Seeman v. United States Postal Service
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss and case is dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 6/4/2012. (law)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
M. James Seemann,
Plaintiff,
v.
United States Postal
Service,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:11-cv-206
OPINION AND ORDER
(Doc. 6)
Plaintiff M. James Seemann, proceeding pro se, claims
to have suffered harm because his mail was not delivered
properly to a post office box in Rutland, Vermont.
Defendant United States Postal Service (“USPS”) now moves to
dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity and Seemann’s
alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
motion to dismiss is unopposed.
The
For the reasons set forth
below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and this case is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
Factual Background
Seemann commenced this case on August 29, 2011, by
filing a one-page Complaint alleging a failure to properly
deliver his mail.
He claims to have a post office box “at
the Irving Station in Rutland[,] Vermont,” and that “[a]
number of items were not delivered to the box rented by the
plaintiff.”
(Doc. 4 at 1.)
As a result, Seemann has
allegedly had his license suspended four times, and has
“also suffered other monetary damages.”
Id.
For relief,
Seemann seeks compensation in the amount of “one thousand
dollars for documented losses,” and $7,000 for emotional
distress.
The USPS now moves to dismiss the Complaint, arguing
that it is protected by sovereign immunity.
The USPS also
asserts that Seemann has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”).
As noted above, the motion to dismiss is
unopposed.
Discussion
The USPS brings its motion pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedures 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
The standards of
review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim are “substantively identical.”
Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d. Cir.
2003).
However, on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1),
the party invoking the Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden
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of proof to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction
exists, whereas the movant bears the burden of proof on a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Id.
In deciding
both types of motions, the Court must “accept all of the
plaintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint as true and
draw inferences from those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”
Starr v. Georgeson S’holder,
Inc., 412 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2005).
The Court’s review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) is generally limited to “the facts as asserted
within the four corners of the complaint, the documents
attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents
incorporated in the complaint by reference.”
McCarthy v.
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).
In addition, the Court may also consider “matters of which
judicial notice may be taken” and “documents either in
plaintiffs’ possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge
and relied on in bringing suit.”
Brass v. Am. Film Techs.,
Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993).
In deciding a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1), however, the Court “may resolve
disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the
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pleadings, including affidavits.”
State Employees
Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 n.4 (2d
Cir. 2007).
I.
Sovereign Immunity
Pursuant to the Postal Reorganization Act (“PRA”), 39
U.S.C. § 101, et seq., the USPS is “an independent
establishment of the executive branch of the Government of
the United States,” 39 U.S.C. § 201, and, as such, it
“enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver.”
Dolan
v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006).
Although the PRA “generally waives the immunity of the
[USPS] from suit by giving it the power ‘to sue and be sued
in its official name,’” id. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 401(1)), it
also specifically provides that the FTCA “shall apply to
tort claims arising out of activities of the [USPS].”
U.S.C. § 409(c); see Dolan, 546 U.S. at 484.
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Consequently,
and because the claim in this case alleges negligent
delivery of mail, any waiver of sovereign immunity is
dictated by the terms of the FTCA.
The FTCA contains an express waiver of the United
States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of certain
torts committed by federal employees.
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See Ali v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 217-18 (2008) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)); Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70,
80 (2d Cir. 2008).
The FTCA also contains exceptions to its
waiver of sovereign immunity, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§
2680(a)-(n).
See Ali, 552 U.S. at 218; see also Dolan, 546
U.S. at 485 (holding that if one of the FTCA’s exceptions
applies, the bar of sovereign immunity remains).
Federal
courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims
falling within one of the exceptions to the FTCA’s waiver of
sovereign immunity.
See Fazi v. United States, 935 F.2d
535, 537 (2d Cir. 1991).
Relevant to this case, the FTCA specifically exempts
from its waiver of sovereign immunity “[a]ny claim arising
out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of
letters or postal matter.”
546 U.S. at 485.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(b); see Dolan,
Under this “postal matter exception,” the
USPS retains sovereign immunity “for injuries arising,
directly or consequentially, because mail either fails to
arrive at all or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at
the wrong address.”
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 489.
Seemann seeks to hold the USPS liable for damages
suffered as the result his mail failing to arrive and/or
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being misdelivered.
The USPS, pursuant to the FTCA, has
specifically retained sovereign immunity with respect to
such a claim.
See id.
The Court therefore lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this case.
See id.; see also
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (“the
terms of [the government’s] consent to be sued in any court
define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”).
II. Failure To Exhaust
Even if the “postal matter exception” did not
explicitly bar this case, the Court would lack subject
matter jurisdiction because Seemann has not shown compliance
with the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement.
28
U.S.C. § 2401(b); Celestine v. Mount, 403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d
Cir. 2005).
The FTCA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to commencing a lawsuit.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,
113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in
federal court until they have exhausted their administrative
remedies.”).
“[B]ecause the FTCA constitutes a waiver of
sovereign immunity, the procedures set forth [therein] must
be adhered to strictly.”
Keene Corp. v. United States, 700
F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1983).
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The FTCA’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and
not subject to waiver.
See Celestine v. Mount Vernon
Neighborhood Health Center, 403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to both plead
and prove compliance with the statutory requirements” of the
FTCA.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818
F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Johnson v.
Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999).
Here, Seemann’s Complaint is silent on the question of
exhaustion, and there has been no response to the USPS’s
motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the USPS has submitted an
affidavit from John Pyne, a Paralegal Specialist with the
USPS, attesting to the fact that the USPS has not received
an administrative claim from Seemann.
(Doc. 6-1.)
The
Court therefore finds that Seemann has not carried his
burden of proving compliance with the FTCA’s exhaustion
requirement, and that it is thus deprived of subject matter
jurisdiction.
III.
Leave to Amend
The Second Circuit has cautioned that when addressing a
pro se complaint, a district court should not dismiss
without granting leave to amend at least once “when a
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liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a
valid claim might be stated.”
Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d
411, 419 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d
698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Nonetheless, leave to amend my be
denied when amendment would be futile.
See Ruotolo v. City
of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
Seemann’s claim in this case is clearly barred by the
FTCA’s “postal matter exception,” and by Seemann’s failure
to show exhaustion of the FTCA’s administrative process.
Accordingly, any amendment to the Complaint would be futile,
and leave to amend is not warranted.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the USPS’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. 6) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this
4th day of June, 2012.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
Judge, United States District Court
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