Jackson et al v. Estelle Place, LLC et al
Filing
56
MEMORANDUM OPINION re: Motion/Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 5/8/09. (tfitz, )
IN THE UNITED
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE
Alexandria Division
H".-'
'' ·--
;
TANYA JACKSON,
et
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.
ESTELLE PLACE, LLC, et al..
cu
No. l:08cv984 (LMB/TRJ)
) )
)
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
)
)
OPINION
Before the Court is
Attorneys' Fees and Costs
the plaintiffs'
[42]
Petition for Award of
in which plaintiffs seek an award
of $86,471.00 in attorneys'
fees and $1,710.94
for the costs
incurred in litigating and settling this civil action.
Defendants have opposed the amount sought, arguing that it is
excessive and unreasonable.
For the following reasons,
the
plaintiffs will be awarded $36,000.00
$407.73
I.
in attorneys'
fees and
in costs.
Background
Plaintiffs Tanya Jackson,
Isaac Asare, Sharon Doss,
Michael Agyeman,
Thomas George,
and Courtney Collins brought this
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act
§§ 2 01, et seq.,
("FLSA"),
29 U.S.C.
to recover overtime wages owed to them by the
defendants,
Estelle Place LLC,
Jireh Place LLC,
Our Place LLC,
Destiny Place LLC,
Debra Roundtree,
and Mary Bell.
Defendants
are providers of group home services to disabled persons.
Although each group home was managed by a different limited
liability corporation,
for the purposes of
settling this
litigation,
the defendants agreed to include all of the hours for the various defendants in
worked by the plaintiffs
determining appropriate compensation under the FLSA.
also agreed to characterize one plaintiff,
employee to whom overtime wages were due.
Defendants
as an exempt
Agyeman,
The Complaint,
which also included claims of breach of
was filed on September 22, 2008.
contract and quantum meruit,
Defendants did not file a motion to dismiss.
On December 5,
2008,
plaintiffs filed a Motion to Allow Notice to Similarly
Situated Employees,
which the defendants opposed.
After the
2008, the
Court granted the plaintiffs'
motion on December 19,
parties requested a stay of the proceedings while they negotiated a settlement of the claims. The parties reached a confidential
settlement before any extensive discovery or motions practice had to been conducted. The settlement resolved the plaintiffs' FLSA
claims,
except for the issue of attorneys'
fees and costs,
which
the parties agreed to submit to the Court.
approved on February 23, II. Discussion 2009.
The settlement was
Pursuant to the FLSA,
a prevailing party is entitled to an
award of reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs.
See 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b).
Because the parties have agreed that plaintiffs are
the prevailing parties under 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b),
the plaintiffs
are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys'
However, and costs
F.2d 273,
fees and costs.
the fees 902
plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that they seek are reasonable.
277 (4th Cir. 1990). fee, the
See Plyler v.
Evatt.
In arriving at a reasonable attorneys'
Court
first
must determine the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of
reasonable hours expended times a reasonable hourly rate. See
Robinson v.
2009).
Equifax Info.
Servs..
560 F.3d 235,
243
{4th Cir.
In determining the number of reasonable hours expended
the Court considers the twelve
and a reasonable hourly rate,
factors set out in Barber v.
Kimbrell's
Inc.
Id.;
see also
Barber v.
1978).
Kimbrell's Inc..
577 F.2d 216,
226 n.28
(4th Cir.
These Kimbrell
factors are:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the
outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney;
(10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between
attorney and client;
similar cases.
and
(12)
attorneys'
fees awards in
577
F.2d at 226 n.28.
After deducting any fees
that resulted
from time spent on unsuccessful claims,
the Court evaluates the and arrives at a
"degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff"
final
reasonable
fee.
See
Grissom v.
The Mills
Corp..
54 9
F.3d
313,
321
(4th Cir.
2008)
(internal quotations and citations
omitted).
A.
Reasonable
Hourly Rate
Plaintiffs were
Employment Law Group,
represented in
P.C.
this
lawsuit by The
DC and seek an award of
of Washington,
attorneys'
fees
for 362.3
hours
of work performed by two
principals,
an associate,
a legal assistant,
and a private
$410 for principals
investigator.
The hourly rates billed were:
Nicholas Woodfield and Robert Scott Oswald, have between 11 and 19 years of experience,
attorneys who each $225 for an associate
with 1 to 3 years of experience,
legal assistant and a private
and $13 0
for work performed by a
In total, plaintiffs
investigator.
seek
$86,471.00
in attorneys'
fees.
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the hourly rate
sought by each of
560 F.3d at
their attorneys
To meet
is reasonable.
See Robinson.
243-45.
this burden,
plaintiffs must provide
not only affidavits of their own attorneys,
but also
"specific
evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community
for the type of work for which
(quoting Plvler. 902 F.2d at
[they]
seek[]
an award."
Id.
277).
Plaintiffs support
their contention that
the hourly rates
they seek are consistent with the prevailing market rates district with the affidavits of Mr.
in this
Woodfield and two well-
respected employment lawyers who practice in the Eastern District
of Virginia,
Ms.
Patricia Smith and Elaine Charlson Bredehoft.
Bredehoft stated that they believed The
Both
Smith and Ms.
Employment Law Group,
P.C. was charging the prevailing market
rate for lawyers with the same amount of experience as Mr.
Woodfield and Mr. Oswald. However, both of those affidavits, as
well of that of Mr.
Woodfield,
consistently refer to and rely
upon the Laffey Matrix,
which the Fourth Circuit has held is not
sufficient evidence of the prevailing rates in Northern Virginia.
See Grissom. 549 F.3d at 323.
In response,
the defendants argue that
the rates
charged by
The Employment Law Group exceed the prevailing market rate in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
defendants
This argument is meritorious.
the Laffey Matrix, which was
The
correctly contend that
developed in the District of Columbia,
does not accurately
reflect the prevailing rates in Northern Virginia,
case was litigated. See Grissom. 549 F.3d at 323.
where this
Defendants
also provide the affidavits of Edward Rosenthal,
lead defense
counsel,
and Edward Lee Isler,
an extremely experienced Northern
Virginia employment lawyer,
both of which provide strong support
in this district
for the conclusion that prevailing hourly rates
are significantly less than the hourly rates plaintiffs'
charged in this civil action.
counsel
Of particular significance is the
hourly rate generally charged by lead defense counsel Edward
Rosenthal,
founder and managing partner of
Rich Rosenthal
Manitta
Dzubin & Kroeger,
LLP,
a law firm which plaintiffs'
counsel
twice
recognized as
"one of the preeminent
law firms"
in the Eastern
District of Virginia.
Mr. Rosenthal,
See Mem.
in Supp.
of
of Plfs.'
Pet.
11,
15.
who has more years
experience
than either Mr.
Woodfield and Mr.
per hour,
Oswald,
avers
that he
rate
regularly charges
to $325 per hour
$375
for this
although he
reduced that
case.
He also avers
that,
in his
experience,
attorneys
in the
Eastern District of Virginia with experience and competence
equivalent to that of Mr.
$275
Woodfield and Mr.
Oswald charge between
to an
and $350 per hour for similar cases,
associates with one to $195
three years of experience are normally billed at $165 hour, and legal assistants
are usually billed at between $50 and
$80 an hour.
assistants at
In fact,
$55
Mr.
Rosenthal's
law firm bills
legal
an hour. the parties,
After carefully reviewing the submissions of
the Court finds that the rates requested by the plaintiffs do not
reflect the prevailing market rates in the Eastern District of
Virginia.
As
the Fourth Circuit has recently noted,
the Laffey and
Matrix does not control
in the Eastern District of Virginia,
plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing "that the Laffev
Matrix ... is a reliable indicator of the hourly rates of
[Alexandria], Virginia. ..." See
litigation attorneys in
Robinson.
560
F.3d at 245
(quoting Grissom,
549 F.3d at 323).
Moreover,
courts
in this district have repeatedly recognized that D.C. are usually higher than
See,
(E.D.
hourly rates charged in Washington,
hourly rates
e.g., Am.
charged in the Eastern District of Virginia.
EPA, 138 F. Supp. 2d 722, 740-42
Canoe Ass'n v.
Va.
2001).
Furthermore,
the affidavits provided by the
plaintiffs conflict with the affidavits provided by the
defendants as to what constitutes the prevailing market rates for
experienced attorneys,
associates,
and legal assistants
in this
district.
rates
For these reasons,
the Court finds that the hourly
the
suggested by the defendants more accurately reflect
prevailing market rates in Northern Virginia and will reduce the hourly rate to $350 to for Mr. Woodfield and Mr. Oswald, $170 for
the associate,
not
and $60
for the legal assistant.
investigator.1
Expended
The Court will
award any fees
B.
for the private
Reasonable Number of Hours
Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for a total of 362.3 hours
expended by the attorneys and staff of The Employment Law Group,
P.C.
by Mr.
This figure is compromised of 123.9 hours of work performed
Woodfield, 11.5 hours performed by Mr. Oswald, 16.3 hours
performed by associate Katie Araus,
91.9 hours performed by a
for the private investigator,
hourly rate is
1 Although the defendants did not dispute the hourly rate
reasonable because this entire fee is
the Court has not determined what
litigation, the need for an investigator is highly questionable and in this Court's experience has not been sought by a civil
litigant in a fee petition.
unreasonable.
Given the broad discovery tools available in civil
legal assistant,
and 106.0 hours performed by a private
investigator.
sum of
AAC,
Plaintiffs have also requested reimbursement for a
9.1 hours billed by unidentified persons with the initials
and JMZ.2
DLS,
Defendants argue that the hours expended on this litigation
were excessive considering the type and size of plaintiffs'
claims and ask that these hours be significantly reduced because
they were unnecessary and unwarranted. The defendants contend
that plaintiffs should have sought an early settlement given the
modest monetary claims at issue.
of hours that plaintiffs
They also object to the number
litigation by
incurred early in the
preparing discovery requests even before an initial pretrial conference was held, and they also specifically challenge seven
categories of fees as unreasonable,
the successful claims.
unnecessary,
include
or unrelated to
charges for:
These categories
1)
work performed to evaluate the claims before plaintiffs' 2) background checks run on
counsel agreed to be retained,
plaintiffs and defendants,
issues,
3)
legal research into retaliation
4) other
which were not alleged in the Complaint,
5)
research unrelated to the FLSA claims,
case evaluation
meetings,
6)
time spent on efforts to recruit other potential
individuals because the plaintiffs did not provide any
2 The award will not include the hours billed by these three
information about the qualifications or experience of these individuals, and, therefore, the Court is unable to determine a
reasonable hourly rate for these
8
individuals.
plaintiffs,
who did not
join the lawsuit,
and 7)
work that
appears duplicative or lacks
its relevance to the
sufficient description to evaluate
civil action.
Hours
that are excessive,
redundant,
or unnecessary should
not be included in a fee award.
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983).
See Hensley v.
"hours . .
Eckerhart,
461
In addition, client are .
that are not
properly billed to one's
one's adversary pursuant fees
not properly billed to
Id. that are
to statutory authority."
Furthermore,
should not be awarded for hours
duplicative or where it is unclear why the hours were expended.
The defendants' seven specific objections have merit.
First,
the
fees
charged for running background checks on the
parties and performing additional research on the defendants were
unnecessary to litigate the FLSA claims,
reasonably expended. Second, the fees
and,
thus,
to
were not
case
related
the
evaluation meeting on July 18,
2008 were also unnecessary and
redundant.
At this meeting,
six attorneys billed 1.5 hours each
claims. These
"to evaluate the merits"
of the plaintiffs'
relatively straightforward FLSA claims
did not require such a
meeting or the hours spent preparing for it.
Third,
the fees
related to The Employment Law Group's examination of the
plaintiffs'
claims before the Group was retained will not be
included because a private client would not be charged for those
expenses. See Hensley. 461 U.S. at 433-34. Finally, fees that
the attorneys billed for time spent researching a retaliation
claim and trying to recruit other plaintiffs will not be awarded
because no retaliation claim was alleged in the Complaint and additional plaintiffs did not join the lawsuit. These reductions
reduce the total number of hours reasonably expended from 123.9
to 109.7 hours for Mr. Oswald, from 16.3 Woodfield, from 11.5 to 7.9 hours for Mr.
to 7.4 hours
for the associate,
and from 91.9
to 89.7 hours for the
legal assistant.
The hours expended by the
three unidentified individuals will not be awarded.
Only one of the The the Kimbrell factors, "the amount involved and the fee.
results obtained,"
requires the
further adjustment of skill required
time and labor expended, services,
to properly and all
perform the legal the experience,
the customary fee and ability of
for like work,
reputation,
the attorney are and hours
adequately accounted for in the hourly rate plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' attorneys have
awarded to
significant experience
litigating employment
law cases,
but this civil
action did not
present particularly challenging legal or factual questions. Moreover, nothing about the relatively straightforward FLSA
litigation before this
claims presented by plaintiffs and the Court requires
further adjustment based on the attorneys'
opportunity costs,
litigation, the time
the attorneys'
expectations at the outset of
or the undesirability of Finally, neither
limitations legal
imposed,
case within the
community.
10
plaintiffs'
attorneys'
one time representation of the plaintiffs
in similar cases support increasing or
nor attorneys'
fee awards
decreasing the award.3
Lastly, the Court has considered the amount involved and the
results obtained in evaluating the reasonableness of
See Farrar v. Hobby. 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)
the fees.
{"MT]he most
critical *is
factor'
in determining the reasonableness of a fee award obtained.'"). In the end, only six less
the degree of success joined this
plaintiffs
lawsuit and their total recovery was
than $10,000 before being doubled under the liquidated damage
provision of the FLSA.
for less than $1,000
Moreover,
of the six awards,
four were
before doubling as plaintiff Agyeman
received the largest recovery because of the misclassification.
An attorneys' fee should bear some reasonable relationship to the
Given the modest value of further reduce the to the lodestar
recovery of plaintiffs. plaintiffs' claims,
the Court will
figure by approximately 25 percent to $36,000.00.
For these reasons, figure of $36,000.00
subtract fees
the Court determines It
that a lodestar
is reasonable.
is unnecessary to
unrelated claims or to
incurred for unsuccessful,
3 Plaintiffs cite to attorneys'
two other FLSA actions
fee awards they received in
to support their
in this district
Petition. However, plaintiffs do not provide any information about the nature of those claims or the amount of discovery or motions practice conducted in those actions. Therefore, it is impossible for the Court to satisfactorily compare those awards with the award in this case.
11
award only a percentage of all of their claims 549 F.3d 333,
Costs
this
amount because plaintiffs Cf. 2002). Johnson v.
settled
for full value. 337 (4th Cir.
City of
Aiken.
C.
Finally,
the plaintiffs
request
that
they be awarded
$1,710.94
costs,
in costs.
The defendants oppose
these expenditures
legal
$1,303.21 of
these
arguing that
resulted from unnecessary
background checks, was not alleged,
research on the retaliation claim that for meetings with potential
meal expenses
plaintiffs who did not join the lawsuit,
unnecessary meetings with clients.
and mileage
for
All of
the defendants' either unrelated to
For these reasons,
objections have merit.
or unnecessary for the only $407.73 D. will be
These expenses were
successful claims.
awarded. Position of the Defendants
Financial
In their Memorandum in Response
to Plaintiffs'
Petition,
the
defendants raised the issue of the defendants' and observed that the attorneys'
bankrupt these Defendants." Mem.
financial position "threaten[]
Although the
fees requested
in Resp. 21.
to
defendants'
memorandum did not
specifically request a reduction
of
the award based on the defendants'
attached as exhibits
inability to pay,
the
letters
included the defendants'
financial
information and asked the Court circumstances.
for leniency or to consider their the defendants is not
The financial position of
12
one of
the
factors fee.
to be
considered in arriving at a reasonable Grissom. 549 P.3d at 321.
attorneys'
See,
e.g.,
Accordingly,
III.
the
fee will not be further reduced.
Conclusion
For all
these reasons,
the
Court
finds
that a total award of
$36,000.00
in attorneys'
fees and $4 07.73
in costs is reasonable
and will be awarded by an Order to be issued with this Memorandum
Opinion.
Entered this
Q
day of May,
2009.
Alexandria,
Virginia
/s/
Leonie M. Brinkema
United States District Judge
13
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