Farhan Mohamoud Tani Warfaa v. Yusuf Abdi Ali
Filing
105
MEMORANDUM OPINION: For these reasons, defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss will be granted as to all claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute and denied as to the claims brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act by an appropriate Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion. Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 7/29/14. (yguy)
IN THE UNITED
STATES
EASTERN
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
OF
COURT
FOR THE
VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
FARHAN MOHAMOUD TANI WARFAA,
Plaintiff,
I:05cv701
v.
(LMB/JFA)
YUSUF ABDI ALI,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court
is defendant's
For the reasons that follow,
in open court,
OPINION
Renewed Motion to Dismiss.
in addition to the reasons stated
defendant's motion will be granted in part and
denied in part.
I.
This
Somalia
during
Plaintiff
is
civil
the
arises
tumultuous
out
of
national
who
was
events
regime
Farhan Mohamoud Tani Warfaa
Somali
a
action
BACKGROUND
of
that
Mohamed
("plaintiff"
allegedly
tortured
occurred
Siad
or
in
Barre.
"Warfaa")
based
on
his
membership in a clan opposed to Barre's regime.
Defendant Yusuf
Abdi
officer
Ali
Somali
("defendant"
National
Army,
or
now
"Ali")
living
is
in
a
former
the
United
of
the
States,
who
allegedly directed and participated in plaintiff's torture.
The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are as follows.
In 1987, plaintiff was a farmer living in northern Somalia.
Compl. 1| 17.
At that time, defendant was a Colonel in the
Am.
Somali National Army,
serving in the Fifth Battalion, which
operated out of the nearby city of Gebiley, Somalia.
15.
Id. H
In December 198 7, pursuant to defendant's orders,
6,
Fifth
Battalion soldiers abducted plaintiff from his home at gunpoint
and took him to the Army's regional headquarters.
Over the course of the next three months,
legs were bound,
Id. fK 17-18.
plaintiff's arms and
he was stripped naked, and he was beaten to the
point of unconsciousness at least nine times.
Id. ^|U 20-24.
Defendant was present and witnessed at least some of plaintiff's
torture.
Id. 1 25.
In March 1988, defendant personally
interrogated plaintiff, at the end of which defendant took out a
pistol and shot plaintiff five times.
Id. 1) 26.
Assuming
plaintiff was dead, defendant ordered his subordinates to bury
the body.
Id.
was not dead,
The soldiers quickly discovered that plaintiff
however,
and they agreed to release him in
exchange for a significant bribe.
In
1990,
anticipating
the
Id. H 27.
overthrow
of
Barre's
defendant entered Canada through the United States.
In 1992,
and
he
Id. at 1 7,
Canada deported defendant back to the United States for
gross human rights abuses
United
regime,
States
similarly
voluntarily
Defendant
in Somalia.
1 8.
threatened defendant
departed
nonetheless
Id.
returned
for
to
Somalia
the
in
United
with
July
States
In 1994,
the
deportation,
1994.
in
Id.
December
1996
and has
alien.
See
been living here ever since
as
a
lawful
resident
id.
On November 10, 2004,
two plaintiffs,
anonymously as Jane and John Doe,
in federal court.
April 29, 2005,
June 13, 2005,
proceeding
filed suit against defendant
Pursuant to an Order of the Court,
issued on
their complaint was voluntarily dismissed.
On
the same plaintiffs initiated the instant action.
The Complaint alleged that defendant is liable for engaging in
attempted extrajudicial killing,
arbitrary detention,
torture, degrading treatment,
crimes against humanity,
violation of the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"),
and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
Stat.
73,
28 U.S.C.
§
and war crimes,
28 U.S.C.
in
§ 1350,
("TVPA"),
106
1350 note.
This action has been subject to a number of stays, mostly
to give the United States Department of State an opportunity to
express its views on defendant's claim of immunity and to give
the Supreme Court an opportunity to decide related issues in a
companion case,
Samantar v. Yousuf,
560 U.S.
final stay was lifted on April 25, 2014,
305
(2010).
The
one day after the Court
received a Statement of Interest Submitted by the United States
of America,
explaining that the "United States is not in a
position to present views to the Court concerning this matter at
this time."
On May 9, 2014, plaintiff Farhan Mohamoud Tani
Warfaa filed an Amended Complaint using his true name and
restating his claims against defendant; the other plaintiff,
Jane Doe,
elected not to proceed with this action,
which has
been recaptioned to reflect these changes.
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Fed.
R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
A. Standard of
Review
Under Rule 12(b)(1),
a court must dismiss an action if it
finds subject-matter jurisdiction lacking.
Corp.,
546 U.S.
500, 514
(2006).
Arbaugh v. Y & H
The burden rests with the
plaintiff to establish that such jurisdiction exists.
Warren v.
Sessoms & Rogers,
2012).
P.A.,
676 F.3d 365,
370-71
(4th Cir.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must begin by assuming that the
facts alleged in the complaint are true and by drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
Burbach Broad.
Co.
406
of Del, v. Elkins Radio Corp.,
2002).
278 F.3d 401,
(4th Cir.
"Judgment should be entered when the pleadings,
construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
fail to state any cognizable claim for relief."
Q'Ryan v. Dehler Mfg.
2000).
Co.,
In other words,
99 F. Supp.
2d 714,
to avoid dismissal,
4
718
(E.D.
the factual
Va.
allegations in the complaint,
taken as true,
"must be enough to
raise a right of relief above the speculative level."
Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S.
plaintiff must "nudge[]
544,
[his]
conceivable to plausible."
555 (2007).
Bell Atl.
That means a
claims across the line from
Id. at 570.
"A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows
the
court
to draw a
reasonable
inference
that
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal,
556 U.S.
662,
B. Alien Tort
678
the
Ashcroft v.
(2009) .
Statute Claims
Although defendant failed to raise the issue in his papers,
the Court must address the effect of Kiobel v.
Petroleum Co. , 133 S. Ct.
claims.1
1659
(2013),
Royal Dutch
on plaintiff's ATS
The ATS provides "original jurisdiction" in the federal
1 On July 22, 2014, three days before oral argument on
defendant's motion, the Court issued an Order instructing
plaintiff to present "at the scheduled hearing any argument that
his ATS claims are not barred" by Kiobel.
On July 23, 2014,
plaintiff submitted, without comment, a Notice of Supplemental
Authority, which simply directed the Court's attention to Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., No. 13-1937,
2922840 (4th Cir. June 30, 2014).
In Al Shimari,
2014 WL
the Fourth
Circuit declined to dismiss ATS claims brought by foreign
nationals against an American corporation for torture and
mistreatment at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Id. at *1. The
foreign nationals alleged that their torture and mistreatment
came at the hands of United States citizens employed pursuant to
a contract with the United States government at a facility
administered by the United States military.
Id. at *9-*12.
Plaintiff fails to address any of the obvious factual
dissimilarities with his case, most notably that Al Shimari
involved conduct allegedly sanctioned on American soil by the
5
district courts over "any civil action by an alien for a tort
only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."
28 U.S.C.
§ 1350.
The Supreme Court has
clarified that the ATS is a jurisdictional grant for only a
limited category of claims premised on violations of
internationally accepted norms.
U.S. 692, 729
(2004).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
In Kiobel,
542
the Supreme Court further
clarified that such claims, generally speaking, must be based on
violations occurring on American soil.
(concluding that "relief [under the ATS]
133 S. Ct. at 1669
for violations of the
law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred"
(citing Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd.,
(2010))).
In other words,
561 U.S. 247
the Supreme Court held that a
cognizable ATS claim may not "reach conduct occurring in the
territory of a foreign sovereign."
Here,
Id. at 1664.
" [a]11 the relevant conduct" alleged in the Amended
Complaint occurred in Somalia,
id. at 1669,
defendant who at the time was not a
United States.
carried out by a
citizen or resident of the
Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing that
defendant's violations of international law otherwise "touch[ed]
and concern[ed]
the territory of the United States."
Id.
federal government and a domestic corporation.
Plaintiff does
not come close to alleging a similarly contemporaneous
connection between the United States and defendant's
6
conduct.
Because the extraterritoriality analysis set forth in Kiobel
appears to turn on the location of the relevant conduct, not the
present location of the defendant, a straightforward application
to the instant action leads
the Court
to conclude
that
plaintiff's ATS claims are "barred" and must be dismissed.
C. Torture Victim Protection Act Claims
Plaintiff's TVPA claims are not subject to the same
analysis.
Unlike with the ATS, there are strong indications
that the TVPA was intended to have extraterritorial application.
The language of the TVPA, which creates civil liability for
extrajudicial killing and torture carried out by an individual
with "actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation," naturally contemplates conduct occurring in the
territory of a foreign sovereign.
Moreover,
28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 note.
the Supreme Court did not purport to curb the
extraterritorial reach of the TVPA in Kiobel.
See 133 S.
Ct.
at
1669 (noting that the TVPA addresses "human rights abuses
committed abroad"
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Chowdhury
v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding,
2 014)
Ltd.,
746 F.3d 42, 51
(2d Cir.
(concluding that there was "no bar on the basis of
extraterritoriality to [the plaintiff's]
TVPA claim").
Accordingly, the Court will consider defendant's many defenses
to plaintiff's TVPA claims.
1.
Threshold
Issues
Defendant challenges plaintiff's ability to have these
claims adjudicated in federal court on the grounds that they
implicate nonjusticiable political questions and acts of state,
and that plaintiff is immune from suit in any event.
Supp. of Def.'s Renewed Mot.
to Dismiss
Br.
("Def.'s Br."),
in
at 6-14.
Although defendant purports to raise these arguments under Rule
12(b)(1),
none of the three doctrines on which he relies are
strictly jurisdictional.
a.
Political Question Doctrine
Federal courts have long been reluctant to decide issues
that might infringe upon the province of the Executive Branch.
It was
Chief Justice Marshall who first remarked that
"questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws,
made"
submitted to the executive,
in federal courts.
U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
question doctrine.
Marbury v. Madison,
can never be
1 Cranch 137,
5
This is the essence of the political
The Supreme Court elaborated on the doctrine
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), describing it as a
function of the separation of powers and setting forth six
factors for lower courts to consider,
the presence of any one of
which requires dismissal if the factor is "inextricable from the
case at bar."
Id.
at 217.
According to defendant,
two of the
Baker factors are especially relevant here:
[4]
"the
impossibility
of
a
court's
undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government"; [and]
[6]
"the
potentiality
multifarious pronouncements
one question."
of
embarrassment
from
by various departments on
Id.
It is true that the Supreme Court has singled out the
foreign affairs context as one to which the political question
doctrine will normally apply:
"[n]ot only does resolution of
such issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial
application, or involve the exercise of a discretion
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many
such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the
Government's views."
Id. at 211.
Even so,
it remains possible
for an action to touch on foreign affairs without necessarily
raising a nonjusticiable political question.
Pharm.
2010)
Indus.
Co.
v.
United States,
See El-Shifa
607 F.3d 836,
841
(D.C.
Cir.
("[T]he political question doctrine does not bar a claim
that the government has violated the Constitution simply because
the claim implicates foreign relations.").
Accordingly,
courts
are directed to undertake "a discriminating analysis of the
particular question posed" in view of the unique circumstances
of the case to determine whether the political question doctrine
prevents a plaintiff's claims from going forward.
U.S.
at
Baker, 369
211.
Here,
such analysis weighs against applying the political
question doctrine to plaintiff's TVPA claims.
First,
there is
no danger that this Court will express a lack of respect for the
Executive Branch by adjudicating plaintiff's claims because
foreign affairs, as such,
In other words,
are not directly implicated.
See id.
the Court need not reconsider the wisdom of
discretionary decisions made by the Executive Branch (or the
Legislative Branch,
for that matter)
regarding our nation's
relationship with the government of Somalia.
Nor would
resolution in any way call into question the prudence of the
Executive Branch in a matter of foreign affairs constitutionally
committed to its discretion.
To the contrary,
defendant cannot
identify a single decision of the Executive Branch that might
justify application of the political question doctrine because
no such decision has in fact been made,
setting this case apart
from those cited in defendant's papers,
all of which involved
some affirmative policy decision made by a political branch.
See,
e.g.,
Corrie v. Caterpillar,
Inc.,
503 F.3d 974,
Cir.
2007)
(noting that the "decisive factor"
982
(9th
favoring
application of political question doctrine was that the weapon
10
"sales
[at issue]
to Israel were paid for by the United
States"); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
(D.D.C. 2005)
393 F. Supp.
2d 20, 22
(holding that "adjudication of this lawsuit at
this time would in fact risk a potentially serious adverse
impact on significant interests of the United States" after the
State Department advised the court that the lawsuit should not
proceed).
Plaintiff's claims present purely legal issues, and
therefore do not implicate any decisions made by coordinate
branches.
Moreover,
it is well established that the resolution
of claims brought under the TVPA has been constitutionally
committed to the Judiciary.
249
(2d Cir.
Second,
See Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232,
1995).
there is only a slight risk of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by different branches on the subject
of the instant litigation.
See Baker,
369 U.S. at 211.
This
factor is decisive in cases where "judicial resolution of a
question would contradict prior decisions taken by a political
branch in those limited contexts where such contradiction would
seriously interfere with important governmental interests."
Kadic,
70 F.3d at 249;
see also Sosa,
542 U.S.
at 733 n.21
(explaining that "federal courts should give serious weight to
the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign
policy").
But,
again, no contradictory decisions have been made
11
here.
The Court has afforded the Executive Branch three
opportunities to "express its views on defendant's claim of
immunity"; each time the Executive Branch has declined.2
The
Executive Branch has similarly declined to inform the Court of
any potential adverse impact on foreign affairs in light of the
uncertain political and security situation in Somalia.3
Allowing
plaintiff's claims to go forward in no way contradicts a clear
statement of interest from the Executive Branch, much less poses
the threat of seriously interfering in the conduct of foreign
affairs.
Accordingly,
there is no definite basis at present to
believe that adjudicating the claims before the Court might
infringe on the province of a coordinate branch.
See Baker, 369
U.S. at 211 (explaining that "it is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance").
Defendant's position — that the political uncertainty
itself and the potential for an immunity request from the newly
2 Defendant suggests that the Executive Branch may request
immunity pending the outcome of negotiations with the
transitional government of Somalia.
Rather than deal in
speculation, the Court can always revisit the issue if and when
such a request is made.
3 It is worth noting that the United States does not currently
have an ambassador to or embassy in Somalia; our nation's
interests are represented instead by a Special Representative
for Somalia based in the United States Embassy in Nairobi,
Kenya.
12
formed Somali government justifies application of the doctrine —
conflates political questions with political cases.
Whaling Ass'n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc'y,
478 U.S.
221,
See Japan
230
(1986)
(cautioning that a political question does not arise "merely
because
[a] decision may have significant political overtones").
Because there is no authority for the proposition that mere
political uncertainty,
unaccompanied by a statement of interest
from a coordinate branch,
renders a case nonjusticiable,
the
political question doctrine does not apply here.
b.
Act
of
State Doctrine
The "act of state" doctrine prevents federal courts "from
inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized
foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,
376 U.S.
Like the political question doctrine,
398,
401
(1964).
the act of state doctrine
is derived in part from the concern that the Judiciary, by
questioning the validity of such acts,
could interfere with the
Executive Branch's conduct of foreign affairs.
& Co.
v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,
(1990).
4 93 U.S.
W.S. Kirkpatrick
4 00,
4 04
Accordingly, a plaintiff's claim may be barred to the
extent that it challenges (1) an "official act of a foreign
sovereign performed within its own territory"; and (2)
relief sought or the defense interposed [would require]
13
"the
a court
in the United States to declare invalid the
sovereign's] official act."
[foreign
Id. at 405.
Here, application of the act of state doctrine fails at the
first step.
To understand why, it is necessary to understand
the concept of jus cogens norms of international law, which are
certain "universally agreed-upon norms"
"accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole."
Samantar,
699 F.3d 763,
S. Ct. 897
(2014)
omitted).
As a result,
774
(4th Cir.
2012),
cert,
denied,
134
(internal quotation marks and citations
acts that violate jus cogens norms are
not officially authorized by any foreign sovereigns.
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
(9th Cir. 1992)
Yousuf v.
See
965 F.2d 699,
718
("International law does not recognize an act
that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act [.]") .
It follows
that an act that violates jus cogens norms cannot serve as a
basis
for the act of
state doctrine.
Because plaintiff's TVPA claims are premised on alleged
acts that violate jus cogens norms,
inapplicable.
Extrajudicial killing has long been condemned by
international law.
(9th Cir.
the act of state doctrine is
2002);
Talisman Energy,
See Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp.,
395 F.3d 932,
959
see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Inc.,
244 F. Supp.
2d 289,
345
(S.D.N.Y.
2003).
The Amended Complaint alleges that defendant attempted to kill
14
plaintiff by "[taking] out his pistol and fir[ing]
five shots,"
several of which hit plaintiff, at the conclusion of an
interrogation session.
Am. Compl. H 26.
These allegations,
which must be accepted as true at this stage in the litigation,
constitute jus cogens violations and therefore are not
recognized as official sovereign acts.
Likewise, the right to
be free from torture "is fundamental and universal, a right
deserving of the highest status under international law,
of jus cogens."
Siderman de Blake,
965 F.2d at 717
case law, statutes, and scholarly literature).
a norm
(surveying
The Amended
Complaint alleges that defendant and subordinate members of the
Somali National Army at various points bound plaintiff's arms
and legs,
stripped him naked, and beat him until he lost
consciousness.
Am. Compl. fH 21-22; see also The Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel,
or Punishment,
Dec.
10,
1984,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
23 I.L.M.
1027,
1465 U.N.T.S.
(defining torture for purposes of international law).
85
Again,
such allegations amount to jus cogens violations which would not
constitute sovereign acts.
Even if defendant could make the required two-part showing,
the Court would still have discretion not to apply the act of
state doctrine where the underlying policies weigh against its
15
application.
The Supreme Court articulated three such policies
in Sabbatino:
[1]
[T]he
greater
the
degree
of
codification or
consensus
concerning
a
particular
area
of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it ... .
[2] [T] he less important the implications of an issue
are
for
our
foreign
relations,
the
weaker
the
justification
for
branches.
The
[3]
may
also
be
perpetrated the
exclusivity
balance
of
in
the
relevant
political
considerations
shifted
if
the
government
challenged act of state is no
which
longer
in existence.
Id. at 428.
None of these policies would be served by applying
the act of state doctrine to plaintiff's TVPA claims.
First,
the consensus against extrajudicial killing and torture is
foundational in international law.
Second,
for reasons
discussed above, plaintiff's claims do not implicate any
important issues of foreign affairs.
Third,
Barre's regime was
toppled long ago, meaning the present suit is less likely to
give rise to any new hostilities or political tensions.
It is
therefore clear that application of the act of state doctrine is
not appropriate.
c. Official Acts Immunity
Defendant also invokes "official acts" immunity to the
extent plaintiff seeks to hold him liable for acts committed
pursuant to his official duties as a Colonel in the Somali
National Army.
See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
16
Law § 66(f)
(stating that "[t]he immunity of a foreign state
. . . extends to . . . any . . . public minister, official, or
agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his
official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would
be to enforce a rule of law against the state"); see also Matar
v. Dichter,
563 F.3d 9, 14
(2d Cir.
2009)
("At the time the FSIA
was enacted, the common law of foreign sovereign immunity
recognized an individual official's entitlement to immunity for
acts performed in his official capacity."
marks omitted)).
(internal quotation
Official acts immunity is conduct-based and is
generally available to both current and former foreign
officials.
See Matar,
563 F.3d at 14
("An immunity based on
acts — rather than status — does not depend on tenure in
office.").
Any claim defendant had to official acts immunity was
squarely foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Yousuf
v. Samantar,
134 S.
Ct.
699 F.3d 763,
897
(2014).
774
(4th Cir.
In Samantar,
2012),
cert, denied,
the Fourth Circuit
delineated an important limit on official acts immunity: "a
foreign official may assert immunity for official acts performed
within the scope of his duty,
but not for private acts where the
officer purports to act as an individual and not as an official,
such that a suit directed against that action is not a suit
17
against the sovereign."
alteration,
Id. at 775
and citation omitted);
560 U.S. 305, 322 n.17 (2010)
(internal quotation marks,
see also Samantar v. Yousuf,
(noting that official acts
immunity is not available to "an official who acts beyond the
scope of his authority").
The Fourth Circuit then held that a
foreign official exceeds the scope of his authority any time he
engages in an act that violates jus cogens norms.
699 F.3d at 777
domestic law,
("We conclude that,
See Samantar,
under international and
officials from other countries are not entitled to
foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the
acts were performed in the defendant's official capacity.").
Because plaintiff alleges that defendant did exactly that,
defendant's acts could not have been sanctioned by a foreign
sovereign notwithstanding his position in the Somali National
Army.
Accordingly,
just as in Samantar,
defendant is not
entitled to official acts immunity.
Defendant resists this conclusion by asking the Court to
disregard the Fourth Circuit's decision, which obviously it
cannot do.
Defendant also seems to suggest that Somalia,
as a
sovereign state, ratified his acts at some point after they were
committed.
Even if defendant had some persuasive evidence of
ratification, prohibitions against extrajudicial killing and
torture are foundational international norms, meaning that no
18
state — Somalia included — may condone such acts.
Defendant's
arguments, weak as they are, simply confirm that the common law
affords him no immunity in light of plaintiff's allegations,
d.
Statute of Limitations
Finally, defendant argues that the statute of limitations
applicable to plaintiff's claims has run and that it is not
subject to equitable tolling.
TVPA,
Def.'s Br., at 17-23.
Under the
a plaintiff has ten years from the date a cause of action
arises to bring suit for extrajudicial killing or torture.
U.S.C.
§ 1350 note
28
("No action shall be maintained under this
section unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause
of action arose.").
The alleged attempted extrajudicial killing
and torture giving rise to plaintiff's claims occurred between
December 1987 and March 1988.
Am. Compl. HH 17-26.
did not file suit until November 10,
2004,
years after his cause of action arose.
Plaintiff
well more than ten
Accordingly, the
dispositive question is whether the doctrine of equitable
tolling permits plaintiff's claims to go forward notwithstanding
the delay.
This Court answered the same question in the affirmative in
Yousuf v.
Samantar,
No.
I:04cvl360,
(E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2012) .
2012 WL 3730617,
at *4-*6
To begin, statutory limitations
periods "are customarily subject to equitable tolling" in civil
19
suits between private litigants.
Affairs,
498 U.S.
89, 95
citation omitted).
(1990)
Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans
(internal quotation marks and
Whether equitable tolling is appropriate in
any particular case depends on a finding of extraordinary
circumstances that are both beyond the plaintiff's control and
unavoidable even with diligence.
See id. at 95-96.
Federal
courts have applied this usual rule to the TVPA's limitations
period,
see, e.g., Jean v. Dorelien,
Cir.
2005); Papa v. United States,
Cir.
2002),
*4-*6.
as did this Court,
431 F.3d 776,
281 F.3d 1004,
see Samantar,
779
(11th
1012-13
(9th
2012 WL 3730617,
at
Tolling the TVPA's limitations period is consistent with
the Act's underlying policy: absent a remedy in courts of the
United States, some of the most egregious cases of human rights
violations might go unheard because the regimes responsible
often possess the most inadequate legal mechanisms for providing
redress.
2006).
See Arce v. Garcia,
434 F.3d 1254,
1261-62
(11th Cir.
Allowing tolling is also consistent with the Act's
legislative history:
[The
TVPA]
provides
for
a
10-year
statute
of
limitations, but explicitly calls for consideration of
all equitable tolling principles in calculating this
period
with
a
view
toward
giving
justice
to
plaintiff's rights.
Illustrative, but not exhaustive,
of
the
types of
tolling principles
which may be
applicable include the following.
The statute of
limitations should be
tolled during the
time the
defendant
any
was
absent
jurisdiction
from
in which
the
the
20
United
same
or
States
or
similar
from
action
arising from the same facts may be maintained by the
plaintiff,
provided
that
the
remedy
in
that
jurisdiction is adequate and available.
Excluded also
from
calculation
of
the
statute
of
limitations
would
be the period when a defendant has immunity from suit.
The
statute
of
limitations
should
also
the
period
of
time
in
which
the
imprisoned or otherwise incapacitated.
be
tolled where
the
defendant
has
be
tolled
for
plaintiff
is
It should also
concealed his
whereabouts
or
the
plaintiff
has
been
discover the identity of the offender.
or her
unable
S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
to
Taken
together, general principles of equitable tolling and Congress's
explicit guidance on the matter provide multiple bases for
tolling the limitations period under the TVPA.
The same considerations that justified equitable tolling in
Samantar are present here.
pleadings,
First,
based on plaintiff's
the limitations period should be tolled during the
periods in which extraordinary circumstances — namely,
sectarian
violence and political upheaval in Somalia — prevented plaintiff
from filing his claims.
See Irwin,
498 U.S. at 95.
There is a
consensus among the federal courts that civil war and a
repressive authoritarian regime constitute "extraordinary
circumstances" for purposes of tolling the TVPA's limitations
period.
See Jean,
431 F.3d at 780-81 (collecting cases).
Plaintiff has alleged that Barre's regime targeted members of
his clan for human rights abuses throughout the 1980s.
Compl. H 36.
See Am.
Plaintiff has further alleged that the civil war
21
following the overthrow of Barre's regime in 1991 pushed Somalia
into a state of "increasing chaos," resulting in "the killing,
displacement,
citizens."
and mass starvation of tens of thousands of Somali
Id. 1 37.
Conditions began to improve slightly in
1997, when plaintiff's regional government (Somaliland) achieved
semi-autonomous
status
and was
authority over its terrority."
able
to
"exercise a
Id. 1 40.
modicum of
Plaintiff has
therefore pleaded adequate facts to show that it was impossible
for him to file suit until at least 1997, when the extraordinary
circumstances finally abated such that he could pursue his cause
of action without
fear in the United States
or elsewhere.
Because plaintiff did file by 2004, his claims are timely on
this
basis
alone.
The limitations period should also be tolled during the
periods in which defendant did not reside in the United States
and therefore personal jurisdiction could not be obtained.
See
S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 7 (stating that "only defendants over
which a court in the United States has personal jurisdiction may
be sued").
Plaintiff has alleged that he filed suit within ten
years of defendant's continuous presence in the United States
following the overthrow of Barre's regime in Somalia.
time, defendant was living in Canada.
1992,
See Am. Compl.
At that
f 7.
In
Canada deported defendant to the United States for gross
22
human rights abuses in Somalia.
Id. | 8.
In 1994, the United
States similarly threatened defendant with deportation, and he
voluntarily departed for Somalia in July 1994.
nonetheless returned to the United States
Id.
Defendant
in December 1996
and
has been living here ever since as a lawful resident alien.
id.
Accepting these allegations as true,
See
the limitations period
had not yet expired when plaintiff first filed suit on November
10, 2004,
because defendant had been present in the United
States and subject to the reach of its courts for slightly less
than ten years.
Defendant responds that the limitations period continued to
run while he lived in Canada,
which has a similarly fair legal
system providing an alternative forum for plaintiff's claims,
meaning this suit was filed at least a year too late.
Rep.
See S.
No. 102-249, at 10-11 (noting that the "statute of
limitations should be tolled during the time the defendant was
absent from the United States or from any jurisdiction in which
the same or similar action arising from the same facts may be
maintained by the plaintiff").
The parties have submitted
competing reports by Canadian lawyers regarding the availability
of an adequate remedy there.
Plaintiff's expert plausibly
asserts that Canada's legal system does not afford an adequate
remedy.
On this record, defendant's motion will be denied,
23
although the factual dispute as to whether plaintiff could have
brought his claims in Canada is appropriate for adjudication at
trial.
In sum, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to avoid
dismissal of his TVPA claims at this stage on statute-of-
limitations grounds.
2. Adequacy of the Pleadings
The TVPA authorizes a cause of action against "[a]n
individual" for acts of extrajudicial killing and torture
committed under authority or color of law of any foreign nation.
28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 note.
The Act defines "extrajudicial killing"
as "a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples."
Id.
The Act defines "torture" as "any act,
directed against any individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering . . . ,
whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on that
individual" for a number of different purposes.
addition,
Id.
In
the Act imposes an exhaustion requirement, which bars
adjudication "if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and
available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise
to the claim occurred."
Id.
Accordingly,
24
to state a claim
under the TVPA, plaintiff must adequately allege (1)
that
defendant possessed power by dint of his position in the Somali
National Army;
(2)
that the offending acts (i.e., attempted
extrajudicial killing and torture) derived from an exercise of
that power; and (3) that plaintiff exhausted all available
remedies
in Somalia.
The allegations in the Amended Complaint contain all three
necessary ingredients.
Plaintiff has alleged that defendant
"served as Commander of
the Fifth Battalion of
the Somali
National Army" from 1984 to 198 9, which covers the relevant
period, Am. Compl. 1 6; that defendant committed the offending
acts and directed other soldiers to commit the offending acts in
that capacity, id. H
22-26; and that there has been an absolute
absence of remedies in Somalia since his claims arose,
HH 41-42.
id.
Similarly, plaintiff has alleged both offending acts
with requisite specificity, describing in graphic detail the
nature
of
the
torture
he
endured and defendant's
attempt to kill him without process.
"deliberated"
See id. ^H 18-27, 45.
Defendant responds that the offending acts are beyond the reach
of the TVPA because they were committed before the TVPA was
enacted in 1991.
This line of argument has been considered and
rejected by several courts on the grounds that extrajudicial
killing and torture have clearly contravened established
25
international law for decades.
Larios, 402 F.3d 1148
See,
e.g.,
(11th Cir. 2005)
Cabello v.
Fernandez-
(upholding jury verdict
in favor of a plaintiff who brought ATS and TVPA claims based on
offending acts that occurred in 1973).
Defendant has provided
no compelling reason to create a new rule here.
In addition to direct liability, plaintiff seeks relief
against defendant under three theories of secondary liability:
command responsibility, aiding and abetting liability, and joint
criminal enterprise.
The Supreme Court has recently affirmed
that "the TVPA contemplates liability against officers who do
not personally execute the torture or extrajudicial killing."
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth.,
(citation omitted).
132 S. Ct.
Even before Mohamad,
1702,
1709
(2012)
"virtually every court
to address the issue" has "recogniz[ed] secondary liability for
violations of international law since the founding of the
Republic."
2011)
Aziz v. Alcolac,
Inc.,
396
(4th Cir.
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); accord
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11, 19
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank,
2007)
658 F.3d 388,
(per curiam).
Here,
504 F.3d 254,
(D.C. Cir.
260
2011);
(2d Cir.
plaintiff's allegations are
sufficient to support each theory of secondary liability.
Plaintiff has alleged facts showing defendant not only knew that
members of his battalion were torturing plaintiff, but that
26
defendant personally participated in plaintiff's torture and
further attempted to kill him by shooting him five times.
Am. Compl. Hf 28, 32, 34.
See
Such allegations leave little
question whether the act and state-of-mind requirements for
imposing secondary liability are met.
See Samantar,
2012 WL
3730617, at *11-*12 (articulating the relevant standards).
III.
For these reasons,
CONCLUSION
defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss
will be granted as to all claims brought under the Alien Tort
Statute and denied as to the claims brought under the Torture
Victim Protection Act by an appropriate Order to be issued with
this Memorandum Opinion.
Entered this -Stl day of July, 2014.
Alexandria, Virginia
Leonie M. Brinkema
United States District Judge
27
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