Lareau v. Northwestern Medical Center
Filing
162
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 157 Motion for Reconsideration re: 156 OPINION AND ORDER denying 120 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court's prior summary judgment ruling is affirmed. Signed by Judge William K. Sessions III on 10/8/2019. (jam)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
ASHLEY M. LAREAU,
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:17-cv-81
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ashley Lareau claims employment discrimination on
the basis of a disability.
Her former employer, Northwestern
Medical Center (“NMC”), denies the allegations and contends that
Lareau was terminated from her job due to performance issues.
NMC
previously moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the Court
denied the motion.
NMC now seeks reconsideration of that ruling.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion for reconsideration is
granted in part and denied in part, and the Court’s prior summary
judgment ruling is affirmed.
I.
Reconsideration Standard
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration “is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the
moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked.”
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners,
L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Reconsideration may also be granted if the movant demonstrates an
“intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.”
Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL
Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Virgin
Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.
1992)).
A motion for reconsideration “is neither an occasion for
repeating old arguments previously rejected nor an opportunity for
making new arguments that could have been previously advanced.”
Assoc. Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
II.
Timeliness of NMC’s Motion
Before reaching the merits of NMC’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court must address Lareau’s argument that the
motion is untimely.
Local Rule 7(c) provides that “a motion to
reconsider a court order, other than one governed by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59 or 60, must be filed within 14 days from the date of the
order.”
The Court’s ruling on NMC’s summary judgment motion was
docketed on July 8, 2019.
August 5, 2019.
NMC filed its motion to reconsider on
NMC submits that its motion is governed by Rule
60(a), that the 14-day deadline does not apply, and that strict
adherence to a deadline would elevate form over important
substance.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a
motion for “reconsideration.”
See Lopez v. Goodman, 2013 WL
2
5309747, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2013) (citing Hamilton v.
Williams, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998)).
“Since the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for
motions for reconsideration, such a motion may be construed as a
motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).”
Hill v. Washburn, 2013 WL 5962978, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2013)
(citing Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989)).
The issue becomes more complicated when, as in this case, the
reconsideration motion is filed after an interlocutory ruling
rather than the sort of final judgment contemplated by Rules 59(e)
and 60(b).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend
a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
the judgment.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (allowing relief from a “final
judgment, order, or proceeding”).
Rule 54(a) defines a judgment
as “a decree and any order from which an appeal lies,” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(a), and an appeal generally does not lie after denial
of a summary judgment motion.
See Davidson v. Chestnut, 193 F.3d
144, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that a district court’s denial of
a motion for summary judgment is generally a non-appealable
interlocutory order).
That said, Rule 54(b) allows that “any order or other
decision . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a
judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights
and liabilities.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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Accordingly, a district
court has “discretion to revisit earlier rulings in the same case,
subject to the caveat that ‘where litigants have once battled for
the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without
good reason permitted, to battle for it again.’”
Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors of the Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers &
Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964)).
As reflected in
the standard for reconsideration, decisions considered under Rule
54(b) “may not usually be changed unless there is ‘an intervening
change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
the need to correct a clear error or prevent a manifest
injustice.’”
1255).
Id. (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 956 F.2d at
It is therefore within the Court’s discretion to
reconsider its Order, applying the reconsideration standard,
notwithstanding the deadline set forth in the Local Rule.
Here,
the Court will exercise that discretion and turn to the merits of
NMC’s motion.
III. NMC Claims a Change in the Law
A.
Natofsky v. City of New York
The Second Circuit recently clarified that the legal standard
in employment discrimination cases brought under the ADA is
“but-for” causation.
Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337,
349 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We conclude that ‘on the basis of’ in the ADA
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requires a but-for causation standard.”).
Prior to Natofsky, the
Circuit “applied a ‘mixed-motive’ test to ADA claims, ‘under which
disability [need only be] one motivating factor in [the
employer’s] adverse employment action but [need not be] its sole
but-for cause.’” Id. at 346 (quoting Parker v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Because this Court’s
summary judgment order found genuine issues of material fact on
the question of whether “NMC was in fact motivated by unlawful
discrimination,” ECF No. 156 at 24, NMC submits that
reconsideration under the “but-for” standard is required.
B.
Facts Supporting “But-For” Causation
Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that even under
the more exacting “but-for” standard NMC is not entitled to
summary judgment.
Again viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Lareau, her evidence shows that prior to her seizures
she received positive performance reviews and pay raises based on
merit.
Once her seizures began and she alerted her supervisors
about possible periods of medical leave, she was faced with
attendance-related questions and placed on a punitive performance
plan (“PIP”).
And although a supervisor later stated in an email
that most minimum requirements of the plan had been satisfied,
Lareau was terminated shortly after the plan’s conclusion.
Lareau contends that the cost of her medical care under NMC’s
self-insured program contributed to her placement on a PIP.
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NMC
argues that evidence of that allegation is unsupported by the
record.
Lareau was placed on a PIP on March 18, 2016, yet the
medical records produced to Lareau showing her high (and
increasing) medical costs were not received by NMC’s Human
Resources staff until after that date.
122.
ECF No. 132-31 at 91, 96,
The records do pre-date her termination.
Consequently,
while the cost of Lareau’s care may be relevant to termination, it
does not fully explain her placement on a PIP.
Other facts in the record, however, when viewed in Lareau’s
favor, provide support for her causation time-line with respect to
the PIP.
For example, Lareau’s initial seizures occurred in
January 2016, two months before the PIP.
Lareau’s husband alerted
NMC that she had suffered seizures, and her supervisors knew that
she might be needing time off and possibly even surgery in the
coming months.
The record also indicates that NMC’s Human
Resources department was closely monitoring medical bills.
In an
email dated January 19, 2016, Thomas Conley and Louise Rocheleau
received an email providing detailed information about large
medical claims.
ECF No. 132-31 at 1.
It is unclear whether the
information was provided at the suggestion of NMC, or through the
initiative of NMC’s insurance broker, The Richards Group.
Id.
(noting that The Richards Group had “requested some follow up
details,” and commenting that the data will “give us a sense for
what may be on going”).
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NMC also questions Lareau’s claim that its failure to follow
disciplinary protocol can be used as evidence of pretext.
Specifically, NMC submits that because NMC’s Corrective Action
policy reserves the right to dispense of any step or steps in its
disciplinary protocol, a failure to follow those steps cannot be
used to show discrimination.1
Lareau responds that NMC’s
reservation of rights merely makes clear that employees have no
contractual rights to certain disciplinary steps, and can instead
be fired at any time as their employment status is “at will.”
It is well established that a court may look to “[t]he
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision,” including “[d]epartures from the normal procedural
sequence” when determining whether discrimination was a motivating
factor.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977); see also Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729
F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Departures from procedural regularity
. . . can raise a question as to the good faith of the process
where the departure may reasonably affect the decision.”).
Here,
Lareau contends that NMC failed to follow its usual, documented
1
NMC’s Corrective Action policy provides it is “not a
contract,” and that the type of corrective action “will depend
entirely on the particular facts and circumstances, and NMC
reserves the right to omit, repeat or amend any of the corrective
action options . . . and to take whatever action it deems
appropriate at any time and in any order, including immediate
termination of employment.” ECF No. 132-18 at 6.
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practice of providing the employee with written notice before
implementing disciplinary action.
The Court previously accepted
this fact as favoring Lareau’s discrimination claim at summary
judgment, and NMC cites no new facts or controlling authority that
the Court overlooked.
In a related argument, NMC critiques Lareau’s reliance on the
lack documentation of her alleged performance issues.
The Court
discounted that argument as carrying little weight, since pretext
is the plaintiff’s burden to prove and not the defendant’s to
disprove.
ECF No. 156 at 25.
This issue therefore does not
require additional analysis upon reconsideration.
In sum, there remain genuine issues of material fact in
dispute as to whether discrimination was the “but-for” cause of
Lareau’s termination.
The Court grants the motion for
reconsideration to the extent that NMC requests review under the
“but-for” standard, but denies reconsideration insofar as NMC’s
arguments merely restate its previous positions and point to no
new evidence, overlooked information, or clear error.
Because a
reasonable jury could conclude that NMC would not have terminated
Lareau but for her disability, upon reconsideration the Court’s
prior summary judgment ruling is affirmed.
IV.
Failure to Accommodate
NMC next argues that the Court erred with respect to Lareau’s
failure to accommodate claim.
NMC’s position is based on three
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contentions: first, that Lareau only needed accommodations
immediately after her seizures; second, that she failed to
establish the existence of accommodations that would permit her to
perform her job; and third, that Lareau conceded she was always
able to perform the essential functions of her job.
As Lareau
notes in her opposition to reconsideration, these same arguments
were largely raised in NMC’s initial summary judgment briefing.
One of Lareau’s reasonable accommodation claims is that her
records highlight certain conditions, such as stress and sleep
deprivation, that would make seizures more likely.
also identified as a limitation.
Driving was
NMC argues that stress and sleep
deprivation are not, by themselves, disabilities requiring
accommodation.
Stress and sleep deprivation are, however,
conditions related to epilepsy.
The ADA provides that “[a]n
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (emphasis added).
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The cited
accommodations——avoidance of stress and sleep deprivation——were
intended to decrease the chance of epilepsy becoming active, and
were therefore legitimately raised under the ADA.
NMC also argues that Lareau failed to identify a specific
accommodation that would enable her to perform the essential
functions of her job.
The question of appropriate accommodations
was raised, however, in a meeting between Lareau and Conley prior
9
to Lareau’s firing.
In fact, it was Conley who reportedly
suggested requesting an accommodation.
ECF No. 120-27 at 53.
According to Lareau, she told Conley that she feared further
retaliation and mistreatment if she submitted a request for
accommodations, and Conley did not offer alternatives that would
avoid the prospect of retaliation.
Id. at 53-54.
Viewing those
facts in a light most favorable to Lareau, a reasonable jury could
find that the employer’s failure to address Lareau’s concern
violated her rights under the ADA.
NMC’s final point with respect to reasonable accommodations
is that Lareau conceded she was capable of performing the
essential functions of her job without accommodation.
was raised in NMC’s prior briefing.
This point
In any event, although Lareau
may have been able to find ways to function without any
accommodations, her discussion with Conley suggests that
accommodations may have been appropriate but were not requested
due to her fear of retaliation.
The Court therefore declines to
find, as a matter of law, that no accommodations were necessary.
V.
Medical Confidentiality
NMC’s final request for reconsideration focuses on Lareau’s
medical confidentiality claim.
Again, this claim was addressed in
the Court’s prior ruling, and NMC has not identified any issues
the Court overlooked.
Instead, NMC submits that Lareau’s claim is
without merit because it is based upon conclusory and unsupported
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allegations.
As the Court noted previously, Lareau claims that Conley
improperly received information from The Richards Group about
“large claims” incurred by individual employees.
at 1.
ECF No. 132-31
The parties dispute whether this information was obtained
as a legitimate means of administering NMC’s self-insured benefits
plan, or was instead a search for employees with expensive
disabilities.
The emails in question focused on medical care
claims in excess of $25,000.
129.
Id. at 51, 83, 89, 93, 116, 126,
Lareau’s name appeared in each email as having claims
exceeding $25,000, beginning in March 2016 and continuing through
September 2016.
Id. at 80, 86, 91, 96, 122, 126, 131.
Given the
nature of the emails and the data shared with NMC, a jury must
determine whether the information was obtained for an unlawful
purpose.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, NMC’s motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 157) is granted in part and denied in
part, and the Court’s prior ruling is affirmed.
DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 8th day
of October, 2019.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
District Court Judge
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