Coon v. Southwestern Vermont Medical Center et al

Filing 212

OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendant's 152 MOTION to Enjoin Plaintiff From Filing Further Vexatious Litigation Without Permission From the Court. Plaintiff is HEREBY ENJOINED from filing any further actions in this Court without obtaining prior leave from the Court. Signed by Judge John M. Conroy on 9/30/2014. (hbc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT

Donald J. Coon,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-182

Southwestern Vermont Medical Center,
Shea Family Funeral Homes,
Lon McClintock, Esq.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
(Doc. 152)
This case is one of the most recent in a long saga of litigation brought by pro se
Plaintiff Donald J. Coon. On June 25, 2013, Mr. Coon, proceeding pro se, commenced
this action against several Defendants, including Defendant Shea Family Funeral Homes
(“Shea”). On January 30, 2014, the Court granted a number of motions to dismiss,
leaving only Shea as a Defendant. (See Doc. 72.) The remaining claims against Shea
are: (1) common-law conversion by repossession of a grave stone installed by Shea; (2)
intentional infliction of emotional distress for grave desecration and the removal of the
grave stone; and (3) breach of contract for overcharging for professional funeral services.
Mr. Coon moved for summary judgment in his favor on those claims (Doc. 105), and the
Court denied that motion in an Opinion and Order dated July 16, 2014 (Doc. 164).

All parties have consented to direct assignment to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge. (Docs. 4, 10, 11, 48.) The Court here addresses Shea’s Motion to Enjoin Plaintiff
from Filing Further Vexatious Litigation Without Permission from the Court (the
“Vexatious-Litigation Motion”) (Doc. 152). The Court held a hearing on that Motion on
September 25, 2014.1 For the reasons that follow, Shea’s Vexatious-Litigation Motion
(Doc. 152) is GRANTED.
Background
Many of the facts are recited in the Court’s January and July 2014 rulings. (Docs.
72, 164.) In brief, Mr. Coon claims that in January 2010, his half-sister Joanne Becker
murdered their mother, Joan Marie Hunt, while Ms. Hunt was a patient at the
Southwestern Vermont Medical Center (“SVMC”). Mr. Coon also claims that after Ms.
Hunt died, Ms. Becker hired Shea to cremate the remains before any autopsy could be
performed. In addition, Mr. Coon claims that Shea wrongly concluded that a balance was
due for the services it provided (including provision of a grave marker), and that after the
balance went unpaid, Shea desecrated Ms. Hunt’s grave and removed the grave marker.
Mr. Coon says that he suffered emotional distress as a result of the alleged desecration
and the removal of the grave marker, and seeks several million dollars in damages.

1

The hearing was originally scheduled for September 5, 2014 (Doc. 192), but was rescheduled
for September 25, 2014 in light of Mr. Coon’s assertions regarding his health. (See Docs. 203, 204.) Mr.
Coon did not appear at the September 25 hearing.

2

Procedural History
The procedural history in this case is convoluted. Since this case was commenced
15 months ago, Mr. Coon has filed more than 20 motions (the majority of which have
been denied), as well as oppositions (sometimes multiple oppositions) to Defendants’
various motions. Mr. Coon’s prolific filings are frequently difficult to understand, both
because of the writing style and organization. Some of Mr. Coon’s filings are also
vitriolic, containing personal attacks against various individuals.2 The Court recounts the
highlights of the procedural history in this case (and related cases) below.
I.

Litigation in New York Federal Court
On May 13, 2013, Mr. Coon filed a pro se complaint in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of New York against SVMC, Ms. Becker, and James A.
Lombardo “& Firm.” (See Doc. 40-2.) The action was dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction because Ms. Becker and Mr. Lombardo, like Mr. Coon, are New York
citizens. See Coon v. Sw. Vt. Med. Ctr., No. 1:13-cv-553 (GLS/RFT), 2013 WL
3777081, at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013).
II.

Litigation in this Case, No. 2:13-cv-182
A.

Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Early Motion Practice

On June 27, 2013, Mr. Coon filed his Complaint in this case, naming SVMC and
Shea as Defendants. (Doc. 3.) SVMC and Shea each filed motions to dismiss. (Docs. 7,
9.) In a reply in support of its motion, SVMC included a one-page printout indicating

2

Shea has supplied a non-exhaustive list of examples of verbal attacks appearing in Mr. Coon’s
filings. (See Doc. 163 at 5–6.)

3

that the New York District Attorney had requested Ms. Hunt’s medical file, and that
“Lon” had “ok’d” the file’s release. (Doc. 12-1.) Mr. Coon apparently then searched for
attorneys in Bennington County named Lon and identified Attorney Lon McClintock as
the individual who had advised SVMC to release the records. (See Doc. 16 at 1–2.)
Noting that Attorney McClintock had represented him in the past, Mr. Coon alleged that
McClintock was in “cahoots” with SVMC (id. at 1), moved to amend the Complaint to
add McClintock as a Defendant (Docs. 14, 16), and filed an Amended Complaint (Doc.
17). Attorney McClintock subsequently filed his own Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 49.)
Extensive motion practice followed, eventually resulting in the Court’s
January 30, 2014 Opinion and Order dismissing SVMC and Attorney McClintock as
Defendants. (Doc. 72.) Prior to issuing that Opinion and Order, the Court authorized
limited ex parte expedited discovery to address a “strong initial showing” by Attorney
McClintock that Mr. Coon might have fabricated certain emails that he submitted to the
Court in opposition to McClintock’s Motion. (Doc. 57 at 3.) The Court ultimately
determined that it was unnecessary to inquire further on that issue. (Doc. 72 at 17 n.19.)
As to Defendant Shea, the Court dismissed Mr. Coon’s wrongful-cremation claim, but
concluded that dismissal was not warranted for Mr. Coon’s conversion, mischarge, and
grave-desecration claims. (Id. at 29–39.)
B.

Appeal

Mr. Coon attempted to appeal the January 30, 2014 Opinion and Order even
before any judgment was entered. (Doc. 78.) On March 4, 2014, the Court granted
4

SVMC and Attorney McClintock’s motions for entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b)
(Doc. 86), and on March 6, 2014 entered judgment in favor of SVMC and McClintock
(Doc. 87). On June 26, 2014, the Second Circuit dismissed Mr. Coon’s appeal of that
judgment, reasoning that it “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” (Doc. 146 at 1.)
C.

Continued Litigation Against Shea; Additional Motions

Mr. Coon’s case against Shea in this Court continued. Shea filed an Answer to
Mr. Coon’s Amended Complaint on March 7, 2014. (Doc. 89.) The parties commenced
discovery. On April 18, 2014, Mr. Coon filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc.
105.) The Court denied that motion in an Opinion and Order dated July 16, 2014. (Doc.
164.)
Meanwhile, Mr. Coon continued filing various motions. Perhaps most notably, on
May 29, 2014, he filed a Motion for Immediate Relief, alleging that Shea had again
desecrated Ms. Hunt’s grave, and seeking an order prohibiting Shea from appearing at the
burial site. (Doc. 123.) After holding a hearing on July 9, 2014, the Court denied the
Motion. (Docs. 161, 186.) At the hearing, Mark Shea testified that he had not returned to
the grave site since 2011. Mr. Coon presented only speculation that Shea had any
involvement in the alleged more recent grave desecration, and even suggested that the
perpetrator might have been Ms. Becker.

5

On June 9, 2014, Mr. Coon filed a Motion to Compel NBT Bancorp (“NBT”) to
Answer a Subpoena. (Doc. 132.)3 The Court granted that Motion only insofar as NBT
had records of payments from Ms. Hunt’s account to Shea between January 1 and July
31, 2010. (Doc. 178 at 6.) NBT subsequently filed a response indicating that it had no
records of any such payments. (Doc. 181 at 1.)
On June 20, 2014, Mr. Coon filed a Motion to Void the Contract Between Shea
and Ms. Hunt’s estate. (Doc. 139.) On the same date, Mr. Coon filed a Motion for
Permission to File all Discovery Through the Court. (Doc. 140.) The Court denied both
of those Motions. (Docs. 142, 168.)
D.

Discovery and the Surrogate Letter

Shortly after Shea produced a letter from Mark Shea to the Washington County,
New York Surrogate’s Court (the “Surrogate Letter”), Mr. Coon filed a pair of motions
(Docs. 144, 147) seeking Rule 11 sanctions and to strike all of Shea’s filings that refer to
the Surrogate Letter. The Court denied those motions in an Opinion and Order dated
August 7, 2014. (Doc. 188.)4 As described in that Opinion and Order, the Surrogate
Letter states as follows:

3

Shea points out that Mr. Coon has also expressed some desire to sue NBT or other banks. (See
Doc. 163-1 (email from Mr. Coon to counsel for Shea indicating: “[O]f course I will file to see if his
honor will allow the banks to be added to suit . . . .”).)
4

In that Opinion and Order, the Court noted that Shea sought Rule 11 sanctions against Mr.
Coon, including a sanction prohibiting the Court from accepting any future case filings by Mr. Coon
unless he is either represented by counsel or obtains prior leave of court to proceed pro se. (Id. at 7.) The
Court declined to rule on that request at the time, leaving it for resolution in the context of Shea’s
Vexatious-Litigation Motion. (Id.)

6

RE: JOAN MARIE HUNT
Dear SirsI was asked to sign the enclosed by the son of Mrs. Hunt (Donald
Coon), at the time he had given us a check for the remaining balance of her
account. Since then the check has not cleared and we have incurred
charges, therefore the estate of Mrs. Hunt owes our funeral home $192.00.
I feel that he had me sign the document under false pretenses as he
knew the check would not clear.
We are submitting this as a claim against the estate of Mrs. Hunt.
Please be in touch with any further instruction or questions.
(Doc. 144-1 at 2.)5 Meanwhile, Mr. Coon filed a new case in this Court on a variety of
theories arising out of the Surrogate Letter. The new case, docketed Coon v. Shea, No.
2:14-cv-85, is discussed in more detail below.
The parties’ discovery disputes ultimately resulted in Shea’s July 7, 2014 Motion
to Dismiss Mr. Coon’s case as a sanction for failure to comply with his discovery
obligations. (Doc. 154.) This Court held a hearing on that Motion on September 25,
2014, and it is currently under advisement.
E.

Shea’s Vexatious-Litigation Motion

Shea filed the pending Motion to Enjoin Plaintiff from Filing Further Vexatious
Litigation on July 2, 2014. (Doc. 152.) Ironically, that Motion appears to have resulted
in Mr. Coon seeking to institute additional litigation. The Motion discusses some of Mr.
Coon’s prior litigation, and prompted two written responses from Mr. Coon. (Docs. 158,
5

The letter was addressed to the Surrogate’s Court at 386 Broadway, Fort Edward, New York.
(Id.) It was apparently never received by the Surrogate’s Court, which is located at 383 (not 386)
Broadway in Fort Edward. (See id. at 1.)

7

159.) The latter response—apparently written at least in part before Mr. Coon had even
received Shea’s Motion to Enjoin (see Doc. 159 at 1)—asserts that Shea’s Motion raised
an issue regarding a “sealed” case and an “aw[]ful period” in Mr. Coon’s life (id. at 1,
10).6 According to Mr. Coon, the Motion “opened up a nightmare for me” and he had an
“old time screamfest this week thanks [to] you.” (Id. at 5.)
On July 23, 2014, Mr. Coon filed a Motion apparently asking the Court to advise
him whether he has an actionable claim against Shea’s counsel for bringing up the
“sealed case” and causing him distress. (Doc. 173.) The Court denied that Motion on
August 5, 2014. (Doc. 187.) Counsel for Shea insists that he has no idea what “sealed
case” Mr. Coon is referring to, and that Shea’s Motion cited only publicly available
cases. (Doc. 176 at 1.)7 Mr. Coon maintains that counsel for Shea has caused him pain
by bringing up the “sealed case,” and indicates his intent to file suit against counsel.
(Doc. 185.) Shea filed a Reply on August 14, 2014, reiterating that neither counsel for
Shea nor Shea have any interest in the “sealed case.” (See Doc. 194 at 1.)
III.

Litigation in No. 2:14-cv-85 Regarding the “Surrogate Letter”
In the midst of the ongoing litigation in No. 2:13-cv-182, Mr. Coon filed a new

case in this Court seeking millions of dollars in damages and other relief for alleged

6

The Court ordered Doc. 159 sealed because it appeared to contain confidential mental health
information.
7

In fact, it appears that one of the cases that Shea cited in its Motion—Coon v. Hoosick Falls
Central School, No. 1:03-cv-228 (N.D.N.Y.)—relates to the subject matter of the “sealed case.” Shea is
correct in asserting, however, that Coon v. Hoosick Falls Central School is publicly available. If there
was a sealed case arising out of the underlying incident, Mr. Coon apparently volunteered information
about that incident and placed it in the public domain by filing suit against the Hoosick Falls Central
School.

8

wrongs stemming from the Surrogate Letter. Specifically, he claimed the Surrogate
Letter defamed him in the eyes of the Surrogate Court clerks, and interfered with his
pursuit of justice in that court. Complaint at 3, Coon v. Shea, No. 2:14-cv-85 (D. Vt.
May 8, 2014), ECF No. 4. He also claimed that the Surrogate’s Court and that court’s
clerks violated his rights because they never notified him of Shea’s statements in the
Surrogate Letter. See id.
Initially, Mr. Coon attempted to sue Mark Shea and Shea Family Funeral Homes,
as well as the Washington County (New York) Surrogate’s Court Clerk’s Office and
various Surrogate’s Court employees. Id. The undersigned recommended that, due to
lack of complete diversity, the case be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Coon v. Shea, No. 2:14-cv-85, 2014 WL 2462808, at *3 (D. Vt.
June 2, 2014). The District Court adopted that recommendation, noting that Mr. Coon
had already filed an Amended Complaint. Id. at *1. Mr. Coon’s Amended Complaint
drops the Surrogate’s Court defendants, but appears to add Mark Shea’s spouse as a
defendant. Amended Complaint, Coon v. Shea, No. 2:14-cv-85 (D. Vt. May 14, 2014),
ECF No. 7 Several motions are currently pending in No. 2:14-cv-85, all of which are the
subject of an Order and Report and Recommendation filed on September 5, 2014. Coon
v. Shea, No. 2:14-cv-85 (D. Vt. Sept. 5, 2014), ECF No. 30.
Analysis
The Court has authority to enjoin parties from “vexatious litigation.” Safir v. U.S.
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1986). As the Second Circuit has explained: “‘A
district court not only may but should protect its ability to carry out its constitutional
9

functions against the threat of onerous, multiplicitous, and baseless litigation.’” Id. at 24
(quoting Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). The
threshold procedural requirement for issuing an injunction is satisfied here; Mr. Coon has
had notice and an opportunity to be heard on Shea’s Vexatious-Litigation Motion. See
Iwachiw v. New York State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 2005)
(per curiam).
In determining whether to restrict a litigant’s future access to the courts, the Court
considers:
(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by
counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other
parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their
personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the
courts and other parties.
Id. at 528. “Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has
a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and
harass other parties.” Safir, 792 F.2d at 24.
I.

Mr. Coon’s History of Litigation
Shea asserts that “[o]ver the past 20 years, Plaintiff has filed dozens of lawsuits

against numerous parties, including public officials, schools, private entities, and even
counsel defending those private entities.” (Doc. 152 at 1.) According to Shea, the bulk
of those suits were dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as either frivolous,

10

malicious, or as failing to state a claim. (Id.) The Court has collected the cases cited by
Shea, as well as a number of other cases instituted by Mr. Coon, in the Appendix, infra.
In short, since 1993, Mr. Coon has filed more than 40 cases in state or federal
court; there are only a few years since 1993 that did not see Mr. Coon filing one or more
new actions in federal court or the Vermont state courts. More than a quarter of those
cases were dismissed by the court or dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Approximately ten resulted in a partial or full settlement. Several were dismissed by the
plaintiff. A handful of the cases proceeded to the summary-judgment stage. One statecourt case advanced to trial, where judgment was ultimately rendered for the defendant.
Many of Mr. Coon’s cases have been dismissed at or near the outset. Cf. Zorn v.
Brown, No. 1:05-cv-297 (D. Vt. Nov. 30, 2005), ECF No. 50 at 3–4 (enjoining further
filings without prior leave, noting “multiple unsuccessful actions over the past 15 years,”
each of which was dismissed at or near the outset); Zorn v. Smith, 2011 VT 10, ¶ 19, 19
A.3d 112, 118 (sanction was warranted where history of litigation reflected “a pattern of
chronic vexatious, baseless, and frivolous filings”). On the other hand, a few of Mr.
Coon’s cases proceeded past the motion-to-dismiss stage, and a number resulted in
settlements. But, for the reasons discussed below, those instances are insufficient to
avoid the conclusion that Mr. Coon has abused the judicial process. See Safir, 792 F.2d
at 24 (affirming sanction even though “some of Safir’s lawsuits, far from being frivolous,
were meritorious.”).
The sheer number of cases that Mr. Coon has filed, together with the fact that
many were dismissed, is an instructive starting point. See Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 529
11

(noting that plaintiff had filed more than fifteen actions in the federal and New York state
courts). Moreover, some particular cases demonstrate that whatever partial successes Mr.
Coon might have achieved in some of his past litigation, his pattern of litigiousness has
on numerous occasions crossed the line to abusive. Perhaps most notably, in Coon v.
Bowen, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because “the action was malicious.” No.
98-9185, 1999 WL 314134, at *1 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit noted that Mr.
Coon had threatened to sue the attorneys who represented the defendants in that case, and
had stated that his wife would file her own lawsuit if Mr. Coon did not win his. Id.8 The
court concluded by warning Mr. Coon in no uncertain terms: “[I]n the future, this Court
or the district court well might consider imposing sanctions based on any further
vexatious litigation such as that reported here.” Id.
That warning seems to have done little to stem the tide of vexatious litigation from
Mr. Coon. He filed a new case, Coon v. Town of Springfield, shortly after the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Bowen, and in that case the Court noted in a March 16, 2000 Order
that “it seems clear the [plaintiffs] seek to harass the named [defendants].” No. 1:99-cv382 (D. Vt. Mar. 16, 2000). The case ultimately settled after Early Neutral Evaluation,
but it perhaps worth noting that in March 2002 Mr. Coon apparently attempted to reopen
the case.
Mr. Coon initiated numerous additional suits throughout the early 2000s. By
2006, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York noted that
8

That was not the only instance where Mr. Coon threatened to (or did) sue opposing counsel.
Shea points out a number of additional examples. (See Doc. 152 at 2.) Mr. Coon has threatened to do the
same in this case.

12

he was a “pro se litigator who has filed ten prior actions in this District.” Coon v. Kilgo,
No. 1:06-cv-925 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006), ECF No. 3 at 1 n.1. The court in Kilgo
dismissed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. at 3. In 2008, the same court
dismissed another of Mr. Coon’s cases under § 1915(e), denying several of his motions as
“moot, incoherent and frivolous,” and noting that Mr. Coon “has shown a propensity for
filing a multitude of generally frivolous actions.” Coon v. Trustco Bank Corp., No. 1:08cv-177, 2008 WL 2096534, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008).
Mr. Coon’s pattern of vexatious litigation also appears in the present case. In the
15 months since this case was filed, Mr. Coon has filed more than 20 motions, frequently
confusing and incoherent, with large numbers of attachments. Most of those motions
have done little to advance the case. As noted above, many of Mr. Coon’s filings contain
abusive language, and the Court has even ordered him to “refrain from using scurrilous,
insulting, or offensive language when referring to counsel or parties to this action in
future motions or pleadings.” Coon v. Shea, No. 2:14-cv-85 (D. Vt. July 18, 2014), ECF
No. 26. Moreover, Mr. Coon has called his own veracity into question, prompting the
expedited ex parte discovery described above. He has also made accusations of
egregious conduct apparently based only on his own speculation, as evidenced by the
May 29, 2014 Motion for Immediate Relief, also described above.
He launched a new federal suit based on the Surrogate Letter, naming a variety of
non-diverse defendants. Mr. Coon has since amended his complaint in that suit to drop

13

the non-diverse defendants.9 Most recently—and ironically—he has sought to open up a
new front of litigation against counsel for Shea for citing a publicly available case in
Shea’s Vexatious-Litigation Motion, the citation of which Mr. Coon says caused him
mental anguish. For all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that Mr. Coon’s
extensive history of litigation demonstrates sanctionable abuse of the judicial process,
especially in light of the explicit warning to that effect issued by the Second Circuit in
1999.
II.

Additional Factors
The second factor the Court considers is Mr. Coon’s motive in pursuing the

litigation, and whether he has “an objective good faith expectation of prevailing.” Safir,
792 F.2d at 24. The Court has previously remarked that Mr. Coon’s claims in this case
are not sufficiently meritorious to warrant appointment of counsel. (Doc. 204 at 2.) And
the extensive history of litigation discussed above is compelling evidence that Mr. Coon
cannot have had an objective good faith expectation of prevailing in many of those cases.
Moreover, some courts have explicitly found Mr. Coon’s legal maneuvering to be
malicious, harassing, or frivolous.
The third factor is whether the litigant is represented by counsel. In this case and
in Coon v. Shea, No. 2:14-cv-85, Mr. Coon is proceeding pro se.10 It also appears that

9

The Court makes no comment here as to the merits of the new suit against the remaining
defendants.
10

The Court notes, however, that Mr. Coon has stated in several of his filings that he is receiving
help from law students and a judge. (E.g., Doc. 127 at 2 (“I get help at law school clinic and a federal
judge and his class . . . .”).)

14

Mr. Coon was pro se in all of the other cases listed in the Appendix. However, as the
Vermont Supreme Court has observed, a litigant’s pro se status is not a “passport to
waste the court’s time indefinitely.” Zorn, 2011 VT 10, ¶ 22, 19 A.3d at 118. As to the
fourth factor, numerous defendants have incurred the expense of being represented by
counsel, and state and federal courts have shouldered the burden of processing Mr.
Coon’s prodigious litigation.
III.

Adequacy of Other Sanctions
Shea seeks an order barring Mr. Coon from filing any further cases (presumably in

this Court) without obtaining leave from the Court. (Doc. 152 at 6.) Warnings seem to
have had little effect on Mr. Coon’s vexatious litigation; he continued that pattern shortly
after receiving an explicit warning from the Second Circuit in 1999. Given Mr. Coon’s
in forma pauperis status (see Doc. 2), he would be unable to pay a monetary sanction. In
this case, no other sanction would offer defendants and the courts adequate protection.
See Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 529.
The Court therefore concludes that a “measured” pre-filing injunction is
warranted. Id. The injunction will be limited to filings in this Court. See id. (affirming
injunction that did not extend to filings in other federal district courts or to state courts).
The Court has considered whether to limit the scope of the injunction to filings arising
out of the events surrounding Ms. Hunt’s death and burial. Indeed, some injunctions with
such limited scope are sufficient to protect defendants and the courts. See RinggoldLockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 2014 WL 3805579, at *7 (9th Cir.
2014) (concluding that pre-filing restriction was overbroad); Safir, 792 F.2d at 25 (same).
15

In light of Mr. Coon’s very substantial litigation history, however, the Court
concludes that a somewhat broader restriction is necessary. Although Mr. Coon’s present
focus appears to be on the events following the death of his mother, there appears to be
no end to the possible theories or defendants in Mr. Coon’s mind. An injunction limited
to the events surrounding Ms. Hunt’s death would not be effective. See Iwachiw, 396
F.3d at 529 (affirming injunction imposing pre-filing restriction on bringing any future
proceedings in the Eastern District of New York).
Accordingly, if Mr. Coon wishes to commence an action in this Court in the
future, he must file with his proposed complaint a motion for leave to file. The motion
will be reviewed by the Court, and if it appears that the proposed action is repetitive,
frivolous, malicious, intended to harass, or otherwise barred, leave to file will be denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Shea’s Vexatious-Litigation
Motion (Doc. 152). Mr. Coon is hereby ENJOINED from filing any further actions in
this Court without obtaining prior leave from the Court.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 30th day of September, 2014.
/s/ John M. Conroy
.
John M. Conroy
United States Magistrate Judge

16

APPENDIX
Based on Shea’s citations and the Court’s own research, the Court has compiled
the following list of federal and Vermont state cases instituted by Mr. Coon since 1993,
organized by filing date. Federal court case history is drawn from PACER. Vermont
state court case history is drawn from the “Vermont Courts Online” website,
https://secure.vermont.gov/vtcdas/user (registration required).11 Parentheticals briefly
describe the disposition of each case; subsequent history is noted where appropriate.
***
Coon v. United States District Court of Vermont, No. 2:93-cv-212 (D. Vt.) (section 1983
case filed July 16, 1993; petition dismissed under Rule 9).
Coon v. Vermont State’s Attorney, No. 5:94-cv-177 (D. Vt.) (section 1983 case filed
June 20, 1994; dismissed as frivolous).
Coon v. Ferraris, No. 1:96-cv-1230 (N.D.N.Y.) (medical malpractice case filed
August 1, 1996; dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)), appeal dismissed
Nov. 21, 1996.
Coon v. O’Connor, No. 1:96-cv-1251 (N.D.N.Y.) (suit filed August 5, 1996; dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)), appeal dismissed Feb. 11, 1997.
Coon v. Springfield Police, No. 1:96-cv-398 (D. Vt.) (civil-rights suit filed
December 16, 1996; IFP denied for failure to answer questions).
Coon v. Paletta, No. 1:97-cv-222 (D.N.H.) (case filed May 2, 1997; dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction).
Coon v. Forguites, No. 257-6-97 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (defamation case filed
June 6, 1997; dismissed by parties).
Coon v. Hunt, No. 342-7-97 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (fraud cause filed July 31, 1997;
dismissed by plaintiff).
11

The Court has made no attempt to compile state-court litigation history from outside of

Vermont.

17

Coon v. Paletta, No. 1:97-cv-392 (D. Vt.) (section 1983 case filed November 20, 1997;
dismissed by the court), appeal dismissed Dec. 16, 1998.
Coon v. Village of Hoosick, No. 1:98-cv-66 (N.D.N.Y.) (section 1983 case filed
January 12, 1998; dismissed by reason of settlement).
Coon v. Bowen, No. 1:98-cv-142 (D. Vt.) (civil-rights case filed April 29, 1998; motion
to dismiss granted by court), affirmed No. 98-9185, 1999 WL 314134 (2d Cir. 1999)
(concluding that “this action was malicious”).
Coon v. State of Vermont, No. 1:98-cv-183 (D. Vt.) (civil-rights case filed May 28, 1998;
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).
Coon v. Boylan & Bowen, No. 1:98-cv-290 (D. Vt.) (section 1983 case filed
August 20, 1998; in forma pauperis status denied).
Coon v. Springfield Vermont Police Department, No. 164-4-99 (Vt. Super. Ct.)
(harassment case filed April 1, 1999; claims dismissed by court or parties).
Coon v. Town of Springfield, No. 1:99-cv-369 (D.N.H.) (section 1983 case filed
August 16, 1999; case settled).
Coon v. Town of Springfield, No. 1:99-cv-382 (D. Vt.) (section 1983 case filed
December 13, 1999; case settled after early neutral evaluation).12
Coon v. Windsor County State’s Attorney, No. 1:00-cv-46 (D. Vt.) (section 1983 case
filed February 4, 2000; dismissed by court or parties).
Coon v. HCRS, No. 181-4-00 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (medical malpractice case filed
April 19, 2000; claims dismissed by plaintiff or parties).
Coon v. Ankuda, No. 275-6-00 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (attorney malpractice case filed
June 29, 2000; dismissed by plaintiff).
Coon v. Sekellick, No. 1:00-cv-1158 (N.D.N.Y.) (breach-of-contract case filed
July 28, 2000; stipulation of dismissal).
Coon v. Springfield School Board, No. 361-8-00 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (harassment case
filed August 14, 2000; judgment for defendant after court trial).

12

Notably, in an Order filed March 16, 2000, the Court observed: “On the record before the
Court, it seems clear the pltfs seek to harass the named defts.”

18

Coon v. Springfield School District, No. 558-11-00 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (negligence
case filed November 27, 2000; dismissed by plaintiff).
Coon v. United States Department of Education, No. 1:01-cv-134 (D. Vt.) (civil-rights
case filed April 25, 2001; dismissed by plaintiff).
Coon v. Town of Springfield, No. 1:01-cv-148 (D. Vt.) (section 1983 case filed
May 9, 2001; summary judgment for defendants), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and
remanded, 404 F.3d 683 (2d Cir. 2005).13
Coon v. Springfield School District, No. 7:01-cv-1459 (N.D.N.Y.) (breach-of-contract
case filed September 21, 2001; transferred to D. Vt. on March 4, 2002).
Coon v. McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan PC, No. 7:02-cv-89 (N.D.N.Y.) (civil-rights case filed
January 22, 2002; transferred to D. Vt. on March 4, 2002).
Coon v. Clattenburg, No. 7:02-cv-177 (N.D.N.Y.) (medical malpractice case filed
February 11, 2002; transferred to D. Vt. on March 4, 2002).
Coon v. Clattenburg, No. 1:02-cv-54 (D. Vt.) (transferred from N.D.N.Y.; dismissed by
parties under Rule 41).
Coon v. Springfield School District, No. 1:02-cv-55 (D. Vt.) (transferred from N.D.N.Y.;
dismissed by plaintiff under Rule 41).
Coon v. McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan PC, No. 1:02-cv-56 (D. Vt.) (transferred from
N.D.N.Y.; summary judgment granted to defendants).
Coon v. McDonald, No. 1:02-cv-65 (D. Vt.) (medical malpractice case filed
March 13, 2002; dismissed by plaintiff).
Coon v. Vermont Department of Children, No. 86-4-02 Oscv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (suit for
injunctive relief filed April 15, 2002; dismissed by court).
Coon v. Town of Springfield, No. 202-4-02 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (trespass suit filed
April 22, 2002; summary judgment for defendant).
Coon v. Rutland Herald Newspaper, No. 226-5-02 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (defamation suit
filed May 2, 2002; summary judgment for defendant).

13

After remand, the remaining parties settled the case.

19

Coon v. William J. McDonald, DMD, No. 239-5-02 Rdcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (medical
malpractice suit filed May 6, 2002; dismissed by court).
Coon v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., No. 1:02-cv-10839 (D. Mass.) (contract case filed
May 7, 2002; dismissed for failure to respond to court order).
Coon v. Springfield Hospital, No. 1:02-cv-160 (D. Vt.) (medical malpractice suit filed
June 25, 2002; dismissed by parties under Rule 41).
Coon v. HCRS, No. 19-1-03 Wmcv (Vt. Super. Ct.) (breach-of-settlement suit filed
January 10, 2003; dismissed by parties).
Coon v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 1:03-cv-1064 (S.D.N.Y.) (breach-of-contract suit filed
February 18, 2003; dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).
Coon v. Hoosick Falls Central School, No. 1:03-cv-228 (N.D.N.Y.) (section 1983 case
filed February 24, 2003; dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as timebarred).14
Coon v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, No. 1:03-cv-777 (N.D.N.Y.)
(section 1983 case filed June 23, 2003; dismissed for failure to state a claim).15
Coon v. Rhodes, No. 1:05-cv-767 (N.D.N.Y.) (ADA suit filed June 20, 2005; judgment
for defendants as a result of plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order).
Coon v. Kilgo, No. 1:06-cv-925 (N.D.N.Y.) (auto-accident suit filed August 1, 2006;
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of diversity or any federal
question).

14

This is one of the cases cited in Shea’s Vexatious-Litigation Motion, and it is apparently the
case that Mr. Coon says caused him distress regarding the “sealed case.”
15

This case appears to be related to Mr. Coon’s “auto-ped” accident. As Mr. Coon has
previously stated, he “suffers from a massive injury being run over in my home by a lady who had
Alz[]heimer[’]s on October 29, 2002 which also includes a brain injury with 15 to 20 years of memory
loss, 1985 thru 2002.” (Doc. 40 at 3–4 (all-caps writing converted to lowercase).) (See also, e.g., Doc. 40
at 11–12 (“Coon suffered a significant mental health-brain injury in auto-pedestrian accident on Oct. 29
2002.” (all-caps writing converted to lowercase); Doc. 127 at 14–15 (recounting the “auto-peds
accident”).)

20

Coon v. State Farm Insurance Co., No. 1:07-cv-164 (D. Ga.) (auto-accident/insurance
suit filed November 9, 2006; dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction), appeal
dismissed for want of prosecution, No. 07-13736-EE (11th Cir. Nov. 27, 2007).
Coon v. Kelly, No. 1:08-cv-177 (N.D.N.Y.) (section 1983 case filed February 14, 2008;
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim).
Coon v. Southwest Vermont Medical Center, No. 2:13-cv-182 (D. Vt.) (filed
June 25, 2013).
Coon v. Shea, No. 2:14-cv-85 (D. Vt.) (filed April 28, 2014).

21