Kosti v. University of Utah Health Clinic

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements set forth in the authorities referenced in this Order on or before May 22, 2020. Failure to do so will result in a recommendation to Judge Kimball that this action be dismissed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 4/22/2020. (eat)

Case 2:18-cv-00421-DAK-PMW Document 5 Filed 04/22/20 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

KADEN STEPHAN KOSTI,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:18-cv-00421-DAK-PMW

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HEALTH
CLINIC,
Defendant.

District Judge Dale A. Kimball
Chief Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner

District Judge Dale A. Kimball referred this case to Chief Magistrate Judge Paul M.
Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 1 At the outset, the court notes that Plaintiff Kaden
Stephan Kosti (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se in this case. Consequently, the court will
construe Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183,
1187 (10th Cir. 2003). The court also notes that Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (“IFP Statute”). 2 Before the court is the review of Plaintiff’s
complaint3 under the authority of the IFP Statute.

1

See ECF no. 4.

2

See ECF no. 2.

3

See ECF no. 3.

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Whenever the court authorizes a party to proceed without payment of fees under the IFP
Statute, the court is required to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for relief under the IFP Statute, the
court employs the same standard used for analyzing motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d
1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). Under that standard, the court “look[s] for plausibility in th[e]
complaint.” Id. at 1218 (quotations and citations omitted) (second alteration in original). More
specifically, the court “look[s] to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether
they plausibly support a legal claim for relief. Rather than adjudging whether a claim is
‘improbable,’ ‘[f]actual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007)) (other quotations and citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original).
In undertaking that analysis, the court is mindful that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
that “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th
Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Ledbetter, 318 F.3d at 1187. At the same time, however, it is not “the
proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant,”
Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110, and the court “will not supply additional facts, nor will [it] construct a
legal theory for [a pro se] plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Dunn v.
White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Further,

2

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[t]he broad reading of [a pro se] plaintiff’s complaint does not
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on
which a recognized legal claim could be based. . . . [C]onclusory
allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to
state a claim on which relief can be based. This is so because a pro
se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if
the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which
relief can be granted. Moreover, in analyzing the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s complaint, the court need accept as true only the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory
allegations.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110 (citations omitted).
Even when the court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint, the court concludes that
Plaintiff has failed to provide enough well-pleaded factual allegations to support the claims for
relief alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff’s nearly illegible complaint provides only conclusory
allegations and fails to provide any sufficiently detailed factual allegations that would allow the
court to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims should survive dismissal.
For those reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s current complaint fails to state
claims upon which relief can be granted. At the same time, the court recognizes that “[d]ismissal
of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the
plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an
opportunity to amend.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly,
Plaintiff is hereby provided with an opportunity to amend the current complaint in this action.
Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements set forth in the

3

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above-referenced authorities on or before May 22, 2020. Failure to do so will result in a
recommendation to Judge Kimball that this action be dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2020.
BY THE COURT:

PAUL M. WARNER
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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