Sejas v. MortgageIT Inc.

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 7 Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint by MortgageIT Inc. (See Memorandum Opinion For Details). Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 6/20/11. (nhall)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

Wilfredo Sejas,
Plaintiff,
v.
MortgageIT, Inc.,
Defendant.

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1:11cv469 (JCC)

M E M O R A N D U M

O P I N I O N

This matter is before the Court on Defendant
MortgageIT, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “MortgageIT”) Motion to
Dismiss (“MTD”).

For the following reasons, the Court will

grant dismissal.

I. Background
Plaintiff Wilfredo Sejas, pro se (“Plaintiff” or
“Sejas”), alleges in his Complaint [Dkt. 1, Ex. A] that he
signed a Deed of Trust and promissory note for a property
located at 7651 Rugby Court, Manassas, Virginia, 20109 (the
“Property”), with Defendant as beneficiary.
6.)

(Complaint ¶¶ 2,

He claims that the Deed of Trust is defective for lack of

proper acknowledgement and that the Certificate of
Acknowledgement is also “defective.”

(Complaint ¶ 7.)

And he

claims that Defendant instructed a Substitute Trustee to carry

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out a foreclosure sale of the property without having had the
authority to do so, and without properly notifying Plaintiff.
(Complaint ¶¶ 8, 9.)
Several unusual aspects of this case should be noted
from the outset.

It appears quite similar to Sejas v.

MortgageIT, Inc., et al., Case No. 153CL09003947-00, filed in
Prince William Circuit Court on October 15, 2009.

In that

earlier case, where Plaintiff was represented by counsel,
Plaintiff claimed at Paragraph 11 of his complaint that he “does
not speak, read, or write English.”

Remarkably, however,

Plaintiff’s instant Complaint is written in English, meaning
either that his English skills have improved dramatically in the
past two years or that his pleadings are being ghost-written.
To the extent the latter case proves true, this Court admonishes
Plaintiff that “the practice of ghost-writing legal documents to
be filed with the Court by litigants designated as proceeding
pro se is inconsistent with the procedural, ethical and
substantive rules of this Court.”

Laremont-Lopez v. Se.

Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1080-81 (E.D. Va.
1997).

The Court further warns any attorney providing ghost-

writing assistance that he or she is behaving unethically.
Davis v. Back, No. 3:09cv557, 2010 WL 1779982, at *13 (E.D. Va.
April 29, 2010) (Ellis, J.).

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Also, perhaps relatedly, Plaintiff’s recent Motion for
a Continuance [Dkt. 11] contained Plaintiff’s signature, but
underneath listed the name “Wyman P. Rodriguez, pro se.”

And

finally, the phone number listed at the end of that pleading is
not that of Mr. Sejas, as the Court learned in attempting to
notify Mr. Sejas that the Motion to Dismiss would be decided on
the pleadings.

Needless to say, these facts are suspicious.

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes claims of Wrongful
Foreclosure (Count I), Trespass (Count II), Breach of Contract
(Count III), and seeks Declaratory Relief (Count IV).

Defendant

Moved to Dismiss on May 13, 2011.

Plaintiff

[Dkt. 7 (“Mot.”).]

failed to respond to that motion until June 3, 2011, when he
moved for a continuance [Dkt. 11], which the Court denied on
June 7, 2011 [Dkt. 12].

Defendant’s motion is before the Court.

II. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint.

See Randall v. United States, 30

F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994).

In deciding such a motion, a

court must first be mindful of the liberal pleading standards
under Rule 8, which require only “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
R. Civ. P. 8.

Fed.

A court must take “the material allegations of

the complaint” as admitted and liberally construe the complaint

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in favor of a plaintiff.

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,

421 (1969).
While Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” a plaintiff must still provide “more than labels
and conclusions” because “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citation omitted).
Indeed, the legal framework of the complaint must be supported
by factual allegations that "raise a right to relief above the
speculative level."

Id. at 1965.

In its recent decision,

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court
expanded upon Twombly by articulating a two-pronged analytical
approach to be followed in any Rule 12(b)(6) test.

First, a

court must identify and reject legal conclusions unsupported by
factual allegations because they are not entitled to the
presumption of truth.

Id. at 1951.

“[B]are assertions” that

amount to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the
elements” do not suffice.

Id. (citations omitted).

Second,

assuming the veracity of “well-pleaded factual allegations,” a
court must conduct a “context-specific” analysis drawing on “its
judicial experience and common sense” and determine whether the
factual allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.”

Id. at 1950-51.

The plausibility standard requires

more than a showing of “a sheer possibility that a defendant has

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acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 1949.

In other words, "[a] claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Id.

The Court construes the pro se Complaint in this case
more liberally than those drafted by an attorney.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

See Haines v.

Further, the Court is aware

that “[h]owever inartfully pleaded by a pro se plaintiff,
allegations are sufficient to call for an opportunity to offer
supporting evidence unless it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.”

Thompson v.

Echols, No. 99-6304, 1999 WL 717280, at *1 (4th Cir. 1999)
(citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)).

Nevertheless, while

pro se litigants cannot “be expected to frame legal issues with
the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those
trained in law, neither can district courts be required to
conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.”
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir.
1985).

Thus, even in cases involving pro se litigants, as in

here, the Court “cannot be expected to construct full blown
claims from sentence fragments.”

Id. at 1278.

III. Analysis
Defendant seeks dismissal on grounds of res judicata
and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 12(b)(6).

As this Court will dismiss for res

judicata, it need not reach the Rule 12(b)(6) issue.
The doctrine of res judicata bars additional
litigation on matters decided in earlier litigation between the
same parties.

Federal courts apply state res judicata law in

determining the preclusive effects of a state court judgment.
Greengael, LC v. Board of Sup'rs of Culpeper Cnty., Va., 313 F.
App’x 577, 579 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005); In re
Genesys Data Tech., Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Virginia’s claim preclusion1 doctrine bars “relitigation of the
same cause of action, or any part thereof, which could have been
litigated between the same parties and their privies.”

Martin-

Bangura v. Va. Dep't. of Mental Health, 640 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738
(E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Ware, 244 Va. 374, 421
(1992)).

A party asserting that a claim is precluded must also

“show that the previous judgment was a valid, final judgment on
the merits.”

Id.

“The doctrine protects litigants from

multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters

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As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, “[t]he preclusive effect of a
judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are
collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.’” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S.
880, 892 (2008). At issue here is “claim preclusion,” or the doctrine that
“forecloses successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not
relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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certainty and reliance in legal relationships.”

State Water

Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 261 Va. 209, 214 (2001).
Virginia Rule of Supreme Court 1:6 adopts what is
commonly known as the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” test
for res judicata claim preclusion, stating:
A party whose claim for relief arising from
identified conduct, a transaction, or an
occurrence, is decided on the merits by a
final judgment, shall be forever barred
from prosecuting any second or subsequent
civil action against the same opposing
party or parties on any claim or cause of
action that arises from that same conduct,
transaction or occurrence, whether or not
the legal theory or rights asserted in the
second or subsequent action were raised in
the prior lawsuit, and regardless of the
legal elements or the evidence upon which
any claims in the prior proceeding
depended, or the particular remedies
sought.
“[T]he terms of this Rule make clear [that] claim
preclusion in Virginia operates to bar any claim that could have
been brought in conjunction with a prior claim, where the claim
sought to be barred arose out of the same conduct, transaction,
or occurrence as the previously litigated claim.”

Martin-

Bangura v. Va. Dept. of Mental Health, 640 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738
(E.D. Va. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint raises allegations of
fraud and conspiracy regarding the mortgage-loan transaction and
subsequent foreclosure proceedings on the Property.

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These

claims were raised, indeed in far more detail, in Plaintiff’s
previous Prince William County Court claim, which resulted in
dismissal with prejudice on April 30, 2010.

[Dkt. 8, Ex. 3.]

The opening paragraph of the complaint in that case sums it up
well, arguing that “Defendants were not persons entitled to
enforce, not holders, and not holders in due course in
connection with the subject mortgage loan to Mr. Sejas,” and
seeking relief for “the Defendants’ illegal and malicious
actions in violation of the Virginia law and other malfeasance
in the origination, granting, and eventual securitization of the
residential mortgage loan to Mr. Sejas.”

[Dkt. 8, Ex. 2, at 2

(footnote omitted).]
Thus, the instant case is essentially identical to an
earlier case with a final judgment on the merits, with the same
parties, and with claims arising from the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence as the earlier case.

This case is

therefore barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant
Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal.

June 20, 2011
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
___
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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