Gadreault v. Grearson et al
Filing
13
OPINION AND ORDER: 5 MOTION to Dismiss Case for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or in the alternative for failure to state a claim and 6 MOTION to Dismiss are GRANTED; 10 MOTION to Investigate and Charge Valerie J. Corliss/Gadreault with Prejudice is DENIED, 8 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 6 MOTION to Dismiss is GRANTED. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 10/14/2011. (law)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Raymond Gadreault,
Plaintiff,
v.
Hon. Brian Grearson,
Frederick Bethel, Valerie
J. Gadreault/Corliss,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:11-cv-63
OPINION AND ORDER
(Docs. 5, 6, 8 and 10)
Plaintiff Raymond Gadreault, proceeding pro se, brings
this action claiming that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights during the course of two state court
domestic proceedings.
Defendants are Vermont Superior Court
Judge Brian Grearson, Attorney Frederick Bethel, and the
Plaintiff’s wife, Valerie Gadreault/Corliss.
Judge Grearson has moved to dismiss the Complaint on
the basis of judicial immunity.
Attorney Bethel and Ms.
Gadreault/Corliss have filed a joint motion to dismiss,
arguing lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
Also pending before the Court is Mr. Gadreault’s motion for
an extension of time in which to file a response to the
joint motion to dismiss, as well as his request for an
investigation into Ms. Gadreault/Corliss’s assertion that
she is proceeding pro se.
For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Gadreault’s motion
for an extension of time is GRANTED, and his request for an
investigation is DENIED.
Further, Defendants’ motions to
dismiss are GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.
Factual Background
The Complaint first alleges that during a “hearing for
a protection/restraining order,” Judge Grearson failed to
read Mr. Gadreault his rights or provide an “expl[a]nation
on what was happening.”
(Doc. 1 at 1.)
These actions, Mr.
Gadreault claims, violated his right to due process and his
right to a trial by jury.
Defendants submit that this claim
pertains to a relief from abuse proceeding that took place
in the Family Division of the Vermont Superior Court,
Washington Unit.
(Doc. 6 at 3.)1
Mr. Gadreault next claims that Judge Grearson and Ms.
Gadreault/Corliss violated his “right to bear arms and the
right not to endure unreasonable search and seizure . . . .”
(Doc. 1 at 2.)
Defendants again surmise that this
allegation pertains to the relief from abuse proceeding, and
specifically to the portion of the court’s order requiring
1
The Court takes judicial notice of the state court
record. See Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.) v. Starwood Hotels
& Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004).
2
Mr. Gadreault to “remove his personal effects from the
parties’ residence in the company of a law enforcement
officer, who was authorized to remove any weapons in the
home.”
(Doc. 6 at 4-5) (citing Doc. 6-3 at 1.)
Mr.
Gadreault’s final claim concerning the relief from abuse
proceeding is that Judge Grearson barred him from
questioning Ms. Gadreault/Corliss, thus allegedly denying
Mr. Gadreault the right to confront his accuser.
As to Attorney Bethel, who presumably acted as Ms.
Gadreault/Corliss’s counsel, the Complaint alleges that he
and Judge Grearson conspired to deny Mr. Gadreault his
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, going “so far as to
discuss their strategy on how to fight my appeal to the
Vermont Supreme Court in open court.”
(Doc. 1 at 2-3.)
Mr.
Gadreault also alleges that Attorney Bethel was allowed to
“call [him] names” in the courtroom, and that Judge Grearson
granted Attorney Bethel’s request for an emergency hearing
concerning spousal support, while denying Mr. Gadreault an
emergency hearing on his request for an annulment.
3.)
(Id. at
Defendants believe that these latter allegations
pertain to the Gadreaults’ pending divorce proceeding, in
which Judge Grearson is the presiding judge.
3
Mr. Gadreault asserts that these alleged actions by
Defendants violated his rights under the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
For
relief, he is seeking $400,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages from his wife, two million dollars from Judge
Grearson, and eight million dollars from Attorney Bethel.
Discussion
I.
Judge Grearson’s Motion to Dismiss
Judge Grearson moves for dismissal on the basis of
judicial immunity.
Judges have absolute immunity from suits
for damages arising out of judicial acts performed in their
judicial capacities.
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12
(1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988).
The
immunity of the court and its members “is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice,” or “because the action
he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his
authority.”
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13 (quotations and
citations omitted).
Judicial immunity may be overcome only
if a judge is alleged to have taken “nonjudicial actions” or
if judicial actions were taken “in the complete absence of
all jurisdiction.”
Id. at 11–12.
Here, the Complaint alleges that Judge Grearson made
4
rulings, both in the courtroom and in a written order, that
violated Mr. Gadreault’s constitutional rights.
The
Complaint also alleges that Judge Grearson conspired with
Attorney Bethel in open court.
There is no claim that Judge
Grearson lacked jurisdiction to preside over the proceedings
in question, or that any of his actions were “non-judicial.”
Indeed, Vermont law provides that the Family Division of the
Superior Court has jurisdiction over both relief from abuse
proceedings and divorce proceedings generally, see 4 V.S.A.
§ 33(4), (14), and all of Judge Grearson’s alleged actions
were clearly taken in his judicial role.
The claims against
Judge Grearson are therefore DISMISSED on the basis of
judicial immunity.
See, e.g., Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d
133, 139 (2d Cir. 1987); Patterson v. Rodgers, 708 F. Supp.
2d 225, 235 (D. Conn. 2010).
II.
Attorney Bethel and Ms. Gadreault/Corliss
Attorney Bethel and Ms. Gadreault/Corliss have filed a
joint motion to dismiss, arguing first that the Complaint is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Rooker–Feldman is a
limited doctrine aimed at “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
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commenced and inviting district court review of those
judgments.”
McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rooker–Feldman directs federal courts to abstain
from considering claims when four requirements are
met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2)
the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the
state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites
district court review of that judgment, and (4)
the state court judgment was entered before the
plaintiff’s federal suit commenced.
Id.
Defendants report that the Gadreaults’ divorce
proceeding is ongoing.
Consequently, no judgment was
entered prior to the commencement of this lawsuit.
To the
extent that interlocutory orders may have been issued, such
as rulings regarding the questioning of a witness, or
interim orders pertaining to spousal support, Rooker-Feldman
does not apply.
See Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 103
(2d Cir. 2009) (declining to apply Rooker-Feldman to
“interlocutory, unappealable” child custody order).
The relief from abuse order, however, was litigated to
a conclusion and a final order was issued.
therefore requires additional analysis.
That order
The relief from
abuse order reportedly authorized the removal of Mr.
Gadreault’s personal effects, including firearms, from “the
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parties’ residence.”
(Doc. 6-3 at 1.)
Mr. Gadreault now
claims that the court’s order deprived him of his Second and
Fourth Amendment rights, and that the hearing itself
violated his rights to due process and a jury trial.
It
thus appears the Mr. Gadreault’s claim satisfies the first
two Rooker-Feldman requirements of a “state court loser”
complaining of injuries from the state judgment.
See
Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that if a plaintiff alleged in
federal court that a state court order terminating his
parental rights was unconstitutional, “he is complaining of
an injury caused by the state judgment”).
It also appears that the state court order, issued on
July 15, 2010, pre-dated the filing of the Complaint in this
case, thus satisfying the fourth Rooker-Feldman element.
(Doc. 6-1 at 1); (Doc. 1.)
Less clear, however, is whether
Mr. Gadreault is asking this Court to review the state
court’s judgment, as required by the third element of the
Rooker-Feldman test.
See McKithen, 626 F.3d at 154.
The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order for Rooker-Feldman
to apply, a plaintiff must be “plainly” seeking federal
court review “to undo the [Family Court] judgment.”
7
Exxon-
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
293 (2005).
Here, Mr. Gadreault asks for an award of
damages, and does not explicitly request that the Court
review and overturn the state court ruling.
Whether an action for damages necessarily involves a
“review of [the state court] judgment” such that RookerFeldman would apply is not well settled.
Compare Ellis v.
Little Flower Children’s Services, 2000 WL 516887, at * 5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2000) (finding that award of damages on
plaintiff’s claim challenging transfer of her children to
adoption agency would require district court to find that
state court wrongly decided custody issues, and that claim
was therefore barred by Rooker–Feldman), with McKnight v.
Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (reading
Second Circuit rulings to “suggest that a plaintiff’s claims
seeking only monetary damages or prospective-only relief
against court procedures rather than modification of a
family court’s temporary custody or other orders would not
run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”.)
The Court need
not resolve that question here, as Mr. Gadreault’s claims
fail on other grounds as set forth below.
In addition to arguing for dismissal under Rooker-
8
Feldman, Ms. Gadreault/Corliss and Attorney Bethel contend
that Mr. Gadreault has failed to state plausible
constitutional claims, and therefore move to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
In
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court set forth a
“two-pronged” approach for analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss.
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
First, a
court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in
the plaintiff’s favor.
Id.
This assumption of truth,
however, does not apply to legal conclusions, and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. at 1949.
Second, a court must determine whether the complaint’s
“well-pleaded factual allegations . . . plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.”
Id. at 1950. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”
Id. at 1949 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
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“The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.”
Id.
Because Mr. Gadreault is proceeding
pro se, the Court must “construe his complaint liberally and
interpret it ‘to raise the strongest arguments that [it]
suggest[s].’”
Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Harris v. City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 18, 24
(2d Cir. 2010)).
Most of the allegations in the Complaint focus on the
actions of Judge Grearson, who, as discussed above, is
immune from suit.
The first paragraph of the Complaint
alleges that Judge Grearson failed to read Mr. Gadreault his
rights or explain the relief from abuse proceeding.
As
there is no allegation of wrongdoing by either Attorney
Bethel or Ms. Gadreault/Corliss, this claim is DISMISSED.
The Complaint next alleges that Judge Grearson and Ms.
Gadreault/Corliss violated Mr. Gadreault’s right to bear
arms and his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Both claims appear to relate to the relief from
abuse order issued by Judge Grearson, and Ms.
Gadreault/Corliss’s role is unclear.
To the extent that Mr.
Gadreault may be claiming that his wife’s “perjured
10
testimony” (Doc. 1 at 3) resulted in Judge Grearson’s order,
her statements are protected from suit by witness immunity.
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983) (reasoning
that “[a] witness’s apprehension of subsequent damages
liability might induce . . . self-censorship”).
Moreover,
and construing Gadreault’s constitutional claims as brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, witness testimony does not
constitute state action for purposes of Section 1983.
See
San Filippo v. United States Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 256
(2d Cir. 1984) (“a private party giving testimony is not
‘acting under color of state law’ for purposes of § 1983”).
The third allegation in the Complaint is that Mr.
Gadreault was denied a jury trial.
Again, this claim
appears to focus on a determination that would have been
made by Judge Grearson.
Furthermore, because an abuse
prevention order grants only injunctive relief, the
proceeding is equitable in nature, and there is no provision
in Vermont law that requires or authorizes a jury trial.
See Vt. R. Fam. P. 4; cf. Blackmon v. Blackmon, 230 P.3d
233, 237 (Wash. App. Div. 2010) (“there is no right to a
jury trial in a domestic violence protection order hearing
because such proceeding is equitable in nature”); Clark v.
11
Crow, 37 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (no right to
jury trial under state Domestic Abuse Act); Ward v. Ward,
583 A.2d 577, 581 (Vt. 1990) (holding that tort action may
not be joined into divorce action, in part because “‘a
divorce action is highly equitable in nature, whereas the
trial of a tort claim is at law and may well involve, as in
this case, a request for trial by jury’”) (quoting Lord v.
Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah 1983)).
As to the divorce proceeding, even assuming a right to
jury trial, the record indicates that as of the filing of
the Complaint, that proceeding had not yet concluded.
6-2.)
(Doc.
Furthermore, Mr. Gadreault references his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.
(Doc. 1 at 2.)
The Sixth
Amendment applies only to “criminal prosecutions,” while the
state court proceedings at issue here were purely civil in
nature.
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
The Complaint’s fourth claim is that Mr. Gadreault was
not allowed to question his wife, thus violating his right
to confront his accuser.
Once again, the claim pertains to
a ruling by the presiding judge, over which the witness and
her attorney would have had no control.
therefore DISMISSED.
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The claim is
The fifth and final claim alleges a conspiracy between
Attorney Bethel and Judge Grearson.
The first portion of
the claim asserts that Attorney Bethel and Judge Grearson
conspired to deprive Mr. Gadreault of his Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial.
Again, there is no such right in a
relief from abuse proceeding.
As to the divorce proceeding,
the Seventh Amendment provides for a jury trial only for
“suits at common law.”
See Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).
It has been held that
because a divorce requires equitable remedies, it is not a
“suit at common law” as contemplated by the Constitution’s
drafters, and the Seventh Amendment does not mandate a jury
trial.
See Maines v. Vermillion County Circuit Court, 1992
WL 360089, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 1992) (unpublished
opinion citing treatises for proposition that divorce
proceedings were under jurisdiction of equity courts in
1791, and “are still considered equitable proceedings
today”) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, Mr. Gadreault’s claims fall well short of
alleging a conspiracy.
“To prove a § 1983 conspiracy, a
plaintiff must show: (1) an agreement between two or more
state actors or between a state actor and a private entity;
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(2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury;
and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal
causing damages.”
Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72
(2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
“A complaint containing
only conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy
to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot
withstand a motion to dismiss.”
Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d
303, 311 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Sommer v. Dixon, 709 F.2d
173, 175 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
The conspiracy claims presented here are highly
conclusory.
Aside from the bare allegation that a judge and
opposing counsel conspired together, there are no facts to
support a claim that these Defendants had an agreement to
act in concert.
Mr. Gadreault does make reference to a
discussion in open court, but offers no specifics to suggest
that the discussion was part of a conspiracy, or that it was
designed to cause him harm.
Other allegations, such as Judge Grearson’s rulings on
what sorts of questions Attorney Bethel could ask Mr.
Gadreault, and Judge Grearson’s rulings on requests for
emergency hearing, are equally conclusory.
Again, there are
no facts in the Complaint to support the inference that
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Judge Grearson and Attorney Bethel agreed to conspire
against Mr. Gadreault, that the judge’s rulings were somehow
conspiratorial, or that his actions were in furtherance of a
common goal to cause Mr. Gadreault damages.
Finally, with
respect to the claims against Attorney Bethel, the
conclusory allegations in the Complaint do not amount to
“state action” for purposes of § 1983.
Ciambriello v.
County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A
merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in
concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a §
1983 claim against the private entity.”).
Mr. Gadreault’s
conspiracy claims are therefore DISMISSED.
III.
Leave to Amend
The Second Circuit has cautioned that a pro se
litigant’s complaint should not be dismissed “without
granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading
of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim
might be stated.”
Cir. 1991).
Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d
In this case, however, the Court will not grant
leave to amend because even under the most liberal reading
of the Complaint, there is no indication that a valid claim
might be stated.
See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
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(2d Cir. 2000).
The bulk of Mr. Gadreault’s claims focus on rulings by
Judge Grearson.
As those claims are barred by judicial
immunity, they are substantively flawed and better pleading
will not cure their deficiencies.
See id.
Similarly,
claims of a conspiracy to deprive Mr. Gadreault of his right
to a jury when, as a matter of law, he had no such right,
cannot be cured by an amended pleading.
The same is true
with respect to any claim that Mr. Gadreault’s wife
committed perjury, as her testimony cannot be the basis of a
civil action for reasons set forth above.
The Court
therefore finds that the claims in the Complaint are without
any legal merit, and that amendment would be futile.
to amend is therefore DENIED.
Leave
See id.
IV. Motion To Investigate
Finally, Mr. Gadreault asks the Court to investigate
his wife’s representation that she filed her motion to
dismiss pro se.
perjury.
He also asks the Court to charge her with
The Court has no power to either conduct
investigations or initiate a prosecution. “[C]riminal
prosecutions are within the exclusive province of the public
prosecutor, who has complete discretion over the decision to
16
initiate, continue or cease prosecution.”
Solomon v. H.P.
Action Center, H.P.D., 1999 WL 1051092, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov.19, 1999).
Moreover, “[a] private citizen does not have
a constitutional right to . . . compel the initiation of
criminal proceedings.”
Lis v. Leahy, 1991 WL 99060 at *1
(W.D.N.Y. June 3, 1991); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“a private citizen lacks a
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
non-prosecution of another”).
The motion is therefore
DENIED.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Gadreault’s motion
for an extension of time (Doc. 8) is GRANTED, and his motion
requesting an investigation (Doc. 10) is DENIED.
Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 5 and 6) are GRANTED,
and this case is DISMISSED.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this
14th day of October, 2011.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
Judge, United States District Court
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