Ainsworth v. State of Utah
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER: It is therefore ordered that the petition for writ of habeas corpus 3 is DENIED and the action Dismissed with prejudice. It is also ordered that a certificate of appealability is DENIED. This action is closed. Signed by Judge Robert J. Shelby on 03/10/2021. (kpf) Modified to correct spelling on 3/10/2021 (kpf).
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.860 Page 1 of 9
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
THOMAS RANDALL AINSWORTH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
& ORDER DENYING
HABEAS-CORPUS PETITION
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 2:17-CV-1205-RJS
WARDEN BENZON,
Chief District Judge Robert J. Shelby
Respondent.
In this federal habeas-corpus case, inmate Thomas Randall Ainsworth attacks his state
conviction. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2020). Having carefully considered all relevant documents and
law, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not surmounted the federal habeas standard of
review. The petition is therefore denied.
BACKGROUND
On Christmas Eve 2011, [Petitioner] drove his car over a
median and crashed head-on into another vehicle. An 18-monthold boy was killed and both of his parents were seriously injured in
the accident.
Ainsworth had methamphetamine in his system at the time of
the accident. He was charged with three counts of causing
substantial bodily injury or death while negligently driving a car
with a measurable amount of a Schedule II controlled substance in
his body. The charged offenses were second degree felonies
under Utah Code section 58-37-8(2).
State v. Ainsworth, 2017 UT 60, ¶¶ 5-6.
Utah Code fixes two sets of violations for motorists who, having ingested alcohol or
drugs, cause death or serious bodily injury to another. Under DUI sections, it is a third-degree
felony to kill or seriously injure someone when under the influence of alcohol or any drug "to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a1
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.861 Page 2 of 9
502(1)(b) (2021); id. § 41-6a-503(2) (designating as third-degree felony infliction of serious
bodily injury when operating vehicle in negligent manner and violating § 502); id. § 76-5207(2) (designating as third-degree felony causation of death of another by operating motor
vehicle in negligent manner and under influence of alcohol or any drug rendering person
incapable of safely operating vehicle). Meanwhile, the "measurable substance" sections establish
an analogous offense--i.e., it is a second-degree felony to cause death or serious bodily injury
with any "measurable" amount of a Schedule I or Schedule II drug in the driver's body. Id. § 416a-517 (defining elements of measurable-substance offense); id. § 58-37-8(2)(h) (designating as
second-degree felony operation of vehicle in negligent manner while knowingly and
intentionally having measurable amount of Schedule I or Schedule II substance in person's body
and killing or seriously injuring another).
In the Utah Supreme Court, Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged these sections’
constitutionality. Ainsworth, 2017 UT 60. He had been convicted of three second-degree felonies
under measurable-substance sections, but argued constitutional grounds existed for reducing
each charge to a third-degree felony under DUI sections. Id. ¶ 2. The supreme court upheld the
constitutionality of the legislature’s classification of Petitioner’s offenses as second-degree
felonies under the measurable-substance statute. Id. ¶ 4.
PETITIONER’S ASSERTED GROUND FOR FEDERAL-HABEAS RELIEF
Petitioner urges that the second-degree-felony designation in the measurable-amount
statute--as it differs from the third-degree-felony designation in the DUI statute--violates his
substantive due-process rights because it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
(ECF No. 12, at 5.) This is a purely legal issue.
2
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.862 Page 3 of 9
MERITS ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review to be applied in federal habeas cases is found in § 2254, under
which this habeas petition is filed, stating in relevant part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .
28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d) (2021).
This "highly deferential standard," Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 824 (10th Cir.
2013), is "’difficult to meet,' because [the statute’s] purpose is to ensure that federal habeas relief
functions as a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ and not
as a means of error correction.” Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quoting Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-103 (2011) (citation omitted)). This Court is not to determine whether
the supreme court’s decisions were correct or whether this Court may have reached a different
outcome. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). "The role of federal habeas
proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and
limited.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). And, "[t]he petitioner carries the burden
of proof.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.
Under Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), the first step is determining whether
clearly established federal law exists relevant to Petitioner’s claims. House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d
1010, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Littlejohn, 704 F.3d at 825. Only after answering yes to
3
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.863 Page 4 of 9
that "threshold question" may the Court go on to "ask whether the state court decision is either
contrary to or an unreasonable application of such law.” Id. at 1018.
[C]learly established [federal] law consists of Supreme Court
holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or
similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need
not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual
context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal
rule to that context.
Id. at 1016.
Further, "in ascertaining the contours of clearly established law, we must look to the
'holdings as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the
relevant state-court decision.’” Littlejohn, 704 F.3d at 825 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Fairchild v. Trammel,
784 F.3d 702, 710 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating “Supreme Court holdings ‘must be construed
narrowly and consist only of something akin to on-point holdings’” (quoting House, 527 F.3d at
1015)). And, in deciding whether relevant clearly established federal law exists, this Court is not
restricted by the state court's analysis. See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal
courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the
basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003)
("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor
the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).
If that threshold is overcome, this Court may grant habeas relief only when the state
court has "unreasonably applied the governing legal principle to the facts of the petitioner's
case.” Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)). This deferential standard does not let a federal habeas court issue a
writ merely because it determines on its own that the state-court decision erroneously applied
4
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.864 Page 5 of 9
clearly established federal law. See id. "'Rather that application must also be unreasonable.'” Id.
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). Indeed, "'an unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law.'” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100 (emphasis
in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).
This highly demanding standard means to pose a sizable obstacle to habeas petitioners.
Id. at 786. Section 2254(d) "stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation
of claims already rejected in state proceedings.” Id. It maintains power to issue the writ when no
possibility exists that "fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts
with th[e Supreme] Court's precedents. It goes no farther.” Id. To prevail in federal court, "a state
prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was
so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. It is against this
backdrop that the Court now applies the standard of review here.
B. Due Process Argument
Though Petitioner bears the burden of showing the Utah Supreme Court’s analysis does
not pass the federal standard of review, the way Petitioner framed his argument completely
ignores the standard of review. Petitioner’s ground for relief would accurately reflect the
standard of review if it were restyled as follows: Was the Utah Supreme Court’s decision (that
the second-degree-felony designation in the measurable-amount statute--as it differs from the
third-degree-felony designation in the DUI statute--did not violate his substantive due-process
rights because it was rationally related to a legitimate state interest) “contrary to, or involv[ing]
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States”?
5
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.865 Page 6 of 9
Because Petitioner did not acknowledge the standard of review, he did not even begin to
meet his burden to show that the Utah Supreme Court applied the wrong United States Supreme
Court precedent and/or unreasonably applied that precedent. He similarly missed the chance
before the Utah Supreme Court to flesh out his federal due-process argument. As the supreme
court put it:
Ainsworth also vaguely asserts a due process basis for his
challenge. But he does not identify a distinct basis in the Due
Process Clause for his constitutional challenge. His briefing just
recasts his uniform operation arguments in due process terms-asserting that the measurable substance classification falls short
under the Due Process Clause because there is no rational basis for
punishing the (purportedly lesser) measurable substance offense
more harshly than the DUI offense. For that reason we do not treat
the due process claim separately in this opinion. We treat it as
Ainsworth does--as a mere restatement of the uniform operation
challenge--and reject it for reasons set forth below.
Ainsworth, at ¶ 15 n.3. The Court thus reviews the supreme court’s rational-basis analysis of the
Utah Code’s measurable-substance provisions under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause,
Utah Const. art. I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”), as
including a rational-basis analysis under the Federal Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”).
The narrow question before the Utah Supreme Court was whether there was a “rational
basis for punishing individuals who have any measurable amount of controlled substance in their
bodies more harshly than individuals who have an incapacitating amount of the substance in
their bodies." Ainsworth, at ¶ 18 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Remembering that review is tightly restricted by the federal habeas standard of review,
this Court observes that Petitioner concedes that the Utah Supreme Court selected the correct
6
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.866 Page 7 of 9
governing legal principle with which to analyze this alleged due-process issue: the rational-basis
standard. (ECF No. 12, at 5 (arguing due-process rights violated because measurable-amount
statute “is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest”)); see United States v. Comstock,
560 U.S. 126, 151 (2010) (“The phrase ‘rational basis’ most often is employed to describe the
standard for determining whether legislation that does not proscribe fundamental liberties
nonetheless violates the Due Process Clause. Referring to this due process inquiry, and in what
must be one of the most deferential formulations of the standard for reviewing legislation in all
the Court's precedents, the Court has said: ‘But the law need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way
to correct it.’ Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488 (1955).”).
The Utah Supreme Court set forth its rational-basis analysis regarding Petitioner’s issue
as follows:
[W]e see a rational basis for this classification. It is true that the
measurable substance provisions do not require proof of an
"incapacitating amount" of a drug; "any measurable amount" is
sufficient. Id. ¶ 9. But the measurable substance provisions require
an element not required under the DUI laws: A second degree
felony is established under the measurable substance provisions
only upon a showing that the drug in question is a Schedule I or II
substance. See Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(h). The DUI provisions are
different. They are triggered by the use of alcohol or any drug. See
id. § 41-6a-502(1)(b); id. § 76-5-207(2). And the legislature
obviously deemed that difference significant. It was so concerned
about the use of Schedule I or II drugs by drivers that it deemed
that element enough to bump the offense level to a second degree
felony (even in cases in which there is no showing of actual
impairment).
We see nothing irrational in that decision. Schedule I and II
drugs are those viewed as having a greater potential for abuse and
a greater risk of dependence than other controlled substances. See
Utah Code § 58-38a-204(1)-(5); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11-1308.15.
That concern can certainly sustain a rational decision by the
7
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.867 Page 8 of 9
legislature to punish the use of these substances more harshly than
the use of other substances. See State v. Outzen, 2017 UT 30, ¶ 23,
408 P.3d 334 (upholding Utah Code section 41-6a-517 against
similar constitutional attack; concluding that classification treating
those with a valid prescription differently may be understood to
"promote[] public safety by discouraging individuals who have
ingested controlled substances from operating motor vehicles and
creating potentially dangerous driving conditions"). And that is
sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of this statutory scheme.
Ainsworth, at ¶¶ 19-20.
At this point, Petitioner has not met his burden of finding on-point United States Supreme
Court precedent and arguing that the Utah Supreme Court unreasonably applied it. The Court
therefore denies habeas-corpus relief.
The Court notes that the Supreme Court has described rational-basis review as “highly
permissive,” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017); and, “one of the most deferential
formulations of the standard for reviewing legislation in all the Court's precedents,” Comstock,
560 U.S. at 151. This emphasizes the significant challenge Petitioner would have had if he had
actually tried to show the Utah Supreme Court unreasonably applied on-point United States
Supreme Court precedent. And, it bears noting the Court itself searched for on-point United
States Supreme Court precedent to assess whether Utah Supreme Court unreasonably applied the
rational-basis analysis. The Court found nothing on-point.
8
Case 2:17-cv-01205-RJS Document 31 Filed 03/10/21 PageID.868 Page 9 of 9
CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s claim does not hurdle the federal habeas standard of review.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED
and the action DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
This action is CLOSED.
DATED this 10th of March, 2021.
BY THE COURT
________________________________________
CHIEF JUDGE ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Court
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?