Octagon, Inc. v. Richards

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: Plaintiff's Motion for Confirmation of an Arbitration Ward by Octagon, Inc., 12 Cross MOTION to Vacate Arbitration Award by Sanya Richards. (See Memorandum Opinion For Details). Signed by District Judge Claude M. Hilton on 10/5/10. (nhall)

-TCB Octagon, Inc. v. Richards

Doc. 25

IN T H E
FOR THE

UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT
OF

COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT

VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

OCTAGON,

INC.,

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil

Action No.

01:10-cv-652

SANYA RICHARDS,
Defendant

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Octagon,

I n c ' s ( " O c t a g o n " ) M o t i o n f o r C o n f i r m a t i o n of a n A r b i t r a t i o n
Award and Defendant Sanya Richards's Cross-Motion to Vacate the
Arbitration Award. Because Defendant has failed to demonstrate

c o n d u c t b y the a r b i t r a t o r s u f f i c i e n t l y e g r e g i o u s to v a c a t e t h e
award under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9

U.S.C.

§ 10, t h i s C o u r t g r a n t s P l a i n t i f f ' s M o t i o n f o r
Defendant's

Confirmation of an Arbitration Award and denies Cross-Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award.
I.

T h i s C o u r t f i r s t n o t e s t h a t it is b o u n d b y t h e f a c t s as f o u n d b y the a r b i t r a t o r .
of f a c t u a l

" C o u r t s . . . d o n o t s i t to h e a r c l a i m s

. . . error by an arbitrator as an appellate court

d o e s in r e v i e w i n g d e c i s i o n s of l o w e r c o u r t s . T o r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s . . . , an arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject

Dockets.Justia.com

those f i n d i n g s s i m p l y b e c a u s e it d i s a g r e e s w i t h them." S e e
U n i t e d P a p e r w o r k e r s I n t ' l Union, A F L - C I O v. M i s c o ,
U.S. 29, 39 (1987).

Inc., 4 8 4

The underlying dispute arises from a contract entered into

d u r i n g the spring of 2004. Earlier that year, someone from Nike
USA, Inc. ("Nike"), i n f o r m e d R e n a l d o Nehemiah, a n a g e n t e m p l o y e d

by Octagon, that Richards, then a sophomore t r a c k star at the U n i v e r s i t y of Texas at Austin, might be t u r n i n g professional.
Nehemiah then called Archie Richards, Defendant's father, and

Beverly Kearney, Defendant's coach, to confirm whether this
rumor was true. Nehemiah was then referred to Pamella Watson,

the family's advisor. In a subsequent telephone conversation
w i t h Watson, N e h e m i a h t o l d W a t s o n that if D e f e n d a n t w e r e to turn

professional, he would be interested in serving as her agent.
Later, W a t s o n c a l l e d N e h e m i a h o n s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s s e e k i n g m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n i n d u s t r y guidelines, f e e s c h a r g e d for

services, and o t h e r q u e s t i o n s about t u r n i n g professional. This

ultimately led to Watson requesting that Nehemiah meet briefly
with her and Defendant's father. Nehemiah obliged, and they met

in May 2004 in Florida. At that meeting, Nehemiah informed the
D e f e n d a n t ' s f a t h e r a n d W a t s o n that, if t h e y w a n t e d to s e l e c t

N e h e m i a h as D e f e n d a n t ' s agent, D e f e n d a n t w o u l d f i r s t n e e d to

turn professional in order to avoid any eligibility issues.

On J u n e 16, 2 0 0 4 , a f e w d a y s a f t e r p l a c i n g t h i r d i n t h e

w o m e n ' s i n d i v i d u a l 400 m e t e r r a c e at the N C A A c h a m p i o n s h i p s ,
Richards announced at a press conference that she was forgoing

h e r r e m a i n i n g y e a r s of N C A A e l i g i b i l i t y a n d t u r n i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l . T h a t s a m e day, W a t s o n t e l e p h o n e d Nehemiah,
informing him that Richards had turned professional and that she

was s e l e c t i n g O c t a g o n as h e r agent, s u b j e c t to a r e d u c e d fee of
15%, to w h i c h N e h e m i a h a g r e e d .

O n J u n e 17, 2004, R i c h a r d s , a l o n g w i t h h e r p a r e n t s , s i g n e d

the representation agreement ("Octagon Agreement"). Included in
the O c t a g o n Agreement were provisions stating that O c t a g o n w o u l d
s e r v e as R i c h a r d s ' s e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n m e r c h a n d i s i n g a c t i v i t i e s , s u c h as c o r p o r a t e s p o n s o r s h i p s a n d p r o d u c t
endorsements. For these services, the Octagon Agreement further s t a t e d t h a t R i c h a r d s a g r e e d to p a y O c t a g o n 1 5 % of a l l

c o m p e n s a t i o n she r e c e i v e d "pursuant to a n y agreement, arrangement, or association, w h i c h is e n t e r e d into, or on w h i c h

negotiations, s u b s t a n t i a l l y commenced, d u r i n g the term of this Agreement, and any renewal, extension, or m o d i f i c a t i o n thereof,
regardless of w h e t h e r s u c h c o m p e n s a t i o n is p a i d d u r i n g the t e r m
of t h i s A g r e e m e n t o r t h e r e a f t e r . "

D u r i n g the t e r m of the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t , R i c h a r d s a n d N i k e
entered into a track and field endorsement contract ("2004 Nike

C o n t r a c t " ) . T h e t e r m of t h e 2 0 0 4 N i k e C o n t r a c t l a s t e d f r o m July,

1, 2 0 0 4 t h r o u g h D e c e m b e r 31, 2008. U n d e r t h i s c o n t r a c t , R i c h a r d s r e c e i v e d c o m p e n s a t i o n i n t h e f o r m of, a m o n g o t h e r things, b a s e

compensation, b o n u s e s for race performances, N i k e products,

and

m e r c h a n d i s e c r e d i t . I n 2 0 0 4 a n d 2005, R i c h a r d s p a i d O c t a g o n f e e s

for the c o m p e n s a t i o n she r e c e i v e d u n d e r the 2004 N i k e Contract.
O n J a n u a r y 10, 2006, R i c h a r d s e - m a i l e d N e h e m i a h s t a t i n g t h a t she w o u l d not r e - s i g n w i t h Octagon. N i n e d a y s later,

Richards again e - m a i l e d Nehemiah, s t a t i n g that she w o u l d "honor
o u r c o n t r a c t a n d p a y [Octagon] o n time e v e r y month." O c t a g o n
l a t e r b e c a m e a w a r e t h a t D e f e n d a n t h a d a t t e m p t e d to a s s i g n t h e
benefits from the Nike Contract from Octagon to Ashar

Enterprises, Inc., Richards's new agents (her parents). On March
7, 2006, O c t a g o n i n f o r m e d R i c h a r d s by l e t t e r t h a t "Octagon
c o n t i n u e s to b e e n t i t l e d to a f e e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h y o u r N i k e

c o n t r a c t (and a n y r e n e w a l s t h e r e o f ) . " A f t e r d e c i d i n g n o t to r e - s i g n w i t h Octagon, R i c h a r d s
h o n o r e d h e r c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s a n d c o n t i n u e d to p a y

O c t a g o n ' s fees e a r n e d u n d e r the N i k e C o n t r a c t t h r o u g h o u t 2006,
the l a s t of w h i c h w a s p a i d on J a n u a r y 9, 2007. R i c h a r d s a l s o

p a i d O c t a g o n a fee e a r n e d u n d e r the Nike C o n t r a c t on February
21, 2 0 0 7 f o r h e r r a n k i n g b o n u s e s t h a t h a d b e e n i n v o i c e d o n
J a n u a r y 3, 2007.

In e a r l y 2007, R i c h a r d s e n t e r e d i n t o a n o t h e r a g r e e m e n t w i t h
N i k e ("2Q07 N i k e C o n t r a c t " ) . R i c h a r d s a n d N i k e m o d i f i e d o n l y t w o

terms of the 2 0 0 4 N i k e C o n t r a c t -- t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n a n d the
e x p i r a t i o n date; o t h e r w i s e , the 2 0 0 7 N i k e C o n t r a c t a n d the 2 0 0 4

Nike Contract were identical. Octagon learned about the 2007

N i k e C o n t r a c t , w h i c h p r o m p t e d N e h e m i a h to e - m a i l D e f e n d a n t ' s

m o t h e r (and n o w agent)

r e q u e s t i n g a c o p y of the 2 0 0 7 N i k e

Contract. In t h a t e-mail, N e h e m i a h a l s o q u o t e d a p o r t i o n of the

O c t a g o n Agreement, n o t i n g that D e f e n d a n t o w e s O c t a g o n fees o n any renewal, extension, or m o d i f i c a t i o n of a n y e n d o r s e m e n t

agreement entered i n t o d u r i n g the t e r m of the O c t a g o n agreement.

Responding to Nehemiah's e-mail, Sharon Richards stated
that "[w]e will continue to pay you what you negotiated for

Sanya and her new increases . . . ." Defendant continued to race
f r o m 2007 a n d 2009, a n d was v e r y successful, w i n n i n g a g o l d
m e d a l i n t h e 4 x 4 0 0 m e t e r r e l a y at t h e 2 0 0 7 W o r l d

Championships in Athletics in Osaka, Japan, a gold medal in the
4 x 400 m e t e r r e l a y a n d a b r o n z e m e d a l in the i n d i v i d u a l 4 00
m e t e r r a c e at the 2 0 0 8 O l y m p i c G a m e s in B e i j i n g , a n d a g o l d
m e d a l in the 4 x 4 0 0 m e t e r r e l a y at t h e 2 0 0 9 W o r l d C h a m p i o n s h i p s

in A t h l e t i c s in Berlin, Germany. Richards n e v e r p a i d O c t a g o n a n y fees for a n y c o m p e n s a t i o n e a r n e d u n d e r the 2007 N i k e C o n t r a c t
from 2007 to present.

O n S e p t e m b e r 3, 2007,
arbitration. Richards

Octagon filed its demand for

filed her answer and affirmative defenses

o n N o v e m b e r 7, 2007,

where she cited the Florida athlete agent

statute as a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , D e f e n d a n t s t a t e d t h a t " C l a i m a n t [Octagon] m a y n o t r e c o v e r a g a i n s t
Defendant since the subject agreement was entered into in
F l o r i d a a n d C l a i m a n t w a s n o t l i c e n s e d p u r s u a n t t o Fla. S t a t . §

468.453. Therefore,
unenforceable."

t h e s u b j e c t c o n t r a c t is v o i d a n d

Soon after the American Arbitration Association noted the

parties' request to mediate the matter, b o t h parties agreed to
h o l d the m a t t e r i n a b e y a n c e i n a n a t t e m p t to s e t t l e t h e d i s p u t e .

T h e m a t t e r r e m a i n e d i n a b e y a n c e u n t i l A u g u s t 14, 2009, w h e n

Octagon filed an amended demand for arbitration. The parties
j o i n t l y selected an a r b i t r a t o r on S e p t e m b e r 18, 2009 and

participated in preliminary hearings on October 14 and December
15, 2009. The h e a r i n g o n the m e r i t s t o o k p l a c e o n M a r c h 17,
2010. B e f o r e t h i s h e a r i n g c o m m e n c e d , D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y p l a n n e d to a p p e a l a n y a d v e r s e a w a r d b e c a u s e

the A A A d i d n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h i s d i s p u t e -- i . e . , t h e y

questioned whether this dispute was arbitrable.
On April 9, 2010, the arbitrator issued an interim award of
$ 2 6 4 , 0 0 0 in d a m a g e s to Octagon. In h e r w r i t t e n o p i n i o n

c o n c e r n i n g the i n t e r i m award, the a r b i t r a t o r d e t e r m i n e d that
"the Florida or Texas statute concerning agents and student

a t h l e t e s is i r r e l e v a n t to t h i s p r o c e e d i n g . T h e s e s t a t u t e s a r e

b o t h r e g u l a t o r y / c r i m i n a l in n a t u r e a n d d e s i g n e d to p r o t e c t the

colleges a n d u n i v e r s i t i e s of t h o s e r e s p e c t i v e s t a t e s as w e l l as
the student athlete." The arbitrator further determined that the

2007 Nike Contract both extended and modified the 2004 Nike
Contract.

O n A p r i l 23, 2010,

the arbitrator issued a final award

further awarding Octagon $13,686.50 in attorney's fees and

$ 2 , 1 5 0 in f i l i n g fees, f o r a t o t a l a w a r d of $ 2 7 9 , 8 3 6 . 5 0 . O n M a y 4, 2010, O c t a g o n f i l e d a M o t i o n f o r C o n f i r m a t i o n of a n
A r b i t r a t i o n A w a r d i n t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t f o r F a i r f a x County, p u r s u a n t to Va. C o d e §§ 8 . 0 1 - 5 8 1 . 0 9 a n d 8 . 0 1 - 5 8 1 . 0 1 3 . O n J u n e 11, 2010, D e f e n d a n t p r o p e r l y r e m o v e d t h i s a c t i o n to t h i s C o u r t p u r s u a n t t o 28 U . S . C . § 1332. O n J u l y 9, 2010,

D e f e n d a n t f i l e d a R e s p o n s e in O p p o s i t i o n to M o t i o n t o C o n f i r m
Arbitration Award and Cross-Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award,

a r g u i n g that the a r b i t r a l a w a r d m u s t be v a c a t e d b e c a u s e (1)
t h e r e w a s n o e n f o r c e a b l e a g r e e m e n t to a r b i t r a t e , m e a n i n g t h a t t h e a r b i t r a t o r e x c e e d e d h e r power; (2) t h e a w a r d v i o l a t e s t h e

p u b l i c p o l i c y of T e x a s a n d Florida; a n d (3) the a r b i t r a t o r
e x c e e d e d h e r p o w e r s a n d m a n i f e s t l y d i s r e g a r d e d t h e l a w in
issuing the award.
II.

To vacate an arbitration award,

as Defendant concedes,

the

c h a l l e n g i n g p a r t y h a s a n e x t r e m e l y h i g h b u r d e n to bear.
of a n a r b i t r a t o r ' s a w a r d i s s e v e r e l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d [and]

"Review
...

is a m o n g the n a r r o w e s t k n o w n a t l a w b e c a u s e to a l l o w f u l l

s c r u t i n y of s u c h a w a r d s w o u l d f r u s t r a t e the p u r p o s e of h a v i n g
a r b i t r a t i o n at a l l -- t h e q u i c k r e s o l u t i o n of d i s p u t e s a n d t h e

a v o i d a n c e of the e x p e n s e a n d d e l a y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h litigation."
Apex Plumbing Supply, I n c . v. U . S . S u p p l y Co., 1 4 2 F . 3 d 188, 193

(4th Cir. 1998). " E v e r y p r e s u m p t i o n is in f a v o r of the v a l i d i t y
of the award," Richmond, F r e d e r i c k s b u r g & P o t o m a c R.R. Co. v.

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n C o m m u n i c a t i o n s I n t ' l Union,
(4th Cir. 1992),

973 F . 2 d 276, 2 7 8

and this court cannot reconsider the merits of

an award. Misco,

484 U.S. at 45 (1987); United Steelworkers of

Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 5 6 7 - 6 8 (1960) . S u c h " j u d i c i a l

second-guessing . . . w o u l d transform a b i n d i n g process into a

purely advisory one, and ultimately impair . . . arbitration . .
. ." W e s t v a c o C o r p . v. U n i t e d P a p e r w o r k e r s I n t ' l U n i o n , 1 7 1 F . 3 d

971, 974 ( 4 t h Cir. 1 9 9 9 ) , t h e v a l u e of w h i c h h a s l o n g b e e n

recognized, see, e.g., M o s e s H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. M e r c u r y
C o n s t . Corp, 4 6 0 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e FAA, w h i c h n e i t h e r p a r t y d i s p u t e s a p p l i e s

to this agreement, see 9 U.S.C. § 2, e n u m e r a t e s f o u r instances
w h e r e a c o u r t m a y v a c a t e a n award:
(1)
fraud,

where the award was procured by corruption,

or undue means;

(2) w h e r e t h e r e w a s e v i d e n t p a r t i a l i t y o r c o r r u p t i o n in t h e a r b i t r a t o r s , or e i t h e r of them;

(3) w h e r e the a r b i t r a t o r s w e r e g u i l t y of m i s c o n d u c t in r e f u s i n g to p o s t p o n e the hearing, u p o n s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e shown, o r in r e f u s i n g to h e a r evidence pertinent a n d material to the controversy; or of any m i s b e h a v i o r by w h i c h the rights of a n y p a r t y have been prejudiced; or (4) w h e r e the a r b i t r a t o r s e x c e e d e d t h e i r powers, o r s o i m p e r f e c t l y e x e c u t e d t h e m t h a t a m u t u a l , final, definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a). T h i s l i s t p r o v i d e s the e x c l u s i v e g r o u n d s
f o r j u d i c i a l v a c a t u r of a n a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d . S e e H a l l S t r e e t
Associates, L . L . C . v. M a t t e l , Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2008).

S e c t i o n 10(a)(4)

is the o n l y r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n to t h i s dispute.
A.

A t the o u t s e t , D e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s t h e a w a r d o n the g r o u n d

that the a r b i t r a t o r e x c e e d e d h e r power. Specifically, D e f e n d a n t asserts that the a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e in the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t
d o e s n o t s t a t e w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o s u b m i t to a n

a r b i t r a t o r the q u e s t i o n of a r b i t r a b i l i t y of d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g
u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t . B e c a u s e t h e a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e is u n c l e a r ,

D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t o w e s n o d e f e r e n c e to the arbitrator's determination that this dispute was arbitrable.
Because no deference is owed to the arbitrator's determination

of arbitrability, u n d e r D e f e n d a n t ' s reasoning, this Court
e s s e n t i a l l y o w e s the u n d e r l y i n g a r b i t r a t i o n n o d e f e r e n c e .
T h i s C o u r t w i l l a s s u m e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e d to a r b i t r a t e t h e q u e s t i o n of a r b i t r a b i l i t y o n l y w h e r e " t h e r e is ' c l e a r a n d

unmistakable' e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y d i d so." F i r s t O p t i o n s of

Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,

514 U.S. 938, 942 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ( q u o t i n g A T & T

Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 6 4 9 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ) . T h e r e l e v a n t c l a u s e of t h e O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t

provides:

[Richards] a n d O c t a g o n a g r e e to a t t e m p t i n g o o d f a i t h to r e s o l v e a n y claims, disputes, o r o t h e r m a t t e r s in q u e s t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of, or in c o n n e c t i o n with, this A g r e e m e n t o r a n y b r e a c h t h e r e o f . In t h e e v e n t t h a t [Richards] a n d O c t a g o n a r e u n a b l e to r e a c h a n a m i c a b l e s e t t l e m e n t , s u c h d i s p u t e s h a l l be s e t t l e d b y a r b i t r a t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e n - e x i s t i n g
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American

A r b i t r a t i o n A s s o c i a t i o n . . . . T h e a w a r d r e n d e r e d by the a r b i t r a t o r s s h a l l be final, not s u b j e c t to appeal, a n d j u d g m e n t m a y be e n t e r e d u p o n it in a n y c o u r t having jurisdiction. Thus, the a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e in the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t g r a n t s an a r b i t r a t o r b r o a d a n d e x p a n s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n to h e a r d i s p u t e s
related to this contract.

B r o a d a n d e x p a n s i v e , h o w e v e r , a r e n o t s y n o n y m o u s w i t h "'
clear and unmistakable.'" First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. at

942 (quoting A T & T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649). "[B]road
arbitration clauses that generally commit all interpretive

d i s p u t e s 'relating to' o r 'arising o u t o f the a g r e e m e n t do not
s a t i s f y t h e c l e a r a n d u n m i s t a k a b l e t e s t . " C a r s o n v. G i a n t Food,
Inc., 1 7 5 F . 3 d 325, 3 3 0 ( 4 t h Cir. 1999). " [I] f c o n t r a c t i n g

parties w i s h to let an a r b i t r a t o r determine the scope of his own
jurisdiction, t h e y m u s t i n d i c a t e that i n t e n t in a c l e a r a n d

10

specific m a n n e r . E x p a n s i v e g e n e r a l a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e s w i l l n o t

suffice to force the arbitration of arbitrability disputes." Id.
T h e O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t ' s a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e m a k e s n o m e n t i o n of

w h o -- a n a r b i t r a t o r or a c o u r t -- s h o u l d determine arbitrability.
Thus, w i t h o u t more, this C o u r t c a n n o t a s s u m e that the p a r t i e s
a g r e e d to h a v e the a r b i t r a t o r d e c i d e the s c o p e of h e r o w n
powers.

The "more", P l a i n t i f f argues, is D e f e n d a n t ' s conduct d u r i n g the arbitration. P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s that b y c o m p l e t i n g the
a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e s s , D e f e n d a n t m a n i f e s t e d a n o b j e c t i v e i n t e n t to

a r b i t r a t e t h i s dispute, t h e r e b y w a i v i n g a n y o b j e c t i o n to

arbitrability. See R o c k - T e n n Co. v. U n i t e d P a p e r w o r k e r s Intern.
Union AFL-CIO, 1 8 4 F . 3 d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[P]arties can

m a n i f e s t t h e i r a g r e e m e n t t o a r b i t r a t e b y c o n d u c t . . . .").

W h i l e D e f e n d a n t m a y h a v e p a r t i c i p a t e d in the arbitration,
D e f e n d a n t f a r f r o m a c q u i e s c e d to the p r o c e e d i n g .

O n the contrary, D e f e n d a n t r a i s e d h e r o b j e c t i o n to
a r b i t r a t i o n b o t h i n h e r A n s w e r to O c t a g o n ' s D e m a n d f o r

A r b i t r a t i o n a n d at the o u t s e t of the m e r i t s hearing. That d i s t i n g u i s h e s this c a s e f r o m R o c k - T e n n Co., w h e r e the p a r t y
c h a l l e n g i n g a r b i t r a b i l i t y "utter[ly] fail[ed] d u r i n g
[arbitration] to c h a l l e n g e the a r b i t r a t o r ' s a u t h o r i t y to

d e t e r m i n e the d i s p u t e , o r e v e n p r e s e r v e t h e i s s u e f o r r e s o l u t i o n b y t h e c o u r t . " Id. D e f e n d a n t t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t " ' c e d e U '

11

authority to the arbitrator" to decide arbitrability. Id.
(citing Richmond, F r e d e r i c k s b u r g & P o t o m a c R.R. Co., 973 F . 2 d a t

280); I n t ' l Chem. W o r k e r s Union, L o c a l No. 5 6 6 v. M o b a y Chem. Corp., 7 5 5 F . 2 d 1107, 1 1 1 0 ( 4 t h Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) ) ; s e e a l s o K a p l a n v.
Inc., 19 F . 3 d 1 5 0 3 , 1 5 1 0 ( 3 d Cir.

First Options of Chicago,

1994), a f f ' d 514 U.S. 938 (1995) ("A j u r i s d i c t i o n a l objection,
once stated, remains preserved for judicial review absent a

c l e a r a n d u n e q u i v o c a l waiver. Therefore, w h e r e a p a r t y objects to arbitrability, b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s v o l u n t a r i l y p a r t i c i p a t e s in
the a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s , w a i v e r of the c h a l l e n g e to a r b i t r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n w i l l n o t be i n f e r r e d . " (citations omitted)).

B a s e d on the l a n g u a g e in the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t a n d
Defendant's conduct during arbitration, this Court cannot assume t h a t the p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d to s u b m i t t h e q u e s t i o n of

a r b i t r a b i l i t y to the a r b i t r a t o r . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s C o u r t r e v i e w s de n o v o the q u e s t i o n of a r b i t r a b i l i t y . S e e F i r s t O p t i o n s of
Chicago, 514 U.S. at 947.

D e t e r m i n i n g the a r b i t r a b i l i t y of a d i s p u t e r e q u i r e s a twos t e p a n a l y s i s : 1) w h e t h e r the p a r t i e s h a v e a v a l i d a r b i t r a t i o n

agreement, and, if so, (2) w h e t h e r that a g r e e m e n t applies to the
s u b j e c t m a t t e r b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . S e e id. a t 9 4 3 - 4 6 ; A T & T T e c h n o l o g i e s , 4 7 5 U . S . at 6 5 1 - 5 2 . M o r e o v e r , "any doubts

concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in

12

favor of a r b i t r a t i o n . " M i t s u b i s h i M o t o r s C o r p . v. S o l e r
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).

R e g a r d i n g the f i r s t s t e p of the analysis, D e f e n d a n t
contends that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate because

the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t was v o i d a b initio. T e x a s a n d F l o r i d a l a w g e n e r a l l y r e q u i r e t h a t a n a t h l e t e a g e n t be r e g i s t e r e d or
l i c e n s e d w i t h t h e s t a t e b e f o r e s e r v i n g in t h a t c a p a c i t y w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e b o r d e r s . S e e Tex. Occ. C o d e A n n .
2 0 5 1 . 1 0 1 ( a ) ; Fl. Stat.

§§

§ 468.453. Because Nehemiah was not

licensed under Texas and Florida law when Richards entered into

the Octagon Agreement, defendant asserts that the contract was
void. See Tex. § 2 0 5 1 . 1 0 1 ( c ) ; Fl. Stat. § 468.454. Therefore,

a c c o r d i n g to Defendant, the a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e t h e r e i n is
invalid.

D e f e n d a n t is m i s t a k e n -- t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e e n t i r e c o n t r a c t ,
d o e s not, i p s o f a c t o , d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a r b i t r a t i o n

clause. Rather,

" a n a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n is s e v e r a b l e f r o m the
I n c . v.

remainder of the contract." Buckeye Check Cashing,

Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 4 4 5 (2006) ( r e j e c t i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n
t h a t the e n f o r c e a b i l i t y of a n a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e w i t h i n a c o n t r a c t d e p e n d s u p o n s t a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y a n d c o n t r a c t law). Thus, w h e t h e r t h e O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t i t s e l f is v a l i d p l a y s n o

13

part i n t h i s C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e ' s

validity.1
The B u c k e y e r e s p o n d e n t s a s s e r t e d v e r y s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t s to
t h o s e t h a t D e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s here. There, respondents argued

t h a t b e c a u s e a n a g r e e m e n t v o i d a b i n i t i o u n d e r F l o r i d a l a w is
not a contract, and that agreement contained an arbitration

clause,

t h e r e w a s n o v a l i d a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t to w h i c h
§ 2, c o u l d a p p l y to c o m p e l

S e c t i o n 2 the FAA, 9 U . S . C .

a r b i t r a t i o n of the r e l e v a n t dispute. See id. at 447. The S u p r e m e
C o u r t r e j e c t e d t h i s a r g u m e n t , h o l d i n g t h a t " c o n t r a c t " as u s e d i n

S e c t i o n 2 "include[s]

c o n t r a c t s that l a t e r p r o v e to be void."

Id. at 448. W r i t i n g for the Court, J u s t i c e S c a l i a e x p l a i n e d the
o s t e n s i b l y f a l l a c i o u s r e s u l t of s u c h r e a s o n i n g : [While] t h e P r i m a P a i n t r u l e p e r m i t s a c o u r t to enforce an arbitration agreement in a contract that
the arbitrator later finds to be void, . . . i t is

equally true that respondents' approach permits a c o u r t to d e n y e f f e c t to a n a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n in a

1 Defendant wrongly asserts that because the validity of the
O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t is in question, t h a t is a n i s s u e of c o n t r a c t formation, w h i c h l i e s w i t h i n t h i s C o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . G r a n i t e Rock Co. v. Int'l Bros, of Teamsters, U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2 8 5 6 - 5 7 (2010) ( " [ W ] h e r e t h e d i s p u t e at i s s u e c o n c e r n s c o n t r a c t f o r m a t i o n , t h e d i s p u t e is g e n e r a l l y f o r c o u r t s to
decide.") (citations omitted). While it is true that a

c o n t r a c t ' s v a l i d i t y is d e p e n d e n t u p o n i t s f o r m a t i o n , t h o s e t w o c o n c e p t s are distinct. "The issue of the c o n t r a c t ' s v a l i d i t y is
different from the issue whether any agreement between the alleged obligor and oblige was ever concluded." Buckeye Check C a s h i n g , 5 4 6 U.S. at 444 n . l ( d i s c u s s i n g e x a m p l e s of c o n t r a c t f o r m a t i o n i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s e v e r s i g n e d the

c o n t r a c t or w h e t h e r the s i g n o r l a c k e d the m e n t a l c a p a c i t y to
assent) (citations omitted).

14

contract t h a t t h e c o u r t l a t e r f i n d s t o be p e r f e c t l y
enforceable. Prima Paint resolved this conundrum--and

r e s o l v e d it in f a v o r of t h e s e p a r a t e e n f o r c e a b i l i t y of arbitration provisions.
Id. a t 4 4 9 ; s e e a l s o P r i m a P a i n t C o r p . v. F l o o d & C o n k l i n Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1967). Here, Defendant has not

demonstrated that the arbitration clause contained within the

O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t is i n d e p e n d e n t l y invalid. Indeed, the a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e w i t h i n the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t

is e s s e n t i a l l y a s e p a r a t e c o n t r a c t w i t h i n a contract. While
Defendant has a t t a c k e d the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t as v o i d a b initio,

s h e h a s f a i l e d to m e n t i o n " a n y g r o u n d s t h a t e x i s t at l a w o r in

e q u i t y for the r e v o c a t i o n of a n y contract," 9 U.S.C. § 2, that
w o u l d c a u s e t h i s C o u r t to q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e c o n t r a c t

m o s t r e l e v a n t to t h i s p r o c e e d i n g : the a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e itself.
D e f e n d a n t ' s t a c t i c m a k e s s e n s e , a s " t h e c l a i m e d b a s i s of

i n v a l i d i t y for the c o n t r a c t as a w h o l e w i l l be m u c h e a s i e r to e s t a b l i s h t h a n the s a m e b a s i s as a p p l i e d o n l y to the s e v e r a b l e
a g r e e m e n t to a r b i t r a t e . " R e n t - A - C e n t e r , West, Inc. v. J a c k s o n ,

U.S.

, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010). This Court finds that

t h e a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e w i t h i n t h e O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t w a s valid. T h e s e c o n d s t e p of t h e a n a l y s i s -- w h e t h e r t h e v a l i d
arbitration clause covered the dispute over Octagon's
entitlement to fees from Richards's 2007 Nike Contract--is much

m o r e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . T h i s d i s p u t e f a l l s w i t h i n the s c o p e of t h e

15

arbitration clause, as it is a "claim[], d i s p u t e [ ] , o r o t h e r
matter[] i n q u e s t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of, o r i n c o n n e c t i o n with, this

A g r e e m e n t or a n y b r e a c h t h e r e o f . " I n short, r e s o l u t i o n by
a r b i t r a t i o n of t h i s d i s p u t e is e x a c t l y w h a t b o t h p a r t i e s b a r g a i n e d for.
Because the valid arbitration clause contained in the

O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t c o v e r e d this dispute, this C o u r t finds that the m a t t e r was arbitrable. B e c a u s e the d i s p u t e was of the type

contemplated by both parties to be submitted to arbitration, the
arbitrator did not exceed her powers. Therefore, this Court will

not e x c e e d its p o w e r s a n d c a n n o t v a c a t e the r e s u l t i n g a w a r d on
t h i s ground.
B.

Defendant next contends that the arbitration award must be

set a s i d e b e c a u s e it is c o n t r a r y to T e x a s ' s a n d F l o r i d a ' s p u b l i c

policy. Specifically, Defendant argues that the award violates
both states' policy of protecting student athletes and their
schools f r o m p r o f e s s i o n a l a t h l e t e a g e n t s w h o s o l i c i t them to

turn professional, asserting this policy is evidenced by the
agent l i c e n s i n g laws of b o t h states.
Rooted in the "general doctrine . . . that a court may
r e f u s e to e n f o r c e c o n t r a c t s t h a t v i o l a t e l a w o r p u b l i c p o l i c y , " M i s c o , 4 8 4 U . S . at 42, a c o u r t m a y v a c a t e a n a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d

only when (1) the public policy is "well defined and dominant,

16

as a s c e r t a i n e d b y r e f e r e n c e s to the l a w s a n d l e g a l p r e c e d e n t s a n d n o t f r o m g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of s u p p o s e d p u b l i c
i n t e r e s t s , " a n d (2) t h e a w a r d i t s e l f is a c l e a r v i o l a t i o n o f

p u b l i c policy. W.R. G r a c e & Co. v. Local U n i o n 759,
International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &

Plastic Workers,
43.

461 U.S.

757,

766 (1983); Misco,

484 U.S. at

It s h o u l d be noted, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e v i a b i l i t y of t h e

public policy ground for vacatur is currently in question in
this circuit in the wake of Hall Street Associates, Inc. See MCI

Constructors,

I n c . v.

City of Greensboro,

610 F.3d 849,

857 n.5

( 4 t h Cir.

2 0 1 0 ) ; R a y m o n d J a m e s Fin. S e r v i c e s I n c . v. B i s h o p , 5 9 6

F . 3 d 183, 193 n.13

( 4 t h Cir. 2010). As d i s c u s s e d supra, in H a l l

S t r e e t A s s o c i a t e s , Inc., the S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t S e c t i o n 10(a)(4) p r o v i d e s t h e e x c l u s i v e g r o u n d s f o r a c o u r t to v a c a t e a n
arbitration award. District courts within this circuit have

r e a c h e d d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t the a v a i l a b i l i t y of c o m m o n

law g r o u n d s for v a c a t i n g an a r b i t r a l a w a r d in the w a k e of Hall
Street Associates, Inc. Compare, e.g., MCI Constructors, I n c . v.

Hazen & Sawyer, at *35-37

P.C.,

No.

02CV396, 9, 2 0 0 9 ) ,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17866, aff'd 610 F.3d 849 (4th Cir.

(M.D.N.C. Mar.

2010) , with D.N. Betters Drywall,

I n c . v. W i r t h D e v . C o r p . , No.

2 : 0 9 c v 2 4 6 (E.D. Va. A u g 28, 2 0 0 9 ) . H e r e ,

this Court assumes,

17

without deciding, t h a t p u b l i c p o l i c y r e m a i n s a v i a b l e g r o u n d for

judicial vacatur of an arbitration award.
Defendant's assertion that this Court must vacate the

a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d i n f a v o r of O c t a g o n r e s t s o n t w o a s s u m p t i o n s . D e f e n d a n t a s s u m e s t h a t (1) T e x a s a n d F l o r i d a ' s p u b l i c p o l i c i e s

are r e l e v a n t to this dispute; a n d (2) that the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t v i o l a t e s those states' r e s p e c t i v e laws r e g a r d i n g s t u d e n t
a t h l e t e s a n d a t h l e t e a g e n t s . R e g a r d i n g the f i r s t a s s u m p t i o n ,

O c t a g o n does not dispute before the Court that Texas and Florida
are the states w h o s e p u b l i c p o l i c i e s are r e l e v a n t to this
matter. T h e r e f o r e , f o r its analysis, t h i s C o u r t w i l l a s s u m e that

t h o s e a r e the s t a t e s to w h i c h it s h o u l d l o o k f o r p u b l i c p o l i c y

grounds, if any, to v a c a t e this award.
D e f e n d a n t ' s s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n , t h a t the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t
v i o l a t e d T e x a s a n d F l o r i d a law, w a s r e j e c t e d b y the a r b i t r a t o r
as stated in her interim award--"the Florida or Texas statute

concerning agents and student athletes is irrelevant to this

proceeding. These statutes are both regulatory/criminal in
n a t u r e a n d d e s i g n e d to p r o t e c t the c o l l e g e s a n d u n i v e r s i t i e s of
t h o s e r e s p e c t i v e s t a t e s as w e l l as the s t u d e n t a t h l e t e . "
N e v e r t h e l e s s , D e f e n d a n t p o i n t s to t h e s e s a m e s t a t u t e s as
evidence that the arbitral award itself violates Texas and

Florida public policy.

18

That,

of c o u r s e , a s s u m e s t h a t t h e O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t
and a court's "refusal to

violated Texas and Florida laws,

enforce an award must rest on more than speculation or

assumption." Misco, 4 84 U.S. at 44. As e v i d e n c e d by b o t h

parties' p o s t - h e a r i n g briefs submitted d u r i n g arbitration,

this

issue was f u l l y l i t i g a t e d in that proceeding. S e t t i n g aside the
a w a r d on this g r o u n d w o u l d s e r v e to c i r c u m v e n t the l i m i t s of

severely circumscribed judicial review of arbitration
p r o c e e d i n g s that are i m p o s e d by the F A A a n d the S u p r e m e Court.
T h i s C o u r t is e s p e c i a l l y r e t i c e n t to v a c a t e a n a w a r d b a s e d o n

the purported invalidity of a contract, an issue that rests
s o l e l y w i t h i n the arbitrator's jurisdiction. See Buckeye Check
Cashing, 5 4 6 U.S. a t 4 4 5 - 4 6 . T h e a w a r d h e r e r e f l e c t s t h e

arbitrator's decision that the laws of Texas and Florida were

n o t v i o l a t e d b e c a u s e t h e y d i d n o t a p p l y to t h i s dispute. The
a r b i t r a t o r w a s " f r e e to r e a c h t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , a n d h a v i n g d o n e so, [her] a w a r d d o e s n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h a n y e s t a b l i s h e d p u b l i c

policy." R e m m e y v. PaineWebber,
1994) .

Inc., 32 F . 3 d 143, 150 (4th Cir.

The p u b l i c p o l i c y g r o u n d for o v e r t u r n i n g a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d s is a "two-edged sword," a n d the c o u n t e r v a i l i n g p u b l i c p o l i c y
f a v o r i n g the e n f o r c e m e n t of a r b i t r a l d e c i s i o n s m u s t be b a l a n c e d

against the public policy that the award is allegedly violating.
Westvaco, 171 F.3d at 977-78. Consequently, Defendant has not

19

met the h e a v y b u r d e n r e q u i r e d to v a c a t e a n a w a r d o n t h e s e

grounds. This is not o n e of the rare i n s t a n c e s w h e r e this Court
w i l l v a c a t e an a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d b a s e d o n p u b l i c policy.
C.

D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t has a t h i r d g r o u n d f o r

v a c a t i n g the a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d -- t h a t the a r b i t r a t o r m a n i f e s t l y
d i s r e g a r d e d t h e l a w o f T e x a s a n d Florida. B y f i n d i n g t h e T e x a s

a n d F l o r i d a a t h l e t e a g e n t s t a t u t e s i r r e l e v a n t to the dispute, D e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s the a r b i t r a t o r e x c e e d e d h e r p o w e r s .
J u s t as t h e v i a b i l i t y of t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y g r o u n d f o r

s e t t i n g a s i d e a n a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d is c u r r e n t l y in question,
t h i s C o u r t n o t e s t h a t t h e v i a b i l i t y of " m a n i f e s t d i s r e g a r d of the law" as a n i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u n d f o r v a c a t u r is a l s o in doubt.
See Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 584. Nevertheless,

s e v e r a l c o u r t s h a v e h e l d t h a t m a n i f e s t d i s r e g a r d of t h e l a w r e m a i n s a g r o u n d f o r v a c a t i n g a n a w a r d w h e n t h a t p h r a s e is u s e d

as s h o r t h a n d f o r the g r o u n d s e n u m e r a t e d in S e c t i o n 10(a)(4) of
t h e FAA.
F . 3 d 85,
Ct. 1758

S e e S t o l t - N i e l s e n S A v. A n i m a l F e e d s I n t ' l C o r p . ,
93-95 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds,
I n c . v.

54 8

1 3 0 S.
553

(2010); Comedy Club,

ImprovWest Associates,

F.3d 1277,

1290

(9th Cir.

2009)

("we conclude that manifest

d i s r e g a r d of t h e l a w r e m a i n s a v a l i d g r o u n d f o r v a c a t u r b e c a u s e it is p a r t of § 1 0 ( a ) ( 4 ) . " ) ; C o f f e e B e a n e r y , Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.,

300 Fed. Appx. 415, 4 1 8 - 2 1 (6th Cir. 2008) . T h e F o u r t h C i r c u i t

20

has n o t r u l e d o n t h i s i s s u e .

See MCI Constructors,

610 F.3d at

857 n.5;

R a y m o n d J a m e s Fin.

S e r v i c e s Inc.,

5 9 6 F . 3 d 1 8 3 at n . 1 3 .

F o r the s a k e of t h i s C o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s today, it a s s u m e s , w i t h o u t

deciding, t h a t a n a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d m a y be s e t a s i d e o n p u b l i c p o l i c y g r o u n d s i n the w a k e of H a l l S t r e e t A s s o c i a t e s .
T h a t assumption, however, is of n o h e l p to D e f e n d a n t here.

No m a t t e r h o w c o n s t r u e d , m a n i f e s t d i s r e g a r d of the l a w is p e r h a p s the m o s t a r d u o u s p a t h to s e e k v a c a t u r of an a r b i t r a t i o n
award. Defendant must show that the arbitrator "was aware of the

law, u n d e r s t o o d it c o r r e c t l y ,

f o u n d it a p p l i c a b l e to the c a s e

b e f o r e [her], a n d y e t c h o s e to ignore it in p r o p o u n d i n g [her]
decision." Remmey,
Int'l Bros,

32 F . 3 d at 1 4 9 ( c i t i n g N a t ' l W r e c k i n g Co. v.
Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 961 (7th Cir.

of Teamsters,

1993)). "So l o n g as a n a r b i t r a t o r m a k e s a g o o d f a i t h e f f o r t to

a p p l y the law as [she] perceives it, the courts may not upset
[her] d e c i s i o n s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e a b l e t o p o k e a f e w h o l e s

in the a r b i t r a t o r ' s a n a l y s i s . " R i c h m o n d ,
P o t o m a c R . R . Co.,

Fredericksburg, &

9 7 3 F . 2 d at 2 8 1 . T h i s c o u r t " i s l i m i t e d t o

d e t e r m i n i n g ' w h e t h e r the a r b i t r a t o r s d i d the j o b t h e y w e r e t o l d to d o -- n o t w h e t h e r t h e y d i d it well, o r c o r r e c t l y , o r reasonably,

but s i m p l y w h e t h e r t h e y d i d it." Remmey, 32 F . 3 d at 146 (quoting
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 973 F.2d at 281).

Defendant equates the arbitrator's finding laws i n a p p l i c a b l e to a d i s p u t e w i t h a m a n i f e s t d i s r e g a r d of the law.

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Remmey, h o w e v e r , m a k e s it c l e a r t h a t m a n i f e s t d i s r e g a r d of the

l a w r e q u i r e s a f i n d i n g t h a t l a w s are a p p l i c a b l e to case, b u t the
a r b i t r a t o r n e v e r t h e l e s s c h o s e to i g n o r e them. Id. at 14 9. Here,

the a r b i t r a t o r d i d n o t d i s r e g a r d the law, b u t i n s t e a d , c o n s i d e r e d the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the T e x a s a n d F l o r i d a s t a t u t e s to t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e b e f o r e her. A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the

e v i d e n c e a n d t e s t i m o n y s u b m i t t e d by b o t h parties, the a r b i t r a t o r a g r e e d w i t h O c t a g o n ' s a r g u m e n t that the s t a t u t e s w e r e
i n a p p l i c a b l e a n d r e n d e r e d a n a w a r d in f a v o r of Octagon.
Moreover, whether or not the arbitrator made an error of

l a w as to the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the F l o r i d a a n d T e x a s s t a t u t e s a n d the v a l i d i t y of the O c t a g o n A g r e e m e n t is i r r e l e v a n t to this Court's inquiry, as a n e r r o r of law is not a s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d
to overturn an arbitration award. Apex Plumbing Supply, 142 F.3d

at 195. "An a r b i t r a t o r d o e s not act in m a n i f e s t d i s r e g a r d of the l a w unless: '(1) the a p p l i c a b l e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e is c l e a r l y

d e f i n e d a n d n o t s u b j e c t to r e a s o n a b l e d e b a t e ; a n d (2) t h e arbitrator!] r e f u s e d to h e e d t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e . ' " L o n g J o h n
I n c . v. C o l e , 514 F.3d 345, 349-50 (4th

Silver's Restaurants,

Cir. 2008) (quoting M e r r i l l Lynch, Pierce, F e n n e r & Smith, Inc.
v. J a r o s , 70 F . 3 d 4 1 8 , 4 2 1 ( 6 t h Cir. 1995)). The arbitrator's

c o n d u c t s i m p l y d o e s n o t r i s e to the l e v e l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s C o u r t to h a v e t h e a u t h o r i t y to v a c a t e h e r a w a r d . "The statutory

grounds for vacatur permit challenges on sufficiently improper

22

conduct i n the c o u r s e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s ; t h e y d o n o t p e r m i t r e j e c t i o n of a n a r b i t r a l a w a r d b a s e d o n d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t t h e a r b i t r a t o r s r e a c h e d . " Remmey, 32 F . 3 d at

146. Here, D e f e n d a n t has f a i l e d to p r o v e a n y t h i n g b e y o n d a n
unfavorable result.
III.

" ' A r b i t r a t o r s d o n o t a c t as j u n i o r v a r s i t y t r i a l c o u r t s

w h e r e s u b s e q u e n t a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w is r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e to the

l o s i n g party.'" Id. (citing N a t ' l W r e c k i n g Co., 990 F . 2 d at
960). Rather,
bench.

i t is t h i s C o u r t t h a t m u s t s i t t h i s o n e o u t o n t h e

For the f o r g o i n g reasons,

the a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d s h o u l d be

c o n f i r m e d . A n a p p r o p r i a t e o r d e r s h a l l issue.

JsL
Claude M. Hilton

United States District Judge

Alexandria, Virginia O c t o b e r -5" , 2 0 1 0

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