTALA is not a substitute for state law on medical malpractice. . . . Congress never intended
to displace state malpractice law. This intent to supplement, but not supplant, state tort law is
evident in EMTALA’s limited preemption provision.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
18
Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
that claims for screening misdiagnosis are not cognizable under EMTALA); Vickers v. Nash
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that claims for negligent stabilization
3
Here, Plaintiff is only seeking recovery under state law because she claims negligence in
her treatment, stabilization, and transport. Her sole cause of action is for “Medical
Malpractice.” 20 A claim under EMTALA would require additional allegations that she was
treated differently than other covered patients within their insurance plans. 21 The original
Complaint’s mention of EMTALA appears as if it was only stated as a potential ground for
breach of the standard care, rather than asserting a separate claim under EMTALA. This is not to
say that federal question jurisdiction was improperly invoked in this case’s removal, but no
federal claims remain.
B. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Plaintiff contends that without a federal question in the Amended Complaint, the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the case must be remanded under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 22
Defendant responds that because federal jurisdiction was properly invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) at removal, this Court maintains subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 23
of patients is left to state malpractice law); Fraticelli-Torres v. Hosp. Hermanos, 300 F. App’x 1,
7 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a negligent medical decision in the transfer of a patient cannot
constitute an EMTALA anti-dumping violation.).
19
Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996)
(“EMTALA is a limited “anti-dumping” statute, not a federal malpractice statute.”); Power v.
Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994) (“EMTALA is not a substitute for state
law malpractice actions, and was not intended to guarantee proper diagnosis or to provide a
federal remedy for misdiagnosis or medical negligence.”).
20
Docket No. 23, at 5.
21
Romar ex rel. Romar v. Fresno Cmty. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187
(E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The key is whether Plaintiff was treated differently, it is not whether
[Defendant] breached the standard of professional medical care, i.e. did not act like a reasonable
hospital under the circumstances.”).
22
Docket No. 27, at 2.
23
Docket No. 29, at 3.
4
On this issue, Defendant’s argument prevails but not for the stated reasons. When federal
claims are dismissed, resolved, or omitted in amended complaints, the Court retains subject
matter jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and (c). 24 It is
therefore up to the Court’s discretion whether to exercise this supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims or remand. 25 In a Tenth Circuit case upholding this principal, the court held that,
where the only federal claim had been dismissed, the court “retained subject matter jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims . . . [and] possessed the discretion to either retain or remand
those claims pursuant to § 1367(c).” 26 Therefore, this Court’s decision to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over this case is “purely discretionary.” 27 However, the Tenth Circuit has suggested
“[w]hen all federal claims have been dismissed, the court . . . usually should[] decline to exercise
jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.” 28 Having considered the relevant factors, 29 the
Court will decline to exercise its discretion over Plaintiff’s remaining claim and will remand this
matter to state court.
24
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009).
25
Id. at 640.
26
Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 412 F. App’x 74, 77–79 (10th Cir. 2011).
27
Toone v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 716 F.3d 516, 524 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 556 U.S. at 639).
28
Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. City
of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998)).
29
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (“[A] federal court should
consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction
over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims.”).
5
III.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Docket No. 27) is GRANTED. The
Clerk of the Court is directed to remand this case to the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
DATED this 15th day of February, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
Ted Stewart
United States District Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?