Aldrich v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
17
OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES Plaintiff's 11 MOTION for Order Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner and GRANTS Defendant's 16 MOTION for Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Judge John M. Conroy on 10/31/2014. (hbc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
Travis Aldrich,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-254-jmc
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
(Docs. 11, 16)
Plaintiff Travis Aldrich brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the
Social Security Act, requesting review and remand of the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance
benefits. Pending before the Court are Aldrich’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s
decision (Doc. 11), and the Commissioner’s motion to affirm the same (Doc. 16). For the
reasons stated below, Aldrich’s motion (Doc. 11) is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s
motion (Doc. 16) is GRANTED.
Background
Aldrich was 32 years old on his alleged disability onset date of May 20, 2008. He
attended school through the eleventh grade and thereafter obtained a GED. He last
worked in the spring of 2009 as a bottle clerk and soda manager at a store. He has also
worked as a cashier, a custodian, a delivery assistant, and a flagger (directing traffic).
Aldrich had a traumatic childhood, and claims his father murdered his mother
when he was two years old. (AR 41, 275, 299.) After his mother’s death, his paternal
grandparents took custody of him, and he alleges they were physically and emotionally
abusive. (AR 41, 275, 300.) Aldrich describes himself as an angry child who regularly
got into fights. (AR 275.) He spent time in juvenile detention and lived with a foster
family during his teenage years. (AR 276, 300.) He has past legal charges for domestic
assault, simple assault, and assaulting a police officer. (AR 300.) In 2011, Aldrich and
his fiancé had a son. They were living together in a home along with Aldrich’s fiancé’s
sister and his fiancé’s three children who ranged in age from 7 to 11. (AR 34, 42, 305,
326.) On a typical day during the alleged disability period, Aldrich cared for the four
children while his fiancé was at work, getting them up and out of bed in the morning,
walking the older children to school, playing with his young son when he was not at
daycare, and preparing meals. (AR 42–43, 228–29, 419.) In addition, Aldrich did
household chores including the dishes and laundry, cared for his pets (three dogs and
multiple cats), played computer games, watched television, rested on the couch, and
shopped for groceries once a month. (AR 42–43, 46, 228–32.) He was unable to drive
because his license had been suspended due to unpaid traffic tickets. (AR 34.)
Aldrich has a history of chronic back and shoulder pain. (AR 304, 419.) When he
was 17 years old, Harrington rods were inserted in his back for treatment of congenital
2
scoliosis,1 and he was diagnosed with congenital kyphoscoliosis2 with reported chronic
back pain. (AR 305–06, 419.) Aldrich also struggles with mental health problems
including posttraumatic stress syndrome (“PTSD”) and depression. He has low trust of
others, low self-esteem, and anxiety which manifests in frequent anger outbursts. (AR
299–300.) He testified that he is “very scared” in crowds and does not like to go out in
public.3 (AR 41–42.)
In September 2010, Aldrich protectively filed applications for supplemental
security income and disability insurance benefits. In the latter application, he alleged
that, starting on May 20, 2008, he has been unable to work due to a history of back
problems, acid reflux, emotional problems, and restrictive airways. (AR 211.) At the
administrative hearing, Aldrich testified that he is in constant discomfort due to his back
problems; he is unable to bend over; and he has to take breaks on walks. (AR 37, 47, 49.)
Aldrich’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and he timely
requested an administrative hearing. The hearing was conducted on June 12, 2012 by
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Paul Martin. (AR 29–59.) Aldrich appeared and
testified, and was represented by an attorney. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified at
the hearing. On July 18, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Aldrich was not
1
Scoliosis refers to “[a]bnormal lateral and rotational curvature of the vertebral column.”
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1734 (28th ed. 2006).
2
Kyphoscoliosis refers to “[l]ateral and posterior curvature of the spine.” Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary 1036 (28th ed. 2006).
3
Because the only issue raised in Aldrich’s motion relates to a treating physician’s opinion
regarding Aldrich’s physical residual functional capacity (see Doc. 11 at 11–16), this Opinion and Order
focuses on Aldrich’s physical, rather than mental, impairments.
3
disabled from the alleged onset date of May 20, 2008 through the date of the decision.
(AR 11–23.) The Appeals Council denied Aldrich’s request for review, rendering the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1–3.) Having exhausted his
administrative remedies, Aldrich filed the Complaint in this action on September 16,
2013. (Doc. 3.)
ALJ Decision
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate disability
claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 380–81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step
requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in “substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not so
engaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a “severe
impairment.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that the claimant
has a severe impairment, the third step requires the ALJ to make a determination as to
whether that impairment “meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The
claimant is presumptively disabled if his or her impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment. Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984).
If the claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required to determine the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which means the most the claimant can
still do despite his or her mental and physical limitations based on all the relevant
medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1),
416.920(e), 416.945(a)(1). The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the
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claimant’s RFC precludes the performance of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant can do “any other work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). The claimant
bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four, Butts, 388 F.3d at
383; and at step five, there is a “limited burden shift to the Commissioner” to “show that
there is work in the national economy that the claimant can do,” Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the burden shift to the Commissioner at step
five is limited, and the Commissioner “need not provide additional evidence of the
claimant’s [RFC]”).
Employing this sequential analysis, ALJ Martin first determined that Aldrich had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date of
May 20, 2008. (AR 13.) At step two, the ALJ found that Aldrich had the following
severe impairments: scoliosis (status post rod insertion), asthma, PTSD, anti-social
personality, and depression. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that none of Aldrich’s
impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment.
(AR 14–16.) Next, the ALJ determined that Aldrich had the RFC to perform light work,
as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except as follows:
[Aldrich] is unable to stand or walk [for] more than 30 minutes at a time,
with a break of a few minutes and/or change of position. He is able to
occasionally twist, stoop, climb stairs, and balance, but he is unable to
climb ladders, ropes[,] and scaffolds[,] or crouch. He must avoid
concentrated exposure to environmental irritants, such as fumes, dusts[,]
and gases. He must avoid interactions with groups of more than 4-5
people, and may have occasional contact on a routine basis with
co[]workers, supervisors[,] and the general public. He is able to perform 13[-]step tasks or routine tasks performed on a regular basis.
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(AR 16.) Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Aldrich was unable to perform his past
relevant work as a bottler (recycler), cashier/bagger, flagger, custodian, inventory clerk,
or receiving shipping clerk. (AR 21.) Finally, based on testimony from the VE, the ALJ
determined that Aldrich could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy, including parking lot attendant, basket filler, and bottle label
inspector. (AR 22.) The ALJ concluded that Aldrich had not been under a disability
from the alleged onset date of May 20, 2008 through the date of the decision. (AR 23.)
Standard of Review
The Social Security Act defines the term “disability” as the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A person will be found disabled only if it is determined that his
“impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
In considering a Commissioner’s disability decision, the court “review[s] the
administrative record de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence
supporting the . . . decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
standard.” Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw v. Chater,
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221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court’s factual review of
the Commissioner’s decision is thus limited to determining whether “substantial
evidence” exists in the record to support such decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v.
Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991); see Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d
Cir. 1990) (“Where there is substantial evidence to support either position, the
determination is one to be made by the factfinder.”). “Substantial evidence” is more than
a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
Poupore, 566 F.3d at 305. In its deliberations, the court should bear in mind that the
Social Security Act is “a remedial statute to be broadly construed and liberally applied.”
Dousewicz v. Harris, 646 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1981).
Analysis
Aldrich argues that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the opinions of treating
physician Dr. Stuart Williams. Specifically, Aldrich claims that the ALJ should have
afforded controlling weight to Dr. Williams’s opinions, and that the ALJ failed to provide
good reasons for affording limited weight to those opinions. In response, the
Commissioner asserts that Dr. Williams’s opinions are not entitled to controlling weight
because they are on a matter reserved to the Commissioner. Moreover, the
Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly considered the applicable regulatory
factors in his analysis of Dr. Williams’s opinions, and that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinions are entitled to only limited weight. The Court
finds in favor of the Commissioner, for the reasons explained below.
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Dr. Williams has been Aldrich’s treating primary care physician since 2001,
seeing him approximately once every four to six months. (AR 315.) In April 2011, Dr.
Williams opined in a RFC questionnaire regarding Aldrich’s physical limitations that,
because of Aldrich’s kyphoscoliosis and chronic back pain, he was capable of sitting for
only 15 to 20 minutes and standing for only five minutes at a time, and sitting for about
four hours and standing/walking for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. (AR
318.) Dr. Williams further opined that Aldrich needed a job that would allow him to shift
positions at will and take 10- to 15-minute unscheduled breaks approximately every 20 to
30 minutes throughout the day. (Id.) Dr. Williams found that Aldrich could frequently
lift and carry less than 10 pounds, occasionally lift and carry 10 pounds, never to rarely
lift and carry 20 pounds, and never to rarely crouch/squat or climb ladders. (AR 319.)
Dr. Williams concluded that Aldrich could not complete a standard 35- to 44-hour work
week on a consistent basis but could “perhaps” work for 15 to 20 hours per week “if
given [the] flexibility to take required breaks.” (AR 320.) Dr. Williams further opined
that Aldrich would miss about three or four days of work each month due to his medical
conditions or treatment. (Id.) Also in April 2011, Dr. Williams stated in a treatment note
that Aldrich was “disabled from regular gainful employment” because of progressive
back disorder from kyphoscoliosis, Harrington rod placement, progressive degenerative
disease of the spine, and disabling pain. (AR 326.) In May 2012, Dr. Williams indicated
that his assessment of Aldrich’s physical RFC had not changed. (AR 417.)
The ALJ was required to analyze Dr. Williams’s opinions under the treating
physician rule, given his status as Aldrich’s treating primary care physician during the
8
relevant period. Under that rule, a treating physician’s opinion on the nature and severity
of a claimant’s condition is entitled to “controlling weight” if it is “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence in [the] record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see
Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 567–69 (2d Cir. 1993). The deference given to a treating
physician’s opinion may be reduced, however, in consideration of other factors, including
the length and nature of the physician’s relationship with the claimant, the extent to
which the medical evidence supports the physician’s opinion, whether the physician is a
specialist, the consistency of the opinion with the rest of the medical record, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2)–(5), and any other factors “which tend to . . . contradict the opinion,” id.
at (c)(6). See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, if the
ALJ gives less than controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, he must provide
“good reasons” in support of that decision. Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The ALJ complied with the treating physician rule in his analysis of Dr.
Williams’s opinions and gave good reasons in support of his decision to afford “limited
weight” to those opinions. (AR 21.) First, the ALJ found that Dr. Williams’s opinions
are conclusory, failing to include “much diagnostic or clinical evidence . . . to support the
limitations noted [therein].” (Id.) The evidence supports this finding. In response to a
question in Dr. Williams’s RFC questionnaire inquiring about what “clinical findings and
objective signs” supported his opinions, Dr. Williams wrote merely: “multiple [illegible],
tense para-spinous muscles.” (AR 315.) Moreover, Dr. Williams stated in the
9
questionnaire that the basis for his opinion that Aldrich could perhaps work 15 to 20
hours per week is: “[Aldrich’s] reported functional capacity.” (AR 320.) In other words,
the basis for this important portion of Dr. Williams’s opinions is Aldrich’s own
subjective reporting about his limitations. But the ALJ was “not required to accept
[Aldrich’s] subjective complaints without question”; he had discretion to weigh the
credibility of Aldrich’s testimony “in light of the other evidence in the record.” Genier v.
Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010). The ALJ found that Aldrich’s statements about
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible
(AR 17), and Aldrich does not dispute that finding. While another fact-finder could view
the evidence in a light more favorable to Aldrich, the court may not substitute its own
credibility determination for that of the ALJ’s unless the latter was “patently
unreasonable,” Pietrunti v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 119 F.3d 1035,
1042 (2d Cir. 1997), not the case here.
Aldrich cites to Dr. Williams’s treatment note which was prepared on the same
date of Dr. Williams’s RFC questionnaire (April 28, 2011) in support of his argument
that Dr. Williams’s opinions were entitled to controlling weight. (See Doc. 11 at 14
(citing AR 326).) But the “objective” portion of that note states merely that Dr. Williams
observed that Aldrich had “[m]ultiple incisions, tense and somewhat tender parathoracic
and lumbar muscles[,] [and] fairly good range of motion [in the] shoulders, elbows,
knees, [and] hips.” (AR 326.) Also noteworthy, the April 28, 2011 treatment note
indicates that 25 minutes of Aldrich’s 30-minute appointment with Dr. Williams
consisted of “face-to-face counseling and review of disability forms.” (AR 326–27.)
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Moreover, the note indicates that Dr. Williams did not find it necessary to see Aldrich
again until another “6 months.” (AR 327.) This treatment note does not support the
significant walking, standing, sitting, lifting, and carrying limitations contained in Dr.
Williams’s RFC questionnaire.
Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Williams’s opinions were entitled to only limited
weight because they are “inconsistent with his own medical exam notes, which show
generally good range of motion in [Aldrich’s] shoulders with only some tenderness in his
back.” (AR 21.) It was proper for the ALJ to consider the consistency of Dr. Williams’s
opinions with the rest of the record, including his own treatment notes. See Halloran v.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (“the opinion of the treating physician is not
afforded controlling weight where . . . the treating physician issued opinions that are not
consistent with other substantial evidence in the record”). Moreover, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s finding. For example, in the “objective” portion of Dr.
Williams’s January 13, 2010 treatment note, he stated that Aldrich had “[g]ood range of
motion in [his] shoulders and elbows” and his spinal kyphosis was “stable.” (AR 284.)
And in the “objective” portion of an August 29, 2011 treatment note, Dr. Williams stated
that Aldrich had “[f]airly good range of motion” in his shoulders; “[g]ood range of
motion” in his elbows, knees, and hips; and only “slight[ly] tender” posterior cervical and
upper paraspinous muscles. (AR 358.) Although Dr. Williams’s April 28, 2011
treatment note, discussed above, states that Aldrich had “chronic back pain” and
“constant pain around the shoulder blades,” and was “extremely limited” in his daily
activities, these recordings were part of the “subjective” portion of the treatment note,
11
indicating they were based on Aldrich’s subjective reporting, not objective findings based
on examination. (AR 326.)
The ALJ noted that Dr. Williams’s records indicate that physical therapy (“PT”)
“has been helpful in alleviating [Aldrich’s] pain.” (AR 21.) This finding is also
supported by substantial evidence. A June 28, 2011 treatment note from Dr. Williams
states that Aldrich had been doing PT “on and off with improvement for 6 months or so,”
and that he was “[d]oing better with standing tolerance, [was] able to hold the baby
easier, [and had a] stronger core.” (AR 353.) The note also states that Aldrich was
independent in self-care, caregiving, and walking; his back felt “okay”; and he “[w]as
able to go on [a] longer walk yesterday, more than he’s done in a[ ]while.” (Id.) Dr.
Williams stated that overall there was “some improvement in function,” and Aldrich was
“[d]oing chores and activities at home,” although he still had bouts of pain in his back
which limited him functionally. (Id.) In the “Assessment/Diagnosis” portion of this
treatment note, Dr. Williams stated that Aldrich “has made good progress with [PT], [and
was] feeling better, stronger, and [was] able to tolerate more activity.” (AR 355.)
In the August 2011 treatment note discussed above, Dr. Williams stated that,
although PT had been helping Aldrich and Aldrich was “doing well,” he had stopped
going to PT “because of [his] busy family schedule.” (AR 358.) After returning to PT
sometime soon thereafter, Aldrich was again doing better. In an October 13, 2011
treatment note, PT Amy Partin stated that Aldrich’s rehabilitation potential was “[g]ood.”
(AR 390.) An October 19, 2011 treatment note from Partin states: “Patient Report: ‘I’m
a little bit better.’ ‘It’s been hard to do the exercises because I’ve been so busy.’ ‘I’m
12
definitely better than when I first came in.’” (AR 393.) Partin further states: “Pain not
noted today” (id.), and: “Patient . . . reports improved pain[-]free function with [activities
of daily living]. Patient does continue to report low back and left shoulder pain with
resisted [upper extremity] activities and with bending and lifting . . . , but anticipate this
to improve with continued compliance to both land and aquatic programs” (AR 394).
Aldrich’s PT services were discontinued on that date because his “[g]oals ha[d] been
MET” and there was no longer a need for “skilled therapy intervention.” (Id.) Thus, the
ALJ was correct in noting that Dr. Williams’s opinions were inconsistent with PT notes.
The ALJ also was correct in noting that muscle relaxant and pain medications were
helpful in treating Aldrich’s pain. (See, e.g., AR 358 (“[h]e does get some relief from
tramadol 50 mg up to 4 times daily and chlorzoxazone 500 mg 4 times daily”); 368 (“new
pain medication . . . seems to have helped”) (internal quotation marks omitted).)
The ALJ’s third and final reason for affording limited weight to Dr. Williams’s
opinions is that these opinions are “inconsistent with [Aldrich’s] own testimony and
reported activities of daily living.” (AR 21.) The ALJ explained that Aldrich had
reported he could lift up to 25 pounds, walk up to a couple of miles each day (with a rest
break), and perform other household chores. (Id.) In determining what weight to afford
to Dr. Williams’s opinions, it was proper for the ALJ to consider both the consistency of
the opinions with other evidence in the record, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“the more
consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that
opinion”), and Aldrich’s daily activities, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (a claimant’s
“pattern of daily living” is “an important indicator of the intensity and persistence of [the
13
claimant’s] symptoms”). Moreover, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings on
these issues. As noted in the ALJ’s decision (AR 15, 18–19), Aldrich “has been able to
carry on a fairly active lifestyle” (AR 18), performing household chores (with breaks) on
a daily basis, going grocery shopping, preparing meals for his family, caring for multiple
pets, and taking care of four young children, including walking them approximately one
mile to school each day4. (AR 41–43, 45–46, 228–33.) A therapy note from June 2009
indicates that Aldrich described himself as “the stay at home Dad,” never having time for
himself. (AR 275.) On various dates, Aldrich reported to his medical providers that he
cleared snow, raked his lawn, cleaned and worked around the house, held his baby son
for feedings, changed his son’s diapers, built and repaired kitchen shelves, ran errands,
installed a new door, and worked on his washer. (AR 284, 326, 351, 353, 378, 381, 387,
390.)
More specifically, a January 2010 treatment note from Dr. Williams states that
Aldrich was injured while “clearing snow on Christmas Eve.” (AR 284.) An April 2011
treatment note from Dr. Williams indicates that Aldrich was doing housework such as
light cleaning or washing dishes for 15 to 20 minutes at a time and raked his lawn for 15
minutes at a time. (AR 326.) A September 2011 treatment note from PT Lorelei Wyman
states that Aldrich “did do a lot of cleaning yesterday” and was improving in his ability to
put away dishes and groceries without pain exacerbation. (AR 378.) An October 4, 2011
treatment note from PT Partin states: “Patient Report: ‘I have been feeling better[,] but
4
At the administrative hearing, Aldrich testified that he could walk for about one-quarter of a
mile on a flat surface without a break. (AR 40.)
14
then I did too much over the weekend.’ [Aldrich] reports increased left shoulder pain
attributed to building and repairing kitchen shelves over the weekend.” (AR 381.) An
October 12, 2011 treatment note from Partin states: “[Aldrich] reports he is very sore
today, both in his back and left shoulder, due to increased activity over the weekend. He
states that he put in a new door which caused him to perform some bending and lifting.
He also worked on his washer which involved kneeling.” (AR 387.) Finally, an
October 13, 2011 treatment note from Partin states: “Patient reports . . . , ‘I’ve been really
busy running errands.’” (AR 390.) The ALJ reasonably found that Aldrich’s ability to
do these activities does not support the functional limitations assessed by Dr. Williams.
Having found a lack of evidence to support Dr. Williams’s opinions, the ALJ was
entitled to rely on the opinions of other physicians in the record, including those of
examining consultant Dr. Roger Kellogg (AR 305–07) and nonexamining state agency
consultant Dr. Geoffrey Knisely (AR 97–99). Aldrich argues that Dr. Knisely’s opinions
deserves less weight because Dr. Knisely did not examine Aldrich and made inconsistent
and conclusory findings. Based on his review of the record—including Dr. Williams’s
treatment notes and opinions, PT notes, and Dr. Kellogg’s consultative examination
report—Dr. Knisely opined in an assessment of Aldrich’s physical RFC that Aldrich
could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk
for about six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour
workday, but would need to alternate between sitting and standing for three to five
minutes every hour to relieve pain and discomfort. (AR 97–98.) Dr. Knisely further
opined that Aldrich could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and only occasionally
15
stoop and crouch. (AR 98.) Regarding Dr. Williams’s April 2011 assessment of
Aldrich’s physical RFC, Dr. Knisely stated that the opinion “relies heavily on the
subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by [Aldrich], and the totality of
the evidence does not support the opinion.” (AR 115.) Moreover, Dr. Knisely noted that
Dr. Williams’s opinion “contrasts sharply with the other evidence in the record, which
renders it less persuasive.” (Id.) As discussed above, substantial evidence supports Dr.
Knisely’s conclusions. Therefore, it was proper for the ALJ to give significant weight to
Dr. Knisely’s opinions. See Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing
Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 567–68 (2d Cir. 1993)) (“[T]he regulations . . . permit the
opinions of nonexamining sources to override treating sources’ opinions provided they
are supported by evidence in the record.”); SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (July 2,
1996) (“In appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency . . . consultants . . .
may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources.”).
For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in his analysis of Dr.
Williams’s opinions.
Conclusion
The Court DENIES Aldrich’s motion (Doc. 11), GRANTS the Commissioner’s
motion (Doc. 16), and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 31st day of October, 2014.
/s/ John M. Conroy
.
John M. Conroy
United States Magistrate Judge
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