Guerrero et al v. Deane et al
Filing
202
MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: 196 MOTION for Leave to File a Memorandum in Support of Motion in limine by Matthew Caplan, Charlie T. Deane, Does 1-5, Adam Hurley, David L. Moore, Karen Muelhauser, Luis Potes, Prince William County, Roes 1-5. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 7/27/2012. (stas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
ESPERANZA GUERRERO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHARLIE T. DEANE, et al.,
Defendants.
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1:09cv1313 (JCC/TRJ)
M E M O R A N D U M
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Officer
David Moore’s (“Defendant” or “Officer Moore”) Motion for Leave
to File a Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine [Dkt. 196]
(the “Motion”).
For the following reasons, the Court will deny
Defendant’s Motion.
I.
A.
Background
Factual Background
The factual background of this case is recited in
detail in the Court’s October 27, 2010, Memorandum Opinion
granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for partial
summary judgment.
See Guerrero v. Deane, 750 F. Supp. 2d 631
(E.D. Va. 2010).
Familiarity with that Memorandum Opinion is
presumed.
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To summarize, on November 24, 2007, Defendant Officer
David Moore, an officer in the Prince William County Police
Department, went to Plaintiffs’ home in order to serve a summons
on one Antonia Munguia.
Plaintiff Esperanza Guerrero answered
the door and told Officer Moore that Ms. Munguia was not
present.
card.
Ms. Guerrero then asked Officer Moore for his business
Officer Moore produced his card and stepped onto the
threshold of the Guerreros’ home.
happened next.
The parties dispute what
According to Plaintiffs, Ms. Guerrero then began
closing the door, and Officer Moore attempted to force his way
into the home.
According to Defendant, Ms. Guerrero initially
took a step backward while further opening the door, but then
charged forward and pushed Officer Moore out of the house.
The
parties agree that the door closed on Officer Moore’s leg or
foot.
Officer Moore struggled against the door, attempting to
enter the home and arrest Ms. Guerrero.
While his foot was wedged in the door, Officer Moore
called for assistance.
The first officer to respond was Officer
Luis Potes, followed immediately by Officers Matthew Caplan and
Adam Hurley.
The officers pushed open the door, freeing Officer
Moore’s leg, and entered Plaintiffs’ home.
forced Ms. Guerrero to the floor.
The officers’ entry
As the officers were placing
Ms. Guerrero under arrest, her husband, Juan Guerrero, came
towards the officers, either running rapidly or walking fast.
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Once Mr. Guerrero was very close to the officers, an officer
deployed pepper spray on him.
Both Mr. Guerrero and Ms.
Guerrero were placed under arrest and placed in custody at the
Adult Detention Center.
Both suffered minor injuries as well.
As a result of the incident, Plaintiffs alleged violations of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted certain Virginia state-law
claims.
B.
Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on July 2,
2010 (the “Complaint”).
[Dkt. 70.]
On September 10, 2010,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 107], and
Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment [Dkt.
112].
On October 12, 2010, the Court contacted the parties and
informed them that Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment was denied, and that Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment was granted as to all Defendants and all counts except
as to Officer Moore and Plaintiffs’ unreasonable search claim.
On October 14, 2010, Defendants filed a motion to
continue the trial date and suspend the interim filing schedule.
[Dkt. 144.]
The Court denied Defendants’ motion on October 15.
[Dkt. 146.]
The same day, Defendants filed a motion in limine.
[Dkt. 153.]
The motion in limine sought to exclude, among other
things, evidence as to what took place after Officers Potes,
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Caplan, and Hurley arrived at Ms. Guerrero’s house, and all
portions of the audiotape of Plaintiffs’ 911 call after 6:23
minutes into the tape.
On October 18, 2010, this case was stayed pending
adjudication of Officer Moore’s interlocutory appeal on the
issue of qualified immunity.
[Dkt. 161.]
On October 27, 2010,
the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in
part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.
[Dkts. 165, 166.]
On August 4, 2011, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
Court’s partial denial of Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
[Dkt. 180.]
The Fourth Circuit denied Officer
Moore’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on
September 6, 2011.
[Dkt. 183.]
And, the Supreme Court denied
Officer Moore’s petition for certiorari on March 26, 2012.
On June 27, 2012, Defendant moved to file a memorandum
in support of the October 15, 2010 motion in limine.
196.]
[Dkt.
Plaintiffs filed an opposition on July 12, 2012.
[Dkt.
198.]
Defendant’s Motion is now before the Court.
II.
Analysis
As noted above, Defendant’s October 15, 2010 motion in
limine sought to exclude evidence of all events that occurred
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after Officers Potes, Caplan, and Hurley arrived at the
Guerreros’ house as well as all portions of a 911 audiotape
after 6:23 minutes into the tape.
The motion in limine was
filed before the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order
on the cross-motions for summary judgment.
Defendant now seeks
to support the motion in limine with a memorandum, so that he
can draw on the Court’s findings and reasoning as set forth in
the Memorandum Opinion.
Defendant explains that such a
memorandum could not be filed earlier, as the case was stayed
prior to the issuance of the Memorandum Opinion.
As Plaintiffs point out, the Court entered a
scheduling order prescribing a deadline of October 15, 2010, for
filing motions in limine.
[Dkt. 102.]
By now seeking to file a
memorandum in support of the October 15, 2010 motion in limine,
Defendant in effect asks the Court to postpone the deadline.
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local
Rules of the Eastern District of Virginia, a scheduling order
may only be modified upon good cause.
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause shown
. . . .”); E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 16(b) (“The parties and their
counsel are bound by the dates specified in any such orders and
no extensions or continuances thereof shall be granted in the
absence of a showing of good cause.”)
The factors to be
considered in determining whether there is good cause include
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the “danger of prejudice to the non-moving party, the length of
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the
reason for the delay, and whether the movant acted in good
faith.”
Tawwaab v. Va. Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 757,
768-69 (D. Md. 2010).
Here, the justification offered by Defendant for
filing the memorandum -- i.e., because the original motion in
limine was filed prior to the issuance of the Court’s Memorandum
Opinion and Order -- is unpersuasive.1
A review of the original
motion reveals that Defendant knew the essence of the Court’s
ruling at that time.
Defendant correctly ascertained that
“[q]ualified immunity is denied as to Defendant Moore’s stepping
onto the Guerrero’s [sic] doorframe to serve a summons and/or
give Esperanza the business card that she had asked for” and
that “the remaining issue for trial is whether Moore reasonably
interpreted Esperanza’s words and actions as an implied
invitation to step onto the doorframe to hand her the card.”
(Mot. in Limine [Dkt. 153] at 2.)
This is entirely consistent
with what was later stated in the Memorandum Opinion:
“Defendants have not made a showing that no reasonable juror
could return a verdict for Plaintiffs with respect to whether
Ms. Guerrero impliedly consented to Officer Moore’s entry into
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Indeed, the Court implicitly rejected the notion that availability of the
Court’s Memorandum Opinion was necessary for the parties’ motions in limine
when it denied Defendants’ motion seeking to suspend the interim filing
schedule on October 15, 2010.
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the Guerrero home.”
(E.D. Va. 2010).
Guerrero v. Deane, 750 F. Supp. 2d 631, 643
As such, Defendant’s need to file a memorandum
based on the findings and reasoning of the Memorandum Opinion is
not readily apparent.
Tellingly, while Defendant represents that he merely
wishes to provide further support for the original motion, he in
fact aims to expand the scope of evidence he asks to have
excluded.
For example, in the original motion, Defendant only
submitted that “no testimony or evidence should be presented at
trial as to any events that took place after Officers Potes,
Hurley and Caplan arrived on the scene and saw Moore’s leg in
the door” and that “all portions of the ‘911’ audiotape after
6:23 minutes into the tape . . .
trial . . . .”
should be inadmissible at
(Mot. in Limine at 3.)
However, in his proposed
memorandum, Defendant seeks to exclude from trial “all evidence
relating to events that occurred after Ms. Guerrero slammed the
door on Officer Moore” and all portions of the 911 audiotape.
(Proposed Mem. [Dkt. 196-1] at 6.)
These additions belie
Defendant’s position that the proposed memorandum is a mere
supplement to the original motion.
In short, Defendant has
failed to demonstrate that good cause exists that would warrant
an amendment of the Court’s scheduling order.
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III.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court will deny Defendant’s
Motion for Leave to File a Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine.
An appropriate Order will issue.
July 27, 2012
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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