Thayer v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Filing
10
OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES Plaintiff's 6 Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner, and GRANTS Defendant's 9 Motion for Order Affirming Decision of Commissioner. Signed by Judge John M. Conroy on 3/6/2012. (hbc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Jennifer Thayer,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:11-CV-117
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
(Docs. 6, 9)
Plaintiff Jennifer Thayer brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the
Social Security Act, requesting review and remand of the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance
benefits. Pending before the Court are Thayer’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s
decision (Doc. 6), and the Commissioner’s motion to affirm the same (Doc. 9). For the
reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Thayer’s motion, and GRANTS the
Commissioner’s motion.
Background
Thayer was thirty-seven years old on her alleged disability onset date of
April 1, 2006. She completed school through the tenth grade. Her job history consists of
working as a cashier and a cook. At times during the alleged disability period, she lived
with her boyfriend and his aging mother. At other times, she lived at a battered women’s
shelter, a half-way house, or a substance abuse treatment center; or was incarcerated.
The record reflects that Thayer grew up in an alcohol-abusing family, and was
molested by a family friend at the age of nine. At age seventeen, she married, and
thereafter had two children. She has since divorced. She began using alcohol and
marijuana at around the age of ten, and later began abusing painkillers including opioids,
which were initially prescribed for back pain. She has undergone at least four substance
abuse treatment programs. At age 32, she was incarcerated for selling narcotics to a
minor. She has also been charged with assault, larceny, being an accessory to a burglary,
and parole/probation violations.
In addition to her drug problems, Thayer also suffers from back pain, depression,
and difficulty sleeping. Despite having three back surgeries, steroid injections, and
physical therapy, she claims her back pain persists to the point where she is bedridden
some days and can walk for only approximately five-to-ten minutes at a time. (AR 3940.) Her depression symptoms include irritability, low self-esteem, poor concentration,
weight gain, fatigue, low libido, feelings of worthlessness, social withdrawal, and suicidal
ideation. She also describes having panic attacks, anxiety, and paranoid personality
traits. Thayer is obese, smokes approximately one pack of cigarettes each day, and
drinks about six cups of coffee and two caffeinated sodas each day.
On January 13, 2009, Thayer protectively filed applications for social security
income and disability insurance benefits. In her disability application, she alleged that,
starting on April 1, 2006, she has been unable to work due to back problems and
depression. (AR 172.) She explained that she is unable to stand or sit for long periods of
time; she cannot bend, twist, turn, or stoop; and she is uncomfortable around groups of
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people. (Id.) Thayer’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she
timely requested an administrative hearing. The hearing was conducted on
October 14, 2010 by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Dory Sutker. (AR 24-44.)
Thayer appeared and testified, and was represented by an attorney. A vocational expert
(“VE”) also testified at the hearing. On December 13, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision
finding that Thayer was not disabled under the Social Security Act at any time from her
alleged onset date through the date of the decision. (AR 7-17.) A few months later, the
Decision Review Board notified Thayer that it had not completed its review of the claim
during the time allowed, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. (AR 1-3.) Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Thayer filed
the Complaint in this action on May 5, 2011. (Doc. 1.)
ALJ Decision
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate disability
claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step
requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in “substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not so
engaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a “severe
impairment.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that the claimant
has a severe impairment, the third step requires the ALJ to make a determination as to
whether the claimant’s impairment “meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subt. P, App. 1 (“the listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The
claimant is presumptively disabled if the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.
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Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984).
If the claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required to determine the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), meaning “the most [the claimant] can
still do despite [his or her mental and physical] limitations,” based on all the relevant
medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545,
416.920(e), 416.945. The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant’s
RFC precludes the performance of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant can do “any other work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). The claimant
bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four, Butts, 388 F.3d at
383; and at step five, there is a “limited burden shift to the Commissioner” to “show that
there is work in the national economy that the claimant can do,” Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the burden shift to the Commissioner at step
five is limited, and the Commissioner “need not provide additional evidence of the
claimant’s [RFC]”).
When faced with a claimant who has a drug or alcohol addiction, such as Thayer
here, the ALJ is required to consider an extra step in the five-step sequential evaluation.
Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 622 (10th Cir. 2006). The Social Security Act states:
“An individual shall not be considered to be disabled . . . if alcoholism or drug addiction
would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s
determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); see Porter v.
Chater, 982 F. Supp. 918, 921-22 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). Accordingly, if the ALJ finds that
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the claimant is disabled, and there is medical evidence of the claimant’s drug addiction or
alcoholism, the ALJ “must determine whether [that] drug addiction or alcoholism is a
contributing factor material to the determination of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a).
The “key factor” in this determination is “whether [the Commissioner] would still find
[the claimant] disabled if [he or she] stopped using drugs or alcohol.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1535(b)(1); see Frankhauser v. Barnhart, 403 F. Supp. 2d 261, 272 (W.D.N.Y.
2005). Given that the claimant is the party best suited to demonstrate whether he or she
would still be disabled in the absence of drug or alcohol addiction, “[w]hen the record
reflects drug or alcohol abuse, the claimant bears the burden of proving that substance
abuse is not a contributing factor material to the disability determination.” Eltayyeb v.
Barnhart, No. 02 Civ. 925 (MBM), 2003 WL 22888801, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2003)
(citations omitted); see Frankhauser, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
Employing this sequential analysis, ALJ Sutker first determined that, although
Thayer had worked after the alleged onset date of April 1, 2006, that work was below
substantial gainful activity levels, and thus she had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity during the alleged disability period. (AR 10.) At step two, the ALJ found that
Thayer had the following severe impairments: “substance abuse, a lumbar spine disc
herniation, a pain disorder, and obesity.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Thayer’s
impairments, including her substance use disorders, met Listing 12.09, which is the
listing for substance addiction disorders. (AR 10.) The ALJ explained that Thayer had a
depressive disorder with anxiety and a pain disorder; and that she had moderate
restriction in activities of daily living, marked difficulties with social functioning, and
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marked difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace. (Id.) The ALJ further
explained that Thayer had experienced one to two episodes of decompensation, and had
engaged in several drug-related detoxification programs. (Id.)
Next, the ALJ determined that, if Thayer stopped the substance use, her depression
would cause “no more than minimal/mild limitations,” but she would continue to have
the severe impairments of lumbar spine disc herniation, a pain disorder, and obesity. (AR
12.) The ALJ further determined that, if Thayer stopped the substance use, she would not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed
impairment. (AR 12-13.) The ALJ next found that, if Thayer stopped the substance use,
she would have the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work, as defined in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). (AR 13-15.) Given this RFC, the ALJ found that, if Thayer
stopped the substance use, she would be unable to perform her past relevant work as a
cashier and a cook; nonetheless, there would be a significant number of jobs in the
national economy that Thayer could perform. (AR 15-16.) The ALJ concluded that,
because Thayer would not be disabled if she stopped the substance use, her substance use
disorders were a “contributing factor material to the determination of disability,” and thus
Thayer had not been disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from the
alleged onset date of April 1, 2006 through the date of the decision. (AR 16.)
Standard of Review
The Social Security Act defines the term “disability” as the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
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expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A person will be found to be disabled only if it is determined that his
“impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
In reviewing a Commissioner’s disability decision, the court limits its inquiry to a
“review [of] the administrative record de novo to determine whether there is substantial
evidence supporting the . . . decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct
legal standard.” Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw v.
Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court’s factual
review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether “substantial
evidence” exists in the record to support such decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v.
Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991); see Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d
Cir. 1990) (“Where there is substantial evidence to support either position, the
determination is one to be made by the factfinder [sic].”). “Substantial evidence” is more
than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
Poupore, 566 F.3d at 305. In its deliberations, the court should consider that the Social
Security Act is “a remedial statute to be broadly construed and liberally applied.”
Dousewicz v. Harris, 646 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Analysis
I.
“Materiality” of Thayer’s Substance Abuse Disorder
Contrary to Thayer’s claim, the ALJ’s analysis of Thayer’s substance abuse
disorder was proper. As discussed above, the regulations require that, if – as here – the
ALJ determines that the claimant is disabled and has medical evidence of the claimant’s
drug addiction; the ALJ must determine whether that drug addiction is a “contributing
factor material to the determination of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a). In making
this determination, the ALJ is required to conduct a two-part inquiry: first, deciding
whether the claimant is disabled by all her impairments including her substance abuse
disorder; and second, determining whether the claimant would still be disabled if he or
she stopped using drugs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a), (b); Frankhauser, 403 F. Supp. 2d at
272. As described above, the ALJ properly conducted this two-part inquiry. The ALJ
first determined that Thayer was disabled by all her impairments, including her substance
abuse disorder, which met Listing 12.09. (AR 10.) And second, the ALJ determined that
Thayer would not remain disabled if she stopped her substance use. (AR 16.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Thayer would be able
to do sedentary work if she stopped her substance use. For example, in November 2007,
during a period of abstinence, Thayer’s treating physician, Dr. John King, noted that
Thayer was “working 20 hours a week, though applying for Disability, as her back has
significant function[ality].” (AR 669.) The Doctor further noted that, in addition to
working part-time, Thayer was attending a sobriety program three days each week for
three hours a day. (Id.) Moreover, and as the ALJ pointed out, in September 2008,
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Thayer reported to Dr. King that her pain was “fairly well controlled,” despite
experiencing muscle spasms in her legs mostly at night. (AR 348.) In November 2009,
Thayer reported to Dr. King that, although she was having increasing pain and numbness
in her left leg, she was doing “fairly well in terms of daily functional activity,” including
completing chores and showering. (AR 725.) The Doctor noted that Thayer appeared
“quite well,” was “moving fairly easily in the room,” and had “good strength.” (Id.) In
disability reports, Thayer reported that, although her back hurt all the time, when she took
her medications, she was able to prepare light meals, do dishes, fold laundry, handle
money, play cards and dice, watch television, sew, and walk one-quarter of a mile. (AR
182-85, 198.) In February 2010, as noted by the ALJ, Thayer reported to Dr. King that
her back pain was “stable” and her depression and anxiety were “not limiting.” (AR
720.) Treatment notes from July 2010 reveal that Thayer was fairly active, despite her
pain and substance abuse issues, and was providing nursing-type care for her friend’s
aging mother “24 hours a day” for “the last year,” caring for herself, and “actively
engaging in addictive behavior.” (AR 647.)
With respect to social functioning, as the ALJ explained, Thayer’s own treating
physician, Dr. King, opined in September 2010 that she had no limitation in her ability to
interact appropriately with others. (AR 703.) The ALJ also noted that another of
Thayer’s treating physicians, Dr. Andrew Horrigan, opined in July 2010 that Thayer had
“likely” “developed a pain syndrome from heavy opioid use, and once opioids are
detoxified from her system, her pain levels may diminish.” (AR 651.) In accord, and as
noted by the ALJ, treating physician Dr. Brian Erickson stated in November 2007 that
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Thayer “[wa]s aware that her pain perceptions get worse when she is experiencing
stress.” (AR 669.) The ALJ also accurately stated that each of Thayer’s past episodes of
decompensation was induced by drug use, and thus that, absent such use, these episodes
“would likely cease.” (AR 13.)
Thayer references records from the Howard Center which indicate that, during an
approximately fifty-day period of sobriety, Thayer “still fe[lt] serious back pain and
depressed mood.” (Doc. 6 at 5 (citing AR 677, 679).) But these same records diagnose
Thayer with opioid dependence, cocaine abuse, amphetamine abuse, and cannabis abuse;
and reveal that Thayer was “still participating in high risk/criminal behaviors” and
“addict/criminal behavior,” and more specifically, that she still suffered from “[o]pioid
dependence as evidenced by a great deal of time . . . spent in activities necessary to obtain
the substance or recover from it[]s effects.” (AR 677, 678; see AR 712.) These records
also reveal that, although Thayer suffered from extreme poverty, inadequate housing, and
unemployment; she “presented as mostly positive and engaged,” was “generally
functioning pretty well,” and “ha[d] some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” (AR
678, 679.)
In light of this evidence, much of which the ALJ referenced in her decision, the
Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Thayer’s
substance abuse was material to her disability determination.
II.
Thayer’s Back Impairment and Listing 1.04
Thayer next contends that the ALJ erred in determining that her impairments did
not meet Listing 1.04, the listing for disorders of the spine; and more specifically, that the
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ALJ should have considered the opinions of treating physician Dr. King in making this
determination. The ALJ stated as follows with respect to Listing 1.04: “I find that
[Thayer] fails to meet the criteria [for Listing 1.04] because she does not display evidence
of nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis, or lumbar spinal stenosis that results in
an inability to ambulate effectively.” (AR 13.)
For a claimant to qualify for benefits by showing that his or her impairment meets
a listing, the impairment “must meet all of the specified medical criteria” for the
particular listing. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). For a claimant to qualify
for benefits by showing that his or her unlisted impairment or combination of
impairments is “equivalent” to a listed impairment, the claimant “must present medical
findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment.”
Id.at 531. The Social Security Administration has explained that a determination
regarding whether a claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments is medically
the equivalent of a listed impairment “must be based on medical evidence demonstrated
by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, including
consideration of a medical judgment about medical equivalence furnished by one or more
physicians designated by the Secretary.” SSR 86-8, 1986 WL 68636, at *4 (1986),
superseded on other grounds by SSR 91-7c, 1991 WL 231791 (Aug. 1, 1991). For a
claimant to meet or equal the severity of Listing 1.04, the claimant must suffer from:
Disorders of the spine (e.g., herniated nucleus pulposus, spinal
arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, facet
arthritis, vertebral fracture), resulting in compromise of a nerve root
(including the cauda equina) or the spinal cord. With:
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A. Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuroanatomic
distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy
with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by
sensory or reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower back, positive
straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine) . . . .
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subt. P, App. 1, Listing 1.04 (emphases added).
Thayer references only four pages from the 909-page record to support her claim
that her impairments met or medically equaled Listing 1.04. (See Doc. 6 at 6-7.) First,
Thayer refers to Dr. King’s statement in his September 2010 opinion that a 2002 MRI
revealed “concentric disc protrusion [at] L5-S1 with nerve root compression.” (AR 703;
see AR 467.) Next, Thayer refers to 1991 and 1993 “Operative Reports” which
document two separate surgeries intended to “decompress[] . . . S1 nerve root.” (AR 470,
481.) However, the MRI and each Operative Report pre-dates the alleged disability onset
date by at least several years.
Moreover, in order to meet Listing 1.04, the claimant must demonstrate
“functional loss,” meaning “the inability to ambulate effectively on a sustained basis.”
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subt. P, App. 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(a). “Inability to ambulate effectively”
is defined as meaning “an extreme limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., an impairment(s)
that interferes very seriously with the individual’s ability to independently initiate,
sustain, or complete activities. Ineffective ambulation is defined generally as having
insufficient lower extremity functioning . . . to permit independent ambulation without
the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that limits the functioning of both upper
extremities.” Id. at § 1.00(B)(2)(b)(1). Here, the record – including Thayer’s own selfreporting – reflects that Thayer was able to effectively ambulate without assistive devices
12
during the insured period. (See, e.g., AR 154 (able to go out alone and able to shop in
stores for food and personal needs items once a month), 157 (no assistive devices
required to ambulate), 355 (“normal heel-and-toe walk”), 548 (“fairly active doing her
normal activities,” “back shows fairly good range of motion with quick motion to get up
onto the exam table”), 706 (cane not required to ambulate), 713 (“walks without
difficulty”), 725 (“doing fairly well in terms of daily functional activity,” “moving fairly
easily in the room,” “normal heel and toe walk”).)
Thus, the ALJ correctly held that Thayer did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled Listing 1.04 during the
insured period.
III.
Treating Physician’s Opinion
Finally, Thayer argues that the ALJ should have afforded “controlling weight” to
the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. King, and that Dr. King’s opinion should have
been incorporated into the ALJ’s RFC determination. (Doc. 6 at 8-9.) In September
2010, Dr. King opined in a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related
Activities (Physical)” that Thayer could not perform even sedentary work, and could
never walk a block at a reasonable pace or travel without a companion for assistance.
(AR 705-09.) He further opined that Thayer’s physical impairments would cause her to
be absent from work for more than four days each month. (AR 709.) The ALJ afforded
“little weight” to this opinion, stating that it was “inconsistent with the medical record,
when considered as a whole, as well as the objective medical findings.” (AR 15.)
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Under the “treating physician rule,” a treating physician’s opinion on the nature
and severity of a claimant’s condition is entitled to “controlling weight” if it is “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is
not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2); see Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 567-69 (2d Cir. 1993). Conversely,
a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight where “it is not
consistent with other substantial evidence in the record, such as the opinions of other
medical experts.” Stanton v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Because Dr.
Lasda’s opinion was unsupported by objective clinical evidence and contradicted by his
own records, the examination report of Dr. Ganesh, the report of a state agency disability
analyst, and [the plaintiff’s] own account of her range of activities, the ALJ did not err in
declining to accord it controlling weight.”) (citing Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.2d 28, 32
(2d Cir. 2004)). Factors to be considered in affording weight to a treating physician’s
opinion include the nature and length of the treatment relationship, the physician’s area of
specialization, whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole, and whether
the opinion is supported by medical or other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
Dr. King’s opinion that Thayer was unable to do even sedentary work due to her
physical impairments is not supported by citation to medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques. The only comment provided by Dr. King as “the
particular medical or clinical findings” supporting his opinion is: “[e]xacerbates low back
pain.” (AR 708.) Oddly, in a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related
Activities (Mental),” Dr. King provided clinical findings to support his opinion that
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Thayer is unable to work as a result of her physical impairments, including a 2002 MRI
and a 2003 x-ray. (AR 703 (emphases added).) But, as discussed above, these tests
significantly pre-date the alleged onset date. Similarly, the notes from Drs. Paul Penar
and John Fogarty, cited by Thayer as medical evidence supporting Dr. King’s opinions,
also pre-date the alleged onset date. (AR 237-38.) The notes from Dr. Graham, also
cited by Thayer in support of Dr. King’s opinions, actually support the ALJ’s RFC
determination because they state that Thayer’s pain was only “intermittent” and that she
had a “normal heel-and-toe walk,” which would allow for sedentary work. (AR 355.)
More importantly, Dr. King’s opinions are inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record, including his own treatment notes and Thayer’s self-reporting.
Aas noted above, in September 2008, Thayer reported to Dr. King that her pain was
“fairly well controlled,” despite experiencing muscle spasms in her legs mostly at night.
(AR 348.) A few months later, in December 2008, Dr. King noted that Thayer was
“mov[ing] well[,] getting up on the exam table” and had “normal heel-and-toe walk.”
(AR 344.) In May 2009, Dr. King recorded that Thayer was “fairly active doing her
normal activities,” and that Thayer’s “back shows fairly good range of motion with quick
motion to get up onto the exam table.” (AR 548.) And in November 2009, Dr. King
stated that, although Thayer was having increased numbness and pain in her left leg, she
was “doing fairly well in terms of daily functional activity, getting her chores done, being
able to wash dishes and take a shower, for example.” (AR 725.) The Doctor again noted
that Thayer was “moving fairly easily in the room” and had “normal heel and toe walk.”
(Id.) These contemporaneous recordings in Dr. King’s treatment notes do not support the
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opinion he provided in his physical Medical Source Statement that, for example, Thayer
could never climb stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, reach overhead, push/pull, or operate foot
controls; and was unable to travel without a companion for assistance or walk a block at a
reasonable pace on rough or uneven ground. (AR 707-09.) Nor does Thayer’s own selfreporting support such limitations. In fact, Thayer stated in a Function Report that she
was able to “go out alone” (AR 154), in direct contrast to Dr. King’s statement that
Thayer was unable to “travel without a companion for assistance” (AR 709).
The record as a whole supports the ALJ’s finding that Thayer was able to perform
a wide range of activities when she was not abusing substances, in contravention to Dr.
King’s opinion. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in affording little weight to that opinion.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Thayer’s motion (Doc. 6), GRANTS the
Commissioner’s motion (Doc. 9), and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 6th day of March, 2012.
/s/ John M. Conroy
.
John M. Conroy
United States Magistrate Judge
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