Drown v. Town of Northfield
Filing
22
OPINION AND ORDER denying as moot 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and 10 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 16 Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 3/25/2015. (law)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
LARRY DROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF NORTHFIELD,
Defendant.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 2:14-cv-80
OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises out of disputes between Plaintiff Larry
Drown and Defendant Town of Northfield (“the Town”) regarding
Drown’s alleged zoning violations.
The Town ultimately filed at
least one enforcement action in state court which resulted in a
judgment against Drown and subsequent foreclosure proceedings.
Drown comes to this Court claiming due process violations and
malicious prosecution.
Now before the Court are the Town’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, Drown’s motion for injunctive relief,
and the Town’s supplemental motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
The supplemental motion seeks dismissal under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and if appropriate, abstention under the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
For the reasons set forth below, the Town’s supplemental motion
to dismiss is granted, its initial motion to dismiss and Drown’s
pending motion are denied as moot, and this case is dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Factual Background
In October 2005, Drown submitted an application to the Town
seeking conditional use approval for a 60 foot by 100 foot
commercial building located at 11 Wall Street in Northfield (“the
Wall Street property”).
The application described the use of the
proposed structure as a store for “retail & personal service.”
ECF No. 1-2 at 1.
A hearing was held on November 17, 2005,
after which the Board of Adjustment approved the use with
conditions, including the planting of trees for screening and a
limitation on lighting.
The application was heard by the Town Planning Commission on
January 16, 2006.
The Planning Commission’s decision, issued 14
days later, reported that “Mr. Drown is constructing a spec
building which will be rented and used as described for retail
automobile repair, tire shop, and/or storage of service delivery
vehicles.”
ECF No. 1-5 at 2.
The application was approved
unanimously.
On July 8, 2008, the Town sent Drown a Notice of Violation
stating that the use of the Wall Street property was not
consistent with the zoning approvals.
alleged violations.
The Notice set forth four
The first stated that the approved use was
for a “Retail and Personal Services Store,” and that instead
“[t]he property is being used for a combination of auto repair,
auto recycling, and junkyard.
None of these uses is consistent
2
with the definition of Retail and Personal Service Store, the
approved uses of the property.”
ECF No. 1-6 at 1.
The second
alleged violation accused Drown of establishing or maintaining an
unapproved junkyard.
Third, the Notice alleged that Drown had
established an office in a travel trailer without a permit.
The
fourth charge alleged that Drown had not planted adequate trees
for screening.
The Notice of Violation gave Drown seven days to
come into compliance, and warned that failure to comply might
result in the Town pursuing the matter in court, “where the Town
of Northfield may seek injunctive relief and fines up to $100.00
per day.”
The Notice also informed Drown of his right to appeal
to the Zoning Board of Adjustment (“ZBA”).
Drown did not appeal
to the ZBA.
On October 7, 2008, the Town filed a municipal enforcement
action against Drown and others in the state court Environmental
Division.1
The court granted summary judgment to the Town,
concluding that Drown’s substantive arguments were barred as a
matter of law for failure to appeal to the ZBA.
The court
further noted that “the only way around these strict rules of
finality would be if Defendants could claim . . . a
constitutional violation, such as a violation of Defendants’
1
Other Defendants included Jason Law, who operated a business
at the Wall Street property, and Kenneth Strong, who was allegedly
involved with Drown in an unapproved lot line adjustment. The lot
line adjustment increased the size of the Wall Street property.
3
constitutionally-protected civil or due process rights.”
16-2 at 7.
ECF No.
Given that Drown had been given adequate notice of
his right to appeal to the ZBA, the court found “no due process
or other constitutional violations in the [Notices of Violation]
that were issued here.”
Id.
In a subsequent order, the state
court found that the fines imposed were not inequitable or
excessive.
Drown appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, but the
appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee.
On December 9, 2011, the Town filed a state court complaint
for foreclosure on the Wall Street property and another property
owned, at least in part, by Drown on Western Avenue in
Northfield.
On May 13, 2013, Judge Robert Bent entered a
judgment of foreclosure.
In an entry order dated November 24,
2013, the state court bifurcated the Wall Street and Western
Avenue matters and extended the redemption date on the Wall
Street property to February 21, 2014.
On February 20, 2014, the
state court extended the redemption period a second time to June
21, 2014.
On September 17, 2014, the court issued a certificate
of non-redemption and a public sale was scheduled for December
12, 2014.
The latest state court order on this Court’s docket
indicates that the sale was postponed for an additional 30 days
while Drown removed his belongings from the property.2
2
The Western Avenue property was sold at public sale on May 9,
2014. The state court confirmed the sale on November 11, 2014 and
extinguished Drown’s right of redemption.
4
Procedural Background
Drown, appearing pro se, filed his Complaint in this Court
on April 24, 2014.
The Complaint alleges that Drown was
“aggressively approached” by the Town to sell his land, and that
the Town has engaged in a “disingenuous ruse.”
ECF No. 1 at 8.
Drown further claims that the Town violated his “due process
right to a fair trial,” and that his cause of action includes
“malicious prosecution and a Law Firm that was filled with
pettifoggers getting into free government money that had no
bucket bottom.”
Id.
The Town responded on May 15, 2015 with a motion to dismiss,
arguing that Drown had failed to set forth a plausible legal
claim.
The Town’s motion also referenced attachments to the
Complaint which, the Town argued, demonstrate that Drown received
due process at the municipal level.
On June 3, 2014, Drown filed a pro se motion for injunctive
relief, asking this Court to postpone the sale of his home on
Western Avenue.
Among other things, Drown alleges in his motion
that he “has serious cognitive memory issues, and the [state
court] judge and lawyers are aware of these issues, and that Mr.
Drown is unable to represent himself in the fair and proper way.”
ECF No. 10 at 3.
The Town subsequently notified the Court that
a state court judge had found Drown incompetent, and requested
that the Court either appoint Drown counsel pursuant to Fed. R.
5
Civ. P. 17(c)(2) or dismiss this case without prejudice.
12.
ECF No.
On December 17, 2014, the Court appointed counsel to
represent Drown pro bono for the limited purpose of addressing
the pending motions.
The Town has since filed a second, supplemental motion to
dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
That motion cites
the state court proceedings and argues for dismissal pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, if appropriate, Younger
abstention.
Both motions to dismiss, as well as Drown’s motion
for an injunction, are now before the Court.
Most recently, the
Court granted Drown’s counsel’s motion to withdraw from the case
due to her inability, as stated in her motion, “to reach an
accord with Plaintiff regarding the matter at issue.”
ECF No. 20
at 1.
Discussion
The Court must first address the Town’s jurisdictional
arguments submitted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
See
Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674,
678 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that when a court is presented with
motions to dismiss under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the
court should first address subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1)).
A court will grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the court is not
authorized by statute or the Constitution to adjudicate the
6
plaintiff’s claims.
See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110,
113 (2d Cir. 2000).
In determining whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists, the court may look to evidence outside the
complaint.
See Kamen v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006,
1011 (2d Cir. 1986).
The party asserting subject matter
jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
The Town’s first contention is that Drown’s claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker–Feldman
doctrine establishes “the clear principle that federal district
courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance,
appeals from state-court judgments.”
Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd.
of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005); see District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
“Rooker–Feldman bars a losing party in state court from seeking
what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment
in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s
claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal
rights.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 287 (2005); see also Bridgewater Operating Corp. v.
Feldstein, 346 F.3d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[F]ederal district
courts do not have jurisdiction over claims that have already
been decided . . . by a state court.”).
7
As the Second Circuit has explained, “Rooker–Feldman directs
federal courts to abstain from considering claims when four
requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2)
the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court
judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that
judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the
plaintiff’s federal suit commenced.”
143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).
McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d
“[T]he applicability of the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine turns not on the similarity between a
party’s state-court and federal-court claims . . . but rather on
the causal relationship between the state-court judgment and the
injury of which the party complains in federal court.”
McKithen
v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 9798 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 1179 (2008).
Here, Drown was issued a Notice of Violation and failed to
appeal to the ZBA.
When the Town brought an action in the
Environmental Division of the state court, the court determined
that his substantive arguments were procedurally barred and that
he had failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation.
appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court was dismissed.
Drown’s
Foreclosure
judgments have also been entered against his properties.
As
Drown was clearly the loser in the state court proceedings, the
first part of the Rooker-Feldman test is satisfied.
The second factor is also satisfied, as Drown is
8
complaining of injuries caused by the state court’s judgment.
Although Drown’s pro se Complaint is not clear with regard to the
precise injuries suffered or the relief being sought, the state
court records indicate that his losses on the zoning issues
provided the basis for subsequent foreclosure proceedings.
In
his motion for injunctive relief, Drown states that he is in
danger of living “on the street” if his mobile home is sold.
No. 10 at 3.
ECF
Accordingly, the proceedings being challenged have
resulted in adverse judgments and a loss of property rights.
The third factor asks whether the plaintiff is inviting
federal court review of a state court judgment.
The lower state
court considered Drown’s constitutional claims and found that
they lacked merit.
Drown’s appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court
was dismissed, and Drown is now challenging the state court
rulings, citing an unfair trial.
This Court has no power to
review those rulings, notwithstanding Drown’s claims of
unconstitutional conduct.
See
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87
(1983) (holding that a federal district court does not have
jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions . . .
arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges
allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional”);
Rabinowitz v. New York, 329 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“A plaintiff may not overcome the doctrine and seek reversal of
a state court judgment ‘simply by casting his complaint in the
9
form of a civil rights action.’” (quoting Ritter v. Ross, 992
F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Johnson v. Smithsonian
Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1999) (pursuant to the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine, “among federal courts, only the Supreme
Court has subject matter jurisdiction to review state court
judgments”).
Finally, the injuries relative to Drown’s constitutional
claims predated his filing of this case.
The constitutional
questions were addressed by the lower state court in September
2009, and judgment was entered in that case in April 2010.
Post-
judgment motions were resolved in 2013, and the Vermont Supreme
Court dismissed Drown’s appeal on May 8, 2013.
foreclosure was also entered in 2013.
Complaint on April 24, 2014.
Judgment of
Drown filed his federal
The Court therefore concludes that
Drown’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as it
has no subject matter jurisdiction over the state courts’
determinations.
The Town also notes an ongoing state court proceeding and
the possible application of Younger abstention.
Documents
recently submitted by the Town show that as of January 2015, the
Wall Street property had not yet been sold.
Those same documents
indicate continuing state court proceedings governing the date of
the sale.
While judgment of foreclosure on both the Wall Street
and Western Avenue properties was entered prior to the filing of
10
this federal case, a liberal reading of Drown’s filings could
infer a challenge to those ongoing proceedings.
The Town submits
that any challenge to such proceedings would be barred by
Younger.
The Second Circuit has held that “Younger abstention is
mandatory when: (1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that
implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state
proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity
for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims.”
Spargo v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65,
75 (2d Cir. 2003).
In Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.
Ct. 584, 591–92 (2013), however, “the Supreme Court rejected this
three-part test in favor of a categorical approach.”
Shah, 569 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2014).
Mir v.
Sprint Communications
held that the Younger doctrine applies only to three classes of
state court proceedings: 1) “state criminal prosecutions”; (2)
“civil enforcement proceedings”; and (3) civil proceedings that
“implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts.”
134 S. Ct. at 588 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see id. at 591 (“We have not applied Younger
outside these three ‘exceptional’ categories, and today hold . .
. that they define Younger’s scope.”).
Because Drown’s state court cases do not involve either
criminal prosecutions or civil enforcement proceedings, the Court
11
must focus upon the third category: the State’s interest in
enforcing state court orders and judgments.
The third Sprint
Communications category echoes the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Pennzoil v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), which reasoned that
“[n]ot only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere
with the execution of state judgments, but they would do so on
grounds that challenge the very process by which those judgments
were obtained.”
481 U.S. at 13.
In this case, it is not clear whether the Complaint seeks
any form of injunctive relief.
ECF No. 1 at 8 (asking the Court
to “[u]se all the pettifoggers amended complaint against the
truth that was easily found in Northfield Town Records”).
Drown
did file a separate motion for injunctive relief, however,
seeking an order enjoining the sale of the Western Avenue
property.
To the extent that such property is subject to ongoing
state court proceedings,3 the Court might consider whether the
third Sprint Communications prong applies.
The parties have not
briefed that specific issue, and other district courts have been
reluctant to characterize a foreclosure as the sort of proceeding
that warrants abstention under the Supreme Court’s most recent
jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servs.,
LLC, 2015 WL 452285, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2015); Brumfield v.
3
As discussed above, it appears that the Western Avenue property
was sold and that Drown’s right of redemption was extinguished through
the state court’s confirmation of the sale.
12
U.S. Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 7005235, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 2014).
That said, Drown’s request for injunctive relief is
precluded by the Anti–Injunction Act, which provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283.
This provision applies when the requested
injunction would either stay ongoing proceedings or prevent the
parties from enforcing an order that has already issued.
See
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs,
398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970) (“[T]he prohibition of § 2283 cannot be
evaded by addressing the order to the parties or prohibiting
utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding.”).
Courts in this Circuit have held that the Anti-Injunction Act
applies to state court foreclosure proceedings.
See Ungar v.
Mandell, 471 F.2d 1163, 1165 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the
Anti–Injunction Act did not permit injunction of state court
foreclosure proceeding); Billie v. Aurigremma, 2013 WL 6331358,
at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2013) (same);
Attick v. Valeria Assocs.,
L.P., 835 F. Supp. 103, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
Accordingly,
if Drown is seeking relief with regard to ongoing foreclosure
proceedings, his action is statutorily barred.
The Court’s final consideration is Drown’s current lack of
representation.
Although the Court previously appointed pro bono
13
counsel, that counsel has been granted leave to withdraw due to
differences with her client.
The Second Circuit has held that a
Court may deny a request for counsel, “even for a minor or
incompetent person,” when “‘it is clear that no substantial claim
might be brought on behalf of such a party.’”
Berrios v. New
York City Housing Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Wenger v. Canastosa Cent. School Dist., 146 F.3d 123,
125 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Furthermore, while a district court may not
make a merits determination of claims filed by an incompetent
person, see Wenger, 146 F.3d at 134, the Court’s determination
here pertains to its jurisdiction.
A jurisdictional ruling where
it is “clear that no substantial claim might be brought” does not
run afoul of Rule 17(c)(2).
Berrios, 564 F.3d at 134 (citing
Wenger, 146 F.3d at 125).
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Town’s
supplemental motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) is granted and this
case is dismissed without prejudice.
The Town’s initial motion
to dismiss (ECF No. 8) and Drown’s motion for injunctive relief
(ECF No. 10) are denied as moot.
DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 25th
day of March, 2015.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
District Court Judge
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?