United States of America v. 2001 Lexus LS430 et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM ORDER that Claimant Mark Allen Jackson's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 15 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Gerald Bruce Lee on 12/3/10. (tfitz, )

United States of America v. 2001 Lexus LS430 et al

Doc. 34

IN T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T C O U R T
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

United States of America,

r
Case No.

D E C - 3 2010

Ui-

CLLRK. U.S. C I S ! RiCT C O U R T ALEXANDRIA. VIRGINIA
2001 Lexus LS430

VIN:

JTHBN30F910017797,
and

I:10cv94(GBL)

1998 Mitsubishi 3000GT

VIN:

JA3AM84J7WY003061,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Claimant Mark Allen

J a c k s o n ' s M o t i o n for J u d g m e n t o n the Pleadings.

(Dkt. No. 15.)

This case concerns the Government's Motion to forfeit Mr.

Jackson's two personal vehicles.

Mr. J a c k s o n u s e d t h e v e h i c l e s

to transport a m i n o r female from M a r y l a n d to Virginia, where he

engaged in sexual intercourse with her on three separate
occasions.

There is one issue before the court.

T h e i s s u e is w h e t h e r a

s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n e x i s t s b e t w e e n Mr.

Jackson's vehicles and

his offense of interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit
s e x u a l c o n d u c t p u r s u a n t to t h e C i v i l A s s e t F o r f e i t u r e R e f o r m A c t
("CAFRA") of 2000. The Court denies Mr. Jackson's Motion because

the G o v e r n m e n t p l e a d s s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o s h o w t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l
c o n n e c t i o n e x i s t s b e t w e e n Mr. J a c k s o n ' s v e h i c l e s a n d h i s o f f e n s e .

Dockets.Justia.com

I.

BACKGROUND

M a r k A l l e n J a c k s o n is a r e t i r e d m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r a n d f o r m e r

ROTC instructor for a Maryland high school.

(Compl. 1 7;
On t h r e e

C l a i m a n t ' s Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s 2 [ h e r e i n a f t e r "Mot."].)

s e p a r a t e occasions, Mr. J a c k s o n d r o v e one of his R O T C students,
Jane Doe, from her Bowie, Maryland residence to his Alexandria,

Virginia apartment, where they engaged in sexual intercourse.

(Compl. *h 9; Mot. 2.)

On each of these occasions, Mr. Jackson

u s e d a d i f f e r e n t o n e of h i s p e r s o n a l v e h i c l e s , n a m e l y a t w o - s e a t
2004 Lexus C430-2, a f o u r - s e a t 2 0 0 1 L e x u s L S 4 3 0, and a four-seat

1998 Mitsubishi 3000 GT.

(Compl. 1H 1, 11, 12, 14.)

On one of
Jackson was

t h e s e o c c a s i o n s , J a n e D o e ' s m o t h e r b e l i e v e d t h a t Mr.

t r a n s p o r t i n g s e v e r a l s t u d e n t s to a n e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , a n d
believed he would drive Jane Doe from her residence for that

purpose.

W h e n J a n e D o e ' s m o t h e r a s k e d Mr. J a c k s o n h o w he w o u l d

t r a n s p o r t s e v e r a l s t u d e n t s i n the t w o - s e a t 2 0 0 4 L e x u s C 4 3 0 - 2 he
w a s d r i v i n g , Mr. J a c k s o n r e p l i e d t h a t h e w o u l d m a k e s e v e r a l t r i p s

because his other vehicles were being repaired.
Several months into Mr.

(Compl. f 12.)
illicit

Jackson and Jane Doe's

relationship, an anonymous caller informed Prince George's County
S c h o o l s of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n a s c h o o l

i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d l a w e n f o r c e m e n t ' s involvement.

(Compl. f 10.)

Mr. J a c k s o n w a s l a t e r a r r e s t e d a n d p l e d g u i l t y to i n t e r s t a t e t r a v e l w i t h i n t e n t to e n g a g e in i l l i c i t s e x u a l c o n d u c t , in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)
Mot. 3.)

(2006).

(Compl. 1M 10 & 15;

A l t h o u g h Mr. J a c k s o n a n d J a n e D o e d i d n o t e n g a g e in
the Government now seeks to

sexual conduct inside the vehicles,

f o r f e i t two of the t h r e e p e r s o n a l v e h i c l e s Mr. J a c k s o n u s e d to

t r a n s p o r t Jane Doe f r o m M a r y l a n d to V i r g i n i a -- t h e four-seat 2001
Lexus LS430 and the four-seat 1998 Mitsubishi 3000GT--arguing t h a t t h e s e v e h i c l e s a r e " f a c i l i t a t i n g p r o p e r t y " s u b j e c t to c i v i l

forfeiture.

(Compl. HH 1 & 17.)

The Government does not seek

forfeiture of the two-seat 2004 Lexus C430-2 because it has a

lien in excess of its value.
O n J a n u a r y 29, 2010,

(Compl. f 14.)

the G o v e r n m e n t f i l e d a V e r i f i e d

C o m p l a i n t I n Rem f o r m a l l y s e e k i n g f o r f e i t u r e of the f o u r - s e a t
2001 Lexus LS430 and the four-seat 1998 Mitsubishi 3000GT,

p u r s u a n t to 18 U.S.C. § 2428.

This case is b e f o r e the Court on

Mr. J a c k s o n ' s M o t i o n f o r J u d g m e n t o n t h e P l e a d i n g s , p u r s u a n t to

F e d e r a l R u l e of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 12(c).1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

F e d e r a l R u l e of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 12(c) a l l o w s a p a r t y to m o v e
for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed but

1 At the June 24, 2010, hearing on Mr. Jackson's Motion for
J u d g m e n t o n the Pleadings, the C o u r t g r a n t e d j u d g m e n t in f a v o r of Mr. J a c k s o n . (Dkt. No. 19.) O n J u l y 19, 2010, t h e G o v e r n m e n t f i l e d a R u l e 59(e) M o t i o n to R e c o n s i d e r , r e q u e s t i n g t h a t the
Court reverse its original ruling to correct a clear error of law. (Dkt. N o s . 2 1 & 22.) After considering the Government's

Motion, the C o u r t f o u n d r e v e r s a l a p p r o p r i a t e a n d g r a n t e d j u d g m e n t
in favor of the Government. (Dkt. No. 32.) The Court now

e x p o u n d s o n its d e n i a l of Mr. J a c k s o n ' s M o t i o n f o r J u d g m e n t o n the P l e a d i n g s .
3

within s u c h t i m e as n o t to d e l a y t h e t r i a l .

Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(c).

I n r u l i n g o n a m o t i o n u n d e r R u l e 12(c), the c o u r t a p p l i e s
See, e.g., Edwards v.

the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

City of Goldsboro,

178 F . 3 d 231, 2 4 3 - 4 4 ( 4 t h Cir.

1999).

However, u n l i k e the a d j u d i c a t i o n of a 12(b)(6) motion, a g r a n t of
a m o t i o n f o r j u d g m e n t o n the p l e a d i n g s c o n s t i t u t e s a f i n a l j u d g m e n t o n the m e r i t s of t h e c o n t r o v e r s y . 5 C Charles Alan Wright &
(3d ed. 2004).

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1 3 7 2
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

motion should be

g r a n t e d u n l e s s a n a d e q u a t e l y s t a t e d c l a i m is " s u p p o r t e d b y s h o w i n g a n y set of f a c t s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e a l l e g a t i o n s in the
complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 5 5 0 U.S. 554, 561

(2007).

In addition,

the c o u r t m u s t c o n s t r u e t h e c o m p l a i n t i n r e a d t h e c o m p l a i n t as
See Mylan

t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e to the p l a i n t i f f ,
a whole, Labs,

and take the facts asserted therein as true. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134

Inc.

(4th Cir. 1993); s e e

a l s o Burbach Broad. Co.
( 4 t h Cir. 2002)

v . E l k i n s R a d i o C o r p . , 278 F . 3 d 401, 406

( s t a t i n g t h a t in a 12(c) m o t i o n , a l l f a c t s

asserted in the complaint must be taken as true and all
reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff).

C o n c l u s o r y a l l e g a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the legal effect of
See Labram v. Havel, 43

the facts alleged need not be accepted.

F . 3 d 918, 9 2 1 ( 4 t h Cir. 1995).

B e c a u s e t h e c e n t r a l p u r p o s e of

t h e c o m p l a i n t is to p r o v i d e t h e d e f e n d a n t " f a i r n o t i c e of w h a t

the p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m is a n d the g r o u n d s u p o n w h i c h it rests,"
the p l a i n t i f f ' s l e g a l a l l e g a t i o n s m u s t be s u p p o r t e d b y s o m e f a c t u a l b a s i s s u f f i c i e n t to a l l o w the d e f e n d a n t s to p r e p a r e a fair response. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3.
III. ANALYSIS

The Court denies Mr. J a c k s o n ' s M o t i o n for J u d g m e n t on the
P l e a d i n g s b e c a u s e t h e G o v e r n m e n t p l e a d s s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s to

plausibly suggest that a substantial connection exists between
Mr. Jackson's vehicles and his offense of interstate travel with

i n t e n t to e n g a g e in i l l i c i t s e x u a l c o n d u c t , as c o d i f i e d in 18
U.S.C. § 2423(b). S e c t i o n 2 4 2 3 is s u b j e c t t o c i v i l f o r f e i t u r e

p r o v i s i o n 18 U . S . C .

§ 2428, w h i c h s t a t e s ,

i n r e l e v a n t part:

T h e court, in i m p o s i n g s e n t e n c e o n a n y p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of a v i o l a t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r , s h a l l o r d e r . . . t h a t s u c h p e r s o n s h a l l f o r f e i t to the U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . such person's interest in any property, real or p e r s o n a l , t h a t w a s u s e d o r i n t e n d e d to b e u s e d to
commit or to facilitate the commission of such violation . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 2428(a)

(2006).

Additionally,

§ 2428 is s u b j e c t to
"if t h e

t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n CAFRA, w h i c h s t a t e s that,

G o v e r n m e n t ' s t h e o r y of f o r f e i t u r e is that the p r o p e r t y was u s e d
to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense substantial ..

. the Government shall establish that there was a

c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the p r o p e r t y a n d the offense."
983(c) (2006). Moreover,

18 U.S.C. §

CAFRA's amendment in 2000 created a

h e i g h t e n e d b u r d e n of p r o o f f o r the G o v e r n m e n t , r e q u i r i n g t h a t it

establish a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of the e v i d e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e p r e v i o u s s t a n d a r d of p r o b a b l e cause. United S t a t e s v. One 1998 Tractor, 288 F. S u p p . 2 d 710, 713 (W.D.

Va. 2003); s e e § 983(c).

Accordingly, u n d e r I q b a l a n d T w o m b l y ' s

p l e a d i n g standard, the G o v e r n m e n t m u s t a s s e r t a p l a u s i b l e c l a i m
f o r c i v i l f o r f e i t u r e b y a l l e g i n g s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s to s h o w t h a t a
s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n e x i s t s b e t w e e n t h e p r o p e r t y it s e e k s to
have forfeited and the offense.

A l t h o u g h C A F R A s e t s f o r t h the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t the
Government establish a substantial connection to state a claim

for civil forfeiture,
connection.

CAFRA does not define substantial

Several courts since CAFRA's amendment in 2000 have

c o n s i d e r e d d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s in f o r m u l a t i n g t e s t s to d e f i n e substantial connection. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t of A p p e a l s f o r

the F o u r t h C i r c u i t in U n i t e d S t a t e s v . H e r d e r h a s r e c e n t l y
a d o p t e d the o b s t r u c t i o n a n d h i n d r a n c e test.
Herder, 594 F.3d 352, 365 (4th Cir. 2010).

United States v.
There, the court

a l l o w e d the c r i m i n a l f o r f e i t u r e of $ 1 , 2 2 3 i n p r o c e e d s f o u n d o n
the defendant's person when circumstantial evidence established
t h a t t h e p r o c e e d s w e r e u s e d to f a c i l i t a t e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of

c r a c k cocaine.

Id.

In j u s t i f y i n g the f o r f e i t u r e , the c o u r t h e l d

that a "[s]ubstantial c o n n e c t i o n m a y be e s t a b l i s h e d by showing
t h a t u s e of t h e p r o p e r t y m a d e xt h e p r o h i b i t e d c o n d u c t l e s s

difficult or more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.'"

Jd. a t 364

( c i t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v . S c h i f f e r l i , 895 F . 2 d 987,
1990) (internal citations omitted)).

990-91 (4th Cir.

S p e c i f i c a l l y , the F o u r t h C i r c u i t e x p l i c a t e d ,

"[w]e h a v e n e v e r

adequately articulated the proper standard for the requisite n e x u s b e t w e e n p r o p e r t y a n d c r i m e u n d e r § 853. We n o w e x p r e s s l y

a d o p t the ' s u b s t a n t i a l connection' s t a n d a r d f r o m c a s e l a w
i n t e r p r e t i n g n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l c i v i l f o r f e i t u r e l a n g u a g e i n 21
U.S.C. § 881 (2006)." Id. ( a d d r e s s i n g § 853, which governs

c r i m i n a l f o r f e i t u r e s , a n d § 881, w h i c h g o v e r n s t h e f o r f e i t u r e of

p r o p e r t y u s e d to v i o l a t e the D r u g A b u s e P r e v e n t i o n a n d C o n t r o l
Act) .

H e r e , Mr. J a c k s o n m a k e s t h r e e a r g u m e n t s to d i s t i n g u i s h
Herder from the instant case. First, Herder's holding regarding

substantial connection is dicta because CAFRA's substantial

c o n n e c t i o n t e s t o n l y a p p l i e s to f a c i l i t a t i o n forfeiture, not
proceeds forfeiture. F u r t h e r , H e r d e r w a s a f o r f e i t u r e of

proceeds case that was not decided pursuant to CAFRA.

( C l a i m a n t ' s O p p ' n to Mot. to R e c o n s i d e r 5-6.)

Second,

because

H e r d e r ' s statement of the substantial connection test is dicta,

Herder provides no guidance for resolving the substantial

c o n n e c t i o n q u e s t i o n i n t h i s case.

The Court must therefore rely

o n the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t in e n a c t i n g CAFRA, w h i c h r e q u i r e s a
primary purpose test to establish substantial connection. ( C l a i m a n t ' s O p p ' n to Mot. to R e c o n s i d e r 7; C l a i m a n t ' s Mot. J.

Pleadings 10.)

T h i r d , n o f e d e r a l d e c i s i o n h a s a p p r o v e d of

vehicle forfeiture on facts similar to this case because illicit

sex, u n l i k e o f f e n s e s s u c h as d r u g d i s t r i b u t i o n , d o e s not d e p e n d

o n v e h i c u l a r transportation.

Mr. J a c k s o n r e a s o n s that s o m e t h i n g

m o r e t h a n t h e m e r e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of a m i n o r t o t h e s i t e f o r s e x

is required to s a t i s f y the substantial c o n n e c t i o n requirement.
( C l a i m a n t ' s O p p ' n to Mot.
P l e a d i n g s 5.)

to R e c o n s i d e r 6; C l a i m a n t ' s Mot. J.
Jackson's

T h e C o u r t a d d r e s s e s e a c h o f Mr.

a r g u m e n t s in turn.
(a) Obstruction or Hindrance

Mr. J a c k s o n a r g u e s t h a t H e r d e r ' s s t a t e m e n t of t h e
substantial connection test is dicta because Herder was a

c r i m i n a l f o r f e i t u r e of p r o c e e d s c a s e r a t h e r t h a n a c i v i l

forfeiture of facilitating p r o p e r t y case.
Mot. t o R e c o n s i d e r 5.) Mr.

(Claimant's O p p ' n to

Jackson reasons that the issue in

H e r d e r was not the e x t e n t of the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the d r u g s a n d the money, but w h e t h e r the m o n e y was in f a c t the p r o c e e d s of a

d r u g transaction.

(Claimant's O p p ' n to Mot. to R e c o n s i d e r 6.)

The Court rejects this argument for two reasons.

First, although

the issue in Herder concerned the criminal forfeiture of

proceeds, the court's express language a c k n o w l e d g e s that the same
s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n test a p p l i e s for c i v i l forfeitures. H e r d e r , 594 F . 3 d at 364 ("We n o w e x p r e s s l y a d o p t the 'substantial

connection' s t a n d a r d f r o m c a s e l a w i n t e r p r e t i n g n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l

c i v i l f o r f e i t u r e l a n g u a g e in 21 U.S.C.

§ 881 (2006).").

Second, Mr. J a c k s o n ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t H e r d e r is i n a p p l i c a b l e
b e c a u s e it w a s n o t d e c i d e d p u r s u a n t t o C A F R A is u n c o n v i n c i n g ,
since the forfeiture statutes in Herder and the instant case are

s u b s t a n t i a l l y similar.

H e r d e r e m p l o y e d 21 U.S.C. § 853, a

c r i m i n a l f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e c o m m o n l y u s e d in r e l a t i o n to the d r u g
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f f e n s e s s u b j e c t to f o r f e i t u r e u n d e r 21 U . S . C .
881. Id. Section 853(a) allows the forfeiture of real or

§

p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y that is "used, or i n t e n d e d to be used, in a n y
m a n n e r o r part, to c o m m i t , o r to f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o m m i s s i o n of"

the drug offenses contained within the Drug Abuse Prevention and C o n t r o l Act. 21 U . S . C . § 853(a)(2). Similarly, § 881 requires including

that no property right shall exist in "conveyances,
aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used,

or are intended

f o r use,

to t r a n s p o r t , o r i n a n y m a n n e r t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e

t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , sale,

r e c e i p t , p o s s e s s i o n , o r c o n c e a l m e n t of

[controlled substances]. . . ."
18 U.S.C.

21 U.S.C. § 881.

Comparatively,

§ 2428, the f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e a p p l i c a b l e to Mr.

J a c k s o n ' s o f f e n s e , s t a t e s t h a t n o p r o p e r t y r i g h t s h a l l e x i s t in
"any property, real or personal, used or intended to be used to

commit or to facilitate the commission of a n y v i o l a t i o n of this
chapter." Thus, the language of the criminal forfeiture statutes

i n t e r p r e t e d in H e r d e r is c o m p a r a b l e to the c i v i l f o r f e i t u r e

statute a p p l i c a b l e to t h e i n s t a n t case.

T h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e is

t h a t § 2 4 2 8 d o e s n o t d e l i n e a t e t h e t y p e s of c o n v e y a n c e s t h a t a r e

s u b j e c t to forfeiture.

T h i s is n o t d i s p o s i t i v e b e c a u s e the

l e g i s l a t u r e l i k e l y a n t i c i p a t e d that p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w o u l d i n c l u d e a n y p e r s o n a l v e h i c l e s u s e d to c o m m i t t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f f e n s e s ; the f o r f e i t u r e p r o v i s i o n a i m s to a d d r e s s t h i s i s s u e by

a l l o w i n g forfeiture of b o t h real a n d p e r s o n a l property.
Again, H e r d e r ' s l a n g u a g e i n d i c a t e s t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l
connection can be established under both forms of forfeiture

t h r o u g h t h e o b s t r u c t i o n o r h i n d r a n c e test.

I d . a t 3 6 4 - 6 5 ("We

n o w e x p r e s s l y a d o p t the ' s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n ' s t a n d a r d f r o m

case law interpreting nearly identical civil forfeiture language
in 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006)."). Yet, a c c o r d i n g to Mr. J a c k s o n ' s

r e a s o n i n g , e v e n if H e r d e r ' s o b s t r u c t i o n o r h i n d r a n c e t e s t a p p l i e d , it w o u l d n o t be s a t i s f i e d b e c a u s e Mr. J a c k s o n ' s v e h i c l e s

d i d not affect the d i f f i c u l t y of his offense.

Mr. J a c k s o n

contends that the essence of his offense was the illicit sexual

activity, which was not made less difficult by use of his
p e r s o n a l v e h i c l e s to t r a v e l a c r o s s s t a t e l i n e s . ( C l a i m a n t ' s Mot.

J. Pleadings 11.)
reasons.

The Court rejects this argument for two

First, the n a m e a n d d e s c r i p t i o n of the offense,
indicate that travel in interstate

codified in § 2423(b),

c o m m e r c e is t h e l y n c h p i n of t h e o f f e n s e s l i s t e d w i t h i n .

S e e 18

U.S.C. § 2423(b)

(listing "[t]ravel with intent to engage in

10

illicit s e x u a l c o n d u c t "

as one of the three main offenses within

that code section).

Moreover,

the title of § 2423,

" T r a n s p o r t a t i o n of M i n o r s , " i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e p u r p o s e of t h a t s e c t i o n is to r e g u l a t e n o t s o l e l y i l l i c i t s e x u a l a c t i v i t y , b u t
interstate travel for illicit purposes.

S e c o n d , the f a c t t h a t Mr. J a c k s o n ' s o f f e n s e is s u b j e c t to

c i v i l f o r f e i t u r e p r o v i s i o n § 2 4 2 8 s h o w s t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e
i n t e n d e d to a l l o w f o r f e i t u r e of p r o p e r t y t h a t w o u l d c o m m o n l y facilitate such transport, including personal vehicles. Thus,
is

the conduct that would need to be made more or less difficult

Mr. J a c k s o n ' s a c t of t r a n s p o r t i n g J a n e D o e f r o m h e r Bowie, M a r y l a n d h o m e to Mr. J a c k s o n ' s A l e x a n d r i a , V i r g i n i a a p a r t m e n t . G i v e n the f a c t s p l e d i n t h e G o v e r n m e n t ' s V e r i f i e d C o m p l a i n t ,
C o u r t c a n r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r t h a t u s e of Mr. J a c k s o n ' s p e r s o n a l

the

v e h i c l e s m a d e Mr. J a c k s o n a n d J a n e D o e ' s t r a n s p o r t l e s s d i f f i c u l t
and more or less free from the obstructions and hindrances that

Mr. J a c k s o n a n d J a n e D o e w o u l d h a v e e n c o u n t e r e d h a d t h e y u s e d the a l t e r n a t i v e s of w a l k i n g , biking, o r t a k i n g p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

to t r a v e l o v e r t w e n t y - f i v e m i l e s f r o m Bowie,
Alexandria, Virginia.
(b) Intent to Conceal

M a r y l a n d to

Mr. J a c k s o n a r g u e s t h a t H e r d e r p r o v i d e s n o g u i d a n c e f o r r e s o l v i n g the s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n q u e s t i o n i n t h i s case, and

the Court must therefore rely on the legislature's intent in

11

enacting C A F R A to d e f i n e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n .

To support this

c o n t e n t i o n , Mr. J a c k s o n p o i n t s to R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H e n r y H y d e ' s

s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g C A F R A ' s amendment.

Because Representative

H y d e was CAFRA's p r i n c i p a l proponent, his s t a t e m e n t s e m b o d y m u c h
of the s t a t u t e ' s l e g i s l a t i v e intent. ( C l a i m a n t ' s O p p ' n to Mot.
s e e 146 Cong.

to R e c o n s i d e r 7; C l a i m a n t ' s Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s 10.);

Rec. H2040, 2 0 4 7 ( i n d i c a t i n g t h a t C A F R A ' s a m e n d m e n t s in 2 0 0 0 w e r e

led b y R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Hyde, w h o first p r o p o s e d and s p e a r - h e a d e d
C A F R A ' s o r i g i n a l e n a c t m e n t i n 1993). R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H y d e e x p l a i n e d that, A c c o r d i n g to Mr. J a c k s o n , " w h e r e c o n c e a l m e n t is the

t h e o r y of facilitation, the g o v e r n m e n t m u s t e s t a b l i s h that 'a
p r i m a r y p u r p o s e ' of o w n i n g t h e p r o p e r t y m u s t h a v e b e e n to

d i s g u i s e the c r i m i n a l conduct."

(Claimant's R e p l y in Supp. Mot.
H o w e v e r , Mr.

J. P l e a d i n g s 4 ( c i t i n g 146 Cong. Rec. at H 2 0 5 1 ) . )

J a c k s o n seems to a s s u m e too m u c h f r o m R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Hyde's
statements, which actually provide that
[ u ] n d e r [CAFRA's] s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n test, i n o r d e r f o r a n e n t i r e b a n k a c c o u n t c o m p o s e d of b o t h t a i n t e d a n d u n t a i n t e d funds to be forfeitable, a p r i m a r y p u r p o s e of

its establishment or maintenance must be to disguise a m o n e y laundering scheme. This rule s h o u l d a l s o apply
w h e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t s e e k s to f o r f e i t a n e n t i r e b u s i n e s s
because tainted funds were laundered in a firm bank

account.

For the business to be forfeitable, a primary

purpose for the establishment or maintenance of the

entire business must be to disguise a money laundering
scheme.

146 Cong. Rec.

H2040,

2051.

A

close examination of

these

s t a t e m e n t s and t h e i r s u r r o u n d i n g text r e v e a l s that R e p r e s e n t a t i v e

12

Hyde d o e s n o t c l e a r l y s t a t e a n o v e r - a r c h i n g t e s t f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a substantial connection. I n s t e a d , he m e r e l y g i v e s e x a m p l e s of

w h a t m i g h t c r e a t e a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n w h e n the G o v e r n m e n t a t t e m p t s to f o r f e i t r e a l p r o p e r t y a n d the e n t i r e p r o c e e d s of
businesses that form individuals' livelihoods. D e s p i t e Mr.

J a c k s o n ' s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the C o u r t a c c e p t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H y d e ' s p r i m a r y p u r p o s e c o m m e n t s as the r u l e f o r s u b s t a n t i a l connection,
t h e C o u r t c a n n o t i g n o r e t h a t (1) the l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h i s a l l e g e d r u l e i n t h e l a n g u a g e of CAFRA, a n d (2) Mr. J a c k s o n
can only offer United S t a t e s v. O n e 1 9 9 8 T r a c t o r as t h e s o l e

d e c i s i o n in the t e n y e a r s f o l l o w i n g C A F R A ' s a m e n d m e n t t h a t

p o s s i b l y uses this " p r i m a r y purpose" test.
Mr. J a c k s o n a r g u e s t h a t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n t e s t u s e d

in United S t a t e s v . One 1 9 9 8 T r a c t o r is s i m i l a r to the "primary
purpose" test s u p p o s e d l y e s p o u s e d by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Hyde.

(Claimant's R e p l y in Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings 4.)
Tractor,

In One 1 9 9 8

the court found no substantial connection where the

claimants used a truck and trailer to conceal and transport
c o n t r a b a n d cigarettes. 288 F. Supp. 2d 710, 714 (W.D. Va. 2003).

T h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t f a i l e d to s h o w

p r o o f of the o w n e r ' s intent to use the p r o p e r t y for the p u r p o s e of s h i e l d i n g . . . criminal activity[, which] q u a l i f i e s as the s o m e t h i n g m o r e r e q u i r e d to e s t a b l i s h a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n . . . . B e c a u s e the g o v e r n m e n t has not p r o v i d e d a n y e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g that S h i m s h i r y a n ' s t r u c k i n g b u s i n e s s was a sham, or that he o p e r a t e d it w i t h the intent of c o n c e a l i n g his c r i m i n a l activity, it has not met its b u r d e n of proof.
13

Id.

(internal quotations omitted).

Mr. J a c k s o n c o n t e n d s t h a t b y

r e q u i r i n g the g o v e r n m e n t to p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the
t r u c k i n g b u s i n e s s w a s a sham, the O n e 1 9 9 8 T r a c t o r c o u r t r e q u i r e d

n o t o n l y t h a t t h e r e be a n i n t e n t to c o n c e a l , b u t t h a t i n t e n t to
conceal must be the business's primary purpose. R e p l y i n S u p p . Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s 5.) (Claimant's

Mr. J a c k s o n ' s r e a d i n g of First, p r o p e r t y

O n e 1 9 9 8 T r a c t o r is t o o n a r r o w f o r t w o r e a s o n s .

c a n s t i l l be s u b j e c t to f o r f e i t u r e if it a l s o h a s l e g i t i m a t e uses. As o n e c o u r t a p t l y e x p l a i n e d in r e j e c t i n g the p r i m a r y

purpose notion:

M a g i n n i s w a s a d e a l e r of m a r i j u a n a . She owned and d r o v e a c a r in t h e n o r m a l c o u r s e of h e r d a i l y life. S h e w a s f o u n d w i t h a s i g n i f i c a n t q u a n t i t y of m a r i j u a n a a n d c a s h in h e r car. T h e s e f a c t s a r e e n o u g h to e s t a b l i s h the r e q u i s i t e ' s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n ' between the vehicle and the criminal activity alleged.
. . . The forfeiture statute does not invite an

a c c o u n t i n g of h o w m a n y s o c c e r g a m e s o r f a s t f o o d restaurants or other legitimate activities the car was u s e d for; it m e r e l y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t s h o w a

s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the c h a r g e d a c t i v i t y a n d
the vehicle.

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . O n e 2 0 0 1 M e r c e d e s B e n z ML 3 2 0 , 6 6 8 F. Supp. 2 d

1132, 1135 (E.D. Wis. 2009).

A r e q u i r e m e n t that c o u r t s o n l y

a l l o w f o r f e i t u r e of p r o p e r t y w h o s e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e is to c o n c e a l
an offense would go beyond the intent of CAFRA's amendment in

2000.

T h r o u g h t h i s a m e n d m e n t , the l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d to

r e q u i r e a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p r o p e r t y a n d an offense, w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g the g o v e r n m e n t ' s a b i l i t y to u s e f o r f e i t u r e l a w

14

as "an i m p o r t a n t c r i m e - f i g h t i n g t o o l f o r Federal, State, a n d
local law enforcement." 1 4 6 Cong. Rec. H 2 0 4 0, 2047.

S e c o n d , the O n e 1 9 9 8 T r a c t o r c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e d

t h a t the g o v e r n m e n t p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e " i n d i c a t i n g t h a t [the
claimant's] t r u c k i n g b u s i n e s s w a s a sham, o r t h a t he o p e r a t e d it 288 F.

w i t h the i n t e n t of c o n c e a l i n g h i s c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . " Supp. 2 d at 714 ( e m p h a s i s added).

Mr. J a c k s o n f o c u s e s o n t h e

f i r s t p a r t of t h i s h o l d i n g b y a r g u i n g t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t ' s c l a i m
for forfeiture should fail because the Government did not show

that Mr.

Jackson's vehicles were involved in a

sham.

(Claimant's

R e p l y i n Supp. Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s , 4-6.)

However,

this argument

is t o o n a r r o w b e c a u s e t h e s e c o n d p a r t of t h e O n e 1 9 9 8 T r a c t o r

c o u r t ' s h o l d i n g p r o v i d e s t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n m a y be
f o u n d if t h e c l a i m a n t u s e d t h e p r o p e r t y w i t h t h e i n t e n t of

concealing his criminal conduct.

288 F. Supp. 2 d at 714.

A c c o r d i n g to the p l a i n l a n g u a g e of the c o u r t ' s h o l d i n g , w h i c h

m a k e s no m e n t i o n of p r i m a r y purpose, t h i s C o u r t c a n r e a s o n a b l y
infer that Mr. Jackson used his vehicles with the intent of

c o n c e a l i n g his c r i m i n a l conduct.

Mr. J a c k s o n p l e d g u i l t y to the

f a c t t h a t he u s e d h i s p e r s o n a l v e h i c l e s to t r a v e l a c r o s s s t a t e l i n e s w i t h the i n t e n t to e n g a g e i n i l l i c i t s e x u a l c o n d u c t w i t h

one of his sixteen year-old female students.
M o t . J. P l e a d i n g s 3.)

(Compl. t1 10 & 15;

T h e C o u r t f i n d s it f a r - f e t c h e d t o a s s u m e

t h a t Mr. J a c k s o n d i d so w i t h o u t a l s o i n t e n d i n g to c o n c e a l t h i s

15

conduct f r o m o t h e r s .

The fact that he used his personal

vehicles,

r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r f o r m of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , s u c h as

p u b l i c transportation, supports the i n f e r e n c e that he i n t e n d e d to
conceal his conduct from those who could bear witness to the

i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of the situation.
In addition, the Government sets forth facts in its Verified

C o m p l a i n t t h a t i n d i c a t e Mr. J a c k s o n ' s i n t e n t to u s e h i s v e h i c l e s

to c o n c e a l his offense.

The G o v e r n m e n t a l l e g e s that, o n o n e of
Jackson had illicit sex with Jane Doe

the occasions in which Mr.

i n h i s A l e x a n d r i a a p a r t m e n t , Mr. J a c k s o n u s e d h i s t w o - s e a t 2 0 0 4

L e x u s C 4 3 0 - 2 to p i c k u p J a n e D o e f r o m h e r r e s i d e n c e i n Bowie,

Maryland.

(Compl. U 12.)

On that occasion, Jane Doe's mother

q u e s t i o n e d Mr. J a c k s o n a b o u t h o w he i n t e n d e d to t r a n s p o r t s e v e r a l s t u d e n t s to an e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r school a c t i v i t y in the t w o - s e a t
Lexus. Mr. J a c k s o n t h e n r e s p o n d e d t h a t h e w o u l d m a k e s e v e r a l

trips because his other vehicles were being repaired.
12.)

(Compl. fl

The Court recognizes that the Government does not seek

forfeiture of the vehicle involved in this particular exchange,
because that vehicle has a lien in excess of its value. (Compl.

H 14.)

However, these facts show that Mr. Jackson generally

intended to conceal from Jane Doe's mother his true purpose in
transporting her daughter. Mr. Jackson does not contend that

J a n e D o e ' s m o t h e r k n e w of or c o n s e n t e d to h i m t r a n s p o r t i n g J a n e

16

Doe a c r o s s s t a t e l i n e s f o r p u r p o s e s of e n g a g i n g i n i l l i c i t s e x u a l
conduct with her on the other two occasions
four-seat 2001 Lexus LS430 and his four-seat

in which he used his
1998 Mitsubishi

3 000GT.

Therefore,

t h e C o u r t c a n r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r t h a t Mr.

J a c k s o n i n t e n d e d to c o n c e a l h i s c o n d u c t w i t h r e g a r d to e a c h of t h e v e h i c l e s he u s e d to t r a n s p o r t J a n e Doe, i n c l u d i n g t h e four-

seat 2001 Lexus LS430 and the four-seat 1998 Mitsubishi 3000GT

the G o v e r n m e n t s e e k s to h a v e f o r f e i t e d .

A c c o r d i n g l y , the
substantial

Government sets forth sufficient facts to establish a connection between Mr.

Jackson's vehicles and his offense.

(c)

Mere Transport

Mr. J a c k s o n a r g u e s t h a t n o f e d e r a l d e c i s i o n h a s a p p r o v e d of
vehicle forfeiture on facts similar to this case because illicit

sex does not depend on vehicular transportation, unlike offenses s u c h as d r u g d i s t r i b u t i o n . Mr. J a c k s o n f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t

s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n m e r e t r a n s p o r t to t h e s i t e of t h e o f f e n s e is

r e q u i r e d to s a t i s f y the s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n requirement.
( C l a i m a n t ' s O p p ' n to Mot.
P l e a d i n g s 5.)

to R e c o n s i d e r 6; C l a i m a n t ' s Mot. J.

T h e C o u r t r e j e c t s t h e s e a r g u m e n t s f o r t w o r e a s o n s . First,

United S t a t e s v . 2 0 0 4 B l u e L e x u s GX470, the case most factually
s i m i l a r to the i n s t a n t one, s u p p o r t s f o r f e i t u r e . In B l u e L e x u s ,

t h e c l a i m a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h e x p l o i t a t i o n of c h i l d r e n to c r e a t e
c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y i n v i o l a t i o n of 18 U . S . C . § 2251 and

17

transportation of a m i n o r to engage in illegal sexual activity in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). No. C08-5084BHS, 2008 WL

2 2 2 4 3 0 8 , at * l - * 2 (W.D. W a s h . M a y 27, 2 0 0 8 ) .

There,

the

g o v e r n m e n t s o u g h t c i v i l f o r f e i t u r e of t h r e e i t e m s of p r o p e r t y -- a truck, boat, a n d t r a c t of r e a l p r o p e r t y t h e c l a i m a n t u s e d to l a n d
his helicopter. I d . at *1. A s to t h e t r u c k a n d b o a t , the court

allowed the government's claim of civil forfeiture to survive

s u m m a r y judgment.
material

T h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t a g e n u i n e i s s u e of

fact existed as to whether these items were

s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o n n e c t e d to the o f f e n s e b e c a u s e the g o v e r n m e n t
alleged that they were used to attract, entice, and control the

c l a i m a n t ' s victims.

I d . at *4.

However,

the g o v e r n m e n t d i d not

a l l e g e that illicit s e x u a l conduct o c c u r r e d in the t r u c k or boat,

and it did not allege that either was used to transport the
victims to the site of illicit sexual conduct. Id. As to the

p l o t of land, the c o u r t f o u n d the g o v e r n m e n t ' s c l a i m s s u f f i c i e n t

to withstand summary judgment because the government alleged that the claimant "used the helicopter to entice the alleged victims
and transport them to locations where some of the [pornographic]
v i d e o t a p e s w e r e m a d e . " I d . at *5.

Here, although the Government does not allege that Mr.
J a c k s o n u s e d his v e h i c l e s to attract, entice, or c o n t r o l J a n e
Doe, t h e G o v e r n m e n t d o e s a l l e g e t h a t Mr. J a c k s o n u s e d h i s

vehicles to transport her to his apartment, where they engaged in

18

illicit sexual conduct.

(Compl. 1 9, 11, 15, 17.)

C o m p a r e d to

the h e l i c o p t e r l a n d i n g p a d in B l u e L e x u s , s u c h a n a l l e g a t i o n is
sufficient to merit forfeiture and establish a substantial

connection between Mr.

Jackson's vehicles and his offense.

In

B l u e Lexus, the i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y that d i r e c t l y f a c i l i t a t e d the v i c t i m ' s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n was the c l a i m a n t ' s helicopter.
the court still found a

However,

sufficient nexus between the claimant's

o f f e n s e a n d the r e a l p r o p e r t y o n w h i c h t h e h e l i c o p t e r a r r i v e d to

m e r i t forfeiture of the real property.

Here, the G o v e r n m e n t does

not s e e k f o r f e i t u r e of Mr. J a c k s o n ' s home, the p l a c e w h e r e he a n d
Jane Doe arrived. Instead, the Government seeks forfeiture of

the f a c i l i t a t i n g p r o p e r t y itself, w h i c h has a s t r o n g e r n e x u s to Mr. J a c k s o n ' s o f f e n s e t h a n the h e l i c o p t e r l a n d i n g p a d d i s c u s s e d
in B l u e Lexus. Thus, the Court can conclude that a substantial
Jackson's vehicles and his offense.

connection exists between Mr.

Second, courts throughout the nation have found that

v e h i c l e s u s e d to t r a n s p o r t d r u g c o n s p i r a t o r s to the site of a n

illicit drug deal are substantially connected to the underlying
d r u g d i s t r i b u t i o n offense, and are thus s u b j e c t to forfeiture.
See, e.g., U n i t e d S t a t e s v . 2 0 0 2 C h e v r o l e t A v a l a n c h e 1 5 0 0 4WD

P i c k u p , No. 07-1168, 2009 WL 910225, at *3 ( C D . 111. Apr. 1, 2009)(finding vehicle forfeitable as facilitating property
b e c a u s e it was u s e d to d e l i v e r drugs, p i c k up m o n e y o w e d f r o m
d r u g sales, a n d p i c k u p d r u g s f r o m s u p p l i e r s ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v .

19

2000 J e e p G r a n d C h e r o k e e , No. 0 7 - C V - 4 1 1 4 - D E O ,

2 0 0 8 W L 4 6 9 1 0 2 9 , at

*3 (N.D. I o w a Oct. 23, 2 0 0 8 ) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t v e h i c l e u s e d o n o n e
occasion to deliver cocaine was forfeitable under 18 U.S.C. §

983(c)); U n i t e d S t a t e s v . O n e D o d g e D u r a n g o 2 0 0 4 , 545 F. Supp. 2 d 197, 202 (D.P.R. 2 0 0 6 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t v e h i c l e c o n t a i n i n g no d r u g s

that was d r i v e n to d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g p l a n n i n g m e e t i n g was s u b j e c t

to forfeiture as facilitating p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e a p l a n n i n g m e e t i n g
is " a n i n t e g r a l p a r t " of a d r u g t r a n s a c t i o n " ) ; M a n n v .
S t a t e s , No. Civ.A.MJG-02-2687, 2003 WL 23841450, a t *2

United
(D. Md.

Mar. 3, 2003)

( a l l o w i n g f o r f e i t u r e of a u t o m o b i l e u s e d to d r i v e to
Like the vehicles in

t h e s c e n e of a p r e a r r a n g e d d r u g d e a l ) .

t h e s e d r u g d i s t r i b u t i o n cases,

it n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s t h a t

v e h i c l e s u s e d to t r a n s p o r t a m i n o r a c r o s s s t a t e l i n e s f o r

p u r p o s e s of i l l i c i t s e x u a l a c t i v i t y a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o n n e c t e d
t o Mr. Jackson's offense, regardless of whether the illicit
Because Mr.

sexual conduct occurred in or near the vehicles.

Jackson's vehicles were the instrumentalities he used to commit

the offense, they are intrinsically a n d s u b s t a n t i a l l y connected
to that offense.

Mr.

Jackson concedes that courts before and after CAFRA's

amendment in 2000 have found a substantial connection "where

forfeiture [was] premised entirely upon the transportation of
p a r t i c i p a n t s to the l o c a t i o n of c r i m i n a l activity" in the d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g context. (Claimant's Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s 14 n.4.) He

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reasons, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s e c a s e s a d d n o t h i n g to the s u b s t a n t i a l

c o n n e c t i o n analysis b e c a u s e the n a t u r e of d r u g d i s t r i b u t i o n
offenses is different from the nature of sex offenses, in that

t h e e l e m e n t of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n is i n t e g r a l to t h e f o r m e r a n d i n c i d e n t a l to t h e l a t t e r . ( C l a i m a n t ' s Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s 1 4 - 1 5

n.4.; Claimant's R e p l y in Supp. Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s 7.)

Yet Mr.

Jackson concedes that "the analysis the courts utilize in
determining the 'substantial connection' is t h e same, regardless

of the v i o l a t i o n . "
7.)

( C l a i m a n t ' s R e p l y i n S u p p . Mot. J. P l e a d i n g s

Given the Court's conclusion that the essence of Mr.

J a c k s o n ' s o f f e n s e w a s t h e t r a n s p o r t of J a n e D o e a c r o s s s t a t e
lines,
that

and not the illicit sexual conduct itself,

it is conceded
the

the same substantial connection test

that allows

f o r f e i t u r e of v e h i c l e s u s e d f o r m e r e t r a n s p o r t to t h e s i t e of d r u g d i s t r i b u t i o n o f f e n s e s a l s o a l l o w s t h e f o r f e i t u r e of Mr. J a c k s o n ' s p e r s o n a l v e h i c l e s u s e d f o r t r a n s p o r t to t h e s i t e of
illicit sexual conduct.

B y t h i s h o l d i n g , h o w e v e r , the C o u r t d o e s n o t i n t e n d t h a t

f o r f e i t u r e be f o u n d a p p r o p r i a t e a n y time p r o p e r t y is u s e d to
transport participants to the site of an offense. Here, as with

the claimant's o f f e n s e in B l u e L e x u s of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of a m i n o r

to engage in illegal sexual activity, a n d as w i t h drug
t r a f f i c k i n g o f f e n s e s generally, the e l e m e n t of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n is
e s s e n t i a l to t h e o f f e n s e itself. T h i s f i n d i n g a l l o w s the C o u r t

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to d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e r e is a p l a u s i b l e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n between the transporting property and the offense. Accordingly,

t h e C o u r t d e n i e s t h e C l a i m a n t ' s M o t i o n f o r J u d g m e n t o n the
Pleadings.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

the Court denies Mr.

Jackson's

M o t i o n f o r J u d g m e n t o n the P l e a d i n g s b e c a u s e t h e G o v e r n m e n t pleads facts that plausibly suggest that a substantial connection
exists between Mr. Jackson's vehicles and his offense of

i n t e r s t a t e t r a v e l w i t h i n t e n t to e n g a g e i n i l l i c i t s e x u a l

conduct.

Accordingly,

it is h e r e b y

ORDERED that Claimant Mark Allen Jackson's Motion for

J u d g m e n t o n t h e P l e a d i n g s (Dkt. No. 15) p u r s u a n t to F e d e r a l R u l e
of Civil Procedure 12(c) is DENIED.

The C l e r k is d i r e c t e d to f o r w a r d a c o p y of this M e m o r a n d u m
O p i n i o n to c o u n s e l .

E n t e r e d t h i s »" »* d a y of D e c e m b e r ,

2010.

Alexandria, Virginia
Gerald Bruce Lee

/s/ United States District Judge

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