Burnham et al v. United States Customs
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 4/2/2013. (law)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Arthur Burnham and
Melody Drake,
Plaintiffs,
v.
United States Customs,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:12-cv-157
OPINION AND ORDER
(Doc. 9)
Plaintiffs Arthur Burnham and Melody Drake, each
proceeding pro se, bring this action seeking the return of
money that was seized by a United States Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) agent on February 20, 2012.
The basis of
their claim is that the United States Attorney’s Office
failed to file a civil forfeiture action in a timely manner.
The government now moves to dismiss, arguing that its
forfeiture filing was timely.
The motion to dismiss is
unopposed.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss
is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.
Factual Background
For purposes of ruling on the pending motion to
dismiss, the facts alleged in the Complaint, as well as
subsequent amendments, will be accepted as true.
On February 20, 2012, Burnham and Drake and their three
children were traveling by car through Vermont on their way
to Toronto, Canada.
At approximately 9:45 a.m., their
vehicle experienced a tire problem while south of the
Canadian border.
Although the Complaint does not detail
their subsequent interactions with a CBP agent, an agent
seized $12,155.29 in United States currency from Plaintiffs
that morning.
On March 9, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a claim form and
request for judicial process.
The claim form was received
and date stamped by Defendant on March 12, 2012.
On June
11, 2012, the government filed a Verified Complaint
(“forfeiture action”) against the seized funds.
Plaintiffs
commenced the instant case on June 17, 2012, claiming that
the government’s forfeiture action was not timely filed, and
that the seized funds should therefore be returned.
Discussion
I.
Legal Standard
The government has moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
When ruling on a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept
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all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Famous
Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d
Cir. 2010).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
When, as in this case, a motion to dismiss is
unopposed, the failure to oppose does not, by itself,
justify dismissal.
See Goldberg v. Danaher, 599 F.3d 181,
183–84 (2d Cir. 2010); McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321,
322–23 (2d Cir. 2000). “[T]he sufficiency of a complaint is
a matter of law that the court is capable of determining
based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of
the law.”
Goldberg, 599 F.3d at 184 (citing McCall, 232
F.3d at 322–23).
Consequently, as with all Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, when deciding an unopposed motion to dismiss the
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Court must “assume the truth of a pleading’s factual
allegations and test only its legal sufficiency.”
McCall,
232 F.3d at 322.
II. Timeliness of the Civil Forfeiture Action
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A) of the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), the government was
required to file its forfeiture action “not later than 90
days after a claim has been filed . . . .”
983(a)(3).
18 U.S.C. §
According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs filed
their claim form on March 12, 2012.
See Pathway Bellows,
Inc. v. Blanchette, 630 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that a paper is considered “‘filed’” when it “has
been delivered to and received by the party with whom it is
to be filed”).
The ninetieth day after the filing of the
claim form was Sunday, June 10, 2012.
The government commenced its forfeiture action the next
day, filing a Verified Complaint on Monday, June 11, 2012.
Plaintiffs now argue that the filing was not made within the
statutorily-required 90 days.
The government responds that
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1)(c), the fact
that the statutory period expired on a Sunday meant that it
had until the following Monday to commence the action.
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Rule 6(a)(1)(C) sets forth procedures for computation
of “any time period specified in these rules . . . or in any
statute that does not specify a method of computing time.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
The rule provides, in relevant
part, that when a time period is stated in “days or a longer
period of time,” it will “include the last day of the
period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the
next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”
Id.
The question presented here is whether this rule
applied to the time period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 983.
As set forth above, Rule 6(a)(1)(C) applies to a
statutory time period when the statute itself is silent on
the question of computation.
Plaintiffs claim that related
regulations specify a method of computation, but cite only
provisions pertaining to the commencement of a 90-day time
period.
(Doc. 7 at 1.)
Neither party has identified
language in 18 U.S.C. § 983, or in CAFRA generally, that
applies to computation of the 90-day period when that period
ends on a weekend or holiday.
Absent any such language in
the statute, Rule 6(a)(1)(C) applies.
See, e.g., United
States v. $448,163.10, 2007 WL 4178508, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov.
5
20, 2007) (applying computation rule set forth in Rule 6(a)
to civil forfeiture action where ninetieth day fell on a
Sunday and forfeiture complaint was filed the following
Monday); United States v. Forty-Four Miscellaneous Firearms,
2007 WL 1101240, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 12, 2007) (finding
government’s civil forfeiture filing timely where deadline
fell on a Sunday, the following Monday was a federal
holiday, and Verified Complaint was filed on Tuesday).
As the Second Circuit has explained, “Rule 6(a) is an
acknowledgment that the functioning of the courts is often
interrupted by holidays, weekends and other events that make
filing impossible.”
Sciano v. United States, 37 F.3d 858,
865 (2d Cir. 1994).
“‘It is difficult to perceive how a
legitimate governmental interest would be prejudiced by
application of . . . Rule 6 . . . to federal statutes of
limitations, [since it] would delay the expiration of a
given period by, at most, two or three days . . . .’” Id.
(quoting 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1163, at 469 (1987)).
Furthermore, application fo Rule 6(a) is not
inconsistent with the purpose of CAFRA’s 90-day deadline.
Prior to CAFRA, there was no deadline for civil forfeiture
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proceedings.
United States v. $39,480.00 in United States
Currency, 190 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(citation omitted).
The 90-day time period was therefore
imposed to “prevent the government from retaining property
subject to forfeiture for an extended period without
commencing a judicial action that will give the claimant his
day in court.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Application of Rule 6 to the § 983 deadline in
this case would do nothing to frustrate this broad
legislative goal of preventing forfeitures for “an extended
period.”
Id; compare Kane v. Douglas, Elliman, Hollyday &
Ives, 635 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying Rule 6(a)
to 90-day filing deadline set forth in Title VII, concluding
that application of the rule would not frustrate the “broad
remedial purposes of Title VII”).
The Court therefore finds
that the government’s commencement of a forfeiture action on
June 11, 2012 was timely, and that Plaintiffs are not
entitled to any relief on the basis of their Complaint.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the government’s
motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED and this case is
DISMISSED.
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Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this
2nd day of April, 2013.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
Judge, United States District Court
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