Lewis v. Bellows Falls Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Bellows Falls, Vermont, Inc. et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 34 Motion to Phase Discovery and adopting 31 Proposed Stipulated Discovery Schedule/Order. The parties shall proceed with all discovery. Signed by District Judge J. Garvan Murtha on 7/30/2015. (esb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
ANNESSA LEWIS,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BELLOWS FALLS CONGREGATION OF
:
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, BELLOWS
:
FALLS, VERMONT, INC.; WATCHTOWER
:
BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW
:
YORK, INC.; and NORTON TRUE,
:
:
Defendants.
:
__________________________________________:

Case No. 1:14-cv-205

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION TO PHASE DISCOVERY
(Doc. 34)
The Court assumes familiarity with the background of the case. See Docs. 15, 35.
Defendants Bellows Falls Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Bellows Falls, Vermont, Inc. (the
“Congregation”) and the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York (“Watchtower”)
anticipate discovery will reveal the statute of limitations bars Lewis’s claim, and therefore move the
Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(B) to order phased discovery focusing first on the statute of
limitations issue. (Doc. 34, 37.) Plaintiff Annessa Lewis opposes the motion. (Doc. 36.)
“A district court has broad discretion to manage pre-trial discovery.” McCain v. Buffalo
Wild Wings, No. 1:11-cv-143, 2013 WL 6825098, at *3 (D. Vt. Dec. 23, 2013) (citing Wood v. FBI,
432 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2005)). Rule 26(f)(3)(B) permits that discovery “be conducted in phases or
be limited to or focused on particular issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(B). In Axler v. Sci. Ecology
Grp., Inc., No. 98-10161, 1999 WL 1209512 (D. Mass. May 21, 1999), a securities fraud case, the
court ordered “phased discovery, confined initially to the statute of limitations issue” because the
date on which the statute of limitations began to run was appropriately determined on a motion for

summary judgment. Id. at *5. Other courts have similarly limited early discovery to statute of
limitations issues when it appeared likely the case could be ended. See, e.g., Freier v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 2002) (discovery limited to statute of limitations issues by
trial court); Morton v. Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 464-65 (D.C. 1999) (trial court limited
discovery to statute of limitations issues for plaintiffs whose claims were facially time-barred).
Child sex abuse cases in Vermont are not typically resolved on statute of limitations grounds
at summary judgment because the accrual date for the statute of limitations in such a case is often a
jury issue. See Turner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vt., 186 Vt. 396, 427-28, 987 A.2d
960, 982-83 (2009) (finding the accrual date for the statute of limitations in a church sex abuse case
was a question for the jury). The parties agree the statute of limitations applicable to Lewis’s action
based on childhood sexual abuse commenced “within six years . . . of the time the victim discovered
that the injury or condition was caused by the act.” 12 V.S.A. § 522(a). Thus, in Lewis’s case the
“statute of limitations beg[an] to run upon the discovery of the link between the sexual abuse and
the latent injuries,” not upon merely receiving notice abuse occurred. Shovah v. Mercure, 44 F.
Supp. 3d 504, 511 (D. Vt. 2014). The Vermont Supreme Court has “repeatedly and consistently
emphasized that the question of when an injury reasonably should have been discovered is one of
fact to be determined by the jury.” Clark v. Abate, 194 Vt. 294, 299, 80 A.3d 578, 581 (2013)
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, “the court rather than the jury may determine the
accrual-date issue only when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find for the nonmoving party on that issue.” Id.
Phased discovery is unlikely to enable efficient litigation in this case. Under Vermont law,
the Congregation and Watchtower will probably face difficulty in showing no genuine issue of
material fact exists regarding the start of the limitations period. See, e.g., Colomb v. Roman

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Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vt., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-254, 2012 WL 4479758, at *3 (D. Vt. Sept. 28,
2012) (denying summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because issue of material fact
existed when plaintiff testified he had a “moment of clarity” the previous year connecting lack of
trust, anxiety, and drug abuse to childhood sexual abuse). In reply, the Congregation and
Watchtower argue that because Lewis’s initial disclosures indicate she saw multiple therapists
starting in 1996, she “cannot plausibly claim that she did not know of the alleged injury or the
Defendants’ potential liability until six years prior to filing her Complaint.” (Doc. 37, at 3.) The
excerpts from the initial disclosures, however, give no indication Lewis discovered any injury or
condition stemming from the abuse at that time. See Doc. 37-2 at 6 (psychologist’s records of 1996
interviews with Lewis indicated only that she was “very quiet” when questioned about reports of
inappropriate touching); id. at 11 (therapist advised that Lewis and her siblings’ “interaction seemed
quite normal”). The statute of limitations issue is when Lewis discovered the “link between the
sexual abuse and the latent injuries,” Shovah, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 511, and the relevant cases indicate
the date of that discovery is likely to remain a disputed fact following discovery.1 If an early motion

1

As the Congregation and Watchtower point out, a Vermont court has in one instance
granted summary judgment based on 12 V.S.A. § 522. See Tuepker v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Burlington, Vt. Inc., et al., Docket No. S0578-08 CnC, at 9 (Vt. Super Ct. June 23, 2011) (Toor, J.)
(granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds when “[t]he record [was] clear that by
[a date more than six years before filing] [plaintiff] understood that he was suffering psychological
harm as a result of the abuse”). The Congregation and Watchtower also cite Rodrigue v. VALCO
Enters., Inc., 169 Vt. 539, 726 A.2d 61 (1999), a case addressing the statute of limitations for a dram
shop act claim. Rodrigue is applicable to the extent it held that where “there is no dispute as to
what material facts plaintiff was aware of,” and those facts are “sufficient, as a matter of law, for the
plaintiff’s . . . claim to accrue,” a court may grant summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds. Id. at 541. Though it is conceivable no disputed issue of material fat would remain
following discovery, as previously stated, the Vermont Supreme Court has “repeatedly and
consistently emphasized that the question of when an injury reasonably should have been discovered
is one of fact to be determined by the jury.” Clark, 194 Vt. at 299, 80 A.3d at 581.
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for summary judgment were unsuccessful, phased discovery will have multiplied the number of
depositions to be taken, increasing discovery burdens and delaying the case’s ultimate resolution.
Accordingly, the Motion to Phase Discovery (Doc. 34) is DENIED. The current proposed
discovery schedule (Doc. 31) requires completion of depositions of non-expert witnesses by August
24, 2015. Following Lewis’s deposition, the Congregation and Watchtower should have a better
idea of when she connected her injuries to the alleged sexual abuse. As Lewis concedes, it is
conceivable an early and meritorious summary judgment motion based on the statute of limitations
will follow.2 (Doc. 36, at 3.) At this time, however, the parties should proceed with all discovery.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court adopts the pending Stipulated Discovery Schedule/Order
(Doc. 31).
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Brattleboro, in the District of Vermont, this 30th day of July, 2015.
/s/ J. Garvan Murtha
Honorable J. Garvan Murtha
United States District Judge

2

In fact, Lewis has so far alleged no specific facts suggesting her case was timely filed, and
her case is “facially barred” by the six-year statute of limitations. Morton, 725 A.2d at 465.
4