Matson v. Szarejko
Filing
46
OPINION AND ORDER granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. This case is dismissed. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 7/8/2016. (jam)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
JOHNATHAN MATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH SZAREJKO,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:14-cv-171
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Johnathan Matson brings this action claiming that
Defendant Joseph Szarejko, a Trooper with the Vermont State
Police, caused him to be unlawfully detained in jail overnight.
Trooper Szarejko now moves for summary judgment, arguing that he
misunderstood the instructions he received from a state court
judge, and that he cannot be held liable for that
misunderstanding.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion
for summary judgment is granted and this case is dismissed.
Factual Background
On August 4, 2011, Johnathan Matson’s now ex-wife, Carey
Stoudt, filed a state court complaint seeking relief from abuse
as a result of Matson’s alleged behavior.
The next day, the
Vermont Superior Court issued a Temporary Relief from Abuse
Order.
Among other things, the temporary order barred Matson
from entering the family residence without Stoudt’s permission;
required him to stay at least 300 feet from Stoudt, her
residence, and her place of employment; and barred him from
contacting Stoudt in any way, including telephone calls, except
to arrange for limited telephone or computer contacts with the
couple’s children.
The court set a hearing for August 9, 2011.
On August 7, 2011, Stoudt alerted police that Matson had
violated the temporary order multiple times since being served.
At approximately 7:30 that evening, Trooper Szarejko traveled to
Matson’s apartment and questioned him about the allegations.
Based upon his conclusion that Matson had committed thirteen
separate violations of the temporary order, including several
phone calls to Stoudt, he placed Matson under arrest and
transported him to the State Police barracks in New Haven,
Vermont.
While Matson was being processed, and because the arrest
occurred in the evening, Trooper Szarejko contacted Vermont
Superior Court Judge Harold Eaton by phone to determine Matson’s
bail and conditions of release.
According to Trooper Szarejko,
Judge Eaton ordered conditions of release, cited Matson to appear
in court the following day, and confirmed that there would be no
bail.
Trooper Szarejko then executed a conditions of release
form on which he wrote “no bail.”
The form also directed that
Matson could not contact Stoudt or enter her home, could not buy
firearms or other dangerous weapons, and that he must appear in
court the next day at 12:30 p.m.
Based upon his conversation with Judge Eaton, Trooper
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Szarejko believed that Matson was to be held without bail until
his court appearance.
As he explained in his deposition: “So I
assumed that with all these violations of this court order, that
–- and with him being cited for 12:30 the next day, that it was
hold without bail, considering the offenses.”
15.
ECF No. 37-7 at
When asked why the judge would set conditions of release and
then order a hold without bail, Trooper Szarejko responded: “I
just thought the judge said, you know, no bail, that, you know,
he can’t –- he’s going to jail, and there’s no way he can get out
until he goes to court.”
Id.
Trooper Szarejko briefly discussed Judge Eaton’s order with
his supervisor, Sergeant Stephen McNamara.
Sergeant McNamara
noted that people are not often held without bail, id. at 16, and
asked Trooper Szarejko whether the judge intended for “no bail
and hold or release on a citation.”
ECF No. 37-8 at 7-8.
Trooper Szarejko reportedly replied: “Judge Eaton stated no
bail.”
ECF No. 37-8 at 8.
Sergeant McNamara, an 18-year veteran of the Vermont State
Police, did not challenge Trooper Szarejko’s conclusion.
In an
affidavit submitted in support of the summary judgment motion, he
states that conditions of release and detention are not mutually
exclusive, as “[c]onditions of release are set in order to
prevent an inmate from further harassing a victim while he is
still incarcerated, for example, by making telephone calls or
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sending letters.”
ECF No. 37-15 at 1.
Sergeant McNamara
testified in his deposition that he could not recall a judge ever
releasing a person accused of violating a relief from abuse
order.
ECF No. 37-15 at 14-15.1
Once Matson completed processing at the State Police
barracks, Trooper Szarejko transported him to the Addison County
Sheriff’s jail and informed relevant personnel that Matson was to
be held without bail.
The next day, Matson was transported to
court and charged with five counts of violating the Temporary
Relief from Abuse Order.
After his court appearance, Matson was
released from custody.
Matson ultimately pled guilty to one count of violating the
Temporary Relief from Abuse Order.
On August 25, 2011, acting on
a motion for clarification filed by defense counsel, Judge Eaton
issued a handwritten order stating: “The Court set conditions of
release and did not impose any bail.
1
There would be no purpose
Matson objects to this testimony, arguing that it is not
credible and is unreliable because: (1) the law prohibits detention
without bail for a misdemeanor offense, (2) according to Trooper
Szarejko, Sergeant McNamara questioned the “no bail” order and
therefore must have suspected the Judge Eaton intended release, and
(3) Sergeant McNamara testified only about his recollection and had
difficulty recalling specific cases. While at summary judgment a
court may not make weight or credibility determinations, Hayes v. New
York City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996), the Court
finds that none of Matson’s objections undermine Sergeant McNamara’s
testimony. Sergeant McNamara was testifying about his experience
generally. He was not testifying about the law, the specifics of
Judge Eaton’s order, or any specific case in which he was personally
involved. Furthermore, while the basis for Sergeant McNamara’s
reasoning may be contested, the ultimate material fact is that he did
not challenge Trooper Szarejko’s interpretation.
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in setting conditions had the [C]ourt ordered a hold without
bail.
This is a conditions only release.”
Matson submits that
Judge Eaton’s order clarified the intent of his conversation with
Trooper Szarejko on the evening of August 7, 2011.
Matson’s Complaint asserts a cause of action entitled “False
Arrest,” in which he claims that he was unreasonably seized in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and denied his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
For damages, he claims
one day’s lost wages, humiliation, emotional distress, and loss
of liberty.
The second count in the Complaint is for punitive
damages.
Discussion
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment must be granted when the record shows there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Civ. P. 56(a).
See Fed. R.
“A fact is ‘material’ ... when it ‘might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law[,]’” and “[a]n
issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)).
“If, as to the issue on which summary judgment is
sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a
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reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing
party, summary judgment is improper.”
Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When
the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its
opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.
[Rather], the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)
(internal quotation marks, citations, emphasis, and footnotes
omitted).
II.
Liability for Matson’s Detention
In moving for summary judgment, Trooper Szarejko first
argues that Matson’s guilty plea and conviction defeat his claim
of false arrest.
See, e.g., Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380,
387 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that “where law enforcement
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officers have made an arrest,” conviction is a defense to a
Section 1983 action asserting that the arrest was made without
probable cause).
However, Matson is not challenging the grounds
for the arrest itself, but rather the constitutionality of the
detention thereafter.
The fact of a guilty plea plays no role in
evaluating whether Trooper Szarejko’s actions – detaining Matson
overnight after a state court judge intended a release on
conditions – violated Matson’s rights.
Trooper Szarejko next argues that Matson has failed to state
a valid claim of excessive detention.
Again, Szarejko’s argument
mischaracterizes the claim, as Matson is not challenging the
length of his detention after arrest, but rather the fact that he
was detained at all.
It is Trooper Szarejko’s failure to carry
out the Judge’s intent, and not the duration of the detention,
that is at issue.
In any event, Troop Szarejko contends that his actions are
protected by two types of immunity: qualified immunity and
judicial immunity.
Qualified immunity “‘shields government
officials from civil damages liability unless the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.’”
Rogoz v.
City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)).
The doctrine
balances two important interests: the need to hold public
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officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly, and
the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.
Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
“[W]hen a defendant official invokes qualified immunity as a
defense in order to support a motion for summary judgment, a
court must consider two questions: (1) whether the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, makes out a
violation of a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.”
Rogoz, 796 F.3d at 247 (alteration and emphasis in
original) (quoting Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir.
2010)).
With respect to the second inquiry, “clearly
established” means “‘whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.’”
Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 389 (2d
Cir. 2013) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
While protecting the reasonable performance of official
duties, qualified immunity allows for mistakes.
As recently
explained by the Second Circuit, qualified immunity “‘gives ample
room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Rogoz, 796
F.3d at 247 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
The docrtine “protects government officials when they make
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‘reasonable mistakes’ about the legality of their actions.”
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 353 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)), and applies to
mistakes of law, mistakes of fact, and mistakes based on mixed
questions of law and fact, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
A court may
deny a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
where an officer’s judgment was “so flawed that no reasonable
officer would have made a similar choice.”
Lennon v. Miller, 66
F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1995).
Here, Trooper Szarejko mistakenly believed the Judge Eaton
had ordered a hold without bail.
With respect to the violation
of any constitutional rights, there can be little debate that it
is unlawful to detain an arrestee after a judge has ordered his
release and without any intervening cause.
The question
therefore turns to whether it was reasonable for Trooper Szarejko
to believe that his actions were lawful.
The facts of this case are largely undisputed.
Matson was
arrested after Trooper Szarejko identified thirteen violations of
a relief from abuse order over a two-day period.
Because the
arrest occurred in the evening, Trooper Szarejko contacted a
judge via telephone to obtain direction as to bail and conditions
of release.
The judge ordered conditions, specified no bail, and
set a hearing for the next day.
Based upon this conversation,
Trooper Szarejko assumed that the judge had ordered a hold
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without bail, and proceeded accordingly.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Matson,
questions arise about the reasonableness of Trooper Szarejko’s
interpretation.
One such question is whether the conditions of
Matson’s release, which included staying away from Stoudt’s home
and refraining from buying weapons, were consistent with a hold
order.
Matson also draws support from the after-the-fact order
from Judge Eaton, which reportedly reveals that he had intended
to release Matson on “conditions only.”
ECF No. 44-2 at 1.
Even considering these facts, however, the inquiry with
regard to qualified immunity is whether Trooper Szarejko’s
actions were so unreasonable as to rise to the level of “plainly
incompetent.”
Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229.
The Trooper’s own
explanation is that given Matson’s number of violations, and with
a hearing scheduled for the following day, he assumed the judge
intended a hold without bail.
His reasoning was bolstered by the
reaction of his superior, Sergeant McNamara.
Sergeant McNamara
testified in his deposition that he had never known of a judge
releasing a person accused of violating a relief from abuse
order.
ECF No. 37-78 at 15 (Q: So are you saying that your
experience is that people charged with misdemeanor violation of
abuse prevention order charges are held with no bail?
has been my experience, sir.”).
A: That
He also believes that conditions
of release and detention are not necessarily inconsistent.
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Accordingly, he did not question Trooper Szarejko’s
determination.
Matson contends that Trooper Szarejko’s actions were
unreasonable because they violated specific provisions of Vermont
law.
Under the Vermont Constitution, a person is entitled to
bail unless: the allegation involves a crime punishable by life
in prison; the person is charged with a violent felony and there
is no set of conditions that can reasonably protect the public;
or the person is awaiting sentencing or has been sentenced
pending appeal.
Vt. Const. Ch. II § 40.
these exceptions applies here.
Obviously, none of
Matson thus argues that Trooper
Szarejko should have known that his understanding of Judge
Eaton’s “no bail” instruction was erroneous.
Trooper Szarejko counters that it is not clearly established
whether the right to bail applies prior to an arraignment.2
However, as a practical matter, bail became an issue when Trooper
Szarejko telephoned Judge Eaton to ask for instructions as to
bail and/or release conditions.
Indeed, after speaking with
Judge Eaton, Trooper Szarejko completed a form that specifically
contemplated a potential bail amount.
2
ECF No. 37-9 at 2.
Trooper Szarejko also cites Rule 3 of the Vermont Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person arrested for a
misdemeanor offense may be taken into custody – as opposed to released
on a citation – under certain conditions. Vt. R. Crim. P. 3(f).
Those circumstances include violation of a relief from abuse order.
Vt. R. Crim. P. 3(c)(6). While this Rule justifies Matson’s arrest
and initial custody, it does not address his continued custody after
Judge Eaton apparently ordered a release on conditions.
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Regardless of the constitutional right at issue, the central
question is whether a reasonable officer would have believed that
holding Matson overnight without bail was lawful.
Judge Eaton
ordered “no bail,” and Trooper Szarejko accepted those words at
face value, assuming that the detention was based upon the number
of alleged violations and the fact of a court appearance the next
day.
His actions, it was later revealed, were mistaken.
Nonetheless, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Trooper
Szarejko was acting reasonably, as even in the eyes of a
supervisor with many years of experience, there was little reason
to challenge Judge Eaton’s apparent determination that Matson
should be held overnight and delivered to court the next day.
See Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2014) (holding that the
dispositive inquiry “is whether it would have been clear to a
reasonable officer in the agents’ position that their conduct was
unlawful in the situation they confronted”) (internal quotation
marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
Furthermore, there is
no indication that the Trooper’s actions were malicious, or that
he knowingly violated the law.
Accordingly, the Court finds as a
matter of law that qualified immunity applies, and that Matson
has no basis for recovering damages, punitive or otherwise.
The
motion for summary judgment is granted.3
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Because Trooper Szarejko’s conduct is protected by qualified
immunity, the Court need not reach the matter of judicial immunity.
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Conclusion
Trooper Szarejko’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 37)
is granted on the basis of qualified immunity, and this case is
dismissed.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 8th
day of July, 2016.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
District Court Judge
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