Bradford v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation et al

Filing 280

MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: 260 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or in the alternative for summary judgment by Residential Funding Company, LLC. Signed by District Judge T. S. Ellis, III on 2/23/2012. (stas)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

NORMAN BRADFORD
Plaintiff,

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)
)

v.
HSBC MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
ALLY BANK, and RESIDENTIAL
FUNDING COMPANY, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. I:09cvl226

MEMORAN1)UM 0P 1N1 ON

This ease addresses the jurisdictional consequences of declining, or allowing to lapse, a
Rule 68, Fed. R. Civ. P, offer ofjudgment that provides complete relief to a plaintiff asserting a
claim under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 el seq. ("TILA"). At issue, more
specifically, arc the following questions:

(i) Whether a Rule 68 offer ofjudgment that provides a TILA claimant with full statutory
damages, plus one dollar, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, as TILA provides, affords
complete relief to the claimant where, as here, the only actual damages sought by the
claimant arc the attorney's fees claimant incurred in pursuing his TILA action;
And. if so,

(ii) Whether a TILA claim becomes moot so as to extinguish any case or controversy
with respect to the claim where, as here, the claimant did not accept a Rule 68 offer that,
if accepted, would have provided full relief on the claim.
I.

On September 20, 2006, plaintiff Norman Bradford ("Bradford") and defendant HSBC
Mortgage Corp. ("HSBC") agreed to refinance the loan that had originally financed Bradford's
purchase of his primary residence in Ashburn. Virginia (the "Ashburn home"). To this end.

Bradford signed a promissory note (the ••Note"), which was secured by a deed of trust on the
Ashburn home that named HSBC as the lender. At the time of the refinancimz. Bradford was not

provided with a "Truth in Lending" statement that would have informed him of his right to
rescind the transaction pursuant to TILA. Indeed, Bradford has established as an undisputed fact
"that various mandatory TILA disclosures were not provided at the time of closing, such that he

was entitled to rescind his loan within the extended statutory three-year period." Bradfordv.

IlSBCMortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625, 627 (E.D. Va. 2011). Several months after the
refinancing, HSBC sold the Note to Ally Bank ("Ally"). Neither IISBC nor Ally informed
Bradford of the sale at that time. On October 16. 2008, Bradford sent a letter to HSBC

purporting to "exercise [Bradford's) right to rescind the mortgage transactionf.]" (Doc. 30-5).
HSBC responded by letter dated December 17, 2008 declining to comply with Bradford's
rescission request.

Bradford filed the instant action on October 29, 2009 alleging, inter alia, that several
defendants, including HSBC, had violated § 1635 of TILA by failing to honor Bradford's request
for rescission. On December 30, 2009, RFC purchased the Note from Ally in a transaction that

involved RFC's acquisition ofa bundle of mortgage loans.1 At that time, RFC did not notify
Bradford that it had acquired the Note, as RFC was required to do under a separate TILA
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). Bradford filed an amended complaint on August 5, 2010;
neither Ally nor RFC was named as a defendant. After the original discovery period had closed

on December 10, 2010, Bradford and HSBC filed cross-motions for summary judgment. At that

time, the identity of the noteholder was unknown, and thus the parties were granted additional

1Although Bradford attempted to dispute this fact on summary judgment and continues to do so,
the record evidence makes clear that there is no genuine dispute as to the fact that RFC

purchased the Note from Ally on December 30, 2009. See Bradford v. HSBC Along. Corp.. —
F. Supp. 2d —, 2011 WL 6148486, at **2-4 (F..D. Va. Dec. 8, 2011). Bradford adduced no

admissible evidence to the contrary, and yet, he inexplicably continues to question this fact
notwithstanding that "if Bradford were correct that HSBC transferred the Note directly to RFC in
November 2006, then his §1641(g) claim against RFC would fail because RFC would have
acquired the Note well before the statute's effective date." Id. at *8 n.32.

discovery so that the noteholder's identity could be ascertained. Initially, the parties represented,
albeit incorrectly, that Ally was the current noteholder, so Bradford was granted leave to amend

his complaint to add Ally asa defendant.2 See Bradford v. HSBC Morlg. Corp., I:09cvl226
(E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 2011) (Order). Months later, HSBC correctly averred that RFC, not Ally,
was the current noteholder. On June 6, 2011, Bradford was allowed to file a third amended

complaint naming RFC as a defendant.

On July 22, 2011, Bradford's § 1635 claims were dismissed as untimely given TILA's

three-year statute of repose for rescission claims. See Bradford, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
Thereafter, Bradford was allowed to file yet another amended complaint—the fourth—to add a
claim that RFC violated § 1641(g) by failing to disclose in a timely fashion that it had acquired
the Note. RFC then moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint arguing, with respect to the

§ 1641(g) claim, that the claim was untimely. RFC's motion to dismiss was converted into a
motion to summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. and then denied as to the §
1641(g) claim on the ground that the claim had been timely asserted. See Bradford v. HSBC

Mortg. Corp., — F. Supp. 2d —. 2011 WL 6148486, at *8 n.32 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2011).
Subsequently, an Order issued scheduling a status conference. See Bradford v. HSBC Mortg.
Corp., 1:09cvl226 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2011) (Order).

After the status conference, RFC tendered a Rule 68 offer ofjudgment to Bradford on
December 14. 2011. This offer read as follows:

2In particular, "HSBC misidentilied the true noteholder (RFC) to Bradford between December
2009 (when Ally sold the Note to RFC) and May 2011 (when HSBC and Ally disclosed that
RFC was the noteholder)." Bradford, 2011 WL 6148486, at *8 n.33. Indeed, HSBC was

sanctioned for its failure to adhere to court-ordered discovery by failing to respond properly to
Bradford's request for the noteholder's identity. See Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., No.
I:09cvl226 (ED. Va. Aug. 16, 2011) (Order).

Residential Funding Company, LLC offers that the Plaintiff, Norman Bradford,
take judgment against it for a single violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1641(g), in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE DOLLAR
AND NO CENTS (S4.001.00), plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees in
connection with this claim, if provided by statute.

(Doc. 261-1 at 2). Bradford allowed the offer to lapse as he did not accept it "within 14 days

after being scrved|.]" Rule 68(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. 'Ihcrcaftcr, on January 19, 2012, RFC filed the
dismissal motion at bar pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., arguing that because the offer
ofjudgment would have afforded full relief to Bradford on his § 1641(g) claim had the offer
been accepted, the offer served to render Bradford's § 1641(g) claim moot and thus dismissal of
the claim is now required for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In his untimely response to
RFC's motion,"' Bradford asserts that RFC's offer "did not include attorney fees." (Doc. 270 at

3). In particular, Bradford contends that that he is "entitled to attorney fees attributable to
RFC's and other defendants' wrongful conduct in preventing Bradford from discovering the

identity of the owner of the debt." (Id). RFC's dismissal motion has been fully briefed and
argued and is now ripe for disposition.
II.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., challenges the existence
of subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim. When "the defendant challenges the
veracity of the facts underpinning subject matter jurisdiction," then a district court "may go
beyond the complaint, conduct evidentiary proceedings, and resolve the disputed jurisdictional

facts." Kerns v. United States; 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). Accord Velasco v. Gov't of
Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a

J Bradford failed to file his legal memorandum in opposition to RFC's motion within the elevenday period prescribed by Rule 7(F)(1), E.D. Va. Local Civ. R., as enlarged by three days per
Rule 6(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. This tardiness was excused.

district court "may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to

one for summary judgment"). It is well-settled that a plaintiff "bears the burden of proving that
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction" over his claim. Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,

682 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R.
Co. v. UnitedStales, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). Accord Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d

337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that when "a defendant challenges the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction in fact, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the truth of such facts by a
preponderance of the evidence").
III.

At issue on RFC's motion to dismiss is whether the Rule 68 offer of judgment to

Bradford on the § 1641(g) claim rendered the claim moot. The Fourth Circuit has recognized
that "the doctrine of mootness constitutes a part of the constitutional limits of federal court

jurisdiction" under Article III, and that "a case is moot when . . . the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome." United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citations and brackets omitted). For example, a claim becomes moot "when the claimant

receives the relief he or she sought to obtain through the claim." Simmons v. United Mortg. &
Loan Invs., 634 F.3d 754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this
respect, it is well-settled in the Fourth Circuit that "fw]hen a Rule 68 offer unequivocally offers a
plaintiff all the relief she sought to obtain, the offer renders the plaintiffs action moot." Warren

v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., — F.3d —, 2012 WL 76053, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 2012) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). Nor is this result unique to this circuit; all the circuits have
addressed this issue have reached the same result.'

In this case, whether Bradford's § 1641(g) claim is now moot depends, in turn, on
whether RFC's Rule 68 offer ofjudgment offered "the full amount of damages ... to which
[Bradford] claimed individually to be entitled" on his § 1641(g) claim such that "there was no

longer any case or controversy" between Bradford and RFC. Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386,
390 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of claim rendered moot by Rule 68 offer ofjudgment).
If the Rule 68 offer of judgment provided Bradford with everything he could have obtained
through litigation, then the offer would have deprived Bradford of any personal stake in
continuing to litigate the § 1641(g) claim and thereby rendered the claim moot.
There is no disagreement that the offer of statutory damages in the amount of $4,001.00

exceeded the amount of statutory damages that Bradford could have received at trial. See 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iv) (providing that statutory damages for Bradford's particular TILA
claim cannot be "greater than $4,000"). Instead, the parties' dispute centers on whether the Rule
68 offer ofjudgment, to qualify as affording complete relief, must have included a sum-certain
amount for the attorney's fees Bradford asserts arc actual damages caused by RFC's § 1641(g)
nondisclosure violation. RFC argues that its offer of full statutory damages "plus costs and

reasonable attorney's fees in connection with [the § 1641(g) claim], if provided by statute"
would have fully satisfied the claim. Bradford counters that the offer ofjudgment was not

4See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 523 F.3d 1374. 1379 (F'cd. Cir. 2008)
(concluding that "[t]hc district court had no case or controversy to continue to consider" after

defendant "offered the entire amount... in dispute"); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337,
342 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that "•under traditional mootness principles, an offer for the
entirety of a plaintiffs claim will generally moot the claim"); Greisz v. Household Bank (Hi),
176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a Rule 68 offer affording complete relief
"eliminates a legal dispute upon which federal jurisdiction can be based").

sufficient to moot the claim because at least some of the attorney's fees he incurred prosecuting

the instant action were "actual damage"5 caused by RFC's § 1641(g) violation, and the offer did
not specifically quantify these fees as damages. See Warren, 2012 WL 76053, at **5-6 (holding
that offer of damages in an amount to be "determined by the Court" was equivocal and therefore
did not render plaintiffs claim moot).

To resolve this dispute, the starting point is the text of TILA, which provides that "any
creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part," which includes the
disclosure requirement of § 1641(g), is liable to the person entitled to receive such notice in an
amount determined by a formula that includes several statutorily defined liabilities. One such
liability is "any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure[.|" 15 U.S.C. §

1640(a)( 1). Thus, the question presented here is whether Congress intended the statutory phrase
"actual damage" to include attorney's fees.
It did not so intend; indeed, Congress' contrary intent is manifest. Under TILA, a
creditor's liability for a TILA violation also includes, "in the case of any successful action to

enforce the foregoing liability . .. the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's

fee as determined by the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3). By explicitly providing in TILA for a
successful claimant's recovery of reasonable attorney's fees expended in litigating the TILA
action, Congress made unmistakably clear its intent to distinguish sharply between "actual

515 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1).
Under § 1640(a)(3), an "action" embraces the entire lawsuit containing the successful TILA
claim, and an "action can succeed when only one of its constituent claims prevails." See Nigh v.
Koons Buick Ponliac GMC, Inc., 478 F.3d 183, 185-86 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court's
award of attorney's fees to a successful TILA claimant for fees incurred litigating an
unsuccessful appeal on the issue of TILA's damages cap). Thus, a successful TILA claimant
may recover all reasonable attorney's fees incurred litigating the lawsuit containing the
successful TILA claim, including fees reasonably incurred advancing other, ultimately

damage" under TILA and "a reasonable attorney's fee" recoverable under TILA. Put simply.
they are separate and distinct categories; attorney's fees that a TILA claimant incurs advancing
his TILA action are not "actual damage" under TILA. To conclude otherwise would effectively
render TILA's fee-shifting provision redundant or meaningless, a result plainly not intended by
Congress. It follows that Bradford's attempt to label as "actual damage" under TILA the
attorney's fees he incurred in pursuing his TILA action must fail. Although he may recover
"reasonable attorney's fees" under § 1640(a)(3), those fees are not "actual damage" under §
1640(a)(1).

The distinction between attorney's fees incurred in pursuing a claim and damages
attributable to the claim is firmly rooted in this country's jurisprudence through the American
Rule, which provides that "unless Congress provides otherwise, parlies arc to bear their own

attorney's fees." Fogerly v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994) (citing Aleyska Pipeline

Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-62 (1975)).7 And. it is well-settled that
"Congress legislates against the strong background of the American Rule"s and that "the
American Rule presumes that the word 'damages' means damages exclusive offees.'"9 As the
Tenth Circuit has put it, "the American Rule . . . ordinarily bars the recovery of attorney fees by
the prevailing party in litigation, on the theory that such fees are a cost ofrecovering damages,
unsuccessful claims sharing "a common core set of facts" with the successful TILA claim.

Brodziakv. Runyon, 145 F.3d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424,435(1983)).

7Accord Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 245 (holding that under the American Rule "the
prevailing party may not recover attorney's fees as costs or otherwise") (emphasis added); Ilardt
v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., — U.S. —. 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2157 (2010) ("Each litigant pays
its own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.").
Fogerly, 510 U.S. at 533.
Summit Valley Indus, L
Summit Valley Indus, v. Local 112, UnitedB 'hood of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 456 U.S.
717, 722-23 (1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

not damages in themselves." Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 358 F.3d

757, 766-67 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added), " Thus, where, as here, a litigant incurs
attorney's fees advancing a claim, then absent a fee-shifting statute or agreement, those fees
cannot be considered damages under the American Rule. Given this, it is clear that none of the
attorney's fees Bradford seeks here qualify as "actual damage" under TILA because those fees,
all of which were incurred advancing the instant TILA action, are simply a cost of recovering
damages under TILA, not TILA damages themselves. Unsurprisingly, Bradford cites no case—

and none has been found—in which attorney's fees incurred litigating a TILA action qualify as

"actual damage" under TILA."
Because Bradford's attorney's fees arc not "actual damage" under TILA, it follows that
RFC's Rule 68 offer of full statutory damages plus one dollar, the costs of the action, and

"reasonable attorney's fees" would have provided Bradford with all the relief to which he was
entitled for his § 1641(g) claim and therefore rendered that claim moot. See Simmons, 634 F.3d

at 766 n.8 (holding that under TILA "when as here, the defendants have offered to pay the
plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the district court, the plaintiffs have
been offered full relief" in that respect). Once the Rule 68 offer was received, Bradford no

10 Accord Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 725 n.3 (rejecting position that "fees be awarded whenever
a defendant's wrongful conduct requires a plaintiff to incur more litigation expenses, even if
those expenses are incurred in the same action") (emphasis in original); Sternberg v. Johnson,
595 F.3d 937, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Under the American Rule, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily
recover attorney fees spent to correct a legal injury as part of his damages, even though it could
be said he is not made whole as a result.") (citing Restatemeni (Second) of Torts § 914(1) (1979)
("The damages in a tort action do not ordinarily include compensation for attorney fees or other
expenses of the litigation.")).

Research discloses only one case, which is unpublished, in which attorney's fees were
considered actual damages under TILA. But that case is plainly inapposite, as the fees there at

issue were incurred litigating a separate legal proceeding, not the TILA proceeding there at bar.
See Lippner v. Deutsche Bank Nat 7 Trust Co., No. 07cv448, 2008 WL 4200654 (N.D. 111. Sept.
9, 2008).

longer needed to litigate to obtain all the relief he sought through litigation, viz., a judgment

against RFC for $4,000 in statutory damages, as well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
Bradford, in other words, lost any personal stake in litigating the § 1641(g) claim after receiving
RFC's Rule 68 offer ofjudgment, and his § 1641(g) claim was thereby rendered moot.
IV.

Because Bradford's § 1641(g) claim is now moot, the claim must be dismissed. As a

constitutional matter,1" Bradford never regained a personal stake in advancing his § 1641(g)
claim because the expiration of the Rule 68 offer of judgment did not change what made the

claim moot in the first place, namely, that Bradford could have obtained through acceptance of
the offer all he could have hoped to obtain through litigation. It follows that Bradford's claim
became moot at the time he received the offer, and because no case or controversy remains, the

claim must now be dismissed. See Zimmerman, 800 F.2d at 390 (noting in a securities fraud case
that plaintiffs "personal stake in the outcome had disappeared" and her claim had become moot

after she had received an offer of judgment in full satisfaction of her claim); Samsung Elecs. Co.
v. Rambus, Inc., 523 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that "the offer of the full

amount in dispute brought an end to the case and controversy"). The Seventh Circuit put the
point with elegant brevity: "You cannot persist in suing after you've won." Greisz v. Household
Bank (III.), 176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1999).

" Even as a prudential matter, to allow adjudication of a claim rendered moot by a Rule 68 offer
of judgment after the offer's expiration (i) wastes judicial resources, (ii) forces unnecessary
expenses on defendants, and (iii) runs directly contrary to Rule 68's settlement-encouragement
purpose. Cf Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 32 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that "there is no
justification for taking the time of the court and the defendant in the pursuit of minuscule
individual claims which defendant has more than satisfied"); Matthew I. Hall, The Partially
Prudential Doctrine of'Mootness, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 562 (2009) (discussing mootness as
prudential doctrine).

10

Fourth Circuit authority on this point is sparse, but nonetheless supportive of the result
reached here. In Zimmerman, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal of an

individual plaintiffs securities-fraud claims after "defendants had offered [plaintiff] the full
amount of damages [] to which she claimed individually to be cntitled[.]" 800 F.2d at 390
(noting that "federal courts do not sit simply to bestow vindication in a vacuum"). Also pertinent
are two recent cases where the Fourth Circuit was presented with the question whether a
particular offer ofjudgment rendered a claim moot. In each case, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the action for mootness because the offer at issue did not actually
afford full relief. See Warren, 2012 WL 76053, at *6; Simmons, 634 F.3d at 767. There is no
doubt, however, that in the Fourth Circuit's view, had the offer ofjudgment at issue provided full
relief, the claim would have been rendered moot. See Warren, 2012 WL 76053, at *3 (noting

that "had | plaintiff] made a specific demand in the amended complaint for actual damages and
the defendants offered that amount or more, the offer ofjudgment would have mooted

[plaintiffs] action"); Simmons, 634 F.3d at 762-63 (acknowledging that a claimant's receipt of
full relief can render a claim moot as a constitutional matter). Thus, the conclusion that

Bradford's § 1641(g) claim must be dismissed as moot is fully consistent with Fourth Circuit
precedent.
The expiration of the Rule 68 offer that rendered Bradford's § 1641(g) claim moot
extinguished power to enter judgment on the claim. Some courts, including the Sixth Circuit,

have taken the position that judgment on a claim rendered moot by a Rule 68 offer should be
entered per the offer's terms, notwithstanding that the offer has lapsed or been rejected. See,

11

e.g., O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2009).13 The decisions of these
courts, none of which is binding here, are unpersuasive because a federal court has no power to

enter judgment on a moot claim absent a stipulation to entry ofjudgment, a point that none of

these decisions addresses.1'1 See Samsung Elecs., 523 F.3d at 1381 (holding that "the district
court [] lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the attorney fees motion" and remanding
case with instructions to dismiss complaint as moot). In other words, these decisions fail to
explain what would give a federal court power, in effect, to compel a plaintiff to accept an

expired Rule 68 offer that had rendered the plaintiffs claim moot. Indeed, to adopt the position
of these courts would render Rule 68's time limitation for acceptance negatory where a Rule 68

offer affords complete relief on a claim because judgment could later be entered per the offer's
terms even if the offer had been rejected or allowed to lapse. These fatal shortcomings of the

position of the Sixth Circuit and other courts counsel against adopting their approach here.
In sum, consistent with authority from the Fourth Circuit and elsewhere, Bradford's §

1641(g) claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Holstein v. City of Chi., 29
F.3d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "[plaintiff] may not spurn this offer of all the
damages he is owed" and that "his claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

13 See alsoAmbalu v. Rosenblatt, 194 F.R.D. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Greifv. Wilson, Esler,
Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, 258 F. Supp. 2d 157 (E.D.N. Y. 2003); Murphy v. Equifax
Check Servs., 35 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Conn. 1999).

14 To be sure, if Bradford had accepted the Rule 68 offer, then power to enter the conscnted-to
judgment would have remained even though power to adjudicate the claim further—e.g., to
decide whether to dismiss it, grant summary judgment on it, or hold a trial on it—would have
been extinguished. See Greisz, 176 F.3d at 1015 (noting that a fully satisfactory Rule 68 offer of
judgment "givfes] the plaintiff the equivalent of a default judgment" and also "eliminates a legal
dispute upon which federal jurisdiction can be based").
12

jurisdiction").'5 And, because subject-matter jurisdiction over Bradford's §1641(g) claim has
been extinguished, judgment on the claim cannot now be entered. See Rand v. Monsunio Co.,
926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Once the defendant offers to satisfy the plaintiffs entire
demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate, and aplaintiff who refuses to acknowledge

this loses outright... because he has no remaining Stake."); Greisz, 176 F.3d at 1015 (observing
that aTILA claimant's lawyer, "by spurning the defendant's offer . .. shot both himself and his
client in the foot" inasmuch as "[h]e lost his claim to attorney's fees by turning down the
defendant's offer to pay them, and [plaintiff] lost SI ,200" in statutory damages).
An appropriate Order will issue.

The Clerk is directed to send acopy ofthis Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of
record.

Alexandria, Virginia
February 23, 2012
T. S. Ellis, 111

United States Djfetrict Judge

1S See alsosupra note 4 (citing cases).
13