Callahan v. Callahan et al
Filing
8
OPINION and ORDER granting 6 Unopposed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Senior Judge J. Garvan Murtha on 5/23/2011. (kak)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
James Callahan,
Plaintiff,
v.
Leesa L. Callahan,
Does I-X, inclusive,
Roe Corps I-X, inclusive,
Defendants.
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File No. 1:10-cv-141-jgm
OPINION AND ORDER
(Doc. 6)
Plaintiff James Callahan, proceeding pro se, brings this
action asking the Court to set aside or modify a state court
divorce judgment.
Specifically, Mr. Callahan claims the current
distribution of his military pension violates federal law and,
therefore, needs to be revised.
He also claims the state court
judgment violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 522 (“SCRA”) because it was entered while he was on active
duty.
Defendant Leesa Callahan, Plaintiff’s ex-wife, has moved to
dismiss the Complaint, arguing (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) the state court had
jurisdiction to issue the final divorce order; (3) the state
court’s action did not violate the SCRA, and (4) the divorce
order did not violate federal law, since it was the result of an
agreement between the parties.
unopposed.
The motion to dismiss is
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is
GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Factual Background
Mr. Callahan is a career Air Force officer who retired from
active duty in August 2006.
Callahan v. Callahan, 958 A.2d 673,
674 (Vt. 2008) (“Callahan I”).
The Callahans first married in
1990, and had three children during the marriage.
Id.
They
divorced in April 1997, but remarried three months later.
(Doc.
1 at 2.)
In August 1997, Mr. Callahan was deployed to South Korea for
a two-year command position.
Callahan I, 958 A.2d at 674.
He
alleges in his Complaint that in May 1998, his wife, “claiming
she was unhappy and wanted to pursue a nursing career,” moved
back to the United States with the children and settled in
Vermont.
(Doc. 1 at 2.)
In August 1998, Mrs. Callahan wrote to her husband and
informed him that she wanted a divorce.
The letter allegedly
proposed terms similar to those the couple had agreed to in their
first divorce, including Mr. Callahan retaining his full military
pension. (Id.)
The final divorce stipulation, however, provided
that Mrs. Callahan would receive twenty-five percent of her
husband’s monthly pension upon his retirement from the military.
(Id.)
Mr. Callahan signed the stipulation in May 1999.
I, 958 A.2d at 674.
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Callahan
The stipulation was not immediately endorsed by the state
court.
In November 1999, prior to final hearing, Mr. Callahan,
through his attorney,
moved to set aside the terms of the stipulation,
arguing that he was not represented at the time he
signed the agreement, and that he would not have agreed
to its terms if he had known that [his] wife was living
with another man and was pregnant with the man’s child.
The court denied the motion on the grounds that he had
an opportunity to consult with counsel prior to signing
the stipulation and did not establish any legal basis
for setting the stipulation aside.
Id. at 674-75.
The state court entered a final divorce order,
incorporating the terms of the stipulation, on January 28, 2000.
There was no appeal.
Id. at 675.
Upon Mr. Callahan’s retirement in 2006, a dispute arose
regarding the payment of his pension benefits.
When Mrs.
Callahan filed a motion to enforce that provision of the divorce
order, arguing she was entitled to twenty-five percent of her exhusband’s gross retirement pay, Mr. Callahan moved pro se to
clarify or modify the judgment.
Id.
He subsequently filed a
second motion, through counsel, for relief from judgment under
Vt. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming “he was ignorant of the pension
provision until he received a copy of the final order in March
2006,” and he had relied on Mrs. Callahan’s “representations that
the stipulation was the same as the Nevada divorce settlement at
the time he signed the document.”
Id.
The court denied the
motion, finding that it has not been filed within a “reasonable
3
time” as required under Rule 60(b), and granted Mrs. Callahan’s
motion to enforce.
Mr. Callahan filed a direct appeal.
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed that seven years
was an unreasonable delay.
Id. at 676.
The court specifically
cited the trial court’s determination that Mr. Callahan “had
ample opportunity to challenge [the pension provision] both
before and after it was incorporated into the final order –
either by filing a timely appeal, or by filing the motion to
reopen in March 2006, when [Mrs. Callahan] began inquiring about
the impending retirement payments . . . . “
Id. at 676.
The court also reviewed the merits of Mr. Callahan’s claims.
First, the court determined the lower court had acted within its
discretion in 1999 when it denied a hearing on Mr. Callahan’s
motion to set aside the divorce stipulation.
The Court next
affirmed the interpretation of the term “Air Force Pension” to
mean Mr. Callahan’s retirement pay.
This interpretation is, in
part, the basis for Mr. Callahan’s filing in federal court.
Mr. Callahan argued in state court that an ex-spouse’s
interest in military retirement pay is limited to a share of
“disposable retired pay” pursuant to the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses’ Protection Act (Act), 10 U.S.C. § 1408
(“USFSPA”).
The Vermont Supreme Court acknowledged this
limitation, but held that the parties could contract otherwise,
and were not “required to use the precise, federally defined term
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of art, ‘disposable retired pay,’ to effectuate a legally binding
agreement that in plain terms requires husband to pay a portion
of his retirement pay to [his] wife.”
Id. at 677.
To the extent
Mr. Callahan specifically contested the division of his gross
income, as opposed to his retirement pay after certain deductions
as set forth in the USFSPA, the court stated that the effect of
the USFSPA was not “adequately briefed,” and thus did not address
the question.
Id. at 678 n.*.
The Vermont Supreme Court further rejected Mr. Callahan’s
claim that his wife’s alleged misrepresentations about the
contents of the stipulation entitled him to equitable estoppel,
and his claim that the family court was authorized to award only
that portion of his retirement pay attributable to the years in
which he was married.
Finally, the court declined to consider
whether the Rule 60(b) filing period was tolled by the SCRA,
since that issue had not been argued below.
Id. at 677-78.
“Furthermore,” the court held, “husband cannot prevail on the
merits of his 60(b)(6) motion, even if we were to determine that
the motion was timely filed, and therefore we need not consider
his tolling argument.”
Id. at 678.
After his appeal was denied, Mr. Callahan moved the family
court to clarify the question of whether his ex-wife was limited
to twenty-five percent of his retirement pay after certain
deductions.
The family court denied the motion, ruling that the
5
issue had already been decided by the Vermont Supreme Court, and
was, therefore, the “law of the case.”
Mr. Callahan appealed,
and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground.
Callahan v. Callahan, No. 2009-117, slip op. at 1-2 (Vt. Aug.
Term 2009) (“Callahan II”).
Mr. Callahan filed his Complaint in this Court on June 14,
2010.
He claims the state court’s divorce order violates federal
law, and that “[t]he Vermont Supreme Court refused to entertain
the matter.”
(Doc. 1 at 3.)
He also claims Vermont lacked
personal jurisdiction over him, and that he should have been
protected from “legal action” by the SCRA.
For relief, he asks
that “the divorce decree be set aside due to lack of
jurisdiction, due to the Soldiers and Sailors Act and or
Servicemembers Civil Act; or in the alternative, that any
division of military pension be based upon [Mansell v. Mansell,
490 U.S. 581 (1989)]1, and not on the gross proceeds of
Plaintiff’s pension.”
(Doc. 1 at 4.)
Mrs. Callahan, through counsel, has moved to dismiss,
arguing first that this Court is jurisdictionally barred under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from reviewing the family court
judgment.
She also argues that Mr. Callahan had to affirmatively
1
In Mansell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the former
Spouses’ Protection Act does not grant state courts the power to treat
as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has
been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.” 490 U.S. at
594-95.
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invoke the protections of the SCRA, and failed to do so.
Finally, Mrs. Callahan contends that the divorce decree was
valid, as it reflected the agreement of the parties.
Discussion
“Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal district courts
lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from
state-court judgments.”
Phillips ex rel. Green v. City of New
York, 453 F. Supp. 2d 690, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see generally D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923).
This is because Congress has vested
only the United States Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review
state court decisions.
28 U.S.C. § 1257.
The Supreme Court has recently underscored that
Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow doctrine.”
459, 464 (2006) (per curiam).
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.
It deprives district courts of
subject matter jurisdiction only in “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005).
After Exxon Mobil, the Second Circuit reexamined
Rooker–Feldman and made clear that
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there are four requirements that must be met before the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies: “First, the
federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court.
Second, the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused
by a state-court judgment. Third, the plaintiff must
invite district court review and rejection of that
judgment. Fourth, the state-court judgment must have
been rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced - i.e., Rooker–Feldman has no application to
federal-court suits proceeding in parallel with ongoing
state-court litigation.”
Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009) (alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)).
The
first and fourth requirements are “procedural,” while the second
and third requirements are “substantive.”
85.
Hoblock, 422 F.3d at
If a claim meets all four requirements, the Court will
dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
When analyzing a
jurisdictional argument, the Court may look at evidence extrinsic
to the pleadings.
See Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49,
55 (2d Cir. 2002); Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006,
1011 (2d Cir. 1986).
Mr. Callahan’s claims in this case meet all four
requirements for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
First, it is plain that Mr. Callahan was a “state court loser.”
Initially, he was unsuccessful in his effort to have the divorce
stipulation set aside prior to the entry of a final judgment.
His subsequent efforts to re-open the judgment and to have the
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pension question clarified were equally futile, both in the trial
courts and on appeal.
Second, Mr. Callahan complains of injuries caused by the
state courts.
Although he initially agreed to the terms set
forth in the divorce stipulation, Mr. Callahan subsequently
fought to have it set aside after he learned additional details
about his wife’s living situation.
The Second Circuit has held
that a plaintiff’s injuries are not “caused by a state court
judgment” when the state court “simply ratified, acquiesced in,
or left unpunished” the actions of a third party.
F.3d at 85.
Hoblock, 422
Here, the state courts did not simply ratify the
parties’ stipulation, instead refusing to set it aside prior to
judgment, and subsequently denying Mr. Callahan’s efforts to have
the divorce judgment re-opened.
Third, Mr. Callahan is asking this Court to revisit and
either vacate or revise the state court judgment.
His prayer for
relief specifically asks the Court to “set aside” the divorce
decree due to lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to
order a revision to the pension distribution provision.
As the
Supreme Court stated in Exxon Mobil, “[a]mong federal courts, the
Rooker Court clarified, Congress had empowered only [the Supreme]
Court to exercise appellate authority ‘to reverse or modify’ a
state-court judgment.”
544 U.S. at 284 (quoting Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)).
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Fourth, and
finally, the state court judgment was “rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced.”
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at
284.
Mr. Callahan claims this Court must undertake the pension
question because it involves a question of federal law.
The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, is not limited to “state court
judgments based solely on state law.
Even if the federal court
collateral attack . . . is premised on . . . a federal statute,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.”
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d
464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that to adjust monetary award
to ex-spouse under USFSPA “would be to collaterally review[] and
reverse[] [the state court’s judgment] in federal court, which is
precisely what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine exists to prevent.”);
see also Ashby v. Polinsky, 328 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2009)
(Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Section 1983 action brought in
response to state court foreclosure order).
The Court therefore
finds that, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Callahan’s claim.
Furthermore, Mr. Callahan’s efforts to attack the state
court judgments on jurisdictional grounds are without merit.
His
first argument is the Vermont courts lacked jurisdiction over his
person.
There is no indication in the Complaint or elsewhere
that he raised this claim in the state courts.
Moreover, courts
have held that “no exception to the Rooker/Feldman doctrine
10
exists when there is a challenge to the state court’s personal
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.”
In re Salem, 290
B.R. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Schmitt v. Schmitt, 165 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Lubben v. Selective Serv.
Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972)).
Mr. Callahan also argues that under the SCRA, the divorce
action should not have proceeded while he was on active duty
overseas.2
The relevant provision in the SCRA states that when a
plaintiff or defendant is in military service and has received
notice of the action or proceeding, the court “may on its own
motion and shall, upon application by the servicemember, stay the
action for a period of not less than 90 days . . . .”
app. § 522(b).
50 U.S.C.
It is clear from the record that Mr. Callahan had
notice of the divorce proceeding, yet there is no indication he
ever moved for a stay under the SCRA.
Indeed, the only SCRA
issue mentioned in the state court decisions was a claim by Mr.
Callahan, raised for the first time on appeal, that the statutory
period for bringing a Rule 60(b) motion should have been tolled
pursuant to the SCRA.
Callahan I, 958 A.2d at 678.
As the state
court was not compelled to issue a stay absent a request from Mr.
2
Mr. Callahan references both the SCRA and the “Federal
Soldiers and Sailors Act (SSCRA).” (Doc. 1 at 3.) The SSCRA,
commonly known as the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940,
was the statutory predecessor to the SCRA. Cronin v. United States,
2011 WL 1204717, at *5 n.9 (Fed. Cl. March 31, 2011).
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Callahan, belated reliance upon the SCRA does not authorize
voiding the state court judgment.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction either to revoke or revise the state court’s
divorce judgment.
Mrs. Callahan’s unopposed motion to dismiss
(Doc. 6) is therefore GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
Dated at Brattleboro, in the District of Vermont, this 23rd
day of May, 2011.
/s/ J. Garvan Murtha
Honorable J. Garvan Murtha
Senior United States District Judge
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