Knelman v. Middlebury College et al
Filing
69
ENTRY ORDER denying 66 Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment under Rule 54(b); denying 66 Motion to Stay Remaining Claims Pending Appeal. Signed by Chief Judge Christina Reiss on 1/9/2013. (pac)
· U.S. DIS
DISTRICT
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE
2013 J~H - PM
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
CLERK
BY
JAMES "JAK" KNELMAN,
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Will' y Clf~f'
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Plaintiff,
v.
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE, and
BILL BEANEY,
Defendants.
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Case No. 5:11-cv-I23
ENTRY ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY
OF A FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(b).
(Doc. 66)
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff James Knelman's motion for entry
of a final judgment under Rule 54(b). (Doc. 66.) Mr. Knelman seeks the entry of a final
judgment as to some, but not all, of his claims against Defendants Middlebury College
("Middlebury") and Bill Beaney ("Coach Beaney") so that he may immediately appeal
those claims to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He seeks a stay of his
remaining claims while he awaits the outcome of the proposed appeal. Defendants
oppose the motion.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background.
On May 11,2011, Mr. Knelman filed a six count Complaint against Defendants,
arising out of Coach Beaney's decision to dismiss Mr. Knelman as a player on
Middlebury's men's ice hockey team during the final weeks of the 2010-2011 season.
Mr. Knelman has since graduated from Middlebury and thus many, ifnot all, of his
claims for injunctive relief (including reinstatement to the ice hockey team) appear moot.
He seeks compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $75,000 and punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest as permitted by Vermont law.
In his Complaint, Mr. Knelman alleges that his relationship with Middlebury was
contractual in nature and that Middlebury breached its alleged promise to provide him
with procedural due process before he could be dismissed from the ice hockey team. He
asserts Middlebury breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based
upon the same conduct. Mr. Knelman further alleges that the relationship between
himself and Middlebury was fiduciary in nature and Middlebury had a "duty to act in
Knelman's best interest and with the highest standards of integrity and good faith in its
dealings with Knelman." (Doc. 1 at ~ 100.) He asserts a parallel claim of breach of
fiduciary duty against Coach Beaney.
Mr. Knelman contends that the manner in which Coach Beaney handled his
dismissal from the team was arbitrary and capricious and defamed Mr. Knelman in his
chosen prospective profession as a professional ice hockey player. Mr. Knelman's
defamation claim is based upon Coach Beaney's alleged statements that "Knelman is
selfish, Knelman 'had problems' on the hockey team last year, the decision leading to
Knelman's dismissal was 'not an isolated incident,' and he does not think 'hockey is a
priority' for Knelman." (Doc. 1 at ~ lOS.). As framed in his Complaint, Mr. Knelman's
defamation claim is asserted against both Defendants.
Finally, in his negligent supervision claim, Mr. Knelman asserts that Middlebury
knew or had reason to know that Coach Beaney had a "propensity to engage in tortious
acts of breach of the fiduciary duty owing to his students and defamation[,]" and "was
advised of Coach Beaney's ongoing tortious conduct and Middlebury took no action to
stop, prevent or sanction Coach Beaney, but rather condoned, approved and ratified the
incidents of tortious conduct." (Doc. 1 at ~ 119.)
By Opinion and Order dated September 2S, 2012, the court granted partial
summary judgment in Defendants' favor on Count I (breach of contract against
Middlebury); Count II (breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
against Middlebury); Count III (breach of fiduciary duty against Middlebury); and Count
IV (breach of fiduciary duty against Coach Beaney). The court granted in part and
denied in part summary judgment with regard to Count V (defamation claim against
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Middlebury and Coach Beaney) and denied summary judgment on Count VI (negligent
supervision against Middlebury) because the defamation claim was only partially
dismissed.
Mr. Knelman seeks an entry of final judgment as to Counts I through IV of his
Complaint so that he may take an immediate appeal. With regard to his defamation
claim, although the court has dismissed part of that claim, Mr. Knelman does not, at this
time, seek to appeal any portion of it. He seeks a stay of all remaining claims in this
court pending the outcome of his appeal.
Defendants object to the entry of final judgment and a stay and counter that Mr.
Knelman may achieve the same result by dismissing his remaining claims without
prejudice while he pursues his appeal. If Mr. Knelman pursues this option, Defendants
apparently agree that an entry of final judgment should be directed.
Mr. Knelman is represented by Joseph W. Anthony, Esq., Mary L. Knoblauch,
Esq., Kristin B. Rowell, Esq., Robert F. O'Neill, Esq., and Andrew D. Manitsky, Esq.
Defendants are represented by Karen McAndrew, Esq.
For the reasons set forth below, the court hereby DENIES Mr. Knelman's motion
for entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b).
II.
Conclusions of Law and Analysis.
Under Rule 54(b), "a district court may certify a final judgment where: (I) there
are multiple claims or parties; (2) at least one claim or the rights and liabilities of at least
one party has been determined; and (3) there is 'an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay.'" Transport Workers Union ofAmerica, LocallOO, AFL-CIO v.
New York City Transit Auth., 505 F.3d 226,230 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P
54(b)). "[I]n deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual
final judgments ... a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests
as well as the equities involved." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S.
1,8(1980). A court should also "consider such factors as whether the claims under
review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the
nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to
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decide the same issues more than once even ifthere were subsequent appeals." Id.
Where "the adjudicated and pending claims are closely related and stem from essentially
the same factual allegations[,]" a piecemeal appeal may be inappropriate as resolution of
the remaining claims "will illuminate appellate review of the [adjudicated] claims."
Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F .2d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1980). Even where the adjudicated and
remaining claims may be decided separately, a partial entry of final judgment "should be
used only in the infrequent harsh case," and only ifthere exists "some danger of hardship
or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal." 0 'Bert ex
rel. Estate of0 'Bert v. Vargo, 331 FJd 29, 41 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Cullen, 618 F.2d
at 228).
"The matter of whether to direct the entry of a partial final judgment in advance of
the final adjudication of all of the claims in the suit must be considered in light of the
goal ofjudicial economy as served by the 'historic federal policy against piecemeal
appeals.'" Vargo, 331 F.3d at 40-41 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8). "Respect
for that policy requires that the court's power ... be exercised sparingly[,]" bearing in
mind "that 'not all' dismissals of 'individual claims should be immediately appealable,
even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims.''' Vargo,
331 F.3d at41 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8).
The Second Circuit has directed the trial courts to refrain from entering Rule 54(b)
certifications "routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel," Ansam Assocs.
Inc. v. Cola Petroleum} Ltd., 760 F.2d 442,445 (2d Cir. 1985), but to do so only where
the circumstances warrant an immediate appeal and where that appeal is "in the interest
of sound judicial administration" which "must involve a proper regard for the duties of
both the district court and the appellate court." Ginett v. Computer Task Group, Inc., 962
F.2d 1085, 1094, 1095 (2d Cir. 1992).
Mr. Knelman argues that there is "no just reason for delay in the entry of
judgment" because Counts I through IV "are legally separable from the remaining
defamation and negligent supervision claims." (Doc. 66 at 1.) However, Mr. Knelman's
negligent supervision claim (which he does not seek to appeal) is based, in part, upon his
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breach of fiduciary duty claim against Coach Beaney which he does seek to appeal and in
part on his defamation claim which he does not seek to appeal. See Doc. 1 at ~ 119
(alleging that Middlebury negligently supervised Coach Beaney because it "knew or had
reason to know of Coach Beaney's propensity to engage in tortious acts of breach of the
fiduciary duty owing to his students and defamation."). The Second Circuit has ruled that
Rule 54(b) certification is not available "where the party and the claim remain in the
case." Steve's Homemade Ice Cream, Inc. v. Stewart, 907 F.2d 364,366 (2d Cir. 1990).
Although the instant case is arguably distinguishable, this remains a case in which Mr.
Knelman seeks to take a partial appeal that will affect a claim and a party that remain
before the district court. "[T]he interrelationship of the dismissed and surviving claims is
generally a reason for not granting a Rule 54(b) certification, not a reason for granting it."
Hogan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 961 F.2d 1021, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992).
Moreover, the possibility of piecemeal and repetitive appeals in this case is by no
means remote even in the absence of Mr. Knelman's negligent supervision claim. Each
of Mr. Knelman's claims involves a common core of factual allegations involving the
same events, the same parties, many of the same witnesses and the same body of
evidence. Each of Mr. Knelman's legal theories arises out of and is inextricably
intertwined in his dismissal from Middlebury's ice hockey team. It is thus quite possible,
if certification is granted, that the Second Circuit, as well as this court, may have to
consider the same facts and their legal implications twice. Although Mr. Knelman
correctly points out that he has raised legal claims of first impression and that it would be
helpful to have appellate guidance as to whether the evidence before the court is
sufficient to sustain those claims, "a district court's preference to have pretrial appellate
review of its assessment of the evidence to support a given claim is an improper basis for
entry of an immediate partial final judgment." Id. at 1026.
There is also the possibility of conflicting adjudications if a Rule 54(b)
certificatiop is not accompanied by a stay of the remaining claims before this court.
Indeed, the only wayan immediate appeal would make sense is if either a stay is granted
or Mr. Knelman dismisses his remaining claims without prejudice. In the absence of
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either of these two options, a Rule 54(b) certification would not advance judicial
economy and sound judicial administration in either the trial or the appellate court as both
courts could render potentially conflicting adjudications based upon the same set of
facts.l The granting ofa stay is thus integral to Mr. Knelman's Rule 54(b) motion.
The Second Circuit has held that the trial courts must balance four criteria in
determining whether to stay a case pending appeal: "the likelihood of success on the
merits, irreparable injury if a stay is denied, substantial injury to the party opposing a stay
if one is issued, and the public interest." Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.
2002). Mr. Knelman seeks to appeal legal issues which he describes as unsettled in
Vermont and the Second Circuit. His claims that have been dismissed are properly
characterized as "novel" in the context of a student-athlete suing his coach and college
based upon his dismissal from an extracurricular sport which carried with it no
scholarship benefits. The court thus cannot find that he has demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success on the merits.
The only injury Mr. Knelman will suffer if a stay is not granted is the possibility
that he will need to litigate his claims twice-a risk that is arguably insubstantial if his
claims are not factually and legally intertwined as he claims. In seeking a stay, however,
Mr. Knelman concedes that the claims he seeks to appeal and the claims remaining in this
court, if he is successful on appeal, will require a second trial involving the same facts,
the same parties, and many of the same witnesses. Although the harm Mr. Knelman may
suffer if forced to litigate his claims twice is neither unexpected nor unusual, two trials
involving the same set of facts, the same parties, and many of the same witnesses would
clearly be a waste ofjudicial and party resources. There is thus the possibility of
unnecessary and duplicative expense if a stay is not granted.
Defendants contend that the court must also consider their competing interests and
the hardships they will suffer in deciding whether to grant a Rule 54(b) certification and a
1 For example, a conclusion by the Second Circuit that Defendants, or either one of them, owed a
fiduciary duty to Mr. Knelman would potentially transform the nature and outcome of some of
Mr. Knelman's other claims.
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stay. They point out that this case has been pending since May of 20 11 and that it will be
pending for potentially several more years if Mr. Knelman's motion for certification and
a stay are granted. Defendants will be thus exposed to prolonged litigation rather than
receiving a prompt adjudication of the claims against them while Mr. Knelman pursues
an appeal that, if successful, will benefit only him. As Defendants point out with regard
to the claims Mr. Knelman seeks to appeal: "If those claims are as separate and distinct as
[Mr. Knelman] argues that they are, then there is no reason why those claims cannot
proceed to trial forthwith. Trial on the remaining claims should take at most a day or
two, and Defendant Beaney is entitled to have those claims resolved expeditiously."
(Doc. 67 at 4). If, in contrast, the facts and claims are intertwined in a manner that makes
Rule 54(b) certification unadvisable, Defendants argue the court should not attempt to
cure this problem by granting a stay that is not warranted. For the reasons stated by
Defendants, the court agrees that this is not a case where certification and a stay will
"make possible a more expeditious and just result for all the parties." L.B. Foster Co. v.
American Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81,87 (2d Cir. 1998).
Finally, the public interest does not favor a stay. Although the public interest in a
private dispute such as the instant one is not a compelling one, and although the public
interest is not advanced by duplicative judicial proceedings, the public also has no
interest in prolonged litigation or in partially adjudicated cases that remain pending but
which do not progress to a resolution while one party pursues an appeal.
On balance, Mr. Knelman has not established that a stay is warranted in this case.
In the absence of a stay or dismissal of his remaining claims, a Rule 54(b) certification is
not appropriate as the claims on appeal and the claims pending before this court are
sufficiently intertwined that they will all but guarantee duplicative proceedings and
piecemeal appeals.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DENIES Mr. Knelman's motion for
entry ofa final judgment under Rule 54(b) and a stay of the claims remaining in this
lawsuit.
SO ORDERED.
af'"'..
Dated at Rutland, in the District of Vermont, this _-1_ day of January, 2013.
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Chrlstina Reiss, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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