Tate v. C.E. Bradley Laboratories, Inc.

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER denying without prejudice 6 Motion to Dismiss; denying without prejudice 8 Motion for Appointment of Counsel; granting 9 Motion to Amend Complaint; denying without prejudice 10 Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations; denying without prejudice 12 Motion for an Order Requiring Mediation;. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 7/11/2013. (jam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Christopher Amos Tate,
Plaintiff,
v.
C.E. Bradley Laboratories,
Inc.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:12-cv-216

OPINION AND ORDER
(Docs. 6, 8, 9, 10, 12)
Plaintiff Christopher Tate, proceeding pro se, brings
this action claiming that he was discriminated against on
the basis of his race when he applied for employment in
2004.

Now before the Court is Defendant C.E. Bradley

Laboratories, Inc.’s motion to dismiss the case as untimely.
Tate has responded to the motion, arguing that his history
of mental illness entitles him to equitable tolling.

Also

before the Court are Tate’s motion for appointment of
counsel; motion for tolling of the limitations period;
motion to amend the Complaint; and motion for an order
compelling mediation.

For the reasons set forth below,

Tate’s motion to amend his Complaint is GRANTED, and all
other pending motions are DENIED.

Factual Background
Tate alleges that in 2004, he and another individual,
Leron Bedward, went to a job agency in search of work.

The

agency gave the men a reference sheet that showed Defendant
C.E. Bradley Laboratories with positions for immediate hire.
The two men traveled to Defendant’s office, where they were
met by the owner of the company.

When Tate and Bedward

informed him that they had been referred by the job agency
and were seeking to complete a job application, the owner
allegedly told them that they must leave the premises.

Tate

states in his Complaint that “[h]e made us feel like we were
not suppose[d] to be in Vermont because of our skin color.
The owner refuse[d] to give us [an] application because we
were young and black.”

(Doc. 3 at 3.)

Tate further claims that “[t]he EEOC found that we were
discriminated [against].”

Id. at 4.

Bedward reportedly

received a settlement after the EEOC administrative process,
but Tate “was not present.”

Id.

Tate acknowledges that his

current Complaint may be time-barred, but asserts that he
has “been trying to get stable on meds for years now.”

Id.

For relief, he is requesting compensation for earnings he
could have received, as well as for emotional distress and

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depression he allegedly suffered as a result of being made
to “feel[] worthless as a black man.”

Id.

Tate further

requests punitive damages in the amount of five million
dollars.
I.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that any and all
limitations periods have run, including the time for filing
an administrative charge or lawsuit under Title VII, and
that Tate has “failed to allege any basis for tolling prior
to the expiration of the limitations period.”
3.)

(Doc. 6-1 at

Tate acknowledges that the relevant limitations periods

have passed, but argues for equitable tolling on the basis
of “psychotic symptoms” since early 2005 “that prevented him
from exercising his right to state a claim in civil court.”
(Doc. 10 at 1.)
Pursuant to Title VII, a charge of discrimination must
be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of any alleged
unlawful employment practice, or within 300 days where there
is a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek
relief from such practice.

Robles v. Cox & Co., 841 F.

Supp. 2d 615, 625 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

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2000e–5(e)(1)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).

Once the

administrative process is complete and the EEOC has issued a
“right to sue” letter, the plaintiff is considered to have
exhausted his administrative remedies.
A plaintiff must commence a Title VII claim in federal
court within 90 days of his receipt of the EEOC’s right to
sue letter.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(f)(1).

This limitations

period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in
federal court, and may be subject to equitable tolling.

See

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398
(1982); Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d
143, 146 (2d Cir. 1984).

However, equitable tolling is only

appropriate in “rare and exceptional circumstance[s],” such
as when a party “is prevented in some extraordinary way from
exercising his rights.”

Zerilli–Edelglass v. New York City

Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003).

For example,

the Second Circuit has endorsed equitable tolling where the
plaintiff (1) filed a defective pleading that otherwise
would have been timely, (2) was unaware of his cause of
action due to the misleading conduct of the defendant, or
(3) has a medical or mental condition preventing him from
proceeding in a timely fashion.

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See id.

In such cases, a

court must also consider whether the plaintiff “(1) has
acted with reasonable diligence during the time period []he
seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the
circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should
apply.”

Id. at 80–81 (internal quotation omitted).

Pro se

filings, although held to more lenient standards, are not
excused from establishing these elements.

See, e.g.,

Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2000).
In this case, Tate contends that he has been suffering
from mental illness that rendered him unable to file suit
until 2012.

In his Complaint, he states that he seeks

“exemptions under law to allow me to by[pass] the statute of
limitations because [of] incompetency, involuntary
commitment to state hospital, being out of the State of
Vermont and not being on stable medication.”

(Doc. 3 at 4.)

He also contends that he was unable to understand the full
extent of his damages until he was “stable on medication.”
Id.

Defendant contends that these claims are conclusory,

and do “not state how [Tate’s] mental condition ‘affected
[his] capacity to function generally or in relationship to
[the pursuit] of [his] rights.’”

(Doc. 6-1 at 2) (quoting

Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)).

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In his written opposition to Defendant’s motion, Tate
states that he is in the process of gathering documentation
of his history of mental illness, and that his efforts are
intended “to show past and current circumstance[s] that
prevented the Plaintiff from exercising his right to sue in
civil court for [the alleged] federal violation.”
at 1-2.)

(Doc. 7-1

He therefore requests either an extension of time

or a hearing to resolve the tolling question.
Tate subsequently filed a motion to toll the
limitations period, to which he attached reports from two
competency assessments conducted in 2009.

The first report

documents a history of mental illness that has included
“multiple inpatient hospitalizations and involuntary
commitments.”

(Doc. 10-1 at 3.)

Since 2005, Tate has been

involuntarily committed at least three times for inpatient
psychiatric treatment, with diagnoses including
Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type and Bipolar Disorder.

In 2007,

he was “adjudged incompetent to proceed” by a Florida court,
although his competency was deemed “restored” in 2008.
To the person performing the assessment, Tate reported
experiencing “delusional thought content” that involved
“influence by others [sic] control in the form of others

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Id.

hearing his thoughts and grandiosity.”

Id. at 4.

He also

stated that he experienced “mostly auditory hallucinations,
but sometimes will have visual hallucinations as well,
especially if he is off his medication and abusing drugs
such as cocaine.”

Id.

According to the second report, Tate’s medical records
showed seven hospitalizations in the three years prior to
2009.

He reportedly has no history of a chronic medical

condition, but his history of mental health issues dates
back to when he was thirteen years old (Tate was born in
1984).

At the time of the assessment in March 2009, he was

receiving anti-psychotic medication.
Most recently, Tate filed a proposed Amended Complaint
in which he states that he was prevented from filing suit
“because of serious symptom[s] from schizophrenia that
cause[d] me on and off to be in a psychosis state of mind.
I would take medication for a time and became a little
better but the side effects from the medication made me not
take them and put me in delusional bipolar psychosis state
of mind.”

(Doc. 11 at 3-4.)

He further explains that “I

never really got truly stable because of the side effect[s]
until I got to prison in mental health crisis unit in prison

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which is a transitional care unit . . .
for 3 years on and off.”

I’ve been in TCU

Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).

“[T]he question of whether a person is sufficiently
mentally disabled to justify tolling of a limitation period
is, under the law of this Circuit, highly case-specific.”
Boos, 201 F.3d at 184 (holding plaintiff was not entitled to
equitable tolling where her mental incapacity claim amounted
to no more than a mere statement that she suffered from
“paranoia, panic attacks, and depression”).

Because

equitable tolling is highly fact-specific, the Second
Circuit has found that the issue is best analyzed in the
context of summary judgment.

See Mandarino v. Mandarino,

180 F. App’x 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Stella v.
Porter, 297 F. App’x 43, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(c) because the district court
should have accepted plaintiff’s allegation that he was
unable to comply with subsequent time limits due to mental
illness); Brown v. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 60
(2d Cir. 2002) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to
determine whether equitable tolling of period in which to
file Title VII claim was warranted in light of plaintiff’s
mental condition).

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In this case, Tate offers assertions in his Complaint,
and has provided subsequent documentation, to alert the
Court that his mental illness may have made it impossible to
file suit in a timely manner.

Although the dates set forth

in his submissions do not completely fill the time period
between the alleged discrimination in 2004 and the filing of
a Complaint in 2012, “the documented period [is]
sufficiently close in time to raise a reasonable inference
as to his condition at the pertinent time.”
at 60.

Brown, 287 F.3d

Accordingly, accepting Tate’s statements as true,

the Court finds that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) would be
premature, and that a more appropriate review of the issue
may be conducted after both parties have had an opportunity
to present all relevant evidence.

See, e.g., Stella, 297 F.

App’x at 45 (specifically declining to “opine as to whether”
the plaintiff’s claims would survive summary judgment).
Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is therefore DENIED
without prejudice with respect to the issue of equitable
tolling.
II. Tate’s Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations
Because the Court has determined that full
consideration of the tolling question cannot be performed at

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the pleadings stage, Tate’s motion to toll the statute of
limitations (Doc. 10) is DENIED without prejudice as
premature.
III.

Tate’s Motion to Amend Complaint
Tate has moved to amend his Complaint.

The proposed

Amended Complaint contains essentially the same facts as set
forth in the original Complaint, with a few clarifications
and additional information about Tate’s mental health
background.

The motion to amend is unopposed.

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states
that “[t]he court should give leave [to amend] freely when
justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also

Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A pro se
plaintiff, particularly one bringing a civil rights action,
should be afforded an opportunity fairly freely to amend his
complaint . . . unless it appears to a certainty that
plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of the
facts.”).

In this case, the proposed Amended Complaint sets

forth substantially the same claims as the initial
Complaint.

The Court therefore finds no prejudice in

allowing an amended pleading, and the motion to amend (Doc.
9) is GRANTED.

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IV. Tate’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Tate has also moved the Court to appoint pro bono
counsel to represent him.

He claims that he is currently

undergoing “intense therapy,” but that his “extreme
depression and paranoia” nonetheless “prevent him from
representing himself properly.”

(Doc. 8 at 1.)

Tate also

reports that he has requested pro bono counsel in a lawsuit
against President Obama that is currently pending in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.
There is no constitutional rights to appointment of
counsel for litigants in civil cases.

Cooper v. A. Sargenti

Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172–74 (2d Cir. 1989).

District courts

nevertheless have “[b]road discretion . . . in deciding
whether to appoint counsel.”

Hodge v. Police Officers, 802

F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)
(providing district courts may “request an attorney to
represent any person unable to afford counsel.”).

In

considering a motion for appointment of counsel, a district
court “should first determine whether the indigent’s
position [is] likely to be of substance.”

Cooper, 877 F.2d

at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Upon satisfying

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this threshold requirement, the district court considers
secondary factors, including the “plaintiff’s ability to
obtain representation independently, and his ability to
handle the case without assistance in . . . light of the
required factual investigation, the complexity of the legal
issues, and the need for expertly conducted
cross-examination to test veracity.”

Id.

No single factor

is controlling in a particular case, as “each case must be
decided on its own facts.”

Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61.

Here, it is not clear whether Tate’s underlying claim
of race discrimination has merit.

Nonetheless, even if the

Court accepts the facts in the Complaint as true, the first
question in the case is whether Tate has presented his claim
in a timely manner.

For that inquiry, the secondary factors

set forth above do not weigh in favor of appointing counsel
at this time.

Specifically, Tate has begun independently

presenting his case for tolling; the factual inquiry with
respect to the question of tolling is also under way; the
tolling issue is not particularly complex; and there is no
indication that cross-examination will play a role in
determining whether the equities favor a tolling of the
limitations period.

The motion for appointment of counsel

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(Doc. 8) is therefore DENIED without prejudice to re-filing
after the question of timeliness has been resolved.
V.

Tate’s Motion to Compel Mediation
The final motion before the Court is Tate’s “Motion for

Order of Mediation,” in which he asks the Court to compel a
mediation session with the Defendant.

Defendant has filed

an objection to the motion, and Tate does not cite any legal
grounds for such an order.

While the parties are free to

engage in settlement negotiations at any time, the Court
sees no basis for compelling mediation at this time.

The

motion to compel mediation (Doc. 12) is therefore DENIED.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. 6) and Tate’s motion for appointment of
counsel (Doc. 8), motion to toll the statute of limitations
(Doc. 10), and motion for an order requiring mediation (Doc.
12) are DENIED without prejudice.

Tate’s motion to amend

his Complaint (Doc. 9) is GRANTED.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this
11th day of July, 2013.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
Judge, United States District Court
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