Burwell v. Peyton et al
Filing
126
OPINION AND ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part 80 & 81 Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Christina Reiss on 9/14/2015. (pac)
US. DiS "f FUCT COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
DISTRICT Cr VEf<~'IONT
f!LED
2015 SEP I 4 PM 4: 33
Clf1ji\
WAYNEBUR~LL,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARTFORD POLICE OFFICER FREDRICK
PEYTON in his individual capacity and as an
employee of the Town of Hartford, HARTFORD
POLICE OFFICER SCOTT MOODY in his
individual capacity and as an employee of the Town
of Hartford, HARTFORD POLICE OFFICER
KRISTINNAH ADAMS in her individual capacity
and as an employee of the Town ofHartford,
HARTFORD POLICE CHIEF GLENN CUTTING
in his individual capacity, and TOWN OF
HARTFORD for the negligence of Emily Leinoff
and Martha Morse,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
BY--:~
OEPUTY CLf:.R,<
Case No. 5:12-cv-166
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Docs. 80 & 81)
Plaintiff Wayne Burwell ("Plaintiff') brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and state law against the Town of Hartford ("Hartford"), Hartford Police Chief
Glenn Cutting ("Chief Cutting"), and Hartford police officers Kristinnah Adams
("Officer Adams"), Fredrick Peyton ("Officer Peyton"), and Scott Moody ("Sergeant
Moody") (collectively, "Defendants") for their actions stemming from an incident on
May 29, 2010 during which the individual officers responded to a 911 call at Plaintiffs
residence. It is uncontested that the officers pepper-sprayed and beat Plaintiff with a
baton in his own residence while Plaintiff was experiencing a hypoglycemic event
triggered by a medical condition. It is also undisputed that the officers responded to a
call that Plaintiffs residence appeared "ransacked" and that there was an unknown male
inside.
Pending before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants.
(Docs. 80 & 81.) Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law in their favor on all of Plaintiffs claims because they had probable cause to seize
Plaintiff, he was not conscious of any confinement, the officers' use of force was
reasonable and privileged, and the individual officers are entitled to qualified and
statutory immunity. Plaintiff opposes the motions, asserting that there are disputed issues
of material fact and that Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff is represented by Robin C. Curtiss, Esq., lnes C. Rousseau, Esq., Jeffrey
J. Larrimore, Esq., and Edward M. Van Dom, Esq. Defendants are represented by Nancy
G. Sheahan, Esq., Kevin J. Coyle, Esq., Joseph A. Farnham, Esq., and James F. Carroll,
Esq.
I.
Procedural Background.
The court heard oral argument on Defendants' motions on January 30, 2015,at
which time the court ordered Defendants to submit a transcript of an audio recording
1
from the body microphone of Officer Adams previously submitted as evidence. There is
a partial video recording of the incident which was taken from the vantage point of a
police cruiser and which captures only some of the events in question. There is no video
recording depicting what transpired in Plaintiffs residence.
On May 8, 2015, Defendants submitted the requested transcript prepared by a
court reporter, after affording Plaintiff an opportunity to review it. Plaintiff, however,
contests the accuracy of the transcript and proffers a competing version of how
discrepancies and inaudible portions within it may be resolved. The parties have now
submitted three versions of proposed revisions to the transcript of the audio recording
which they apparently agree does not accurately reflect what can be heard on the audio
1
The court also granted Defendants thirty days to submit a statement of disputed facts in
response to Plaintiffs statement of undisputed facts, which Defendants filed on February 25,
2015. (Doc. 112.)
2
recording. Because the court cannot reconcile these competing revisions without making
findings of fact, it relies primarily on the audio recording in setting forth the relevant
facts.
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserts five claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: Count One against the individual officers for excessive force; Count Two against
the individual officers for "detention and confinement"; Count Three against the
individual officers for false arrest; Count Four against Hartford for establishing and
maintaining customs, policies, or practices which gave rise to violations of Plaintiffs
constitutional rights; and Count Five against Chief Cutting for supervisory liability.
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserts four claims against Hartford:
Count Six for the negligence of the individual officers; Count Seven for the negligence of
Chief Cutting; Count Eight for negligent training, retention, and supervision; and Count
Twelve for the negligence of Emily Leinoff and Martha Morse (Hartford's 911
dispatchers on call the date of the incident). Because Plaintiff did not oppose
Defendants' request for dismissal of Counts Eight and Twelve, the court dismissed those
counts at oral argument and Ms. Leinoff and Ms. Morse are no longer defendants in this
lawsuit. (Doc. 111.)
Finally, Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserts three state law claims
against the individual officers and Hartford: Count Nine for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; Count Ten for negligent infliction of emotional distress; and Count
Eleven for assault and battery.
II.
The Undisputed Facts.
A.
Plaintifrs Prior Medical Crisis.
Prior to the incident in question, on March 28, 2010, the Hartford Fire Department
and emergency medical services were dispatched to Plaintiffs residence to resolve "a
blood sugar issue." 2 (Doc. 98-3 at 26, ~ 144.) Plaintiffwas found in the bedroom ofhis
2
At that time, the Hartford Fire Department and the Hartford Police Department were on
separate computer-aided dispatch ("CAD") systems so that a reported call from an apartment or
condominium did not provide an alert regarding whether or why there had been a prior response
3
residence supine, salivating, and unresponsive, with a blood sugar level of 24. (Doc. 985 at 1.) The emergency medical technicians ("EMTs") who responded, Alan Beebe and
Robert Robishaw, were unable to administer glucose orally and observed that, at the time,
Plaintiff could not stand or "take anything orally" and that Plaintiff ''was not fighting
back" while being treated. (Doc. 98-34 at 2; Robishaw Dep. at 26:4-13.) The EMTs
gave Plaintiff a shot of glucagon and intravenous fluids (an "IV"), after which Plaintiff
became "alert" and "responsive" but was still "confused" and had difficulty recalling
what had occurred that day. (Doc. 98-5 at 1; Doc. 98-42 at 2-3.) Plaintiff was then able
to take glucose orally, but Plaintiff needed assistance standing and getting dressed.
Mr. Robishaw testified in deposition that on that occasion Plaintiff"was in an
unconscious state responding only to painful or loud stimuli," and he opined that
generally a person with a blood sugar reading of 24 and an 8 Glasgow Coma Scale would
be in an unconscious state. (Doc. 98-34 at 3-4; Robishaw Dep. at 27:22-28:2.) After the
EMT' s initial treatment, Plaintiff was transported to the hospital.
B.
The Housekeepers' Report to the Dispatcher.
In the afternoon of May 29, 2010, Hartford dispatcher Emily Leinoff(the
"Dispatcher") received a transfer of a 911 call from an agent in Williston, Vermont. The
call agent advised the Dispatcher that she had received a call from an employee of a
cleaning service who had entered a client's residence at 34 Stony Creek in Wilder,
Vermont with another housekeeper. The call agent further advised that the housekeepers
reported that they found the place "ransacked," and that when they opened the door to the
upstairs bathroom, they saw a person in the bathroom who "does not belong to the
residence" and who "was just sitting on the toilet." (Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 00:40.)
to a specific apartment or condominium number. The CAD system did note the number of
"previous calls" for the address associated with the apartment or condominium complex, but not
the substance ofthose calls. (Doc. 84-12 at 5, 6; Boutilier Dep. at 12:6-16, 13:14-24.)
4
One of the two housekeepers, Holly Thomas, subsequently spoke directly with the
Dispatcher. 3 Ms. Thomas explained that she rat:Ig the doorbell of the residence in
question, opened the door and said "hello" a couple times, and that no one responded.
Ms. Thomas stated that the two housekeepers then went upstairs where she smelled
something burning and observed an overturned lamp and alarm clock there were "burning
into something." (Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 01:24-01 :32.) The housekeepers picked up the
lamp which was no longer smoking. Ms. Thomas further reported that the other
housekeeper opened the door to the bathroom, where the lights were off, and saw a
person sitting on the toilet. She described the person as a "black male" who did not say
anything to them or look at them when they opened the bathroom door. (Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5
at 05:30-06:10.) Ms. Thomas told the Dispatcher: "[W]e don't know if it's the person
that owns the house, that ... may be sick or something, or ... what's going on." (Doc.
98-8, Ex. 5 at 01:39-01 :45.) The Dispatcher did not hear this statement at that time,
although she conceded in her deposition that the statement can be heard on the recording
ofthe 911 call. (See Doc. 84-1 at 15-16, LeinoffDep. at 28:14-29:4.)
Ms. Thomas repeatedly informed the Dispatcher she had never seen or met the
owner of the residence, and she further stated that she did not know the resident's name.
(See, e.g., Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 06:18; see also Doc. 98-6 at 2, Thomas Dep. at 16:3-5.)
She also stated that she had not seen the male leave the residence. When asked by the
Dispatcher if the house was ransacked, Ms. Thomas replied that "it looked messy on the
first floor." 4 (Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 04:13-04:25.) When asked if the housekeepers had
keys to the condominium, Ms. Thomas replied that her boss had keys, that the residence
3
The other housekeeper who entered the residence, Hallie Fortune, did not speak with the
Dispatcher but did speak with the call agent, stating that she was not sure if the male she saw in
the bathroom was the homeowner and that the house was "a mess," which it was "never like."
(Doc. 98-7 at 3-4, Fortune Dep. at 28:21-29:12.) Ms. Fortune had never met or seen Plaintiff
prior to this incident. She left the residence before the officers responded to the 911 call and was
not at the residence during the incident in question.
4
The remainder of Ms. Thomas's response to the Dispatcher's question is inaudible on the audio
recording.
5
was unlocked, and that she did not know "if they left it unlocked or if someone broke in
to it." (Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 05:05-05:20.)
Sergeant Moody 5 was present when the Dispatcher received the 911 call. The
Dispatcher informed Sergeant Moody that the call reported a person inside a residence at
Stony Creek, that the cleaning crew did not know "who the person [was]," that there was
smoke inside this residence, and that the residence looked "ransacked." (Doc. 84-1 at 17,
LeinoffDep. at 32:13-17; see also Doc. 84-3 at 4, Moody Dep. at 7:4-9.) The Dispatcher
reported to Sergeant Moody that the cleaning crew believed the unidentified man "may
have broken in." (Doc. 84-3 at 5, Moody Dep. at 12:13-22.) The Dispatcher did not
report to Sergeant Moody that Ms. Thomas thought the man they observed in the
bathroom might be "sick or something" because she had not heard that statement. (Doc.
84-1 at 18-20, LeinoffDep. at 34:18-36:11.) Although she was aware that Ms. Thomas
did not know the owner of this residence or his name, she did not report this information
to Sergeant Moody because she did not think this information was relevant. Sergeant
Moody stated that if he had been told that Ms. Thomas reported she did not know who
lived there and the man in the bathroom may be sick, he "may" have responded
differently by attempting "to determine who lived there maybe from the neighbors"
before entering the residence. (Doc. 98-11 at 9-10, Moody Dep. at 17:23-18:12.) He also
conceded that he may have been able to discover that a black male lived in the residence
if he asked questions outside the residence prior to entering it. (See Doc. 98-11 at 19-20,
Moody Dep. at 50:18-51:6.)
Officers Adams and Peyton 6 were in the squad room at the Hartford police station
when Sergeant Moody informed them that Dispatch had received a 911 call regarding a
5
Sergeant Moody has been certified by the Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council
("VCJTC") as a full-time police officer in the State of Vermont and has successfully completed
the basic training mandated by the VCJTC for all full-time law enforcement officers. Sergeant
Moody has also attended several drug investigation schools and a three-day course in basic crime
scene investigation and has received training in areas such as basic high risk entry, interview and
interrogation, and tactical and operational training.
6
Officers Adams and Peyton have been certified by the VCJTC as full-time police officers in the
State of Vermont and each has successfully completed the basic training mandated by the
6
burglary in progress. Officer Adams was told that "the house looks ransacked and that
they believe he's still in the house." (Doc. 84-8 at 3, Adams Dep. at 14:7-19.) Because
Officer Adams was not told that a housekeeper made the 911 call, she assumed that the
call had been made by the owner or resident reporting an unidentified person in his or her
residence. Officer Peyton was told that "a cleaning lady inside the building ... didn't
recognize an individual inside the building and that the place may be ... burglarized at
this time." (Doc. 84-5 at 5, Peyton Dep. at 8:11-16.)
While the officers prepared for the call and were en route to the scene, the
Dispatcher was still on the 911 call. She spoke with the owner of the housecleaning
service, Jennifer Dean, who stated that she planned to enter the residence to ascertain
what had happened because she did not want to get in "trouble" and lose the "job." (Doc.
98-8, Ex. 5 at 06:50-07:03.) She stated that she did not know why her crew had not
waited for her arrival before calling 911. (Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 06:50-07:03.) The
Dispatcher told her, "Do not go in right now," to which Ms. Dean replied, "I don't even
know why they called you." (Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 08:01-08:19.) Ms. Dean informed the
Dispatcher that she knew the owner of the residence and that his name was "Wayne."
(Doc. 98-8, Ex. 5 at 08:02.) After several minutes of conversation between the
Dispatcher and Ms. Dean, the officers arrived at Plaintiffs condominium complex. The
Dispatcher did not update the officers regarding the resident's name or that Ms. Thomas
reported that the bedroom was no longer smoking.
C.
The Hartford Officers' Response at the Scene.
Officer Peyton arrived first on the scene and encountered Ms. Thomas, Ms. Dean,
and an unidentified male standing outside Plaintiffs residence which is located in a
condominium complex. Officer Peyton spoke with Ms. Thomas, who reported that
VCJTC for full-time law enforcement officers. In addition, Officer Peyton has received training
in active shooter-rapid deployment, street survival, forensic interview and interrogation, proactive criminal enforcement and methamphetamine awareness training, as well as drug
recognition training. Officer Adams has received training in active shooter-rapid deployment
and forensic interviewing. Officer Peyton has successfully completed training on the use of
pepper spray through the VCJTC, and Officer Adams is certified in the use of pepper spray.
7
"there's a man in the building, I don't know who he is, the place looks ransacked[,] and
I'm scared." (Doc. 84-5 at 10, Peyton Dep. at 21:14-19.) Officer Peyton spoke with Ms.
Thomas for approximately twenty seconds. He did not ask Ms. Thomas who owned or
lived in the residence or ask for a description of the homeowner or resident. He knew,
however, that Ms. Thomas did not reside there. In deposition, Officer Peyton
acknowledged that it would be "important" to know who lived in the residence. (Doc.
98-13 at 8-9, Peyton Dep. at 38:20-39:1.) While Ms. Thomas never stated that she
believed the man in the residence was a burglar, Officer Peyton "surmised" he was based
on Ms. Thomas's description that the residence was "a mess" and "looked ransacked."
(Doc. 84-5 at 12-13, Peyton Dep. at 25:23-26:15.)
Sergeant Moody, the second Hartford officer to report to Plaintiffs residence, did
not speak with Ms. Thomas. Officer Peyton, however, relayed to Sergeant Moody that
Ms. Thomas advised that she was part of a cleaning crew for the residence and did not
know the male inside. Sergeant Moody knew that Ms. Thomas was not the owner or
resident, but he "assume[ d] that if she cleans there she knows who lives there." (Doc. 9811 at 12, Moody Dep. at 30: 11-16.) While he was not sure if Ms. Thomas reported that it
looked like a burglary, he was aware that Ms. Thomas had told Officer Peyton that "[i]t
looks like somebody broke in or [it] was ransacked." (Doc. 98-11 at 12, Moody Dep. at
30:19-20.) Sergeant Moody did not ask who lived in or owned the residence, did not ask
for a description of that person, and did not ask the bystanders if they knew the resident
or owner. (See Doc. 84-3 at 7, Moody Dep. at 16:1-20.)
Officer Adams arrived on the scene thereafter. She did not speak with the three
individuals standing outside Plaintiffs residence. Officer Adams had "no idea" who Ms.
Thomas was (Doc. 98-16 at 4), but she assumed that Ms. Thomas lived at the residence
and that Ms. Thomas "must know who belonged in there and who didn't[.]" (Doc. 84-8
at 4, Adams Dep. at 17:15-22.) Officer Adams testified that she did not believe the
circumstances warranted further investigation.
Ms. Dean was standing outside with Ms. Thomas when the officers arrived. None
of the officers asked Ms. Dean if she knew who owned or lived at the residence. The
8
officers also did not speak with any of the other residents of the condominium complex
or bystanders regarding whether they knew the occupant, although the video recording
depicts various bystanders watching the incident unfold.
Officer Peyton drew his firearm and proceeded to walk up the steps to a small
landing in front of the front door to Plaintiffs residence. Officer Adams approached the
stairs behind him, confirmed with Ms. Dean and Ms. Thomas that the unidentified man
was upstairs, and instructed Ms. Dean, Ms. Thomas, and other male individual to calm
down and to remain outside. Officer Adams then drew her firearm, prompting either Ms.
Dean or Ms. Thomas to ask, "Why do you have a gun out?" (Tr. at 3:5.)7 Officer Adams
testified that she was not surprised by the question because people ask her "that all the
time" and "people innately can be threatened just by the presence of the gun." (Doc. 84-8
at 6-7, Adams Dep. at 19:16-20:5.) Officer Peyton replied: "It's just that I don't know
who the hell this guy is .... I don't know this guy." (Tr. at 3:6-9.)
Sergeant Moody retrieved a service rifle from his vehicle and thereafter joined
Officers Adams and Peyton on the front landing. The three officers conferred and agreed
that the man might still be in the upstairs bathroom. There was no sign from the front of
Plaintiffs residence of a forced entry.
Before the officers entered Plaintiffs residence, Bob McKaig, Plaintiffs neighbor,
emerged from his residence. As he stood on his own landing adjacent to Plaintiffs
landing, he asked the officers ifthey were "trying to get Wayne?" (Tr. at 3:18.) Ms.
Thomas can be heard stating: "We went in there. We were scared." (Tr. at 3:20.) As the
officers opened Plaintiffs front door, a fire alarm can be heard emanating from inside
Plaintiffs residence. Mr. McKaig told the officers: "They found him in-- a couple
weeks ago unconscious upstairs. You might want to check the bedroom." (Tr. at 3:2325.) Ms. Thomas can be heard stating: "We got scared, see .... We got scared. When
we got in there, it looked ransacked." (Tr. at 4:5-6.) None of the officers attempted to
7
"Tr." refers to the transcript prepared by transcriber Johanna Masse of the officers' cruiser
video recording ofthe events on May 29, 2010.
9
speak with Mr. McKaig before entering Plaintiffs residence. They provided varying
accounts regarding whether they heard him advise them of Plaintiffs prior medical event.
The officers entered Plaintiffs residence with their guns drawn at a low ready
position. On the second floor, it was smoky, fire alarms were going off, there was a pan
with burned food in the kitchen, and the kitchen faucet was running. (Doc. 84 at 9,
~~
60,
62.) One officer removed the pan from the stove. There were "no threats visible on the
second floor," (Doc. 98-33 at 3), "no visible fire," (Doc. 84 at 9,
was "actively burning." (Doc. 98-3 at 9-11,
~~
~~
63, 65), and nothing
60, 63, 65.) Officer Adams believed the
second fllaintiffs excessive force claim,
Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to Count One must be DENIED.
2.
Plaintiff's False Arrest and Unlawful Restraint Claims.
Defendants fare better with their argument that Plaintiff cannot establish the
essential elements of his false arrest claims. In Count Two of his Second Amended
\
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the individual officers "concertedly, unlawfully, and
maliciously" detained and confined Plaintiff. (Doc. 43 at 12-13.) In Count Three he
asserts that the individual officers "concertedly, unlawfully, and maliciously" arrested
Plaintiff. (Doc. 43 at 13-14.)
39
A § 1983 claim for false arrest (or detention) requires a plaintiff to "demonstrate
that defendant intended to confine him, he was conscious of the confinement, he did not
consent to the confinement, and the confinement was not otherwise privileged." Shain v.
Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 67 (2d Cir. 2001). Because probable cause to arrest constitutes
justification, there can be no claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that during the events that took place inside his
residence "[h]is blood sugar levels had plummeted dangerously low rendering him
comatose." (Doc. 98-1 at 1.) The video recording reveals that at the time Plaintiff
appeared to regain consciousness on the sidewalk in front of his home, he had free use of
his hands and was otherwise unrestrained by the officers. Plaintiff concedes that he has
no memory of the events in question and thus he will be unable to testify at trial that he
was conscious of his confinement. In such circumstances, summary judgment is
appropriate because "[i]t is generally held that the plaintiff in a false imprisonment action
must be aware or conscious of the confinement." In re Carvalho, 2009 WL 4828726, at
*6 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2009) (internal quotations omitted); Carr v. Devereux
Found., Inc., 1995 WL 541799, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (ruling that for a false
arrest claim, plaintiff "must also show that she was aware or conscious of the
confinement"); Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 221 P.2d 428, 433 (Mont. 1950)
(holding there can be no false arrest "where the person sought to be arrested is not
conscious of any restraint of his liberty" or "under the belief and impression that he was
subject to the actual control or will of defendants or any one else" and "[t]here is no
liability for intentionally confining another unless that person knows of the
confinement."). This rule "gives recognition to the fact that false imprisonment, as a
dignitary tort, is not suffered unless its victim knows of the dignitary invasion." Parvi v.
City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 556-57 (N.Y. 1977) (citation omitted).
Because Plaintiff cannot establish the essential element of his consciousness of
confinement, he cannot establish an essential element of his false arrest claims against the
40
individual officers. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to Counts
Two and Three is therefore GRANTED. 24
I
E.
State Law Claims Against the Individual Officers.
1.
Assault and Battery (Count Eleven).
Under Vermont law, battery "is an intentional act that results in harmful contact
with another." Christman v. Davis, 2005 VT 119, ~ 6, 179 Vt. 99, 101, 889 A.2d 746,
749 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 13 (1965)). "At common law, the civil tort
of assault is defined as any gesture or threat of violence exhibiting an [intention] to
assault, with the means of carrying that threat into effect ... unless immediate contact is
impossible." MacLeod v. Town ofBrattleboro, 2012 WL 5949787, at *8 (D. Vt. Nov. 28,
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bishop v. Ranney, 7 A. 820, 820-21
(Vt. 1887) ("And any gesture or threat of violence exhibiting an intention to assault, with
the means of carrying that threat into effect, is an assault, unless immediate contact is
impossible.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
"When assault and battery is alleged against police officers, 'the inquiry is
whether the officer's conduct was reasonably necessary and thereby privileged."'
Crowell v. Kirkpatrick, 667 F. Supp. 2d 391, 417 (D. Vt. 2009), aff'd, 400 F. App'x 592
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. District ofColumbia, 882 A.2d 778, 788 (D.C. 2005)).
Police officers are privileged to use force in arresting a suspect, but the privilege "ends
when the force used is excessive, which is determined using the same standards used to
analyze a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim." Mayo, 2009 WL 8103582.
Because the court cannot determine based on the undisputed facts whether the
officers' use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, the court cannot grant the
officers judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs claims of assault and battery. See
Bombardv. Volp, 2014 WL 4411601, at *10 (D. Vt. Sept. 8, 2014) (addressing state law
claim of battery in case alleging officers used excessive force when tasering plaintiff and
24
The court thus does not address whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. In
declining to address this issue, the court notes that the facts of what occurred inside Plaintiffs
residence are contested and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude the officers had
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff before they entered his residence.
41
concluding: "Because the questions of excessive force and reasonableness are matters for
the jury in this case, the Court cannot grant summary judgment on the state law battery
claim."). Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count Eleven is therefore
DENIED.
2.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Nine).
"To sustain a claim for [intentional infliction of emotional distress,] plaintiff must
show defendants engaged in outrageous conduct, done intentionally or with reckless
disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, resulting in the suffering of
extreme emotional distress, actually or proximately caused by the outrageous conduct."
Fromson v. Vermont, 2004 VT 29, ~ 14, 176 Vt. 395, 399, 848 A.2d 344, 347 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
"A plaintiffs burden on a claim of [intentional infliction of emotional distress] is a
heavy one." Dulude v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc., 807 A.2d 390, 398 (Vt. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted). "The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Denton v. Chittenden Bank,
655 A.2d 703, 706 (Vt. 1994) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). "The test
is objective; the plaintiff must show that the harm resulting from the inflicted distress was
so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Farnum v.
Brattleboro Retreat, Inc., 671 A.2d 1249, 1256 (Vt. 1995). The Vermont Supreme Court
has "declined to find outrageous conduct based solely on the alleged illegal motives
underlying the conduct[,]" Fromson, 2004 VT 29, ~ 18, 176 Vt. at 401, 848 A.2d at 349.
In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, although a close question, the court cannot
conclude that, "as a matter of law," the conduct in question did not "reach the level of
extreme outrage necessary" because a rational jury could conclude that the officers' use
of force against Plaintiff was gratuitous and took place at a time when the officers either
knew or reasonably should have known that Plaintiff was incapacitated. See Denton, 655
A.2d at 706 (directing that summary judgment is appropriate only ifthe alleged conduct
"did not, as a matter oflaw, reach the level of extreme outrage"). Defendants' motion for
42
judgment as a matter of law on Count Nine must therefore be DENIED until the
underlying facts are determined.
F.
Negligence Claims Against Hartford and the Individual Officers.
Plaintiff asserts a claim against Hartford for the negligence of the individual
officers (Count Six) and a claim against Hartford for the negligence of Chief Cutting
(Count Seven), as well as a claim against the individual officers and Hartford for
negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Ten).
Pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 901(a), an action against "any appointed or elected
municipal officer" must be "brought in the name of the town in which the officer
serves[.]" The vast majority of Plaintiffs claims against Defendants allege intentional
acts that do not give rise to claims sounding in negligence. See Sarnicola v. Cty. of
Westchester, 229 F. Supp. 2d 259, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (concluding that claims of
"false arrest, false imprisonment and unconstitutional search (or its attendant torts, assault
and battery) are not acts of negligence, and plaintiff cannot recover for them under
general principles of[New York] negligence law"); DiGennaro v. Town ofGates Police
Dep't, 2013 WL 3097066, at *17 (W.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013) (noting that claims of
"intentional conduct, namely excessive force" are not claims for negligence).
Under Vermont law, a claim of negligence requires proof that the defendant owed
the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached that duty, that the breach was the
proximate cause of the injuries the plaintiff suffered, and that the plaintiff suffered actual
loss or damage. See Endres v. Endres, 2008 VT 124, ~ 11, 185 Vt. 63, 67, 968 A.2d 336,
340. Duty "is central to a negligence claim, and its existence is primarily a question of
law." !d.
at~
11, 185 Vt. at 68, 968 A.2d at 340; see also Lenoci v. Leonard, 2011 VT
47, ~ 9, 189 Vt. 641, 642, 21 A.3d 694, 697 (ruling that to maintain a negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim, which "sound[ s] in negligence," a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant or defendants owed plaintiff a duty).
A governmental actor owes a duty of care "toward specified persons above and
beyond [his or her] duty to the public at large" based on the following considerations:
43
( 1) whether a statute sets forth mandatory acts for the protection of a
particular class of persons; (2) whether the government has knowledge that
particular persons within that class are in danger; (3) whether those persons
have relied on the government's representations or conduct; and (4)
whether the government's failure to use due care would increase the risk of
harm beyond what it was at the time the government acted or failed to act.
Sabia v. Vermont, 669 A.2d 1187, 1191 (Vt. 1995).
In this case, Plaintiff cites no statute that sets forth mandatory acts for the
protection of a particular class of persons of which Plaintiff was a member. The Vermont
Supreme Court has addressed a plaintiffs claim that a VSP trooper failed ''to properly
investigate a reported incident of domestic abuse against plaintiff that continued after the
trooper left the scene." Kane v. Lamothe, 2007 VT 91,
~
1, 182 Vt. 241, 243, 936 A.2d
1303, 1305. Explaining that a governmental actor takes on "a special duty of care to a
specific person beyond that extended to the general public" only when a statute "sets
forth mandatory acts for the protection of a particular class of persons," the Vermont
Supreme Court concluded that the statutes governing the VSP did not "create [a] special
relationship between crime victims and law enforcement personnel" and did not "set forth
any mandatory acts, much less mandatory acts for the protection of a particular class of
persons[,]" apart from the officer's duties "owed to the community as a whole." Kane,
2007 VT 91,
~
9, 182 Vt. at 246-47, 936 A.2d at 1307-08.
Here, Vermont law provides that municipal police officers "shall have the same
powers as sheriffs in criminal matters and the enforcement of the law and the same
powers, immunities, and matters of defense in serving criminal and civil process." 24
V.S.A. § 1935. Vermont law further provides that the chief of police "shall be a police
officer" and is "vested" with the "direction and control of the entire police force[.]" 24
V.S.A. § 1931(a), (b). The state statutes governing municipal police officers and police
chiefs thus impose only duties "owed to the community as a whole." Kane, 2007 VT 91,
~
9, 182 Vt. at 246-47, 936 A.2d at 1308. For this reason, courts decline to find that
"police officers owe criminal suspects a duty to investigate beyond establishing probable
cause prior to arrest." Lahm v. Farrington, 90 A.3d 620, 623, 626 (N.H. 2014); see also
44
Smith v. Iowa, 324 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Iowa 1982) (observing that courts have uniformly
rejected a cause of action for negligent criminal investigations by police officers)
(collecting cases); Pourny v. Maui Police Dep 't, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1146 (D. Haw.
2000) ("There is no 'duty' to not arrest without probable cause.").
In the alternative, Plaintiff contends that the officers owed him a duty of care
when they undertook an investigation of the premises based, in part, on the report of a
fire inside his residence. The Vermont Supreme Court has held that an officer may have
a duty based on "a threshold showing that there existed an undertaking to render services
for another for the protection of a third party and ... a showing that this undertaking
increased the risk of harm or ... a showing that harm was suffered because of reliance on
the undertaking." Kennery v. Vermont, 2011 VT 121, ~ 14, 191 Vt. 44, 53, 38 A.3d 35,
40 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 324A (1965)). "[V]ery little action on the part
of the defendants is required to constitute an undertaking" and "a promise to do
something may be sufficient." !d. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Kennery, the defendant officers agreed to undertake a welfare check, "not only
by promising to do so, but also by following up on their promise, taking concrete actions
to perform the welfare check, and following up on their performance with [the person
who requested it]." !d. In contrast, in this case, there is no evidence that the individual
officers or Chief Cutting promised Plaintiff anything. The instant case thus falls squarely
outside of Kennery's embrace as there can be no reasonable claim that, during the
incident, the officers were rendering services for the protection of Plaintiff after
promising to fulfill this undertaking.
Because Plaintiff cannot establish that Hartford, its officers, or Chief Cutting owed
Plaintiff a specific duty beyond duties owed to the public at large, Plaintiff fails to
establish an essential element of his negligence claims-a duty owed to him by
Defendants. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. The court thus need not reach
Defendants' alternative arguments for dismissal of Plaintiffs negligence claims.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Counts Six, Seven, and Ten is therefore
GRANTED.
45
G.
Plaintifrs Section 1983 Claims Against Hartford and Chief Cutting.
In Count Four of his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against
Hartford for establishing and maintaining customs, policies, or practices which gave rise
to violations of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. In Count Five he seeks to impose
supervisory liability on Chief Cutting for the individual officers' actions. "Under the
standards of Monell v. Department ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a
municipality can be held liable under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] if the deprivation of the
plaintiffs rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage
ofthe municipality." Jones v. Town ofE. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).
Liability under § 1983 "is imposed on the municipality [only] when it has promulgated a
custom or policy that violates federal law and, pursuant to that policy, a municipal actor
has tortiously injured the plaintiff." Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F .3d 248, 253 (2d Cir.
2013). "Absent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior basis for the tort of its employee." Jones, 691 F.3d at 80. Thus, for
a municipality to be held liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its
employees, "a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official
policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiffto be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right." Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
"Supervisory liability is a concept distinct from municipal liability, and is
'imposed against a supervisory official in his individual capacity for his own culpable
action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates."' Kucera v.
Tkac, 2013 WL 1414441, at *4 (D. Vt. Apr. 8, 2013) (quoting Odom v. Matteo, 772 F.
Supp. 2d 377, 403 (D. Conn. 2011)). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Second Circuit required a plaintiff to allege one of the
following categories for supervisory liability under § 1983:
( 1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional
violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a
report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a
policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or
46
allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was
grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful
acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of
[persons] by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional
acts were occurring.
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F .3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff asserts his claims against
Chief Cutting under the second, third, and fifth Colon factors.
In order to succeed on his Monell and supervisory liability claims, Plaintiff must
first "identify obvious and severe deficiencies" in the policies of the Hartford Police
Department and "show a causal relationship" between those deficiencies and his alleged
deprivations. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F .3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2007). Plaintiff argues
that Chief Cutting is responsible for creating, implementing, and enforcing the policies of
the Hartford Police Department and that the Department's Use of Force Policy provides
no instruction or limitation on the use of OC spray on individuals who are unresponsive
(regardless of whether they are unresponsive because they are sick or on drugs). Plaintiff
thus contends that the use of OC spray in a confined space and while he was
unresponsive constituted an unreasonable use of force that violated his constitutional
rights. When regarded in the light most favorable to him, Plaintiff has thus identified
arguable deficiencies in the policies of the Hartford Police Department that have some
connection to the alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.
However, to the extent that Plaintiff premises his claims on a failure to train or
supervise, such failure "may constitute an official policy or custom [only] if the failure
amounts to 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of those with whom the city employees
interact." Wray, 490 F.3d at 195. Similarly, Chief Cutting is liable only for the creation
or continuation of policy that leads to a pattern of unconstitutional conduct or if he
demonstrated deliberate indifference in failing to act on information that a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct was occurring. See Colon, 58 F.3d at 873.
"To establish deliberate indifference a plaintiff must show that a policymaking
official was aware of constitutional injury, or the risk of constitutional injury, but failed
47
to take appropriate action to prevent or sanction violations of constitutional rights."
Jones, 691 F.3d at 81.
A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
"ordinarily necessary" to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes
of failure to train [or supervise because] [w]ithout notice that a course of
training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be
said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause
violations of constitutional rights.
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (quoting Bd. ofCty. Comm 'rs of
Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). "[W]hen city policymakers are on
actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes
city employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights, the city may be deemed
deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program." !d.
In this case, there is no evidence of prior lawsuits or complaints of excessive force
based on the use of pepper spray and only one prior "question regarding the use of
[pepper spray]" during which a suspect had taken a child into a room, the officers were
concerned for the safety of the child, and the officers sprayed the suspect through a crack
in the door rather than force their way into the room. (Doc. 84 at 27-28, ~~ 200, 203.)
This isolated incident is insufficient to establish that the Hartford Police Department and
Chief Cutting were on notice that their training and supervision was deficient in the
"particular respect" Plaintiff contends violated his constitutional rights. Connick, 131 S.
Ct. at 1360; see also Plair v. City ofNew York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
("[l]t is well established that a single incident does not give rise to an unlawful practice
by subordinate officials so permanent and well-settled as to constitute custom or usage.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Giaccio v. City ofNew York, 308 F. App'x 470, 472
(2d Cir. 2009) (finding that allegations of, at most, four prior incidents of misconduct
"falls far short of establishing a practice that is 'so persistent or widespread' as to justify
the imposition of municipal liability") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff nonetheless contends that "post-event evidence is highly probative" of
deliberate indifference and notes two complaints of excessive force arising after the May
48
20 10 incident: a September 20 10 incident during which Hartford police officers
responding to a domestic abuse call had physical contact with the complainant and the
complainant suffered a head laceration (Doc. 98-35), and a June 2011 incident during
which Hartford police officers entered a man's home, removed him from his home, and
forcibly handcuffed him in his driveway after a report of a minor traffic accident. (Doc.
98-36.) While the alleged conduct of the Hartford police officers involves claims of
excessive force, "reports of misconduct [that] were made after the events of which
Plaintiff complains" could not have "put policymakers on notice of a developing de facto
policy." Kucera, 2013 WL 1414441, at *9. Post-event incidents of excessive force thus
do not provide a basis for Plaintiffs Monell claims.
Plaintiff gains no further traction in arguing that proof of an unconstitutional
policy can be inferred from the fact that the Hartford Police Department and Chief
Cutting "endorse[ d] the Officers' actions as consistent with Town policies" after the
incident, rather than admitting "that its Officers' actions were unreasonable and violated
Town policies and procedures[.]" (Doc. 98-1 at 45.) In this respect, Plaintiff seeks to
impose liability on Hartford and Chief Cutting based on the incident in question.
However, "a plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability solely by inference from
evidence of the occurrence of the incident in question." Bourn v. Town ofBennington,
2012 WL 2396875, at *3 (D. Vt. June 25, 2012); see also Anderson v. City ofNew York,
657 F. Supp. 1571, 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Plaintiff cannot infer a policy from the
alleged violation of his own civil rights.").
Because "isolated acts of excessive force by non-policymaking municipal
employees are generally not sufficient to demonstrate a municipal custom, policy, or
usage that would justify municipal liability[,]" Jones, 691 F .3d at 81, judgment as a
matter of law in Defendants' favor is appropriate. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on Counts Four and Five is therefore GRANTED. See Kern v. City of
Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss when
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that an officer's alleged harassment and assault "occurred
as a result of a municipal custom or policy" because there was no indication the city or
49
superiors knew of prior similar misconduct by that officer); Sorlucco v. NY. C. Police
Dep 't, 971 F .2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A municipal agency may not be held liable
under § 1983 simply for the isolated unconstitutional acts of its employees."); see also
Walker v. City ofNew York, 63 F. Supp. 3d 301, 311-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that
"[w ]hen there is only one instance of the particular constitutional violation alleged by a
plaintiff, it will ordinarily be insufficient to state a failure to supervise claim[,]" and
granting motion for summary judgment when "the alleged unconstitutional conduct was
limited to the actions" challenged in that case and plaintiffs had not "identified any
additional, similar examples of unconstitutional practices beyond the events they
complain[ ed] of').
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 80 & 81.) The court GRANTS
summary judgment in Defendants' favor with regard to Counts Two through Seven and
Count Ten. The court DENIES summary judgment with regard to Count One, Count
Nine, and Count Eleven.
As the court has previously dismissed Counts Eight and Twelve with Plaintiffs
consent, only Plaintiffs § 1983 Excessive Force claim and his state law claims of assault
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress remain for trial. Defendants'
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity for those claims
must await a jury determination ofthe underlying facts. Finnegan, 915 F.2d at 821.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this
I Y of September, 2015.
~ay
~·
United States District Court
50
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?