Breitmeyer-Schaal v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 49

OPINION AND ORDER denying 17 MOTION for Order Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner; granting 25 MOTION for Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 12/6/2016. (jam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
ARIANA BREITMEYER-SCHAAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:14-cv-197

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ariana Breitmeyer-Schaal brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act,
requesting review and remand of the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security denying her applications for Disability
Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the
Commissioner’s decision (ECF No. 17) and the Commissioner’s
motion to affirm the same (ECF No. 25).

For the reasons stated

below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion
is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on June 1 and June 6,
2011, respectively.

Both applications were denied initially and

upon reconsideration.
January 16, 2013.

An ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on

The SSA Appeals Council subsequently declined

review, thus rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of
the SSA Commissioner.

Plaintiff is proceeding in this case pro

se.
I.

Plaintiff’s Medical History
On May 31, 2008, at the age of 23, Plaintiff underwent

Cesarean section (C-section) surgery.

Plaintiff reports that she

was fully functional before the surgery, but had not worked since
2006 because she was attending school.

Adhesions resulting from

the C-section have allegedly left her in severe pain and unable
to exert physically.

Plaintiff also claims that her pain impedes

her ability to concentrate.
In the months following her C-section, Plaintiff began
developing radiating pain in the right side of her abdomen.

On

March 31, 2009, she sought care at the Emergency Room at Stony
Brook Medical Center in New York.

On April 23, 2010, after

moving to Vermont, she again sought Emergency Room services
because of her pain.

At that time she was prescribed narcotics

and advised to make an appointment with an OB/GYN.
On April 27, 2010, Plaintiff met with Dr. Kym Boyman, who
became her treating OB/GYN.

Dr. Boyman performed an ultrasound

but was apparently unable to identify the source of the pain,
ruling out a prior ovarian cyst.

In September 2010, Plaintiff

required immediate surgery due to an ectopic pregnancy.

Dr.

Boyman performed the surgery and discovered multiple adhesions of

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the uterus and the abdominal wall.

While Dr. Boyman was able to

both photograph and cut through some of the adhesions, the
surgery was ended because Plaintiff began to suffer blood loss.
During a September 27, 2010 post-operative call from Dr.
Boyman’s office, Plaintiff reported that she was still sore.
During an October 7, 2010 call, Plaintiff again reported pain
while doing certain activities such as grocery shopping.

Shortly

thereafter she reported that she was moving from one residence to
another, and that her incision caused her pain while she was
packing and unpacking her belongings.
During a November 2010 post-surgical follow-up, Dr. Boyman
suggested that internal stretching from the adhesions was causing
myofascial pain, meaning that the muscles surrounding the
adhesions were acting in ways that could cause additional pain.
Plaintiff was not taking medication at that time, and reported
feeling well overall.
In December 2010, Plaintiff had an initial visit with
primary care physician Dr. Terry Cantlin.

During that visit,

Plaintiff mentioned increased lower abdominopelvic discomfort.
subsequent ultrasound showed a cyst on her right ovary.

A

In March

2011, Plaintiff visited gynecologist Beth Vermont, M.D, who noted
abdominal tenderness.

Dr. Vermont suggested hormonal therapy to

shrink the cyst, but Plaintiff believed the therapy might
aggravate her migraines.

Dr. Vermont also suggested a diagnostic

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laparoscopy to try to identify the source of pain.
In May 2011, Plaintiff again complained to Dr. Boyman of
significant pain, at which time Dr. Boyman noted that pelvic pain
was prohibiting Plaintiff from working.

Plaintiff applied for

SSDI in June 2011, and Dr. Boyman wrote a letter supporting the
application, stating that Plaintiff was “currently unable to do
any work due to significant pain.”

Dr. Boyman also noted her

“hope and expectation that this will not be a permanent
condition.”

Plaintiff contends that Dr. Boyman’s notes make

clear that any optimism about possible improvement was based upon
the expected success of physical therapy for the myofascial pain,
and that physical therapy was not expected to address the pain
resulting from the underlying adhesions.
In July 2011, Plaintiff met with gynecologist Dr. Tanya
Kalmar.

During that exam, Dr. Kalmar noted that Plaintiff’s

abdomen was not tender and that she had no guarding or rigidity.
Plaintiff was also estimated to be 13 weeks pregnant.
In November 2011, state agency physician Dr. Carl Runge
reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records.

Dr. Runge determined that

in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit for six hours and
lift and carry up to ten pounds.

He saw no limitations in her

ability to use her hands, climb stairs, balance, kneel, crouch,
or crawl.

Dr. Runge also opined that Plaintiff would need to

change positions for five minutes every hour to relieve pain.

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In December 2011, Plaintiff met with gynecologist Dr.
Lawrence Slocki.

Dr. Slocki reviewed her medical records,

including the pictures of her adhesions.

Although he noted

previous pelvic pain, he reported that Plaintiff did not report
having much pain at that time.

Aside from Plaintiff’s obesity,

Dr. Slocki concluded that the physical examination was
unremarkable.
Plaintiff had another C-Section on March 15, 2012.

The

operating physician, Dr. Dina Levin, again removed some of
Plaintiff’s adhesions.

In April 2012, Plaintiff complained of

abdominal pain and requested a refill of her oxycodone
prescription.

Dr. Levin noted that Plaintiff seemed “awfully

well” and that her wound was healing.

Approximately one week

later, Plaintiff again complained of pain, but Dr. Levin did not
believe that the pain was from the adhesions.

Dr. Levin

suggested physical therapy, and expressed concern that Plaintiff
might be showing “some functional and drug seeking behavior.”
Nonetheless, Dr. Levin refilled Plaintiff’s oxycodone
prescription.
In May 2012, state agency physician Dr. Andrew Przybyla
reviewed Plaintiff’s records and determined that she could stand
for four hours, sit for six hours and lift and carry up to ten
pounds.

Like Dr. Runge, Dr. Przybyla believed that Plaintiff

would need to change positions once per hour to relieve her pain.

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Plaintiff criticizes Drs. Przybyla and Runge for not listing
specialties, and for overstating the importance of Dr. Boyman’s
comment in 2011 that Plaintiff’s condition was not likely to be
permanent.
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Levin in May 2012 complaining that
her pain tended to get worse with activity.

Although Dr. Levin

was skeptical of Plaintiff’s complaints given her examination and
Plaintiff’s movements on that day, she again refilled Plaintiff’s
oxycodone prescription.

Dr. Levin also completed a questionnaire

in which she confirmed that Plaintiff frequently experienced pain
or fatigue that interfered with attention and concentration, but
that Plaintiff could sit, stand and walk in a work setting.

In

fact, Dr. Levin observed that Plaintiff could get up from a lying
position “quite easily” and was able to walk normally.

She also

stated in the questionnaire that Plaintiff did not have any
significant limitations with respect to her ability to reach,
handle, or lift.
Plaintiff criticizes Dr. Levin’s conclusions, in part
because Plaintiff was on narcotics at the time of Dr. Levin’s
observations.

Plaintiff also notes that her insured period ended

on March 31, 2011, and the Dr. Levin’s examinations occurred
after that date.
In June 2012, Plaintiff visited the office of Dr. Brent
Burgee.

Dr. Burgee suggested physical therapy and recommend a

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pain management specialist for what Plaintiff reported as
“disabling” pain.

He did not prescribe any medication.

That

same month (June 2012), Plaintiff was evaluated by physical
therapist Jane Kaufman.

Plaintiff reported that pain prevented

her from lifting her 30-pound daughter and inhibited her
movements.

Plaintiff was discharged from physical therapy after

only a few appointments because she did not keep her last
appointment and did not return calls to reschedule.
In September 2012, Plaintiff had a pain management
evaluation with Dr. Gilbert Fanciullo.

At that time, Plaintiff

stated that her pain was a five out of ten though averaged a
seven out of ten.

Dr. Fanciullo noted that she had normal spinal

motion and normal strength in her upper and lower extremities.
He also noted tenderness in her right lower abdomen.

For

treatment, Dr. Faniciullo recommended Cymbalta, gabapentin and
oxycodone, as well as exercise to lessen the pain.
The hearing before the ALJ occurred in January 2013.
the hearing, Plaintiff was still reporting severe pain.

As of
That

same month, Dr. Boyman completed an impairment questionnaire at
Plaintiff’s request.

Dr. Boyman opined that Plaintiff could sit

for up to one hour and stand for up to one hour in an eight hour
workday, and would require breaks every 20 minutes to avoid pain.
Dr. Boyman also stated that Plaintiff was unable to push, pull,
kneel, bend, or stoop.

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In May 2014, Dr. Boynan submitted a note stating that
physical therapy was not providing much benefit and that
Plaintiff continued to suffer pain.
II.

Hearing Testimony
At the January 16, 2013 hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff

claimed that she was disabled due to abdominal pain.

She stated

that she was taking Advil, and would like to be on stronger
medication but was reluctant because she was breastfeeding her
baby.

While her husband was in law school, Plaintiff took care

of her two children.

Caretaking included preparing simple meals,

sweeping, washing dishes, and folding laundry.

Plaintiff stated

that she needed help scrubbing, getting the laundry into the
washing machine, lifting, and taking care of her daughter.
Plaintiff does not drive, as she never obtained her license.
She does travel to the grocery store and Walmart, and visits
family.

She also testified that she pays bills, has a savings

account, and uses a checkbook.

Plaintiff tried working for her

husband for a short period but reportedly had difficulty
concentrating.
Vocational Expert James Parker testified with respect to a
hypothetical individual who could sit for six hours, stand and
walk up to four hours per day, lift up to ten pounds, was not
limited with respect to the use of her hands or feet, and would
need to change positions every hour for about five minutes.

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According to Mr. Parker, such an individual could work as a data
review clerk, an inspection table worker, and an information
clerk.

Those types of jobs are reportedly available both

nationally and in Vermont.
III. The ALJ’s Decision
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to
evaluate disability claims.
380-81 (2d Cir. 2004).

See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377,

The first step requires the ALJ to

determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in
“substantial gainful activity.”
416.920(b).

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b),

If the claimant is not so engaged, step two requires

the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a “severe
impairment.”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).

If the ALJ

finds that the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step
requires the ALJ to make a determination as to whether that
impairment “meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”).
404.1520(d), 416.920(d).

20 C.F.R. §§

The claimant is presumptively disabled

if his or her impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984).
If the claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is
required to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(RFC), which means the most the claimant can still do despite his
or her mental and physical limitations based on all the relevant

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medical and other evidence in the record.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(1).

The

fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant’s
RFC precludes the performance of his or her past relevant work.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).

Finally, at the fifth

step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can do “any other
work.”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).

The claimant bears

the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four,
Butts, 388 F.3d at 383; and at step five, there is a “limited
burden shift to the Commissioner” to “show that there is work in
the national economy that the claimant can do,” Poupore v.
Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the
burden shift to the Commissioner at step five is limited, and the
Commissioner “need not provide additional evidence of the
claimant’s [RFC]”).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 31, 2008, the alleged
onset date.

At step two, he found that she had severe

impairments, including adhesions causing chronic pelvic and
myofascial pain, and obesity (Plaintiff had reported her height
as 5'3" and her weight as 215 pounds).

At step three, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff did not have any impairments that, either
singly or in combination, equaled a listed impairment.

He also

determined that Plaintiff had residual functional capacity that

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included the ability to perform sedentary work; no limitations on
the ability to use her hands; the ability to lift ten pounds; and
the ability to occasionally stoop and climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds.

The ALJ allowed that if working, Plaintiff would need

to change positions every hour for approximately five minutes.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable
to perform any of her past relevant work.

And at step five,

based upon the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff could perform work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy, and that she was
therefore not disabled from May 31, 2008 through the date of the
decision.
Standard of Review
The Social Security Act defines the term “disability” as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

A person will

be found disabled only if it is determined that her “impairments
are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her]
previous work[,] but cannot, considering [her] age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.”

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42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(2)(A).
In considering a Commissioner’s disability decision, the
Court “review[s] the administrative record de novo to determine
whether there is substantial evidence supporting the . . .
decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
standard.”

Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)

(citing Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).

The Court’s factual review of the

Commissioner’s decision is thus limited to determining whether
“substantial evidence” exists in the record to support such
decision.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964,

967 (2d Cir. 1991); see Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d
Cir. 1990) (“Where there is substantial evidence to support
either position, the determination is one to be made by the
factfinder.”).

“Substantial evidence” is more than a mere

scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Poupore, 566 F.3d at 305.
Discussion
Here, Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ’s ruling on two related
points.

First, she argues that the ALJ failed to assess whether

Dr. Boyman’s opinion as to disability deserves controlling weight
under the treating physician rule.

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Second, she submits that Dr.

Boyman’s opinion deserves controlling weight, and that the
evidence therefore supports an award of benefits.
The treating physician rule generally requires a measure of
deference to the medical opinion of a claimant’s treating
physician.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); see also Schisler v.

Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding the validity
of regulations codifying the treating physician rule).

Under the

treating physician rule, a treating source’s opinion is generally
entitled to “‘controlling weight’ so long as it ‘is
well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record.’”

Burgess v. Astrue,

537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).

In conducting this

analysis, the ALJ must provide “good reasons” for adopting or
rejecting a treating physician’s opinion.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“A claimant . . . who knows that her physician has
deemed her disabled[ ] might be especially bewildered when told
by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some
reason for the agency’s decision is supplied”).

The failure to

provide good reasons for rejecting a treating source’s opinion is
a ground for remand.

Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129–30.

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In the process of providing “good reasons” for discounting a
treating physician’s view, the ALJ is required to consider: (1)
the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, (3) the medical support for the treating
physician’s opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the
record as a whole, (5) the physician’s level of specialization in
the area and (6) other factors that tend to support or contradict
the opinion.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6);

see Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015); Sellian v.
Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418 (2d Cir. 2013).

That said, the ALJ

need not “slavish[ly] recit[e] . . . each and every factor where
[his] reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear.”
Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary
order); see also Khan v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-5118 (MKB), 2013 WL
3938242, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013).

Instead, the ALJ need

only apply “the substance of the treating physician rule.”
Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004).
In this case, the ALJ considered Dr. Boyman’s opinions and
afforded them “limited weight.”

The ALJ explained in detail that

he was discounting Dr. Boyman’s opinions because: (1) they were
internally inconsistent to the extent that she declared Plaintiff
“totally disabled” but also believed that the condition was not
permanent; (2) her opinions were based largely upon Plaintiff’s

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subjective allegations; and (3) her conclusions were contradicted
by Plaintiff’s activities, which included caring for her two
children while her husband was attending law school.

The ALJ

also noted a lack of consistent complaints to other health care
providers and Plaintiff’s limited work history.

With respect to

Dr. Boyman’s conclusion that Plaintiff was unable to work, the
ALJ dismissed this finding as a legal determination that is
“reserve[d] to the Commissioner.”
Beginning with the question of subjective complaints, the
ALJ is correct that much of the evidence of pain derives from
Plaintiff’s own reporting.

Multiple providers acknowledged the

existence of adhesions as the likely cause of pain.

The extent

of the pain, however, and its limiting effects were largely selfreported.
Under the Social Security Act, “[a]n individual’s statement
as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive
evidence of disability[.]”

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).

The

regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) set forth seven factors
that are relevant in assessing credibility: (1) daily activities;
(2) location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other
symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) type,
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (5)
treatment, other than medication, used for relief of pain or
other symptoms; (6) any measures used to alleviate pain or other

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symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning functional limitations
and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

The Social

Security regulations also provide a two-step process for
evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints.
At the first step, the ALJ must decide whether the
claimant suffers from a medically determinable
impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce
the symptoms alleged. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). That
requirement stems from the fact that subjective
assertions of pain alone cannot ground a finding of
disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). If the claimant
does suffer from such an impairment, at the second
step, the ALJ must consider “the extent to which [the
claimant’s] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the objective medical evidence and
other evidence” of record. Id. The ALJ must consider
“[s]tatements [the claimant] or others make about [his]
impairment(s), [his] restrictions, [his] daily
activities, [his] efforts to work, or any other
relevant statements [he] make[s] to medical sources
during the course of examination or treatment, or to
[the agency] during interviews, on applications, in
letters, and in testimony in [its] administrative
proceedings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(3); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); S.S.R. 96-7p.
Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations and
emphasis in original).

In other words, the ALJ must examine the

record as a whole to determine the credibility of a claimant’s
subjective complaints.

See Pascariello v. Heckler, 621 F. Supp.

1032, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (the ALJ may weigh “the objective
medical evidence in the record, the [plaintiff’s] demeanor, and
other indicia of credibility”).
“It is the function of the [ALJ], not [the court], to
resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of

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witnesses, including the [Plaintiff].”

Carroll v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983).

“Even

where the administrative record may also adequately support
contrary findings on particular issues, the ALJ’s factual
findings ‘must be given conclusive effect’ so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence.”

Genier, 606 F.3d at 49

(quoting Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982)).
The ALJ “is not required to accept [Plaintiff’s] subjective
complaints without question; he may exercise discretion in
weighing the credibility of the claimant’s testimony in light of
the other evidence in the record.”

Id.

In this case, there is objective evidence of a medically
determinable impairment in the form of Plaintiff’s adhesions.
Drs. Boyman, Levin and Slocki each believed that the adhesions
could be related to Plaintiff’s reported pain, though pain was at
times attributed to an ovarian cyst.

Dr. Boyman believed that

the muscles around the adhesions were an additional source of
pain.
Regardless of the cause, Plaintiff’s efforts to alleviate
that pain have been inconsistent.

When physical therapy was

recommended, Plaintiff did not continue with her therapy and did
not communicate with therapy provider about termination.

Aside

from Dr. Boyman’s comment in 2014 about the effectiveness of
physical therapy, there is no indication in the record that the

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termination of physical therapy was approved or recommended by a
health care provider.

Plaintiff also declined to follow through

on a recommended laparoscopy and resisted hormonal therapy.

As

noted by Dr. Levin, Plaintiff did request narcotics, which
prompted Dr. Levin to question the credibility of her complaints.
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints to providers were
similarly uneven.

While her complaints to Dr. Boyman about pain

levels were relatively consistent, other providers noted that
Plaintiff presented with only mild pain.

Physical examinations

were also inconsistent as to abdominal tenderness, guarding, and
rigidity.
With respect to Dr. Boyman’s opinions specifically, it is
clear from the record that the ALJ considered the frequency,
length, nature and extent of treatment, as his decision reviewed
Plaintiff’s medical history in significant detail.

The ALJ also

considered the amount of medical evidence supporting Dr. Boyman’s
opinion, and found her blanket statements about disability to be
inconsistent with other portions of the record.

For example, Dr.

Levin’s views differed significantly from those of Dr. Boyman,
and other providers offered varied opinions about the extent of
Plaintiff’s pain.
Additional evidence in the record arguably belies Dr.
Boyman’s conclusions about Plaintiff’s physical capacity,
including Plaintiff’s own description of her daily activities.

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Plaintiff was able to care for two young children while her
husband attended law school.

She also reported a physical

ability to grocery shop and visit family.

These reports are

inconsistent with Dr. Boyman’s suggestion that Plaintiff is
unable to engage in any sort of pushing, pulling, kneeling or
bending activities.
Questionnaire).

AR at 733 (Multiple Impairment

The Court therefore finds that the ALJ properly

limited the weight of Dr. Boyman’s comments on these issues.

See

Poupore, 566 F.3d at 307 (substantial evidence supported ALJ’s
decision opposing treating source where there was evidence that,
inter alia, the claimant took care of his one-year-old child,
vacuumed, washed dishes, watched television, read, used the
computer, and drove occasionally).
Not surprisingly, the clearest opinions on the question of
residual functional capacity came from the non-treating
physicians.

Those experts addressed various work-related

activities such as sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching, as
well as Plaintiff’s ability to use her extremities.

The ALJ

considered the non-treating expert opinions to be consistent with
Plaintiff’s activities, her caring for her family, and “the
limited complaints and objective findings.”

The ALJ also noted

that the only weight limitation mentioned in the record was
Plaintiff’s inability to life her 30-pound daughter.

The ALJ

therefore found that their conclusions were “not inconsistent

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with the medical evidence as a whole” and accorded their opinions
“substantial weight” on the question of residual functional
capacity.
Although the treating physician rule generally requires
deference to the medical opinion of a claimant’s treating
physician, the treating physician’s opinion is not afforded
controlling weight where it is inconsistent with other
substantial evidence in the record, such as the opinions of other
medical experts.

See Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d

Cir. 2002) (treating physician’s opinion is not controlling when
contradicted “by other substantial evidence in the record”); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Here, the ALJ considered Dr. Boyman’s

conclusions in light of the entire record and reasonably
concluded that the evidence was not consistent with some of her
conclusions.

The ALJ considered numerous factors in reaching his

decision, and thus provided “good reasons” for discounting the
opinion of the treating physician.
In the end, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was able to
perform sedentary work so long as she could change positions
every hour.

Substantial evidence supports this assessment.

Plaintiff herself testified that she leaves the house to shop or
visit family, cares for her two children independently, manages
finances, and performs simple chores such as meal preparation,
sweeping, and washing dishes.

The ALJ provided a detailed

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analysis of the record, and in that context expressed his doubts
about Plaintiff’s reported limitations.

Because substantial

evidence supports those doubts, the Court affirms the ALJ’s
conclusion.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion (Doc.
17), GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion (Doc. 25), and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Commissioner.
DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 6th
day of December, 2016.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
William K. Sessions III
District Court Judge

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