Chandler v. Johnson et al
Filing
12
OPINION and ORDER granting Defendants' 8 Motion to Dismiss; denying Plaintiff's 2 Motion to Disqualify Judge and 10 Motion for Default Judgment. This case is DISMISSED. Signed by District Judge J. Garvan Murtha on 3/21/2012. (kak)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Charles Chandler,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
v.
Denise Johnson, Marilyn
Skoglund, and Brian
Burgess,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:11-cv-166-jgm
OPINION AND ORDER
(Docs. 2, 8 and 10)
Plaintiff Charles Chandler, proceeding pro se, brings this
action claiming judicial and criminal misconduct by three
Justices of the Vermont Supreme Court.
Pending before the Court
is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, in which they argue lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
and failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
(Doc. 8.)
Also before the Court are Chandler’s motion to
disqualify “Judge Murtha in the above Docketed case,” and his
motion for a default judgment.
(Docs. 2, 10.)
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED, Chandler’s motions to disqualify
(Doc. 2) and for default judgment (Doc. 10) are DENIED, and this
case is DISMISSED.
Factual Background
The Complaint alleges that Vermont Supreme Court Justices
Denise Johnson, Marilyn Skoglund and Brian Burgess participated
in an “unlawful[] scheme” to violate Chandler’s civil rights and
commit criminal acts.
Defendants each signed an Entry Order,
dated March 18, 2011, denying Chandler’s request for a stay of
his criminal sentence.
(Doc. 8-2.)
In a previous Order, the
Vermont Supreme Court had affirmed Chandler’s conviction on a
charge of hindering an officer.
See State v. Chandler, No. 2010-
135 (Vt. Jan. 21, 2011) (unpublished) (Doc. 8-1.)
In the instant case, Chandler alleges he informed Defendants
of a plot by lower court judges and others to “sabotage” his
criminal case.
(Doc. 1 at 3.)
He also claims he was “falsely
accused and convicted of crimes he never committed.”
Id.
When
Chandler raised his various arguments before the Vermont Supreme
Court, Defendants allegedly declined him any relief, and instead
“decided that they were going to gain valuable consideration . .
. and personal gain” by ruling against him.
Id.
The Complaint sets forth nine causes of action.
Several are
similar to claims Chandler has raised in previous federal
litigation, including allegations a judge ordered the state
police to commit armed robbery; Defendants interfered with his
right to petition the government for redress; his defense
attorney was improperly threatened by the trial judge; and the
2
actions taken against him constituted violations of the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).
See, e.g., Chandler v. Carroll, 2012 WL 252014, at *4 (D. Vt.
Jan. 26, 2012); Chandler v. Carroll, 2009 WL 2514428, at *1 (D.
Vt. Aug. 12, 2009).
Indeed, Chandler incorporates the complaint
from a prior case, Chandler v. Carroll, Case No. 2:11-cv-167, by
reference.
I.
Id. at 2.
Motion to Disqualify
The Court will first consider Chandler’s motion to
disqualify.
Chandler contends “[t]here is a history here where
preferential treatment is given to Attorneys in this Court by the
Presiding Judge Murtha and where Pro Se litigants are
discriminated against . . . .”
(Doc. 2 at 1.)
He claims his
previous cases before the Court were “disregard[ed] . . . as
frivolous no matter how serious the injuries,” and the Court is
motivated by its “unique relationship” with “the Defendants.”
Id.
For support, he cites the Court’s rulings in those cases,
including dismissals based upon judicial and prosecutorial
immunity.
Id. at 3.
Chandler further states “[i]t is unclear at
this point if Judge Murtha benefited [sic] financially from the
above defendant’s illegal acts,” but claims the Court “did
benefit in his career by protecting his friends/colleagues.”
Id.
Title 28, Section 455(a) requires a judge to “recuse himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
3
questioned.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
“The district judge has
discretion in the first instance to determine whether to
disqualify himself.”
In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir.
2008) (citation omitted).
In making this determination, the
judge must “carefully weigh the policy of promoting public
confidence in the judiciary against the possibility that those
questioning his impartiality might be seeking to avoid the
adverse consequences of his expected adverse decisions.”
Id.
The test focuses on “whether an objective, disinterested
observer, fully informed of the underlying facts, would entertain
significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.”
Id.
The scope of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) “is commonly limited to
those circumstances in which the alleged partiality stems from an
extrajudicial source.”
United States v. Carlton, 534 F.3d 97,
100 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “opinions
formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality
motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible.”
Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see LoCascio v. United States,
473 F.3d 493, 495-96 (2d Cir. 2007).
4
As a result, “[j]udicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.”
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
Chandler alleges the Court’s prior rulings have been
motivated by friendship, professional gain, and perhaps financial
reward.
His accusations of improper motives, however, are based
entirely upon speculation.
See United States v. Lovaglia, 954
F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Where a case . . . involves
remote, contingent, indirect or speculative interests,
disqualification is not required.”); Lamborn v. Dittmer, 726 F.
Supp. 510, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that court need not
accept as fact “mere conclusory speculation” that judge had
“special relationship” with plaintiff’s counsel).
Furthermore,
as set forth above, the legal grounds for the Court’s rulings are
not a basis for recusal, and are instead reviewable on appeal.
United States v. Sykes, 2008 WL 3049975, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 31,
2008) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554).
The motion to disqualify
(Doc. 2) is therefore DENIED.
II.
Motion for Default Judgment
The Court next considers Chandler’s motion for a default
judgment. (Doc. 10.)
The motion asserts “[t]he Defendants have
failed to respond to the complaint as required by rule.”
1.
Id. at
Two paragraphs later, however, the motion references
defendants’ motion to dismiss, characterizing it as “false,
misleading, and [m]oot.”
Id.
5
A defendant may assert its defenses to a complaint in a
motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
A timely Rule 12 motion suspends the
time for filing an answer.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4).
On
December 6, 2011, the Court issued an Order requiring Defendants
to file an answer or other appropriate response to the Complaint
on or before January 6, 2012.
(Doc. 6.)
On January 6, 2012,
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was timely, and
Chandler’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 10) is DENIED.
III.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that the Court
has no subject matter jurisdiction to review an Order issued by
the Vermont Supreme Court.
They also argue that they are
protected by absolute judicial immunity, and for application of
the Eleventh Amendment.
Aside from a brief reference in
Chandler’s motion for default judgment, the motion to dismiss is
unopposed.
To the extent Chandler is seeking review of the Vermont
Supreme Court’s ruling, his claims are indeed barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine,
cases “brought by [a] state-court loser [ ] complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
6
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments” are barred in federal
courts.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005).
In Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, the
Second Circuit set forth the following four requirements for
application of the doctrine: (1) plaintiff must have lost in
state court; (2) plaintiff complains of an injury caused by the
state court order; (3) plaintiff seeks a federal court’s review
of the state court’s process and rejection of the state court’s
determinations; and (4) the state court determinations in
question were rendered before the federal action was commenced.
422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005).
Here, Chandler lost in state court, and complains that the
Justices who issued the ruling caused him compensable injuries,
thereby satisfying the first two requirements for application of
Rooker-Feldman.
As to the third requirement, a ruling that the
Vermont Supreme Court’s decision was wrong, or wrongful, would
constitute a reversal of that court’s March 2011 determination.
Finally, it is plain the Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling preceded
Chandler’s commencement of the instant action in June 2011.
Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman applies, and this Court has no
subject matter jurisdiction to review the Entry Order in
question.
7
To the extent Chandler is seeking relief beyond review of
the Vermont Supreme Court’s Entry Order, Justices Johnson,
Burgess, and Skoglund are entitled to absolute judicial immunity
with respect to any claims for damages.
It is well settled that
judges are absolutely immune from suit for any actions taken
within the scope of their judicial responsibilities.
generally Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
See
“[I]t is a general
principle of the highest importance to the proper administration
of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”
Id.
at 10 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347
(1871)).
This immunity applies even against allegations that a
judge acted in bad faith or with malice.
Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
“In deciding whether absolute judicial immunity applies a
court should consider the nature of the act taken, namely whether
it is a function normally performed by a judge, and the
expectations of the parties, namely whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity.”
Arena v. Dep’t of Social Servs.
of Nassau Cnty., 216 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Judicial immunity may only be overcome if a plaintiff presents
(1) “non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s
judicial capacity;” or (2) “actions, though judicial in nature,
8
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Mireles, 502
U.S. at 11–12 (internal citations omitted).
There is no allegation in this case that Defendants acted in
“in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Id.
Furthermore,
it is plain from the Complaint that Defendants were acting
strictly in their judicial roles when denying Chandler’s request
for a stay of his sentence.
Accordingly, absolute judicial
immunity applies.
It is not clear from the Complaint whether Chandler is
seeking any sort of injunctive relief relevant to his claims of
judicial wrongdoing.
To the extent he seeks such relief, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 bars his claims absent an allegation that (1) there
has been a violation of a declaratory decree, or (2) that
declaratory relief was unavailable.
are no such claims in this case.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
There
Further, a request for
injunctive relief against Justice Johnson would be moot, as the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that she has retired.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
Finally, to the extent that Chandler is suing Defendants in
their official capacities as agents of the State of Vermont, his
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh
Amendment generally prohibits plaintiffs from recovering damages
from state officials in their official capacities.
See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d
9
93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (“a claim for damages against state
officials in their official capacity is considered to be a claim
against the State and is therefore barred by the Eleventh
Amendment”).
The only two exceptions to this general rule apply
when there has been an explicit and unequivocal waiver of
immunity by a state, or a similarly clear abrogation of the
immunity by Congress.
See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169; Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
Here, there has been no unequivocal waiver by the State of
Vermont.
In fact, Vermont has specifically preserved Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to tort claims brought against
the State.
See 12 V.S.A. § 5601(g).
It is also well settled
that Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity by
enacting Section 1983.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340–42
(1979).
In sum, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
review the Entry Order issued by Defendants.
Insofar as Chandler
is suing Defendants individually or in an official capacity, for
either monetary damages or injunctive relief, his claims are
barred by judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.
The
motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED, and Chandler’s claims are
DISMISSED.
10
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED, Chandler’s motions to disqualify
(Doc. 2) and for default judgment (Doc. 10) are DENIED, and this
case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Brattleboro, in the District of Vermont, this 21st
day of March, 2012.
/s/ J. Garvan Murtha
Honorable J. Garvan Murtha
United States District Judge
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?