Gabriel v. Albany College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences - Vermont Campus (ACPHS) et al
Filing
96
OPINION AND ORDER denying 94 Motion for Entry of Partial Final Judgment. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 1/15/2014. (law)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Matthew Gabriel, f/k/a
Matta Ghobreyal,
Plaintiff,
v.
Albany College of Pharmacy
and Health Sciences Vermont Campus (ACPHS),
Professor Dorothy Pumo,
Ronald A. DeBellis, Dean
Robert Hamilton, Assistant
Professor Joanna Schwartz,
Jason Long, Melissa Long,
Professor Stefan Balaz,
President Dr. James J.
Gozzo, Associate Dean John
Denio, Dr. Peter J.
Cornish, Professor Gail
Goodman Snitkoff, Gerald
Katzman, Accreditation
Council of Pharmacy
Education (ACPE), Peter
H. Vlasses, Lindsay M.
Antikainen,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:12-cv-14
OPINION AND ORDER ON RULE 54(b) MOTION
(Doc. 94)
Defendants Accreditation Council of Pharmacy Education
(“ACPE”), Peter H. Vlasses, and Lindsay M. Antikainen
(collectively “ACPE Defendants”) move for an entry of final
judgment with respect to claims asserted against them by pro
se plaintiff Matthew Gabriel, citing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) (Doc. 94). Gabriel has not filed a response.
For the reasons set forth below, the ACPE Defendants’ motion
for entry of partial final judgment is DENIED.
Background
Gabriel’s claims arise from his tenure as a student at
the Vermont campus of the Albany College of Pharmacy and
Health Sciences (“ACPHS” or “College”). He alleges a charge
of plagiarism brought against him by one of his professors
(later withdrawn) was discriminatory and resulted in
physical, psychological, and monetary harm. In addition to
naming ACPHS, together with several of its administrators,
professors, students, and General Counsel as Defendants
(collectively “ACPHS Defendants”), Gabriel alleges related
against the ACPE Defendants, who include the entity
responsible for accrediting ACPHS, as well as ACPE’s
Executive Director and Accreditation Facilitator. Gabriel
alleges that he complained to ACPE about the treatment he
received at ACPHS no to avail.
Upon granting Defendants’ initial motions to dismiss
(Doc. 51), this Court gave leave for Gabriel to file a
Second Amended Complaint.
The Second Amended Complaint(Doc.
58) alleges discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against
both the ACPHS Defendants and the APCE Defendants, Federal
Title VI and state law breach of contract claims against the
ACPHS Defendants, and common law negligence against the ACPE
Defendants.
The basis of Gabriel’s discrimination claims is
his national origin (Egyptian) and religion (Coptic
Christian).
This Court granted in part and denied in part the
renewed motion to dismiss filed by the ACPHS defendants
(Doc. 60) and granted the renewed motion to dismiss filed by
the ACPE defendants (Doc. 59), thereby dismissing all claims
against ACPE, Lindsay Antikainen, and Peter Vlasses (Doc.
70).
Discussion
ACPE Defendants seek entry of final judgment pursuant
to Rule 54 (b) with respect to the claims asserted against
them, because the remaining claims against the ACPHS
defendants “are unaffected by the presence or absence of the
ACPE Defendants.” (Doc. 94 at 2).
“[T]here is a historic federal policy against piecemeal
appeals.
Thus, in the federal district courts, the entry of
a final judgment is generally appropriate only after all
claims have been adjudicated.” Novick v. AXA Network, LLC,
642 F.3d 304, 3010 (2d Cir. 2011 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Rule 54(b) is an exception, allowing
the court to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
The Second Circuit has directed district courts not to
grant Rule 54 (b) motions “if the same or closely related
issues remain to be litigated” because “[i]t does not
normally advance the interests of sound judicial
administration or efficiency to have piecemeal appeals that
require two (or more) three-judge panels to familiarize
themselves with a given case in successive appeals from
successive decisions on interrelated issues.” Novick, 642
F.3d at 311 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Rule 54 (b) motions should only be granted “in the
infrequent harsh case where there exists some danger of
hardship or injustice through delay which would be
alleviated by immediate appeal.” Citizens Accord, Inc. V.
Town of Rochester, 235 F.3d 126, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted).
Therefore, the district court’s discretion to grant a Rule
54(b) motion should only be used “sparingly.” Novick, at
310.
In the present case, the ACPE Defendants have not
sufficiently shown a danger of hardship or injustice would
result from awaiting final disposition of the remaining
claims. Final entry of judgment should be delayed until the
entire matter is resolved, because Gabriel’s claims arise
from the same intertwined set of facts and circumstances and
allege similar patterns of discrimination under Section 1981
against all defendants. Therefore, in order to prevent
uneven results should the matter be appealed, the Court
exercises its discretion to deny the ACPE Defendants’ motion
for entry of partial final judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Motion for Entry of Partial Final Judgment filed by
Defendants ACPE, Peter H. Vlasses, and Lindsay M. Antikainen
(Doc. 94) is DENIED.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this
15th day of January, 2014.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
Judge, United States District Court
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