Ze-Ze v. Kaiser Permanente
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 32 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Kaiser Permanente. (See Memorandum Opinion For Details). Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 6/29/11. (nhall)
IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
—
-—
—
"
—
•
t
MARIE
N.
J
ZE-ZE
JUN 2 9 2011
•
Plaintiff,
•T
1
l:10cv959
v.
(LMB/TRJ)
KAISER PERMANENTE MID-ATLANTIC
STATES REGIONS,
INC.
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment [Dkt. No. 32].
We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before us, and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion,
defendant's motion will be granted, and summary judgment will be
entered in favor of
the defendant.
I.
Background
This civil action involves a claim of employment
discrimination, arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").
The plaintiff,
Marie N. Ze-Ze ("Ze-Ze"), is a native of Cameroon, Africa who
worked as a Clinical Assistant at a Springfield, Virginia clinic
operated by the defendant,
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the
Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. ("Kaiser")1, from early January 1989
In her Complaint, which was originally filed pro se,
plaintiff identified "Kaiser Permanente Mid-Atlantic States
through February 2008.
See Def.'s Mot.
(Ze-Ze Dep.) at 25:20-26:20.
for Summ. J. at Ex. A
During the particular time period
at issue in this civil action, 2007 through 2008, Ze-Ze worked in
Kaiser's Dermatology Department, where her duties as a Clinical
Assistant2 included, inter alia, greeting patients, scheduling
and confirming appointments, transporting patients in wheelchairs
to treatment areas, coordinating the flow of patients into
treatment areas, notifying medical and nursing staff if a patient
required immediate attention, advising patients of delays, and,
as appropriate, providing information and instructions to
patients as directed by the medical and nursing staff.
28:18-29:2,
35:13-38:18;
see also id.
at Ex.
Id. at
3.
On February 21, 2008, Ze-Ze was asked to resign from her
position as a Clinical Assistant in lieu of being fired or
demoted.
Id. at 62:16-63:14.
The request for plaintiff's
resignation followed several incidents and patient complaints
involving Ze-Ze throughout February 2008.
See, e.g.. id. at Ex.
B (Nancy Stuehler Dep.) at Ex. 5 (detailing a patient complaint
Region, Inc." as the defendant in this action.
However,
defendant has indicated that the proper party is actually Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.
in Supp. of Def.'s Mot.
See Mem.
for Summ. J. at 1 n.l.
2 Plaintiff was also identified as holding the position of
"Medical Assistant" at certain times during her tenure at Kaiser,
but her job duties remained the same under both job titles. See
id. at 27:16-18:12.
Accordingly, for ease of comprehension, the
Court will refer to Ze-Ze's position as "Clinical Assistant"
through this Memorandum Opinion.
regarding an incident that occurred on February 8, 2008).
Moreover, at the time that plaintiff was asked to resign, she was
already on a Level 3 Corrective Action Plan that required her to
take a "customer service class and a communication (confronting
difficult issues) class."
Id. at Ex. A (Ze-Ze Dep.) at Ex. 7.
The immediate incident that precipitated the request for
plaintiff's resignation occurred on February 11, 2008, when
plaintiff was stationed in the lobby on the first floor of the
Springfield Medical Center, providing patients with directions to
the pharmacy.
Id. at 108:3-109:3.
A patient who had just seen
her doctor on the third floor and who needed to fill a
prescription told Ze-Ze that she needed a place to rest because
she had a fever, was feeling ill, and did not want to go home and
return later for her prescription.
109:19.
Id. at 53:17-57:19, 108:7-
Plaintiff noticed that the patient felt hot to the
touch, and that there was a long line at the pharmacy with no
open seating available in the lobby for patients to sit while
waiting for their prescriptions to be filled.
58:2, 108:10-14.
See id. at 57:20-
Accordingly, Ze-Ze put the patient in an exam
room located in a part of the Dermatology Department that was
closed, had the patient lie down on the exam table, covered the
patient with an exam sheet, closed the door, and left.
Id. at
55:6-58:14.
Ze-Ze did not inform any doctor in the Dermatology
Department that she had put the patient in the exam room.
Id. at
59:16-60:2.
In fact, plaintiff did not tell anyone in the
Dermatology Department that she was bringing the patient to the
exam room.
Id. at 60:3-7.
The patient was discovered later that
day when one of plaintiff's supervisors, Nancy Stuehler
("Stuehler") stumbled upon her while inspecting the Dermatology
Department along with Susan Lutes ("Lutes"),
operations manager.
the business
See id. at Ex. C (Stuehler Decl.)
fl 7.
Stuehler noticed that the patient was warm to the touch, that her
pulse was elevated, and that she had been seen by the Internal
Medicine Department earlier that day for an illness.
Id. fl 8.
Stuehler accordingly called the clinical coordinator for the
Internal Medicine Department, and had her come up to the
Dermatology Department with a wheelchair to take the patient back
to the Internal Medicine Department for further evaluation.
Id.
Once the patient had been taken to the Internal Medicine
Department, Stuehler asked to speak with Ze-Ze, and explained to
the plaintiff that she was concerned that plaintiff had put the
patient in danger by failing to tell anyone that the patient was
in the exam room.
Id. t 9.
She then placed Ze-Ze on paid
administrative leave, which was converted to medical leave
several days later when Ze-Ze notified her supervisor that she
was experiencing medical issues.
Ze Dep.)
Id.: see also id. at Ex. A (Ze-
at 62:7-15.
After the February 11, 2008 incident, Stuehler consulted
with Lutes, Mary Ward, who was then the Medical Center
Administrator for Kaiser's Springfield and Burke, Virginia
Medical Centers, and Charlene Yates, who is a Human Resources
representative for Kaiser.
Id. at Ex. C (Stuehler Decl.)
H 10.
Stuehler decided that Ze-Ze should be discharged, and Ward,
Yates, and Lutes all agreed.
Id.
Ward, however, suggested that
Stuehler might want to give plaintiff an opportunity to become an
on-call greeter, and Stuehler agreed with that suggestion.
id.
See
Accordingly, Stuehler met with Ze-Ze on February 21, 2008,
and gave her three options: (1) resign from her position as a
Clinical Assistant and accept a position as an on-call greeter;
(2) resign from Kaiser altogether; or (3) be discharged.
at Ex. B (Stuehler Dep.) at 28:22-29:11.
See id.
Ze-Ze initially chose
to resign from her position and become an on-call greeter, but
she then resigned from Kaiser altogether by a letter dated April
17, 2008.
See id. at Ex. A (Ze-Ze Dep.) at Ex. l.3
Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on August 25, 2008, alleging that
Kaiser's request for her resignation constituted unlawful
discrimination based on her race and national origin.
Compl. at Ex. 21.
See PL's
On July 12, 2010, the EEOC dismissed
plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination and issued her a Notice of
3 It appears from the record that although Ze-Ze initially
accepted the option to become an on-call greeter, she never
actually worked in that position and instead was on
administrative or medical leave from February 11, 2008 until she
resigned on April 17, 2008.
Id.
Right to Sue letter.
H 11.
See id. at Ex. 22; see also Def.'s Answer
Ze-Ze then timely filed her Complaint before this Court on
August 25, 2010,4 alleging claims for discrimination under Title
VII; the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2007
("GINA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq.: the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. .- and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.
§
12101 et
sea.
By an Order dated January 28, 2011, the Court dismissed
plaintiff's GINA, ADEA, and ADA claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to properly exhaust
those claims before the EEOC, and further dismissed some of
plaintiff's Title VII allegations as time-barred.
23 (January 28, 2011 Order).
See Dkt. No.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that
only plaintiff's Title VII claims for alleged acts of racial or
national origin discrimination occurring on or after October 30,
2007 remained viable,
id.
At the close of discovery, defendant filed the instant
Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 32], arguing that all
remaining claims in this civil action should be dismissed because
there are no genuine issues of material fact, and no reasonable
jury could find in plaintiff's favor.
4 Ze-Ze's Complaint was initially filed pro se, but she is
now represented by counsel.
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record demonstrates
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c).
A genuine issue of material fact exists
only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby.
In resolving a motion for
summary judgment, the Court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
Inc..
288 F.3d 124,
132
See Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md..
(4th Cir. 2002).
However,
"the mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant]."
v.
Phelan.
Anderson, 4 77 U.S. at 252; see also Othentec Ltd.
526 F.3d 135,
Moreover,
140
(4th Cir.
2008) .
"the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute" cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment; the dispute
must be both "material" and "genuine," meaning that it must be
capable of changing the outcome of the lawsuit.
at 132.
Bryant, 288 F.3d
Accordingly, a nonmoving party cannot "create a genuine
issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of
one inference upon another."
(4th Cir. 1985).
Beale v. Hardy.
769 F.2d 213, 214
Rather, to survive a motion for summary
judgment, a nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial
must submit sufficient, credible evidence to establish a
reasonable finding in his favor as to each essential element of
his claim.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 327
(1986).
III.
Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate in defendant's favor on Ze-
Ze's Title VII claims because the evidence is insufficient as a
matter of law to establish a claim for unlawful employment
discrimination based on racial, ethnic, or national origin animus.
Rather, the undisputed material facts establish that plaintiff was
removed from her position as a Clinical Assistant for cause.
A.
Framework for Review
Because she lacks any direct evidence of racial or national
origin discrimination, plaintiff proceeds under the indirect
"burden-shifting" framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under that framework, a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination
by showing: (l) that she was a member of a protected racial,
ethnic, or other group; (2) that she experienced an adverse
employment action; (3) that at the time of the adverse employment
action, she was performing her job at a level that met her
employer's legitimate expectations,- and (4) that the position
remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified applicant
8
outside of the plaintiff's protected class, or that other
employees who are not members of the protected class were retained
under similar circumstances.
McDonnell Douglas. 411 U.S. at 802-
04; see also Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416
F.3d 310,
Inc..
318 (4th Cir.
383 F.3d 180,
Recreation Club.
2005); Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton.
188 (4th Cir.
2004); Brinklev v. Harbour
180 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir.
1999).
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing that prima facie
case,
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
decision.
Hux v. City of Newport News. Va.. 451 F.3d 311, 314-15
(4th Cir. 2006).
This is a burden of production, not of proof or
persuasion, so the reasons proffered need not ultimately persuade
the Court, as long as the defendant offers a legitimate and raceneutral rationale for its decision.
See St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks.
To overcome a defendant's
509 U.S.
502,
509 (1993).
proffered non-discriminatory rationale, the plaintiff must prove
by the preponderance of the evidence that those justifications
were not the real reasons for the adverse decision,
were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods..
Inc..
530 U.S.
but in fact
See Reeves v.
133,
143
(2000) .
This
third and final step "merges with the [plaintiff's] ultimate
burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff]
victim of intentional discrimination."
Affairs v. Burdine.
450 U.S.
248,
has been the
Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
256 (1981).
B.
Prima Facie Case
In this case, plaintiff has not successfully made out a prima
facie case of unlawful employment discrimination.
As a threshold
matter, there is no genuine dispute that plaintiff, as a native of
Africa, is a member of a protected class, nor is there any dispute
that she suffered adverse employment actions when she was placed
on administrate leave, and later removed from her position as a
Clinical Assistant and told to either resign, become an on-call
greeter, or be fired.
However, Ze-Ze cannot meet the third prong
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test because she cannot
establish that, at the time of those adverse employment actions,
she was performing at a level that met Kaiser's legitimate
business expectations.
To the contrary, throughout February 2008, the very same
month in which Ze-Ze was placed on leave and eventually removed
from her position, Kaiser had already received at least two
complaints about Ze-Ze from patients at the Springfield Medical
Center.
3-5.
See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. C (Stuehler Decl.) ^
Those patient complaints alleged that Ze-Ze was providing
poor customer service, that she was rude and unprofessional, and
that she was not doing a good job of communicating with patients
regarding delays.
Ex. 5.
Id.: see also id. at Ex. B (Stuehler Dep.) at
Moreover, although plaintiff disputes the specific factual
circumstances leading to those patient complaints, and further
alleges that Kaiser received complaints about all of its
10
employees, see PL's Resp. Opposing Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8,
she cannot deny that Kaiser received complaints about her in
particular, nor can she deny that she had already been placed on a
Level 3 Corrective Action Plan even before February 11, 2008, the
date on which she was first placed on administrative leave.
e-iS-u/ id^ at Ex. A (Ze-Ze Dep.) at Ex. 7.
See.
In light of her prior
employment history, Ze-Ze therefore cannot show that she was
performing at or above her employer's legitimate expectations at
the time that she suffered any adverse employment action.4
C.
Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Justification
Moreover, even if plaintiff could somehow meet her prima
facie burden under McDonnell Douglas. Kaiser has proffered an
eminently valid, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse
employment decisions, which plaintiff cannot adequately rebut.
Specifically, Kaiser's articulated non-discriminatory reason for
its actions is that Ze-Ze endangered the health and safety of a
patient on February 11, 2008 by placing that ill patient alone in
a closed exam room, without telling anyone that the patient was
there.
4 Ze-Ze points to a "thrive letter" that she received in
February 2007, which commended her on her positive attitude and
customer service, as evidence that she was performing at the
necessary level. See PL's Resp. Opposing Def.'s Mot. for Summ.
J. at 8. That letter, however, pre-dates the events giving rise
to this civil action by a full year, and therefore fails to
create any genuine issue of material fact. Moreover, although
plaintiff argues that other employees at Kaiser received patient
complaints but were not disciplined as harshly as she was, there
is no evidence in the record that any of those other employees
were on a Corrective Action Plan at the time.
11
Courts have long recognized that such poor performance
provides a legitimate basis for taking an adverse employment
action, and that compromising patient safety is a valid, non
discriminatory reason for discharging an employee working in the
medical profession.
In Eiland v. Trinity Hospital, for example,
the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court's grant of summary
judgment for an employer, based upon a finding that terminating an
employee because she would be a threat to patient safety if she
continued in her employment was a valid, non-pretextual reason for
discharge.
150 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Conwright
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.. 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing poor performance as a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for taking an adverse employment action); Jenkins v. Bell
S. Adver. & Publ'g Corp.. No.
May 29,
1996)
94-2106,
1996 WL 281958 (4th Cir.
(same).
As such, on the record before the Court, there is no genuine
dispute that Ze-Ze's conduct on February 11, 2008 warranted the
actions taken against her.5
Ze-Ze admits that she left a patient
5 The only factual dispute that plaintiff has identified
concerning the February 11, 2008 incident is whether two or three
individuals from Kaiser were involved in the discovery of
plaintiff's misconduct. Defendant has represented that only
Stuehler and Lutes discovered the sick patient in the closed
section of the Dermatology Department on that date, while "Ze-Ze
testified that there were three individuals from Kaiser involved
in this incident, Ms. Stuehler, Ms. Lutes, and a Ms. Mary Ward."
PL's Resp. Opposing Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5-6. Plaintiff,
however, has not explained how that factual distinction would in
any way be material to the outcome of this civil action.
Indeed,
whether two, three, or three hundred people discovered Ze-Ze's
wrongdoing on February 11 would appear to have no bearing
12
unattended in a closed wing of the Dermatology Department, with
the door closed, even though she knew that the patient was warm to
the touch and had explicitly stated that she was not feeling well.
See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. A (Ze-Ze Dep.) at 57:17-58:2,
109:17-21.
To make matters worse,
Ze-Ze then failed to inform
anyone else at Kaiser that the patient was even there.
55:6-18, 59:15-60:7
id. at
Plaintiff herself admits that "in hindsight,
[she] possibly should have used better judgment" with regard to
the February 11, 2008 incident.
for Summ. J. at 14.
PL's Resp. Opposing Def.'s Mot.
That is putting matters mildly.
Indeed, as
plaintiff's supervisor, Stuehler, explained:
[The patient left in the exam room] could have died; she
could have fallen off the exam table; she could have had
a seizure, a stroke; we could have had a fire in the
building and nobody would have known she was there . . .
Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B (Stuehler Dep.) at 25:6-11.
Under
these circumstances, defendant clearly had a legitimate basis,
entirely unrelated to Ze-Ze's race or national origin, for
removing Ze-Ze from her position as a Kaiser Clinical Assistant.
Plaintiff's only rejoinder to Kaiser's quite common-sense
concerns about her dangerously deficient performance is that the
February 11 incident was "isolated" and that "her intentions were
well meaning in that she . . . was simply trying to help."
PL's
whatsoever on whether her conduct was sufficiently serious to
warrant termination or strong disciplinary action, or on whether
Kaiser's proffered neutral justification for its decision to
remove Ze-Ze from her Clinical Assistant position was a pretext
for unlawful discrimination.
13
Resp. Opposing Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 14.
Ze-Ze's subjective
intentions, however, are irrelevant; it was her objective conduct
that endangered the safety of a patient, and that objective
conduct fully justified Kaiser in taking adverse employment action
against her.
Moreover, although the incident was "isolated" in
the sense that it only occurred once, the severity of the incident
and the significant lapse in judgment that Ze-Ze's conduct
demonstrated provided a more than adequate basis for defendant to
place her on administrative leave and request that she accept a
different position or resign, to ensure that the "isolated"
incident would never recur.
Finally, although plaintiff argues that this case must
proceed to trial because Kaiser cannot point to a specific written
policy prohibiting her conduct, her behavior was clearly contrary
to her basic job duties as a Clinical Assistant,
which included,
at a minimum, notifying nursing or other medical staff if a
patient required medical assistance.
at Ex. A (Ze-Ze Dep.) at Ex. 3.
See Def.'s Mot.
for Summ. J.
Accordingly, and particularly in
light of Ze-Ze's history of other performance-related problems,
her "lapse in judgment," PL's Resp. Opposing Def.'s Mot. for
Summ. J. at 14, and disregard for patient safety on February 11,
2008 provided a valid, non-discriminatory justification for Kaiser
taking disciplinary action against her.
14
D.
Pretext
Lastly, as a matter of law, plaintiff cannot establish any
genuine issue of material fact in support of her allegation that
Kaiser's proffered performance-related justification for its
actions was pretextual.
Plaintiff claims that her termination
must have been pretextual because she was never explicitly warned
that her conduct on February 11, 2008 could subject her to
discipline or termination.
for Summ. J. at 7, 15-16.
See PL's Resp. Opposing Def.'s Mot.
That argument is meritless.
It should
have been painfully obvious to any qualified Clinical Assistant in
a medical facility that an ill patient should not be left alone
and unattended in an abandoned area of the clinic, particularly if
no one else is aware that the patient is there.
As such, contrary
to plaintiff's contentions, no warning was necessary to
communicate that basic fact to Ze-Ze.
Moreover, plaintiff has submitted no evidence whatsoever of
racially biased statements or other conduct that would indicate
racial or national origin animus on the part of Kaiser or any of
her immediate supervisors.
Instead, Ze-Ze merely alleges that "it
is highly doubtful that another employee, particularly one outside
the Plaintiff's protected class, would have been immediately
subject to termination for similar conduct."
Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 17.
PL's Resp. Opposing
That speculative and conclusory
assertion is wholly unsupported by any evidence in the record, and
it therefore cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact that
15
would allow the plaintiff's claims to survive summary judgment.
Finally, plaintiff contends that a trier of fact could
reasonably find that Kaiser engaged in unlawful discrimination
against her, using her poor performance as a mere pretext, because
other Kaiser employees committed similar infractions and yet were
not placed on administrative leave or asked to resign.
Specifically, plaintiff identifies Vicki Catlin ("Catlin"), a
Caucasian female, as a possible comparator, alleging that Kaiser
patients complained about Catlin on several occasions, but that
"[d]espite these complaints, Ms. Catlin was not disciplined,
terminated, or otherwise reprimanded."
Id. at 13; see also id. at
18 (arguing that "[t]here is a genuine issue about whether Mrs.
Ze-Ze was treated less favorably than Ms. Catlin was").
However, in evaluating claims of discrimination based on
comparisons to other employees, courts look to the relative
seriousness of the plaintiff's and the purported comparator's
actions, to determine whether those actions are truly similar in
degree and kind.
F.2d 1100, 1107
See, e.g.. Moore v. Citv of Charlotte. N.C.. 754
(4th Cir. 1985); see also Havwood v. Locke.
387
Fed. App'x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that to
prove discrimination by means of comparisons to another employee,
a plaintiff must show that the alleged comparator's actions were
"similar in all relevant respects").
Here, there is evidence in
the record suggesting that Kaiser did receive some complaints
about Catlin, and that at least one patient requested to have
16
someone else administer her medication to her instead of having
Catlin administer it because the patient "wasn't confident in
[Catlin's] abilities."
See, e.g.. PL's Resp. Opposing Def.'s
Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. D (Veronica Taylor Dep.) at 17:14-18:12.
As defendant properly responds, however, "that is a far cry from
leaving a patient unattended in a closed exam room in a closed
part of the medical center and then failing to tell anyone that
the patient was there."
Summ. J. at 4-5.
Reply to PL's Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for
Accordingly, because plaintiff has not
established that any other Kaiser employees received lesser
punishments for sufficiently similar misconduct, her argument that
her termination was pretextual fails as a matter of law.6
Ultimately, Ze-Ze simply cannot show "that [her] employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence," Reeves.
530 U.S.
at 143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256), and no reasonable jury
could find in her favor on any of the remaining Title VII
allegations in her Complaint.
For those reasons, defendant's
6 Moreover, even to the extent that Catlin received similar
complaints or similar negative assessments of her interactions
with patients as did Ze-Ze on February 7 and February 8, 2011,
Catlin's performance-related issues were reported to a different
supervisor; specifically, Stuehler and Ward received and
investigated the complaints against Ze-Ze, while the complaints
against Catlin "were brought to the attention of Ms. Rudat."
See
Reply to PL's Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. A (Taylor
Dep.) at 53:4-13.
Because Havwood requires a showing that
plaintiff and her alleged comparator "dealt with the same
supervisor, [and were] subject to the same standards," 387 Fed.
App'x at 359, plaintiff's pretext allegations are insufficient as
a matter of law for that reason,
17
as well.
Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, and judgment will be
entered in favor of the defendant,
Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States,
IV.
the Kaiser Foundation Health
Inc.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment [Dkt. No. 32] will be GRANTED and judgment will be
entered in favor of the defendant by an Order to be issued with
this Memorandum Opinion.
Entered this /?17 day of June, 2011.
Alexandria, Virginia
vr-
Leonie M. Brinkema
United States District Judge
18
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