Todd v. Hatin et al

Filing 21

ORDER AND OPINION granting in part and denying in part 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . The motion is granted with respect to Logan Todds section 1983 claim for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, but denied with respect to Logan Todds section 1983 claim for the violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 8/5/2013. (law)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
LOGAN TODD
Plaintiff,
v.
CHUCK HATIN, ANDREW PALLITO,
WADE JOHNSON, and JEANNE JEAN,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:13-cv-05

ORDER AND OPINION
This is an action brought by Logan Todd to recover damages
from Chuck Hatin, Andrew Pallito, Wade Johnson, and Jeanne Jean
(“the Defendants”), Vermont Department of Corrections officials,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Logan Todd’s Fourteenth
and Eighth Amendment rights.

The complaint stems from Logan

Todd’s imprisonment for nearly fifteen months past the date he
was supposed to be released from prison.

Before the Court is

the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the

reasons set forth below, the motion, EFC No. 14, is granted with
regard to Logan Todd’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, but denied
with regard to Logan Todd’s Eighth Amendment claims.
BACKGROUND
Logan Todd was improperly and unnecessarily incarcerated
for nearly fifteen months.

Compl. ¶ 11.
1

On July 27, 2010,

Vermont Superior Court Judge Rainville found that Logan Todd
violated conditions of his probation and imposed a “fully
suspended” sentence.

Id. ¶ 10.

However, Judge Rainville also

ordered that Logan Todd remain in prison until he obtained
housing approved by his probation officer, Defendant Chuck
Hatin.

Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss (hereinafter “Pl.’s

Resp.”) at 1.

Hatin attended the hearing and was aware of Judge

Rainville’s findings.

Contrary to Judge Rainville’s direction

at trial, the court clerk issued a mittimus revoking Logan
Todd’s probation and ordering that he serve his underlying
sentence of two to four and a half years in prison.

Compl. ¶

11.
After the sentencing hearing, Logan Todd’s father, Bill
Todd, worked with Hatin to find approved housing for him.
Resp. at 3.

Pl.’s

Eventually, on September 28, Bill Todd informed

Hatin that he had rented an apartment in St. Albans for Logan
Todd, which Hatin had previously approved.

Compl. ¶ 12.

Contrary to the expectations of Bill Todd and Hatin, Logan
Todd was not immediately released.

Bill Todd contacted Hatin

about why Logan Todd was still being held.

On October 7, Hatin

responded, “I am being told there is a problem with [Logan
Todd’s] court paperwork, I am attempting to rectify the issue
with the Deputy State’s Attorney.

You may want to contact

Logan’s defense attorney to assist us in straightening things
2

out.”

Pl.’s Resp. at 4.

Bill Todd forwarded Hatin’s e-mail to

Logan Todd’s attorney, who also contacted the State’s Attorney.
Def.’s Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
(hereinafter “Def.’s Reply”), Ex. 1-135.
Efforts to remedy the situation seemed to be progressing in
early October of 2010.

On October 11, Logan Todd’s attorney

assured Bill Todd that “we are finally getting some assistance
directly from the court.”

Id. at Ex. 1-136.

But after an e-

mail from Bill Todd to Hatin on October 15 and a phone call from
Hatin to Bill Todd on October 19, there is no indication of any
effort to secure Logan Todd’s release.

Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 8.

Ten months later, on August 15, 2011, Logan Todd wrote a
letter to Governor Shumlin claiming that he was being unlawfully
incarcerated.

Compl. ¶ 17.

The letter was referred to

Defendant Andrew Pallito, Commissioner of the Vermont Department
of Correction (“DOC”), who assigned the letter to Defendant Wade
Johnson, a DOC employee.

Johnson responded to Logan Todd that

Defendant Jeanne Jean, a DOC caseworker, would speak with him
about his situation.

Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

a conversation ever occurred.

There is no indication that

Id. ¶ 19.

With the assistance of a new attorney, Logan Todd filed a
habeas corpus petition in Vermont Superior Court on December 15,
2011.

Id. ¶ 20.

At the habeas hearing, Judge Kupersmith

reviewed the transcript from the sentencing hearing and
3

determined that Judge Rainville intended for Logan Todd to be
released upon obtaining approved housing.
Resp., Ex. 3.

Compl. ¶ 22; Pl.’s

On December 27, 2011 Judge Kupersmith granted the

habeas petition, and Logan Todd was released from prison.
Compl. ¶ 26.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
To state a claim for relief sufficient to survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Ashcroft v.

A section 1983 claim will

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when the complaint
alleges: “(1) the conduct complained of was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Parratt v.

Tayor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).

The Court must

construe the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw
all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, but an assumption of
truth is not afforded to legal conclusions.
at 678.
II.

The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
4

Ashcroft, 556 U.S.

No State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”
§ 1.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV,

A section 1983 claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment

requires that the plaintiff show that he was denied procedural
due process.

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (“The

Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations
of liberty. It protects only against deprivations of liberty
accomplished without due process of law.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
An inmate is deprived of his liberty when he is detained
beyond the expiration of his sentence.

Calhoun v. New York Div.

of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1993).

Prison

officials must provide an inmate with meaningful procedures to
challenge a sentence when prison officials are responsible for
calculating or interpreting an inmate’s sentence.

Haygood v.

Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[D]ue process in
this case required the state to provide Haygood with a
meaningful hearing at a meaningful time.”).

However, where a

sentence is based on a court order, the process due is judicial
process.

See Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228,

1239 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The proper procedure for a party who
wishes to contest the legality of a court order enforcing a
judgment is to appeal that order and the underlying judgment,
not to sue the official responsible for its execution.”).
5

Post-

deprivation procedures can satisfy the procedural due process
requirement where it is impractical to provide pre-deprivation
procedures to challenge the deprivation.

Parratt, 451 U.S. at

541.
The Defendants are not liable under section 1983 for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation because they did not deprive
Logan Todd of procedural due process.

Challenging the validity

of Logan Todd’s mittimus required judicial intervention and was
properly accomplished through post-deprivation judicial process.
At all times that process was available to Logan Todd under
Vermont law.

See Vt. R. Crim. P. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in

judgments, orders, or other parts of the record . . . may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on
the motion of any party . . . .”).

Because Logan Todd was

provided adequate process to remedy a judicial error, Logan Todd
was not deprived of procedural due process.1
Even if Logan Todd could show that he was denied due
process of law, the Defendants are protected by quasi-judicial
immunity with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment claim because
that claim is predicated on the Defendants’ conduct in carrying
1

It is instructive to contrast this case with Russo v. City of Bridgeport,
479 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2007). In Russo, police officers failed to turn over a
video tape that proved the Plaintiff’s innocence. As a result, the Plaintiff
was detained for 217 days while awaiting trial. The officers’ failure to
produce the video denied the Plaintiff due process by obstructing the
Plaintiff’s ability to challenge his pre-trial detention. There are no
allegations in here that the Defendants obstructed Logan Todd’s ability to
make a Rule 36 motion to correct the erroneous mittimus.

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out a facially valid mittimus.

Prison officials cannot be held

liable under section 1983 for claims flowing from the execution
of a facially valid court order.

See, e.g., Engebertson v.

Mahoney, No. 10-35626, 2013 WL 3242512 at *4-5 (9th Cir. June
28, 2013)(“ [W]e hold that prison officials . . . who are charged
with executing facially valid court orders enjoy absolute
immunity from [section] 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by
those orders.”); Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593, 598-99 (8th Cir.
2006) (“[J]ailers and wardens are absolutely immune from damages
flowing from the fact of a prisoner’s incarceration, when the
incarceration occurs pursuant to a facially valid order of
confinement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Francis v.
Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1954) (“The privilege of
the jailor to impose confinement . . . is, we think, quite as
time-honored in the Anglo-American common law as is the immunity
of the members of the legislature and of judges.”); Ravenscroft
v. Casey, 139 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1944).
Quasi-judicial immunity derives from the absolute immunity
of judicial officers for “acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction,” and benefits the public by ensuring the efficient
and independent function of the judicial branch.

Pierson v.

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); see also Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (explaining that judicial immunity covers
officials performing duties that are comparable to functions for
7

which judges are immune).

The integrity of the judicial process

is protected when officials can rely on facially valid court
orders and when judges are certain that their orders will be
enforced.

See Patterson v. Von Reisen, 999 F.2d 1235, 1240-41

(8th Cir. 1993).

A court’s error is properly corrected on

appeal, not attacked collaterally through civil litigation.
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; see also Valdez v. Denver, 878 F.2d
1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[Prison] [o]fficials . . . must
not be required to act as a pseudo-appellate courts scrutinizing
the orders of judges.”).
Despite potential unfairness to plaintiffs, requiring
prison officials to second-guess a court order when questions
arise regarding its validity would place prison officials in a
dilemma.

See Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289.

On the one hand, public

officials could face section 1983 liability if an order is later
found to be erroneous.

On the other hand, “[p]ublic officials .

. . who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do
not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their office.”
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974).
In Dupree v. City of New York, an inmate was jailed for a
parole violation and subsequently detained for two months beyond
the expiration of his sentence because the parole board was
unable to schedule a final parole revocation hearing prior to
the expiration of the sentence.

418 F. Supp. 2d 555, 556-57
8

(S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Despite the fact that the inmate was

incarcerated for two months beyond the expiration of his
sentence, the inmate’s section 1983 suit against the New York
City Department of Corrections (“NYC DOC”) failed because the
NYC DOC “lawfully detained [the plaintiff] pursuant to a
facially valid warrant issued by the New York State Division of
Parole.”

Id. at 559.

Similarly, in Francis, the First Circuit

extended immunity to former commissioners of corrections,
supervisors of correctional institutions, and parole officers
serving during the an inmate’s detention on the grounds that
those officials were following valid court orders and had no
legal duty or authority to order the inmate’s release, even
though the detention was later found to be erroneous.

216 F.2d

at 585, 86, 88.
Logan Todd acknowledges that on its face the mittimus
revoked his probation and dictated that he be held in prison.
Compl. ¶ 11.

As in Dupree, the Defendants merely followed a

facially valid mittimus.

And as in Francis, the Defendants did

not have the authority to order Logan Todd’s release in the face
of a facially valid mittimus.

See id. at 585 (“The

Commissioners of Corrections had no function, like that of the
Superior Court on a writ of habeas corpus, to go behind said
judicial order of commitment to inquire into the validity of the
procedure leading up to its issuance.”).
9

Because Logan Todd was

incarcerated on the basis of a facially valid mittimus, the
Defendants are immune from section 1983 liability for claims
predicated on the execution of the mittimus.
III. The Eighth Amendment Claim
“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must
show: (1) a deprivation that is objectively, sufficiently
serious that he was denied the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities and (2) a sufficiently culpable state of mind
on the part of the defendant official, such as deliberate
indifference.”

Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir.

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In regard to the

first element, “imprisonment beyond one’s term constitutes
punishment within the meaning of the [E]ighth [A]mendment.”
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989); Wright v.
Kane, No. 94 Civ. 3836, 1997 WL 746457, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2,
1997) (“Detention beyond the termination of a sentence can
constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it is the result of
deliberate indifference”).

In regard to the second element, the

Supreme Court has defined deliberate indifference as a state of
mind more blameworthy than negligence but “something less than
acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm.”
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).

Farmer

Deliberate indifference

requires that “the official must be both aware of the facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
10

serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.”

Id.

at 836-37.
Courts apply a three part-inquiry to evaluate whether a
defendant’s conduct violates the Eighth Amendment: (1) did the
defendant have knowledge of the fact the plaintiff was at risk
of unwarranted punishment, (2) did the defendant fail to act or
take ineffectual actions, and (3) was there a causal connection
between the defendants failure to act and the infliction of
unwarranted punishment?

Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110; see, e.g.,

Peterson v. Tomaselli, 469 F. Supp. 2d 146, 163 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)(applying the Sample test).
The complaint alleges sufficient facts to support the
inference that Hatin was deliberately indifferent and violated
Logan Todd’s Eighth Amendment rights.

First, Hatin’s knowledge

that Logan Todd was at risk of unwarranted punishment is
predicated on his presence at the sentencing hearing where Judge
Rainville indicated that Logan Todd was to be released from
prison upon obtaining approved housing.

Based on his

understanding from the hearing, Hatin actively assisted Bill
Todd in finding and approving housing for Logan Todd so that
Logan Todd could be released from prison.

In so doing, Hatin

acted in a manner consistent with his knowledge that Logan Todd
should be released upon securing approved housing.

Second, it

is reasonable to infer that after Hatin learned of the error in
11

the mittimus his efforts to secure Logan Todd’s release were
ineffectual based on the fact that Logan Todd spent nearly
fifteen more months in jail.

Finally, it is plausible that

Hatin’s allegedly ineffectual efforts were a cause of Logan
Todd’s prolonged detention.

It is reasonable to infer that

Logan Todd would not have been held as long as he was if Hatin
requested an amended mittimus or more effectively communicated
his knowledge regarding Logan Todd’s sentence to others in the
corrections system.
As with Hatin, the complaint alleges facts to support the
allegation that Pallito, Johnson, and Jean had knowledge of
Logan Todd’s situation.

According to the complaint, Logan

Todd’s letter to Governor Shumlin passed through the hands of
each of the Defendants.

The Defendants allegedly had access to

the Logan Todd’s file, which included Todd’s plea agreement and
Hatin’s notes, both of which stated he was to remain on
probation.

Pl.’s Resp. at 11.

The Defendants allegedly failed

to inspect Logan Todd’s file despite the evidence of the
mistaken mittimus.

Additionally, the promised follow-up by Jean

is alleged to never have occurred.

At this stage in the

proceedings, the Court can infer that this failure to look into
Logan Todd’s complaint constituted deliberate indifference and
was a cause of his prolonged detention.

12

In summary, the complaint adequately alleges that the all
Defendants were deliberately indifferent and violated Logan
Todd’s Eighth Amendment rights by virtue of (1) their knowledge
about his unwarranted imprisonment, (2) their inaction or
ineffectual action to ensure Logan Todd was not wrongfully
imprisoned between end of September of 2010 and December 27,
2011, and (3) the connection between the Defendants’ inactions
or ineffectual actions and the time that Logan Todd was wrongly
incarcerated.

See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110.

The Defendants are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity
for the Eighth Amendment claim.

Quasi-judicial immunity is

available to non-judicial officers when they are engaged in
conduct that is “functionally comparable” to the duties of
judicial officers.

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S.

429, 435 (1993); Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th
Cir. 2004) (noting that prosecutors are entitled to quasijudicial immunity for activities related to the judicial phase
of a prosecution, but only entitled to qualified immunity “when
performing investigatory or administrative functions”).

Quasi-

judicial immunity is not appropriate when an allegation against
a prison official is “not an attack on the judge’s sentence, but
on the manner of executing that sentence.”
366 Fed. Appx. 683, 685 (7th Cir. 2010).

13

Schneider v. Will,

Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment claim, which is based on
the Defendants conduct in executing the mittimus, the Eighth
Amendment claim is based on the Defendants deliberate
indifference to a known and specific harm suffered by Logan
Todd.

The Defendants’ decision to not adequately assist Logan

Todd when the Defendants allegedly knew that their failure to do
so would result in Logan Todd’s unwarranted detention is not
conduct that is functionally comparable to the duties of a
judicial officer.

The Defendants’ alleged failure to seek an

amended mittimus or more effectively communicate their knowledge
to others in the corrections system are decisions made within
their discretion as executive branch officials and not governed
by a court order.

Therefore, quasi-judicial immunity does not

protect the Defendants from the Eighth Amendment claim.
The Defendants, however, urge the Court to grant their
motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified

immunity requires that the defendant show that either: (1) the
plaintiff has not suffered a violation of his rights; or (2) the
violated right was not clearly established at the time of the
violation.

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)

(allowing courts discretion in how to employ the two-part
qualified immunity analysis in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
(2001)).

A defendant asserting qualified immunity faces a more

stringent standard at the pleadings stage because “the plaintiff
14

is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged,
not only those that support his claim, but also those that
defeat the immunity defense.”
436 (2d Cir. 2004).

McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432,

The question here is whether the facts

alleged give rise to a plausible inference that the Defendants’
failure to act to secure Todd’s release violated clearly
established law.
A right is not clearly established “if ‘officers of
reasonable competence could disagree’ on the legality of the
defendant’s actions.”

Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d

Cir. 1995) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986));
see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.”).

However, conduct does not have to be

explicitly held unconstitutional to be clearly established as
such “if decisions by this or other circuit courts clearly
foreshadow a particular ruling on the issue.”

Scott v. Fischer,

616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

The

inquiry into whether a defendant’s conduct is clearly
established as an unconstitutional violation of a right “must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as
a broad general proposition.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

15

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Logan Todd’s favor,
the Court finds that qualified immunity is not appropriate at
this stage in the proceedings.

Decisions in other circuit

courts establish that corrections officials have a duty to take
actions to ensure an inmate is not detained beyond his sentence
when that official knows or should know that the detention is
unwarranted and understands that the situation will persist
without his intervention.

Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110 (“[I]f a

prison official knows that, given his or her job description or
the role he or she has assumed in the administration of the
prison, a sentence calculation problem will not likely be
resolved unless he or she addresses it or refers it to others,
it is far more likely [deliberate indifference] will be
present.”).
The Third Circuit found that a corrections official was
deliberately indifferent for failing to investigate an alleged
sentencing error when “[i]t [was] not disputed that [he] had the
duty, believed he had the duty, and was understood by prisoners
to have the duty expeditiously to unravel sentencing problems.”
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1112.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found

that a prison official’s failure to investigate an inmate’s
claim that his sentence was wrongly calculated was a breach of
that official’s duty, which was “clearly established by virtue
of the Bureau of Prisons regulations and policies.”
16

Alexander

v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1989).

Courts in the

Second Circuit have also acknowledged that failure to act in the
face of knowledge of an inmate’s wrongful detention constitutes
an Eighth Amendment violation.

See, e.g., Rivera v. Carroll,

No. 07 Civ. 7847, 2009 WL 2365240, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2009)
(“[I]t cannot be said that reasonable officials would believe it
permissible to allow Plaintiff to remain in custody beyond his
release date.”); Brown v. Coughlin, 704 F. Supp. 41, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Failure to act while [an inmate] remained
imprisoned beyond his release date is not conduct protected by
qualified immunity.”).
Logan Todd has alleged facts showing that the Defendants
had knowledge that he should have been released upon obtaining
approved housing.

It also can be inferred that the Defendants

understood that their failure to act subjected Logan Todd to
continued unwarranted incarceration based on the Defendants’
roles in the prison system and the fact that each day the
Defendants did not act Logan Todd remained in prison.

After

discovery, the facts underlying the Eighth Amendment claim may
be established, and the Defendants may raise the issue of
qualified immunity again.

See McKenna, 386 F.3d at 436.

this stage, however, the allegations suggest that the
Defendants’ conduct may be unconstitutional under the duty
established by Sample and Perrill.
17

At

CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss, EFC No. 14, is granted in part and
denied in part.

The motion is granted with respect to Logan

Todd’s section 1983 claim for violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights, but denied with respect to Logan Todd’s
section 1983 claim for the violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 5th
day of August, 2013.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
District Court Judge

18