McGuire v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING 21 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION denying 14 Motion for Order Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner, granting 19 Motion for Order Affirming the Commissioner's Decision. Signed by Chief Judge Christina Reiss on 6/12/2012. (pam)

U.S.OISTH

DISTRICl

fiLED
UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRlCT OF VERMONT

2UI2 JUN f 2 PM 2: 25
CLERK

BY

2M.:,:":,"
___
DfPUT Y CUR r,

THERESA McGUIRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case NO.5: 11-cv-24

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OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(Docs. 14, 19 & 21)

This matter came before the court for a review of the Magistrate Judge's April 20,
2012 Report and Recommendation ("R & R") in the above-captioned matter (Doc. 21).
Neither party has objected to the R & R, and the deadline for doing so has expired.
In this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Theresa McGuire seeks
review ofthe decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner")
denying her application for disability insurance benefits. In the R & R, the Magistrate
Judge recommends denying Ms. McGuire's motion to reverse the Commissioner's
decision (Doc. 14) and granting the Commissioner's motion to affirm the same (Doc. 19).
A district judge must make a de novo determination of those portions ofa
magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which an objection is made. FED. R.
Cry. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401,405 (2d Cir.
1999). The district judge "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); accord

Cullen, 194 F .3d at 405. A district judge, however, is not required to review the factual
or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of a report and

recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
150 (1985). When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfY itself that there
is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. See
Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196,206 (9th Cir. 1974).
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision that Ms. McGuire is not disabled, the
court must confine its de novo review of the administrative record to a determination of
whether "substantial evidence" supports the Commissioner's factual findings. 42 U.S.c.

§ 405(g). "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 305 (2d
Cir. 2009) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938)).
Assuming the Commissioner's factual determinations are supported by substantial
evidence, they are conclusive, and the court cannot disturb these findings to make them
"conform to [its] own interpretation of the evidence." Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F .2d
60,62 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Rivera v. Harris, 623 F.2d 212,216 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Thomas Merrill used the five-step
sequential process to evaluate Ms. McGuire's disability claim, and concluded she was not
disabled during the relevant time period. In so ruling, he found that Ms. McGuire's
polysubstance abuse was severe, but her depression and her social anxiety were not.
On review, the Decision Review Board ("DRB") modified the ALJ's decision,
finding that both Ms. McGuire's depression and her social anxiety constituted severe
impairments. Despite this modification, the DRB adopted all of the ALl's other fmdings,
explaining that "[w ]hile the [ALl's] decision concludes that the claimant's anxiety and
depression were not severe impairments, it is clear from reading the decision that, in fact,
those impairments were evaluated and considered as if severe when assessing the
claimant's credibility and residual functional capacity." (AR 4-5.) The DRB concluded
that the ALl's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
After filing a complaint with this court, Ms. McGuire moved to reverse the
Commissioner's determination, contending that "neither the ALJ nor the DRB properly
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analyzed the evidence showing that [her] ability to socialize and interact with others was
seriously impaired." (Doc. 21 at 7.) In his seventeen page R & R, the Magistrate Judge
carefully reviewed the factual record, the competing motions, and the applicable law. He
recommends that the court find that the ALJ's decision, as corrected by the DRB,
properly reflects Ms. Maguire's limitations and is supported by substantial evidence.
This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and further agrees
with his observation that "the evidence taken as a whole supports the ALJ's conclusion
that [Ms.] McGuire is 'quite functional despite being socially anxious.'" (Doc. 21 at lO­
ll) (citing AR 33.)
For the reasons stated above, the court hereby ADOPTS the R & R as the Opinion
and Order of this court, DENIES Ms. McGuire's motion to reverse (Doc. 14), and
GRANTS the Commissioner's motion for an order affirming the ALJ's decision as
corrected by the DRB (Doc. 19).
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Rutland, in the District of Vermont, this /2;" day of June, 2012.

Christina Reiss, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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