Rishar v. United States Government et al

Filing 3

ORDER granting 1 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, case is DISMISSED. Signed by District Judge J. Garvan Murtha on 3/10/2014. (law)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
John Rishar,
Plaintiff,
v.
United States Government,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:14-cv-00032-jgm

OPINION AND ORDER
(Doc. 1)
Pro se plaintiff John Rishar moves to proceed in forma
paurperis against the United States Government, the State of
Vermont, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the State of Michigan,
the State of New Jersey, the State of New York, the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, the State of Ohio, the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and “their parties [and] privies.” (Docs. 1 and 1-2.)
Rishar’s proposed Complaint alleges “interference with my
personal profession” and unnamed “Constitutional violations” but
does not allege any set of facts in support of these claims (Doc.
1-2 at 3.)

Because the financial affidavit in support of the

motion meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
the reasons set forth below, this case is DISMISSED.

However, for

Discussion
Rishar’s four-page proposed Complaint states, “I sue
the defendants [f]or interference with my personal
profession (Foundation Press Torts Book) [and]
Constitutional violations.” (Doc. 1-2 at 3-4.)

Under the

heading, “Jurisdictional Averments,” Rishar also alleges,
“[t]he defendants have caused harm to the plaintiff in their
respective jurisdictions involving state action [and]
subject matter jurisdiction.”

(Doc. 1-2 at 2.)

The

proposed Complaint does not specify the form of relief
sought by Rishar.
Pro se filings are “to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

However,

a district court may dismiss a case if it determines that
the complaint “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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A court also has inherent authority to dismiss a case
that presents no meritorious issue.

See Fitzgerald v. First

E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir.
2000) (district court may dismiss frivolous complaint sua
sponte even where plaintiff paid filing fee); Pillay v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.
1995) (court has “inherent authority” to dismiss petition
that presents “no arguably meritorious issue”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a
pleading stating a claim for relief to provide “a short
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief” and “a demand for the relief sought....”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3).

A plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009).
Here, Rishar’s proposed Complaint provides no factual
basis for his claims, nor does it state any demand for

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relief.

Furthermore, the proposed Defendants, which include

the United States Government and several U.S. States, are
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as
a general rule. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
212 (1983) (United States may not be sued without its
consent) and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)
(Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars suits against
states by its own citizens or citizens of another state).
For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Rishar’s
proposed Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.
District courts generally should not dismiss a pro se
complaint without granting leave to amend. See Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

However, the

court finds that granting leave to amend the proposed
Complaint would be futile. See id. (“The problem with
[plaintiff’s] causes of action is substantive; better
pleading will not cure it.

Repleading would thus be futile.

Such a futile request to replead should be denied.”)
Therefore, the proposed Complaint is DISMISSED.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, upon conducting the
review required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B), Rishar’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(Doc. 1) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Brattleboro, in the District of Vermont, this
10th of March, 2014.

/s/ J. Garvan Murtha
Honorable J. Garvan Murtha
United States District Judge

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