Miller v. Morrisville, Town of et al
Filing
50
OPINION AND ORDER granting Motions to Dismiss ( 16 , 35 , 38 , 40 ). Within 30 days from the date of this Opinion and Order, Mekhi Miller must appear pro se or through counsel and file a properly-signed Amended Complaint. Failure to do so will res ult in the dismissal of this case without prejudice. Motions for Default Judgment 32 , 36 , Motion for Leave to Amend 46 , and Motions to Answer and to Set Aside Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 49 are denied. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 4/14/2015. (law)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
BARBARA MILLER, on behalf of
MEKHI MILLER,
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
TOWN OF MORRISVILLE,
:
PEOPLE’S ACADEMY, MORRISVILLE :
POLICE DEPARTMENT, LAMOILLE
:
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH,
:
BEHAVIORAL WELLNESS,
:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
:
LAMOILLE UNION SOUTH
:
SUPERVISORY,
:
:
Defendants.
:
Case No. 2:14-cv-5
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Barbara Miller, proceeding pro se and purportedly
on behalf of her grandson, Mekhi Miller, brings this action
claiming that Defendants engaged in discrimination on the basis
of Mekhi’s race and learning disability.
have moved to dismiss.1
All served Defendants
Arguments for dismissal include Barbara
Miller’s inability to represent her grandson pro se, Plaintiff’s
failure to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, and
failure to state a claim.
Also before the Court are Ms. Miller’s
motions for default judgment, motion to amend the Complaint, and
motion to “set aside” the motions to dismiss.
For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are
1
The docket does not indicate service upon Defendants
Department of Education or Lamoille Union South Supervisory.
granted, Barbara Miller’s motions are denied, and Mekhi Miller is
granted leave to amend his pleadings, either pro se or through
counsel, within 30 days.
Factual Background2
Ms. Miller first claims that on October 4, 2012, she was
informed by a school principal that Mehki was being suspended for
putting his hands on a female classmate.
The next day, the
mother of another student threatened to shoot Mekhi if he did not
leave her son alone.
Mekhi reported this latter incident to Ms.
Miller, who in turn informed police.
A police officer came to
the Millers’ home and advised them to seek a protective order.
On October 8, 2012, Ms. Miller obtained the recommended
protective order.
On October 9, 2012, the woman who had
threatened to shoot Mekhi obtained a protective order barring him
from being near her son.
On October 10, 2012 at the conclusion
of Mekhi’s suspension, Barbara and Mekhi traveled to the school
for a re-entry meeting.
The school developed a “safety plan” for
2
This factual background summarizes the facts set forth in the
Amended Complaint. There are currently three pleadings on the docket
entitled “Amended Complaint.” The first proposed Complaint was
dismissed by the Court sua sponte and thus never docketed. Plaintiff
subsequently filed the first “Amended Complaint” (ECF No. 6), and was
entitled to file a second “Amended Complaint” (ECF No. 7) as a matter
of right. See Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). However, any subsequent
amendment required leave of the Court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2),
and no such leave has been granted. Accordingly, the Court will treat
ECF No. 7 as the operative Amended Complaint. For purposes of the
pending motions to dismiss, the factual allegations set forth in that
pleading will be accepted as true. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
2
the two boys to be able to attend school without violating their
respective protective orders.
entrances and stairways.
That plan included using different
Mekhi also met with “Terrance” from
Defendant Behavioral Wellness3 to discuss his suspension.
Later that same day, Mekhi was taken home by a faculty
member after police informed him that he was in violation of the
protective order.
Ms. Miller contacted “Terrance,” who said he
would speak with the police to determine what was going on.
“Terrance” then informed Ms. Miller that the police said Mekhi
could go to school.4
On October 12, 2012, a state court judge
made clear that Mekhi could indeed attend school.
At that point,
however, Mekhi had already missed several days of classes and
required special education tutoring services in order to catch up
on his work.
Ms. Miller next claims that in January 2010, Mekhi was
assaulted by a teacher at People’s Academy in Morrisville.
The
alleged perpetrator was Jason Derner, a teacher trained to work
with special needs students.
conduct.
Mr. Derner was reprimanded for his
Ms. Miller has since learned that when Mr. Derner was
involved in a subsequent argument with a parent, he was reported
3
Counsel for Behavioral Wellness has moved to dismiss in the
name of the Copley Professional Services Group (“Copley”). ECF No. 38
at 1 (asserting the Copley has been “misidentified” in the pleadings).
4
When Ms. Miller tried to contact “Terrance” several years
later to inquire about who he had spoken with at the police station
that day, he allegedly failed or declined to return her calls.
3
to the Department of Education and ordered to attend anger
management classes.
Ms. Miller alleges that Mr. Derner received
a comparatively lighter punishment for his treatment of Mekhi
because Mekhi is black.
The incident between Mr. Derner and Mekhi was allegedly
reported to the Morrisville police.
However, after two years
with no response from the police, Ms. Miller made inquiries and
was told that the police were unable to locate the complaint
form.
Ms. Miller obtained a letter from “the Behavioral
Intervention person” attesting that they brought Mekhi to the
police after the incident, but the police have not responded to
the letter.
ECF No. 7 at 6.
The police have also had interactions with Mekhi involving
his home placement.
After an argument with Ms. Miller in 2010,
Mekhi went to the police and refused to go home that night.
A
mental health worker helped find a bed for Mekhi in the Hardwick
area.
The following day, after Mekhi told police that he would
run away from wherever they placed him, he was placed in the
custody of the Vermont Department of Children and Families.
Ms.
Miller claims that in placing Mekhi with the State, the police
did not handle the situation properly in light of Mekhi’s
disabilities, which reportedly include “ADHD, ODD and emotional
detachment disorder.”
Id. at 7.
The Amended Complaint further alleges difficulties in the
4
relationship between Mekhi and Defendant Lamoille County Mental
Health Services (“LCMHS”).
Mekhi allegedly had problems with
many behavioral intervention specialists employed by LCMHS, at
times refusing to meet with them.
In 2011 or 2012, Mekhi was
placed in a room by a behavioral interventionist and allegedly
threw a chair, damaging a wall.
Although Mekhi informed Ms.
Miller that he would need to go to court to answer for his
conduct, it is not clear whether a court date was ever set.
In the Amended Complaint’s conclusion, Mr. Miller states
that some of Mekhi’s conduct was not his fault, but was instead
due to his disabilities.
She states that “getting to know him
better would have helped” and that he should have been “rewarded
when he earned it.”
Id. at 8.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks money
damages because Mekhi has reportedly been suicidal and “has never
been exposed to racism until he came here.”
Id.
Discussion
Each served Defendant has moved to dismiss.
While there is
significant overlap in Defendants’ arguments for dismissal, there
are also factual difference that require individual analysis.
The Court will therefore address each Defendant’s motion in the
order filed.
I.
Lamoille County Mental Health Service’s Motion to Dismiss
A.
Pro Se Representation
Defendant LCMHS moves to dismiss on several grounds, the
5
first of which is that Barbara Miller cannot represent her
grandson pro se.
LCMHS states upon information and belief that
Mekhi was not a minor at the time this case was initiated, as the
first docket entry is January 7, 2014 and Mekhi’s date of birth
is December 15, 1995.
An attachment to the Amended Complaint
(ECF NO. 6-6) also reflects a birth date of December 15, 1995.
Accordingly, Mekhi was 18 when the case was filed.
A non-lawyer may not represent another person or entity in
federal court.
Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139–40 (2d Cir.
2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“parties may plead and conduct
their own cases personally or by counsel”).
Consequently, as
Mekhi was reportedly 18 years old when this case was filed, he
cannot be represented by a person who is not a lawyer.
Ms.
Miller’s appearance on his behalf is therefore improper.
Even if LCMHS is mistaken and Mekhi was a minor when his
grandmother filed this case, she cannot represent him.
See
Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59,
61 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“[A] non-attorney parent must be represented
by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her
child.”); accord Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir.
1998); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th
Cir. 1997) (joining “all other circuit courts addressing the
issue [that] have held that the guardian or parent cannot bring a
lawsuit on behalf of a minor in federal court without retaining a
6
lawyer.”).
With respect to representation of minors by non-
lawyers generally, the Cheung court reasoned as follows:
It goes without saying that it is not in the interests
of minors or incompetents that they be represented by
non-attorneys. Where they have claims that require
adjudication, they are entitled to trained legal
assistance so their rights may be fully protected.
There is nothing in the guardian-minor relationship
that suggests that the minor’s interests would be
furthered by representation by the non-attorney
guardian.
906 F.2d at 61.
Ms. Miller contends that because she has been given power of
attorney for Mekhi’s affairs, she may provide legal
representation.
However, the granting of a power of attorney to
a non-lawyer does not enable that person to appear in court on
the grantor’s behalf.
See Snyder v. Perry, 2015 WL 1262591, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2015) (“Even if [the plaintiff] has
conferred upon [his daughter] a power of attorney, [the daughter]
may not represent [her father] in Court as a pro se litigant.”);
Gabayzadeh v. Taylor, 639 F. Supp. 2d 298, 301-02 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(noting that federal law prohibits the practice of law on behalf
of another person “regardless of the authority purportedly
conferred by execution of a power of attorney” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Ms. Miller has already been notified that she cannot
represent her grandson.
In an Opinion and Order dated May 9,
2014, the Court ruled that “[i]f Mekhi is a minor, Rev. Miller
7
may file the Amended Complaint on his behalf, but only if she is
represented by an attorney.
If he is an adult, he must file his
own motion to proceed in forma pauperis.”
ECF No. 3 at 7 n.1.
The Court also granted Plaintiff 45 days in which to file an
Amended Complaint.
Since that Opinion and Order, three Amended Complaints have
been docketed, each signed by Barbara Miller.
Mekhi has not
moved to proceed in forma pauperis or entered an appearance pro
se.
Nor has Barbara Miller alleged her own injuries.
Accordingly, the Court cannot adjudicate the Amended Complaint,
and LCMHS’s motion to dismiss is granted on this basis.
See
DePonceau v. Pataki, 315 F. Supp. 2d 338, 341–42 (W.D.N.Y. 2004)
(finding that pro se plaintiff lacked standing to file § 1983
complaint on behalf of other individuals, even though they had
given him power of attorney).
Within 30 days from the date of
this Opinion and Order, Mekhi must appear pro se or through
counsel and file a properly-signed Amended Complaint.
Failure to
do so will result in the dismissal of this case without
prejudice.
See Berrios v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130,
135 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding to the district court and
instructing that “[i]f counsel is not secured or appointed, the
court may dismiss the complaint, but without prejudice”).
B.
Amending the Pleadings
While an amended pleading is required so that Mekhi can
8
appear either pro se or through counsel, leave to amend may be
denied if his claims would ultimately be futile.
Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014).
See Nielsen v.
The Court will therefore
proceed to LMCHS’s other arguments for dismissal, as they relate
directly to the question of futility.
See Dougherty v. Town of
N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir.
2002) (“An amendment to a pleading will be futile if a proposed
claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss . . . .”).
LMCHS first contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish
a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.
The Amended
Complaint alleges discrimination on the basis of race and
disability, each of which is potentially protected under federal
law.
However, the Amended Complaint does not offer a specific
legal basis for liability on the part of LMCHS, a private entity.
While such laws exist, they require certain factual allegations.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (requiring allegations of intentional
racial discrimination concerning the rights “to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property.”).
Those types of factual allegations are
absent here.
However, when considering subject matter jurisdiction, the
factual validity of the claim “is irrelevant to the question of
whether the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
9
[the] complaint.”
307 (2d Cir. 2003).
Carlson v. Principal Fin. Grp., 320 F.3d 301,
Furthermore, when evaluating a pro se
complaint a court should not dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction if the complaint can plausibly be read to set forth
a federal cause of action.
Cf. Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–76 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasizing the
importance of liberally construing pro se submissions in the
context of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion).
Here, the Amended Complaint
alleges discrimination — an area that is more than plausibly
covered under federal law.
The Court must also address whether an amended pleading
would withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
When
reviewing a pleading under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-movant.
ATSI Commc’ns, 493 F.3d
at 98.
Here, the allegations against LCMHS are sparse.
There are
references to behavioral intervention personnel, to Mekhi’s
interpersonal problems with counselors, and to an incident where
Mekhi threw a chair and damaged a wall.
10
There is a general
conclusory allegation of discrimination on the part of all
Defendants, but no allegations of specific discriminatory acts by
LCMHS or its employee.
It is well established that conclusory allegations of
discrimination do not suffice.
See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993) (remanding
to give pro se plaintiff opportunity to amend where complaint
“fails to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was
discriminated against because of his race”) (internal citation
omitted); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F. Supp. 2d 249, 269
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Even liberally construed, plaintiffs’ complaint
fails to allege any facts relating to race, other than a
conclusory statement that defendants retaliated and discriminated
against plaintiffs based on their being African-American, which
is insufficient under Iqbal.”).
Nonetheless, giving the
pleadings in this case the required liberal reading, it is
plausible that the acts of mistreatment alleged against LCMHS
were attributable to discrimination.
must be freely granted.
By rule, leave to amend
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
The Court
will therefore permit Plaintiff to amend his claims against LCMHS
to set forth non-conclusory allegations of discrimination.
Any
amended pleading will supersede all previous pleadings, and
should therefore include all claims and allegations Plaintiff
wishes to pursue.
As set forth above, the Amended Complaint must
11
be filed without 30 days of this Opinion and Order.
II.
People’s Academy’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant People’s Academy (“People’s”) also argues that
Barbara Miller cannot represent Mekhi in this case.
For relief
on that issue, People’s suggests a stay until counsel can be
The motion to dismiss is granted on this point, and
hired.
Plaintiff has 30 days to rectify the issue as set forth above.
People’s further submits that any claims based upon events
prior to January 2011 are untimely.
Although the pleadings do
not set forth a statutory basis for suit, People’s surmises that
Plaintiff is bringing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim “is that which
the State provides for personal-injury torts.”
549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
In Vermont, a three-year statute of
limitations applies to personal injury claims.
512.
Wallace v. Kato,
See 12 V.S.A. §
Therefore, as this case was initiated in January 2014, any
Section 1983 claim based upon facts prior to January 2011 is
time-barred absent a valid argument for tolling the limitations
period.
People’s also references a release signed by Barbara Miller
on June 29, 2011, based on events that occurred prior to and
including April 10, 2012.
The release, signed on behalf of
Mekhi, stated that it “resolves all of [Ms. Miller’s] complaints
regarding the School District [which included People’s] and Mekhi
12
Miller’s experience as a student in the School District up until”
the date of signing.
ECF No. 35-1 at 10.
The release was later
ratified and amended to be effective through April 10, 2012.
at 4.
Id.
Ms. Miller received a check for $10,000 as consideration
for release.
Plaintiff has not responded to either the timeliness or
release arguments.5
Assuming the validity of the school’s
position, there are allegations in the pleadings that would
survive both the statutory limitations period and the release.
Those allegations include the October 2012 suspension, protective
order, and confusion about whether Mekhi could return to school.
It is unclear from the pleadings how school officials may have
mistreated Mekhi in regard to those incidents, as it appears
there was a lack of clarity from law enforcement about his right
to remain in school.
Nonetheless, as set forth above, the Court
must construe the allegations broadly, and grant leave to amend
if such leave would not be futile.
People’s personnel are
consistently mentioned in the pleadings, and while Plaintiff must
clarify and support any claims of discrimination, the Court
cannot find at this time that future allegations against the
school would be futile.
Leave to amend is therefore granted as
set forth above.
III. Copley Professional Services Group’s Motion to Dismiss
5
No opposition to the motion to dismiss has been docketed.
13
Defendant Copley argues for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.
Copley, identified in the pleadings as
Behavioral Wellness, is alleged to have employed “Terrance.”
It
was “Terrance” who assisted with Mekhi’s response to the school
suspension and had related communications with police.
There is
also an allegation that, years later, “Terrance” declined to
return Ms. Miller’s telephone calls.
As discussed previously, the Court will assert subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis of Plaintiff’s discrimination
claims.
However, it is unclear what Copley and its employees may
have done that was motivated by discriminatory animus, or that
might render it liable under federal law.
The motion to dismiss
is therefore granted.6
While the lack of facts involving Copley renders leave to
amend a close question, there are allegations of wrongdoing and
general claims of discrimination.
Consequently, and in keeping
with Second Circuit precedent, see Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698,
705 (2d Cir. 1991) (courts should grant pro se parties leave to
amend “at least once”), the Court will allow Plaintiff the
opportunity to amend his claims against Copley.
The amended
filing shall be submitted within 30 days, as set forth above.
6
Although Copley did not argue for dismissal on the basis of
Ms. Miller’s representation of her grandson, the allegations against
it would be dismissed on that basis in any event.
14
IV.
Morrisville Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss
The final motion to dismiss is filed by Defendants Town of
Morrisville (“the Town”) and the Morrisville Police Department
(“MPD”) (collectively the “Morrisville Defendants”).
These
Defendants again note that Ms. Miller cannot represent her
grandson in this case.
For reasons set forth above, the motion
to dismiss is granted on that basis.
The Morrisville Defendants also move to dismiss any claims
that occurred three years prior to the filing date, citing the
statute of limitations in Section 1983 actions.
While the Court
has not yet ruled on that issue, as there may be estoppel or
other responses to the limitations argument, any effort by
Plaintiff to amend the pleadings should keep in mind any and all
applicable limitations periods.
The Court also notes that
certain allegations against the MPD occurred in 2012, and would
survive a timeliness challenge.
The Morrisville Defendants next contend that the MPD is not
an entity that may be sued.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3), the
Court looks to Vermont law to determine whether a governmental
entity has the capacity to be sued.
The Court is not aware of
any statute or ordinance in Vermont that permits a suit against a
municipal police department, and has consistently held that such
departments do not have the capacity to be sued.
See, e.g.,
Gorton v. Burlington Police Dep’t, 23 F. Supp. 2d 454, 456 (D.
15
Vt. 1998); Hee v. Everlof, 812 F. Supp. 1350, 1351 (D. Vt. 1993).
Unless Plaintiff can establish a legal basis for such a suit, any
claims brought against the MPD in an amended pleading will be
dismissed.
Finally, the Morrisville Defendants submit that Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for municipal liability.
A
municipality such as the Town of Morrisville cannot be held
liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
See
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Svcs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d
Cir. 2008).
Instead, a plaintiff must show “that action pursuant
to official municipal policy caused the alleged constitutional
injury.”
Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Monell,
436 U.S. at 690–91.
To establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom,
the plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal policy
which is officially endorsed by the municipality, see Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011); (2) actions taken or
decisions made by municipal policymaking officials which caused
the alleged violation of plaintiff’s civil rights, see Amnesty
America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir.
2004); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000); (3) a
practice “so persistent and widespread as to practically have the
16
force of law,” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359; see also Green v.
City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2006), or that “was so
manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior
policy-making officials,” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375
F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted);
or (4) that “a policymaking official exhibit[ed] deliberate
indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by
subordinates.”
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quotations and citations
omitted); see also Okin v. Village of Cornwall–On–Hudson Police
Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009).
Here, even giving the Amended Complaint the required liberal
reading, the Court finds no allegations sufficient to state a
Section 1983 cause of action against the Town of Morrisville.
Specifically, there is no mention of a municipal custom or policy
and no reference whatsoever to policymaking officials.
Absent
any such allegations, the Amended Complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for relief.
However, because an amended pleading
might rectify these shortcomings, the Court will again permit the
filing of a timely-filed Amended Complaint as set forth above.
V.
Plaintiff’s Motions for Default Judgment
Ms. Miller has filed two motions for default judgment on
October 20, 2014 and October 24, 2014, respectively.
17
ECF Nos.
32, 36.7
Defendant Copley notes in response that it received an
extension of time to respond to the Amended Complaint through
October 31, 2014.
On October 15, 2014, all other parties who had
not yet filed responsive pleadings or motions were required to do
so on or before October 29, 2014.
responded in a timely manner.
Each Defendant subsequently
Therefore, the motions for default
judgment are denied.
VI.
Remaining Motions
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to amend and a
motion to “set aside” Defendants’ arguments for dismissal,
including efforts to dislodge her as Plaintiff’s legal
representative.
Because the Court has already determined that
leave to amend will be granted, and as Ms. Miller is not properly
before the Court, the motion for such leave is denied.
Ms.
Miller’s motion to set aside arguments for dismissal is also
denied.
VII. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions to
dismiss (ECF Nos. 16, 35, 38, 40) are granted because Ms. Miller
cannot represent Plaintiff in this action.
Within 30 days from
the date of this Opinion and Order, Mekhi Miller must appear pro
7
The Court will rule on Ms. Miller’s motions because they are
without merit. The motions are also denied because Ms. Miller cannot
act as Plaintiff’s legal representative.
18
se or through counsel and file a properly-signed Amended
Complaint.
Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this
case without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s pending motions (ECF Nos.
32, 36, 46, 49) are denied.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 14th
day of April, 2015.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
District Court Judge
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?