Jackson et al v. Estelle Place, LLC et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: Motion/Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 5/8/09. (tfitz, )

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IN THE UNITED EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE Alexandria Division H".-' '' ·-- ; TANYA JACKSON, et Plaintiffs, ) ) V. ESTELLE PLACE, LLC, et al.. cu No. l:08cv984 (LMB/TRJ) ) ) ) Defendants. MEMORANDUM ) ) OPINION Before the Court is Attorneys' Fees and Costs the plaintiffs' [42] Petition for Award of in which plaintiffs seek an award of $86,471.00 in attorneys' fees and $1,710.94 for the costs incurred in litigating and settling this civil action. Defendants have opposed the amount sought, arguing that it is excessive and unreasonable. For the following reasons, the plaintiffs will be awarded $36,000.00 $407.73 I. in attorneys' fees and in costs. Background Plaintiffs Tanya Jackson, Isaac Asare, Sharon Doss, Michael Agyeman, Thomas George, and Courtney Collins brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act §§ 2 01, et seq., ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. to recover overtime wages owed to them by the defendants, Estelle Place LLC, Jireh Place LLC, Our Place LLC, Destiny Place LLC, Debra Roundtree, and Mary Bell. Defendants are providers of group home services to disabled persons. Although each group home was managed by a different limited liability corporation, for the purposes of settling this litigation, the defendants agreed to include all of the hours for the various defendants in worked by the plaintiffs determining appropriate compensation under the FLSA. also agreed to characterize one plaintiff, employee to whom overtime wages were due. Defendants as an exempt Agyeman, The Complaint, which also included claims of breach of was filed on September 22, 2008. contract and quantum meruit, Defendants did not file a motion to dismiss. On December 5, 2008, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Allow Notice to Similarly Situated Employees, which the defendants opposed. After the 2008, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion on December 19, parties requested a stay of the proceedings while they negotiated a settlement of the claims. The parties reached a confidential settlement before any extensive discovery or motions practice had to been conducted. The settlement resolved the plaintiffs' FLSA claims, except for the issue of attorneys' fees and costs, which the parties agreed to submit to the Court. approved on February 23, II. Discussion 2009. The settlement was Pursuant to the FLSA, a prevailing party is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Because the parties have agreed that plaintiffs are the prevailing parties under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' However, and costs F.2d 273, fees and costs. the fees 902 plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that they seek are reasonable. 277 (4th Cir. 1990). fee, the See Plyler v. Evatt. In arriving at a reasonable attorneys' Court first must determine the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable hourly rate. See Robinson v. 2009). Equifax Info. Servs.. 560 F.3d 235, 243 {4th Cir. In determining the number of reasonable hours expended the Court considers the twelve and a reasonable hourly rate, factors set out in Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc. Id.; see also Barber v. 1978). Kimbrell's Inc.. 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. These Kimbrell factors are: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; similar cases. and (12) attorneys' fees awards in 577 F.2d at 226 n.28. After deducting any fees that resulted from time spent on unsuccessful claims, the Court evaluates the and arrives at a "degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff" final reasonable fee. See Grissom v. The Mills Corp.. 54 9 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A. Reasonable Hourly Rate Plaintiffs were Employment Law Group, represented in P.C. this lawsuit by The DC and seek an award of of Washington, attorneys' fees for 362.3 hours of work performed by two principals, an associate, a legal assistant, and a private $410 for principals investigator. The hourly rates billed were: Nicholas Woodfield and Robert Scott Oswald, have between 11 and 19 years of experience, attorneys who each $225 for an associate with 1 to 3 years of experience, legal assistant and a private and $13 0 for work performed by a In total, plaintiffs investigator. seek $86,471.00 in attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the hourly rate sought by each of 560 F.3d at their attorneys To meet is reasonable. See Robinson. 243-45. this burden, plaintiffs must provide not only affidavits of their own attorneys, but also "specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which (quoting Plvler. 902 F.2d at [they] seek[] an award." Id. 277). Plaintiffs support their contention that the hourly rates they seek are consistent with the prevailing market rates district with the affidavits of Mr. in this Woodfield and two well- respected employment lawyers who practice in the Eastern District of Virginia, Ms. Patricia Smith and Elaine Charlson Bredehoft. Bredehoft stated that they believed The Both Smith and Ms. Employment Law Group, P.C. was charging the prevailing market rate for lawyers with the same amount of experience as Mr. Woodfield and Mr. Oswald. However, both of those affidavits, as well of that of Mr. Woodfield, consistently refer to and rely upon the Laffey Matrix, which the Fourth Circuit has held is not sufficient evidence of the prevailing rates in Northern Virginia. See Grissom. 549 F.3d at 323. In response, the defendants argue that the rates charged by The Employment Law Group exceed the prevailing market rate in the Eastern District of Virginia. defendants This argument is meritorious. the Laffey Matrix, which was The correctly contend that developed in the District of Columbia, does not accurately reflect the prevailing rates in Northern Virginia, case was litigated. See Grissom. 549 F.3d at 323. where this Defendants also provide the affidavits of Edward Rosenthal, lead defense counsel, and Edward Lee Isler, an extremely experienced Northern Virginia employment lawyer, both of which provide strong support in this district for the conclusion that prevailing hourly rates are significantly less than the hourly rates plaintiffs' charged in this civil action. counsel Of particular significance is the hourly rate generally charged by lead defense counsel Edward Rosenthal, founder and managing partner of Rich Rosenthal Manitta Dzubin & Kroeger, LLP, a law firm which plaintiffs' counsel twice recognized as "one of the preeminent law firms" in the Eastern District of Virginia. Mr. Rosenthal, See Mem. in Supp. of of Plfs.' Pet. 11, 15. who has more years experience than either Mr. Woodfield and Mr. per hour, Oswald, avers that he rate regularly charges to $325 per hour $375 for this although he reduced that case. He also avers that, in his experience, attorneys in the Eastern District of Virginia with experience and competence equivalent to that of Mr. $275 Woodfield and Mr. Oswald charge between to an and $350 per hour for similar cases, associates with one to $195 three years of experience are normally billed at $165 hour, and legal assistants are usually billed at between $50 and $80 an hour. assistants at In fact, $55 Mr. Rosenthal's law firm bills legal an hour. the parties, After carefully reviewing the submissions of the Court finds that the rates requested by the plaintiffs do not reflect the prevailing market rates in the Eastern District of Virginia. As the Fourth Circuit has recently noted, the Laffey and Matrix does not control in the Eastern District of Virginia, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing "that the Laffev Matrix ... is a reliable indicator of the hourly rates of [Alexandria], Virginia. ..." See litigation attorneys in Robinson. 560 F.3d at 245 (quoting Grissom, 549 F.3d at 323). Moreover, courts in this district have repeatedly recognized that D.C. are usually higher than See, (E.D. hourly rates charged in Washington, hourly rates e.g., Am. charged in the Eastern District of Virginia. EPA, 138 F. Supp. 2d 722, 740-42 Canoe Ass'n v. Va. 2001). Furthermore, the affidavits provided by the plaintiffs conflict with the affidavits provided by the defendants as to what constitutes the prevailing market rates for experienced attorneys, associates, and legal assistants in this district. rates For these reasons, the Court finds that the hourly the suggested by the defendants more accurately reflect prevailing market rates in Northern Virginia and will reduce the hourly rate to $350 to for Mr. Woodfield and Mr. Oswald, $170 for the associate, not and $60 for the legal assistant. investigator.1 Expended The Court will award any fees B. for the private Reasonable Number of Hours Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for a total of 362.3 hours expended by the attorneys and staff of The Employment Law Group, P.C. by Mr. This figure is compromised of 123.9 hours of work performed Woodfield, 11.5 hours performed by Mr. Oswald, 16.3 hours performed by associate Katie Araus, 91.9 hours performed by a for the private investigator, hourly rate is 1 Although the defendants did not dispute the hourly rate reasonable because this entire fee is the Court has not determined what litigation, the need for an investigator is highly questionable and in this Court's experience has not been sought by a civil litigant in a fee petition. unreasonable. Given the broad discovery tools available in civil legal assistant, and 106.0 hours performed by a private investigator. sum of AAC, Plaintiffs have also requested reimbursement for a 9.1 hours billed by unidentified persons with the initials and JMZ.2 DLS, Defendants argue that the hours expended on this litigation were excessive considering the type and size of plaintiffs' claims and ask that these hours be significantly reduced because they were unnecessary and unwarranted. The defendants contend that plaintiffs should have sought an early settlement given the modest monetary claims at issue. of hours that plaintiffs They also object to the number litigation by incurred early in the preparing discovery requests even before an initial pretrial conference was held, and they also specifically challenge seven categories of fees as unreasonable, the successful claims. unnecessary, include or unrelated to charges for: These categories 1) work performed to evaluate the claims before plaintiffs' 2) background checks run on counsel agreed to be retained, plaintiffs and defendants, issues, 3) legal research into retaliation 4) other which were not alleged in the Complaint, 5) research unrelated to the FLSA claims, case evaluation meetings, 6) time spent on efforts to recruit other potential individuals because the plaintiffs did not provide any 2 The award will not include the hours billed by these three information about the qualifications or experience of these individuals, and, therefore, the Court is unable to determine a reasonable hourly rate for these 8 individuals. plaintiffs, who did not join the lawsuit, and 7) work that appears duplicative or lacks its relevance to the sufficient description to evaluate civil action. Hours that are excessive, redundant, or unnecessary should not be included in a fee award. U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983). See Hensley v. "hours . . Eckerhart, 461 In addition, client are . that are not properly billed to one's one's adversary pursuant fees not properly billed to Id. that are to statutory authority." Furthermore, should not be awarded for hours duplicative or where it is unclear why the hours were expended. The defendants' seven specific objections have merit. First, the fees charged for running background checks on the parties and performing additional research on the defendants were unnecessary to litigate the FLSA claims, reasonably expended. Second, the fees and, thus, to were not case related the evaluation meeting on July 18, 2008 were also unnecessary and redundant. At this meeting, six attorneys billed 1.5 hours each claims. These "to evaluate the merits" of the plaintiffs' relatively straightforward FLSA claims did not require such a meeting or the hours spent preparing for it. Third, the fees related to The Employment Law Group's examination of the plaintiffs' claims before the Group was retained will not be included because a private client would not be charged for those expenses. See Hensley. 461 U.S. at 433-34. Finally, fees that the attorneys billed for time spent researching a retaliation claim and trying to recruit other plaintiffs will not be awarded because no retaliation claim was alleged in the Complaint and additional plaintiffs did not join the lawsuit. These reductions reduce the total number of hours reasonably expended from 123.9 to 109.7 hours for Mr. Oswald, from 16.3 Woodfield, from 11.5 to 7.9 hours for Mr. to 7.4 hours for the associate, and from 91.9 to 89.7 hours for the legal assistant. The hours expended by the three unidentified individuals will not be awarded. Only one of the The the Kimbrell factors, "the amount involved and the fee. results obtained," requires the further adjustment of skill required time and labor expended, services, to properly and all perform the legal the experience, the customary fee and ability of for like work, reputation, the attorney are and hours adequately accounted for in the hourly rate plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' attorneys have awarded to significant experience litigating employment law cases, but this civil action did not present particularly challenging legal or factual questions. Moreover, nothing about the relatively straightforward FLSA litigation before this claims presented by plaintiffs and the Court requires further adjustment based on the attorneys' opportunity costs, litigation, the time the attorneys' expectations at the outset of or the undesirability of Finally, neither limitations legal imposed, case within the community. 10 plaintiffs' attorneys' one time representation of the plaintiffs in similar cases support increasing or nor attorneys' fee awards decreasing the award.3 Lastly, the Court has considered the amount involved and the results obtained in evaluating the reasonableness of See Farrar v. Hobby. 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) the fees. {"MT]he most critical *is factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee award obtained.'"). In the end, only six less the degree of success joined this plaintiffs lawsuit and their total recovery was than $10,000 before being doubled under the liquidated damage provision of the FLSA. for less than $1,000 Moreover, of the six awards, four were before doubling as plaintiff Agyeman received the largest recovery because of the misclassification. An attorneys' fee should bear some reasonable relationship to the Given the modest value of further reduce the to the lodestar recovery of plaintiffs. plaintiffs' claims, the Court will figure by approximately 25 percent to $36,000.00. For these reasons, figure of $36,000.00 subtract fees the Court determines It that a lodestar is reasonable. is unnecessary to unrelated claims or to incurred for unsuccessful, 3 Plaintiffs cite to attorneys' two other FLSA actions fee awards they received in to support their in this district Petition. However, plaintiffs do not provide any information about the nature of those claims or the amount of discovery or motions practice conducted in those actions. Therefore, it is impossible for the Court to satisfactorily compare those awards with the award in this case. 11 award only a percentage of all of their claims 549 F.3d 333, Costs this amount because plaintiffs Cf. 2002). Johnson v. settled for full value. 337 (4th Cir. City of Aiken. C. Finally, the plaintiffs request that they be awarded $1,710.94 costs, in costs. The defendants oppose these expenditures legal $1,303.21 of these arguing that resulted from unnecessary background checks, was not alleged, research on the retaliation claim that for meetings with potential meal expenses plaintiffs who did not join the lawsuit, unnecessary meetings with clients. and mileage for All of the defendants' either unrelated to For these reasons, objections have merit. or unnecessary for the only $407.73 D. will be These expenses were successful claims. awarded. Position of the Defendants Financial In their Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' Petition, the defendants raised the issue of the defendants' and observed that the attorneys' bankrupt these Defendants." Mem. financial position "threaten[] Although the fees requested in Resp. 21. to defendants' memorandum did not specifically request a reduction of the award based on the defendants' attached as exhibits inability to pay, the letters included the defendants' financial information and asked the Court circumstances. for leniency or to consider their the defendants is not The financial position of 12 one of the factors fee. to be considered in arriving at a reasonable Grissom. 549 P.3d at 321. attorneys' See, e.g., Accordingly, III. the fee will not be further reduced. Conclusion For all these reasons, the Court finds that a total award of $36,000.00 in attorneys' fees and $4 07.73 in costs is reasonable and will be awarded by an Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion. Entered this Q day of May, 2009. Alexandria, Virginia /s/ Leonie M. Brinkema United States District Judge 13

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