Alcaraz v. Helton et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dismissing case without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Signed by Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead on 11/14/2023. (alf)

IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
ADRIANNA ALCARAZ,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER

vs.

Case No. 2:23-cv-00631

VIVIANA HELTON and MONTY
HELTON,

Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead

Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Adrianna Alcaraz, proceeding in forma pauperis and without counsel, filed this
action against Viviana Helton and Monty Helton. 1
After screening Alcaraz’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and identifying
deficiencies, the court permitted Plaintiff to address those deficiencies and file an amended
complaint by November 17, 2023. 2 On October 27, 2023, Alcaraz filed her Amended
Complaint. 3 Upon review, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to correct the deficiencies
identified in the initial pleading and, for the reasons set forth herein, is dismissed for failure to
state a claim.

1

ECF No. 5, Complaint.

2

ECF No. 9, Memorandum Decision and Order Allowing Plaintiff to File Amended Complaint.

1

LEGAL STANDARDS
Whenever a court authorizes a party to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must review
the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 4 Under this statute, the court must dismiss the case if it
determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 5 In making this
determination, the court employs the standard for analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 To avoid dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” 7 The court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true, viewing them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor. 8 But the court need not accept a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true. 9 “[A] plaintiff
must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.” 10
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her filings are liberally construed and held “to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 11 Still, pro se plaintiffs must
3

ECF No. 10, Amended Complaint.

4

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

5

Id.

6

Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).

7

Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
8

Wilson v. Montana, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).

9

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

10

Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collings, 656 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2011).

11

Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

2

“follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” 12 For instance, a pro se plaintiff
“still has the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be
based.” 13
While the court must make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper
legal authority, [her] confusion of various legal theories, [her] poor syntax and sentence
construction, or [her] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,” 14 the court “will not supply
additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a
plaintiff’s behalf.” 15
DISCUSSION
Although Alcaraz utilized the court-approved form to file her amended pleading, upon
review, the court remains unable to: (1) determine the nature of Plaintiff’s claims; or (2)
determine if Defendants acted under color of state law.
Alcaraz’s amended pleading asserts federal question jurisdiction and generically states a
claim for a “Civil right[s]” and “Tentent [sic] Rights” violations. 16 Plaintiff further identifies
Defendants Viviana Helton and Monty Helton (collectively “Defendants’) as citizens of the State
of Utah who reside in West Valley City and are employed as a “Processing Operator” and

12

Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).

13

Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

14

Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

15

Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
16

ECF No. 10 at 3.

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“CSR”. 17
To state a valid civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 the plaintiff must allege that
“(a) some person has deprived him of a federally protected right, and (b) the person who has
deprived him that right acted under color of state law.” 19 If both of these “elements are not
alleged, the complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983.” 20 Here, Alcaraz’s amended pleading
alleges neither. Nowhere in the amended complaint does Plaintiff indicate what federally
protected civil rights were violated. Plaintiff’s grievances alone do not create the violation of a
federal right and the court is not required to speculate as to which civil rights Alcaraz contends
may have been violated. In turn, Alcaraz fails to explain how the Defendants violated her rights
while acting under “color of law”. Plaintiff mentions an “assault” and “trespass”, but does not
provide any connection between these actions, the Defendants and the state. Generally, “[p]urely
private acts which are not furthered by an actual or purported state authority are not acts under
color of state law.” 21

17

Id. at 2.

18

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. To state a valid claim for

conspiracy, “a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action
amongst the defendants.” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998)
(discussing conspiracy under § 1983).
19

Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1991).

20

Edward v. Shanelec, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21175 at * 8 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 1998).

21

Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 493 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42

F.3d 809, 816 (3rd Cir. 1994)); see also Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Section 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or

4

The duty to liberally construe pro se complaints “does not require a court to conjure
allegations on a litigant’s behalf” 22 and the court will not manufacture a civil rights claim for
Plaintiff. 23 Further, the court previously identified deficiencies in Plaintiff’s original complaint
and ordered her to amend. However, Alcaraz’s amended pleading fails to state a claim for relief
and therefore dismissal is appropriate. 24 the court previously identified the deficiencies set forth
above and ordered Plaintiff to amend her complaint. Plaintiff failed to do so and therefore

wrong”)). Under certain circumstances, a private individual may be liable under § 1983 for a
constitutional violation, but “a plaintiff must show . . . that the individual’s conduct is ‘fairly
attributable to the State.” Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1465 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982)).
22

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Erwin v Edwards, 22 F. Appx

579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001)).
23

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[A] liberal

interpretation of a . . . civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of [a] claim that
were not initially pled”) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
24

Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for

failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the
facts [s]he has alleged and it would be futile to give h[er] an opportunity to amend”).

5

ORDER
Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim this action is
DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
DATED this 14th day of November 2023.
BY THE COURT
________________________________
DUSTIN B. PEAD
Magistrate Judge
United States District Court

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