Craft v. United States Post Office

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER granting 1 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by District Judge J. Garvan Murtha on 7/8/2015. (esb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Terrick D. Craft,
Plaintiff,
v.
United States Post Office,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-104-jgm

OPINION AND ORDER
(Doc. 1)
Plaintiff Terrick D. Craft, proceeding pro se, moves to
proceed in forma paurperis against Defendant United States Post
Office (“USPS”), seeking damages related to the negligent
delivery of a letter.

(Docs. 1, 1-2.)

Because the financial

affidavit in support of the motion meets the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis is GRANTED.

For the reasons set forth below, however,

this case is DISMISSED.
Discussion
Craft alleges that while incarcerated at the Southern State
Correctional Facility in Springfield, Vermont, he “was cheating
on [his] wife” and corresponding with another woman by mail and
telephone calls. (Doc. 1-2 at 4.)

On one occasion, he attempted

to send the other woman a letter which he had addressed to the
wrong city and state.

Instead of returning the letter to Craft

at the Springfield facility, USPS “looked at the last name and

forward[ed] it to [his] wife.”

Id. at 5.

As a result, Craft’s

wife filed for a divorce against him, “took away” his children,
and no longer puts money in his commissary account.

Id.

As

relief, he seeks monetary damages.
Pro se filings are “to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

A district court may dismiss a

case, however, if it determines the complaint “is frivolous or
malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A court also has

inherent authority to dismiss a case that presents no meritorious
issue.

See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221

F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (district court may dismiss
frivolous complaint sua sponte even where plaintiff paid filing
fee); Pillay v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14,
17 (2d Cir. 1995) (court has “inherent authority” to dismiss
petition that presents “no arguably meritorious issue”).
Here, Craft’s claims against USPS are deemed to be against
the United States.

See Anderson v. United States Postal Serv.,

761 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985) (tort claim against USPS
treated as suit against United States).

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Under the doctrine of

sovereign immunity, the United States is “immune from suit save
as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to
be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to
entertain the suit.”

Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160

(1981); see also Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States,
175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In any suit in which the
United States is a defendant, there must be a cause of action,
subject matter jurisdiction, and a waiver of sovereign
immunity.").

"The sovereign immunity of the United States may

only be waived by a federal statute."

Id.

Although the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §
1346, generally provides a jurisdictional basis for monetary
claims against the United States arising from property loss or
damage, “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or
negligent transmission of letters or postal matter” is exempted.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).

Therefore, because Craft seeks monetary

damages against USPS arising from the negligent transmission of
the letter to his wife, the FTCA does not provide a waiver of
sovereign immunity.

Accordingly, because the United States is

immune from this type of suit, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and all claims against USPS are DISMISSED.
District courts generally should not dismiss a pro se
complaint without granting leave to amend. See Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

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The Court finds,

however, that granting leave to amend the proposed Complaint
would be futile. See id. (“The problem with [plaintiff’s] causes
of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it.
Repleading would thus be futile.

Such a futile request to

replead should be denied.”) Because the facts alleged do not
suggest Craft presents any other viable claims over which this
Court would have subject matter jurisdiction, the Court declines
to grant leave to file an amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, after conducting the review
required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B), Craft’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) is GRANTED, and this
case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
It is further certified that any appeal taken in forma
pauperis from this Order would not be taken in good faith because
such an appeal would be frivolous.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

SO ORDERED.
Dated at Brattleboro, in the District of Vermont, this 8th
day of July, 2015.
/s/ J. Garvan Murtha
Honorable J. Garvan Murtha
United States District Judge

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