Adams v. Department of Children and Families, Commissioner
Filing
47
OPINION AND ORDER granting 36 and 37 Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Defendants Keith Horton, Dave Yacavone, and the Vermont Office of Child Support are dismissed without prejudice. Defendant Georgia Division of Child Support Services shall respond to the Amended Complaint within 20 days of this Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 3/6/2015. (law)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
BAHJI AMELIA ADAMS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
KEITH HORTON, Commissioner of :
the Georgia Department of
:
Human Services, GEORGIA
:
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT
:
SERVICES, DAVE YACAVONE,
:
Commissioner of the Vermont
:
Department of Children and
:
Families, VERMONT OFFICE OF
:
CHILD SUPPORT,
:
:
Defendants.
:
Case No. 2:13-cv-10
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Bahji Amelia Adams brings this action claiming
Defendants have denied her due process and violated her rights
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and
Rehabilitation Act.
Now before the Court are motions to dismiss
filed by Defendants Keith Horton, Commissioner of the Georgia
Department of Human Services (“Georgia DHS”), Dave Yacavone,
Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Children and Families
(“DCF”), and the Vermont Office of Child Support (“OCS”).
The
motions raise several arguments for dismissal, including lack of
personal jurisdiction over Commissioner Horton, lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and mootness.
For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are
granted and those Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
Factual Background
The Amended Complaint alleges that Ms. Adams is disabled,
and that the failure of courts and government officials to
accommodate her disabilities has caused her financial harm.
Her
disabilities are the result of a 2003 automobile accident in
which she suffered a traumatic brain injury.
A psychological
evaluation conducted in 2005 concluded that Ms. Adams is impaired
in her ability to follow directions, perform multiple tasks, work
at a reasonable pace, and function interpersonally.1
She also
allegedly suffers from chronic lower back pain, cervical spine
pain, and migraines.
In August 2005, Ms. Adams filed a complaint in Georgia
Superior Court seeking a divorce from her husband, Adam George.
In the course of that proceeding, Ms. Adams, at times proceeding
pro se, made requests for accommodations because of her inability
to process the information required for litigation.
She alleges
that the state court failed to address her requests and never
properly considered her need for accommodations.
In November
2007, the state court awarded sole legal and physical custody of
the couple’s son to Mr. George and ordered Ms. Adams to pay child
support in the amount of $601 per month.
Ms. Adams subsequently filed suit against various parties,
1
Ms. Bryant initiated this case pro se, but in light of her
representation that she is “legally incompetent” the Court appointed
counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
2
including her ex-husband and state officials, in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
See
Adams v. Georgia, 2007 WL 4979007, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27,
2007); Adams v. Georgia, 2008 WL 649179, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
5, 2008); Adams v. State of Georgia, No. 1:08-cv-280 (N.D. Ga.
June 30, 2008).
Her claims included challenges to the state
court proceedings on the basis of due process and ADA violations.
Each of those claims was dismissed.
Despite her physical and mental impairments, Ms. Adams has
been able to work as a flight attendant.
She began work for
Comair in November 2007, and continued until her furlough in
December 2008.
She joined Comair again in July 2010, where she
worked until a second furlough in January 2012.
In August 2010, Ms. Adams discovered that she was missing
her passport.
When she tried to obtain a replacement, she
learned that in June 2009 the State of Georgia had certified her
to the U.S. State Department’s Passport Denial Program due to her
child support arrearage.
The Passport Denial Program is a joint
venture by the state and federal governments, and can be applied
to persons owing child support in an amount exceeding $2,500.
In
Georgia, the program is implemented by the state Division of
Child Support Services (“Georgia DCSS”).
Ms. Adams claims that she did not receive timely notice from
the State of Georgia with respect to her certification to the
3
Passport Denial Program, and that Georgia’s procedures for
implementing passport denial do not take into consideration a
person’s disabilities or need for accommodations.
She ultimately
found her passport, but continued to pursue the matter of
certification because her passport was set to expire in 2012.
In September 2010, Ms. Adams forwarded a letter from her
employer to the Georgia DCSS explaining that her employment
required possession of a valid passport.
Georgia’s procedures
for implementing the Passport Denial Program allegedly provided
an exemption where a passport is necessary in order to generate
income.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Georgia state
officials initially failed to act upon Ms. Adams’s inquiry.
The
Amended Complaint further alleges that because of the status of
her passport, she was unable to obtain work as a flight attendant
after September 2012.
In January 2013, the Georgia DCSS informed Ms. Adams that if
she disagreed with the stated debt amount she could request an
administrative hearing.
Because of the narrow grounds for
seeking review, Ms. Adams did not request a hearing.
Ms. Adams moved to Vermont in 2010.
In March 2013, the
Vermont OCS filed a Registration of Foreign Support Order to
enforce the Georgia Superior Court’s child support order.
The
OCS also notified Ms. Adams of her child support arrearage and
its own intent to certify her to the Passport Denial Program.
4
The Georgia DCSS ceased its enforcement activities in December
2013, and the Vermont OCS is currently the only agency enforcing
Ms. Adams’s child support obligations.
Ms. Adams filed suit in this Court on January 16, 2013.
On
May 14, 2013, a Vermont Superior Court registered the Georgia
child support order and ruled that if Ms. Adams made a $500
payment toward her arrearage, her passport restrictions would be
released.
Ms. Adams obtained a new passport in October 2013.
The Amended Complaint sets forth claims under the ADA,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process
Clause.
In Count I, Ms. Adams alleges that the Georgia DCSS and
its Director Keith Horton failed to take her disabilities into
account when they certified her to the Passport Denial Program.
By failing to modify their procedures or provide other
accommodation, those defendants allegedly deprived Ms. Adams of
the opportunity to gain meaningful employment.
In Count II, she
claims that the Vermont OCS and Commissioner Yacavone similarly
failed to take her disabilities into account.
Count III claims
that the Georgia DCSS and Commissioner Horton failed to provide
due process before certifying Ms. Adams to the Passport Denial
Program.
For relief, the Amended Complaint seeks an injunction
on any further denials, revocations, or restrictions on Ms.
Adams’s passport; an injunction on further certification to the
Passport Denial Program without considering the need for
5
reasonable accommodations; judgment against the Georgia DCSS in
the amount of $100,000; and attorney’s fees.
Discussion
I.
Vermont Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Yacavone, sued in his official capacity as
Commissioner of DCF, and OCS (collectively “Vermont Defendants”)
have moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.
Their Rule 12(b)(1) argument is that
Ms. Adams’s claims are moot, and that both the domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prohibit the Court from considering her claims.
Under Rule
12(b)(6), they argue that the Amended Complaint fails to state a
claim for relief under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the
Due Process Clause.
A court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss if it
is not authorized by statute or the Constitution to adjudicate
the plaintiff’s claims.
110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d
The party asserting subject matter
jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
In determining whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists, the court may look to
evidence outside the complaint.
See Kamen v. Amer. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986).
6
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint.
See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
To survive such a
motion, the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
544, 570 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
More specifically, the
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id.
The Vermont Defendants argue that Ms. Adams’s claims against
them are moot because she is seeking purely injunctive relief and
her passport has been restored.
The Amended Complaint requests
“injunctive and declaratory relief to obtain reasonable
accommodations and modifications to the [passport denial]
program, as permitted under the statute, to avoid discrimination
in the ongoing implementation of the Passport Denial Program.”
ECF No. 27 at 20 (request for relief under Count II of the
Amended Complaint).
Accordingly, Ms. Adams is seeking not only a
new passport, but also changes to the certification process to
allow for reasonable accommodations.
“A case is deemed moot where the problem sought to be
7
remedied has ceased, and where there is “no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’”
Prins v.
Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402 (1975)).
Ms. Adams submits that her
claim against the Vermont Defendants is not moot because she
might be denied reasonable accommodations with respect to a
future passport application.
This argument invokes the “capable
of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness
doctrine.
See FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
462 (2007).
The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception
applies when (1) the challenged action is too short in duration
to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and
(2) there is a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated
probability that the controversy will recur.
United States v.
Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for
Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1, 6 (1986)).
“The heavy burden of
persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot
reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party
asserting mootness.”
Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Services (TOO), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).
With respect to the first prong of the exception, the
Complaint does not set forth enough detail about the time lines
8
involved in a passport denial for the Court to determine whether
all denials will necessarily evade review.
In this case, it
appears that Ms. Adams was able to obtain review and relief in
state court, but that she may have suffered harm in the form of
unemployment prior to receiving that relief.
Whether immediate
relief in state court would be available upon re-certification is
not clear.
As to the second prong, it is not necessary that a
recurrence of the dispute is more probable than not, but only
that there is a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated
probability of reoccurrence.
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, n.
6 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has found controversies
capable of repetition based on expectations that, while
reasonable, were hardly demonstrably probable in numerous cases).
However, more than “mere speculation” is required to show that
the dispute will recur.
Van Allen v. Cuomo, 621 F.3d 244, 247
(2d Cir. 2010) (citing Van Wie v. Pataki, 267 F.3d 109, 115 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, Ms.
Adams argues that she “lost her passport before.
reasonably foreseeable that it will happen again.”
It is
13.
ECF No. 40 at
She attributes that likelihood to “the challenges that she
faces related to memory and executive functions.”
Id.
While the Court acknowledges Ms. Adams reported limitations,
the prospect of again losing her passport is highly speculative.
9
The Second Circuit has explained, where “the repetition of the
events giving rise to the preliminary injunction is entirely
speculative, the mere ‘theoretical possibility’ that this
scenario will arise again is not sufficient for the capable of
repetition exception to apply.”
Haley v. Pataki, 60 F.3d 137,
141 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Fox v. Board of Trustees, 42 F.3d 135,
140 (2d Cir. 1994)); cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 449 U.S.
934, 936 (1980) (for purposes of equitable relief, “[p]ast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present
case or controversy”).
Ms. Adams alleges in her Amended
Complaint that she wants to find and retain work as a flight
attendant.
Such work requires a valid passport.
Accordingly,
maintaining possession of a passport will be more critical for
Ms. Adams than for those who are not employed by an airline or
engaged in regular international travel.
For her to now allege
that she is likely to lose such a precious document because of
mental infirmities is highly conjectural and speculative.
At some point in the future Ms. Adams’s current passport
will expire.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that an
adult passport is valid for a period of ten years.
§ 217a.
See 22 U.S.C.
Whether Ms. Adams will still be in arrears on her child
support in 2023, or whether she will have received any sort of
relief with respect to that arrearage, are again subject to pure
10
conjecture and speculation.2
As such, they do not support an
order for injunctive relief against the Vermont Defendants as
requested in the Amended Complaint.
Count II of the Amended
Complaint is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
II.
Keith Horton’s Motion to Dismiss
The next dispositive motion before the Court is Commissioner
Keith Horton’s motion to dismiss.
The motion argues insufficient
service of process, lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunities, res judicata, statute of limitations, and failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court will
first addresses the question of personal jurisdiction.
See Mende
v. Milestone Tech., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 221
(2d Cir. 1963) (“[L]ogic compel[s] initial consideration of the
issue of jurisdiction over the defendant – a court without such
jurisdiction lacks power to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim.”)).
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
2
Ms. Adams’s claims of potential future harm by the State
of Vermont may be more appropriately barred as unripe rather than
moot. See National Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d
682, 687 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A claim is not ripe if it depends upon
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In any event, the Court cannot consider them at this
time.
11
Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing personal jurisdiction.
702 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2012).
MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter,
Prior to discovery, a
plaintiff may defeat a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction by “pleading in good faith, legally
sufficient allegations of jurisdiction . . . .
[T]he
[P]laintiff’s prima facie showing may be established solely by
allegations.”
Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722
F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining "sliding scale" of review
for 12(b)(2) motions) (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie
Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)).
The
Court may consider pleadings and affidavits, and construes them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Id. at 84-85.
To meet her burden, Ms. Adams must plead facts sufficient to
support a finding that personal jurisdiction is proper under
Vermont’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In re Roman Catholic Diocese of
Albany, 745 F.3d 30, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2014).
Because Vermont’s
long-arm statute, 12 V.S.A. § 913(b), extends personal
jurisdiction to the outer limits permitted by the federal Due
Process Clause, the Court must analyze whether personal
jurisdiction comports with due process.
Id. at 38.
The Due Process Clause requires that a defendant
“purposefully establishes minimum contacts within the forum State
12
. . . ‘such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.’”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985) (quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980)).
Once such minimum contacts are determined, the
Court must decide whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
is reasonable and acceptable under “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Personal jurisdiction may be specific or general. “Specific
jurisdiction exists when a State exercises personal jurisdiction
over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum; a court’s general
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is based on the defendant’s
general business contacts with the forum state and permits a
court to exercise its power in a case where the subject matter of
the suit is unrelated to those contacts.”
Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Robertson–Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567–68 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
General jurisdiction is
only appropriate where a party’s “affiliations with the State are
so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at
home in the forum State.”
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); see also In re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 674 (2d Cir. 2013)
(explaining that because “general jurisdiction is not related to
13
the events giving rise to the suit, . . . courts impose a more
stringent minimum contacts test”).
In evaluating the strength of
contacts with the forum, a court looks to the totality of the
circumstances.
Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616
F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2010).
Here, Ms. Adams alleges that the Georgia Defendants directed
certain activities toward her while she was in Vermont.
Those
activities included: (1) telephone calls from Georgia DCSS; (2)
injuries as a result of certification to the passport denial
program; and (3) attempts to garnish her wages while she was
living in Vermont.
With respect to telephone calls, Ms. Adams
reports conversations with Georgia DCSS and Horton “related to
child support payments” and her request for “a waiver from the
Georgia Child Support Order so I could get my passport back and
get a job as a flight attendant.”
ECF No. 40-1.
As to specific
contacts with Commissioner Horton, Ms. Adams avers that she spoke
with him on the telephone on “at least one occasion in either
2011 or 2012.”
ECF No. 40-1.
Commissioner Horton first argues that these contacts do not
support specific jurisdiction because they did not pertain to the
certification process that is the subject of this suit.
Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 567-68.
See
Indeed, Ms. Adams has made
clear that she is not challenging her child support obligation in
this case.
Moreover, certification took place in 2009, prior to
14
Ms. Adams’s move to Vermont.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that personal
jurisdiction is generally not established by a single phone call.
See Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1986) (“It would
offend ‘minimum contacts’ due process principles to force [the
defendant], a Massachusetts resident, to litigate in a New York
forum on the basis of one telephone call.”).
It is also unclear
from Ms. Adams’s affidavit who initiated the call.
See Sternberg
v. Nathan, 112 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that twenty-nine
telephone calls were not sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to allege that defendant
initiated the calls).
The minimal telephone contacts between Ms.
Adams and Commissioner Horton are thus insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction.
Ms. Adams also claims that she suffered injuries in Vermont.
In Walden v. Fiore, the U.S. Supreme Court recently made clear
that while “a defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be
intertwined with his transactions or interactions with the
plaintiff or other parties . . . .
a defendant’s relationship
with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”
(2014).
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122
In other words, “[d]ue process requires that a defendant
be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation
with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or
15
attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons
affiliated with the State”.
Corp., 471 U.S. at 475).
Id. at 1123 (quoting Burger King
In this case, the allegations are that
Commissioner Horton contacted Vermont because Ms. Adams moved
here.
Accordingly, any injury suffered in Vermont was a result
of her actions, and not the Commissioner’s affiliation with
Vermont, and thus does not support specific jurisdiction.3
Even assuming, arguendo, that minimum contacts requirements
are met, personal jurisdiction over Commissioner Horton would not
be reasonable.
The Second Circuit applies the five-factor test
established by the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of California to assess the reasonableness of
exercising jurisdiction over a defendant.
480 U.S. 102, 113
(1987); see Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 568 (citing Asahi).
These factors include “the burden on the defendant, the interests
of the forum State . . . the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
relief . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.”
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 291).
3
With regard to garnishment of wages, Ms. Adams asserts that
her wages were garnished from Delta Airlines. Delta Airlines is a
corporation headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. See Bracewell v.
Nicholson Air Servs., Inc., 748 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1984).
16
The burden upon Commissioner Horton to attend trial in
Vermont would be significant.
While other factors may weigh
slightly in favor of Vermont, the final factor invokes concerns
of federalism and comity between the states.
Under this final
factor, courts have held it unreasonable for a state to exercise
jurisdiction over officials or agencies of another state based on
actions they have taken to enforce a valid state court order.
Brown v. Reese, 2013 WL 525354, at *7 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2013)
(holding that, other factors aside, it would be unreasonable to
exercise jurisdiction over Georgia DHS and officials for efforts
to compel child support payments from plaintiff in Arizona);
Payne v. Cty. of Kershaw, 2008 WL 2876592, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July
25, 2008) (exercising jurisdiction over out-of-state officials
based on efforts to garnish wages for spousal support would be
unreasonable because it would expose such officials to litigation
throughout the country).
Commissioner Horton’s motion to dismiss
is therefore granted for lack of personal jurisdiction.
III. Georgia DCSS
The Georgia DCSS, though represented by counsel, has not
filed either an answer to the Amended Complaint or a motion to
dismiss.
Commissioner Horton’s motion to dismiss was filed “in
his official capacity as Commissioner of the Georgia Department
of Human Services and for its Division of Child Support
Services,” but asks only for dismissal of “all claims that are
17
asserted against him in the Amended Complaint.”
10.
ECF No. 46 at 1,
The motion to dismiss does not seek dismissal of the Georgia
DCSS.
Nor is it clear whether the Court can dismiss the Georgia
DCSS sua sponte on the grounds raised in Commissioner Horton’s
motion to dismiss, including arguments for Eleventh Amendment
and/or sovereign immunity.
See Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent.
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that burden of proving entitlement to Eleventh Amendment
immunity is on the party asserting such immunity, and that the
Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the Eleventh
Amendment presents a question of subject matter jurisdiction).
The Georgia DCSS shall therefore file an appropriate responsive
pleading or motion within twenty days of this Opinion and Order.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motions to dismiss
filed by the Vermont OCS and Commissioner Yacavone (ECF No. 37)
and by Commissioner Keith Horton (ECF No. 36) are granted, and
the claims against those Defendants are dismissed without
prejudice.
The Georgia DCSS shall respond to the Amended
Complaint within twenty days of this Opinion and Order.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 6th
day of March, 2015.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
District Court Judge
18
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