ANGLINMATUMONA v. MICRON CORPORATION
Filing
55
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 6/4/2012. (rban, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
TERESSA ANGLINMATUMONA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:11-cv-572 (AJT/TRJ)
v.
MICRON CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this retaliatory discharge action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., plaintiff Teressa Anglinmatumona has filed a Complaint against
her former employer, Micron Corporation ("Micron"), alleging that she was discharged in response
to her complaint about sexual harassment, a protected activity.'
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.
42], which this Court took under advisement on April 24,2012 [Doc. No. 52]. For the reasons
stated herein, the Court grants defendant's motion for summaryjudgment.
UNDISPUTED FACTS.2
On August 28,2006, plaintiff began working for Micron as an engineer at its facility in
Manassas, Virginia. Plaintiffs initial position was "Process Module Owner" in the Dry Etch
1Plaintiff has proceeded pro se in this action. The 29-page complaint does not clearly delineate her
claims, but based on the allegations of the complaint and Plaintiffs opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Court concludes that plaintiffs claim is most appropriately construed as
one of retaliatory discharge under Title VII. See Second Am. Compl. % see e.g., PI. Br. 2, H4.
20;
2As discussed below, plaintiff has failed to provide aseparately captioned section delineating what
material facts she believes to be in dispute, as required by Local Civil Rule 56(B). Plaintiff also
failed to support her opposition with citations to the evidentiary record. Unless otherwise noted, the
Court therefore accepts as undisputed those facts set forth in defendant's statement of undisputed
facts, which are supported by citations to the record.
Department. Her starting salary was $89,000 and she received pay raises to approximately $96,000,
which she received until she was terminated. Shortly after she began, her immediate supervisors
were Honjo Masuji and Harold Carter, the Section Manager of the Dry Etch Department.
Coworkers began complaining about plaintiff almost immediately upon commencement of
her employment. On October 3,2006, a supervisor in another department complained that plaintiff
"was not very courteous to my night shift team member" and "was extremely demanding and was
just short of being rude." Two days later, Masuji received an email from three other employees
complaining about plaintiffs behavior. Those employees discovered an error with plaintiffs work,
after which, as they recalled, "[w]e tried to explain this to the [plaintiff], but she didn't seem to want
to cooperate." Masuji met with plaintiff on October 9,2006, to discuss these incidents and suggest
how plaintiffcould work more cooperatively with others, but she refused to do so. Later, on
January 30,2007, Masuji met with plaintiffand attempted to discuss a project that plaintiffwas
working on; plaintiffresponded to Masuji's suggestions with hostility, making it impossible to
discuss and correct deficiencies in her work product. As a result of that meeting, Masuji sought an
intervention from Carter to assist in articulating how plaintiff could improve her relationships with
coworkers. On January 31,2007, Carter, Masuji, and plaintiff met to discuss her behavior toward
coworkers. At that meeting, plaintiff complained about Masuji's conduct. Plaintiff recalled at her
deposition:
I remember telling Mr. Carter how Honjo had mentioned something about having the
green card or some stuff along that line so that - some of his friends or some stuff
like that and how he was just very touchy-feely.
Plaintiffdid not articulate what she meant by Masuji being"touchy-feely," but stated in her
deposition that she also complained to Carter that Masuji touched her thigh and that Masuji
made an inappropriate hand gesture where he clasped his hands together and rotated his
thumbs. See Def. Ex. 25, at 128-131, 136; Def. Ex. 22, \ 9. Plaintiff contends that her
complaint about Masuji constituted protected activity and that she was later discharged in
retaliation for that protected activity.
The complaints about plaintiffs inability to get along with her coworkers continued.
On April 6,2007, Masuji received a complaint from Micron employee Bill Nelson, whereby
Nelson witnessed plaintiff harassing a coworker about some work. Nelson vented, "This is
truly bad form.... If I were [the coworker] in this case I would be pretty upset and less than
willing to lift a finger for Dry Etch to complete a goal." On April 9, 2007, another Micron
employee, Justin Shields, emailed Carter complaining about plaintiffs hostility toward him
and a coworker. Specifically, when Shields approached plaintiff about her unnecessary
hostility, she responded "this is just the way I am." Other similar incidents occurred on July
26,2007, July 31,2007, August 7,2007, and August 16,2007. These led to several formal
meetings with plaintiff regarding her tendency to act with hostility toward other Micron
employees. Along with feedback from supervisors, Micron employees receive peer reviews
where coworkers rate those who they work with. Plaintiffs two peer reviews, on May 23,
2007 and September 2,2007, were very poor, particularly with respect to her ability to work
well with others.
On September 26, 2007, plaintiff sent an email to Dawn Hutchinson, a human
resources manager, alleging "sexual harassment and retaliation." The email outlined alleged
tensions between her and Masuji, and included a complaint of sexual harassment against
Masuji based on the same alleged conduct she described to Carter in their January 31,2007
meeting. At Hutchison's request, she and plaintiff met to discuss plaintiffs sexual
harassment allegations. At that meeting, Hutchison attempted to discuss the harassment
complaint, but plaintiff avoided the subject and explained that the issue had been "resolved."
Plaintiff had also told Carter on August 7, 2007 that her January 31,2007 complaint about
Masuji had been resolved.
In September 2007, plaintiff was placed on a six-month training rotation. Plaintiff
agreed to the rotation and described it as a "great opportunity" that she was excited about;
plaintiff admitted in her deposition that the terms of her employment did not change with the
reassignment. On October 28,2007, shortly after she began the rotation, a coworker
complained that she was confrontational. That same coworker complained the following
January that she was uncooperative with peers. Due to plaintiffs continuing issues, Gary
Capron, plaintiffs overall supervisor and manager of all engineers in the shift engineering
department, met with her on January 25, 2008 and presented her with a "Corrective Action
Notice," in which he described his concerns about plaintiffs inability to work with her
peers.3 That notice stated:
1. Specific Problem: Teressa is unable to effectively work with her peers and be part
of the Fab 6: Dry Etch Team. Specifically she is unable to effectively communicate
with team members, she isolates herself from the team, and she is disruptive to the
team environment. These types of issues have been documented several times and
they continue to re-occur.
***
2. Improvement Plan: Teressa must make improvements in her ability to be part of
our team. She must recognize that there is a pattern of issues with several different
people and that many people are complaining how difficult it is to work with her.
She must recognize that she is extremely defensive, she has a very difficult time
accepting responsibility for issues, and is very difficult to interact with. Teressa
must make improvements in these areas and her teammates must recognize these
improvements.
Plaintiff refused to sign the notice in compliance with the company's internal policy, which
requires employees to sign an acknowledgement receipt of a Corrective Action Notice to
3Capron had knowledge ofthe complaints about plaintiffs behavior and had personally observed
her behavior on the manufacturing floor.
ensure that the employee and her supervisor have the same understanding of what is
expected of the employee. Based on her refusal to sign an acknowledgement of the
Corrective Action Notice, Capron believed that she would not change her behavior and
decided to terminate her employment with Micron. Capron and Carter met with plaintiff on
January 30,2008 and told her she was being discharged because of insubordinate and
disruptive conduct, and presented her with a discharge sheet stating those reasons. Def. Ex.
19. Plaintiff now claims that she was discharged in retaliation for her January 31,2007
complaint against Masuji, even though Capron did not know, and plaintiff never told him, of
her complaint. Overall, during plaintiffs 17-month tenure at Micron there were no less than
11 documented complaints levied against her by coworkers, two poor peer evaluations, and
at least eight meetings where supervisors attempted to address plaintiffs conduct with her.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summaryjudgment is appropriate only if the record shows that "there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,247-48 (1986); Evans v. Techs.
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1996). The party seeking summary
judgment has the initial burden to show the absence of a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All
U.S. 317, 325 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, All U.S. at 248. Once a
motion for summaryjudgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden
of showingthat a genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Anderson, All U.S. at 247-48 ("[T]he mere existence ofsome alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.") (emphasis in original). Whether a
fact is considered "material" is determined by the substantive law, and "[o]nly disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment." Id. at 248.
The nonmoving party may rebut the motion for summary judgment "by any of the kinds of
evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c)." Celotex, All U.S. at 324. To overcome a motion for
summary judgment, the nonmoving party "'may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own
pleadings' but must 'set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.'" News & Observer
Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Autk, 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)). To support a factual position, a party must cite to particular parts of the evidentiary
record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party fails to properly support an assertion of fact,
the Court may "(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting
materials—including facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4)
issue any other appropriate order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The facts shall be viewed, and all
reasonable inferences drawn, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, All
U.S. at 255; see also Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 2007).
Micron's motion for summary judgment contains a separate section that delineates the
material facts it believes are not in dispute, as required by Local Civil Rule 56(B), and Micron's
motion is supported by citations to the evidentiary record. Plaintiffs opposition, however, does not
include a specifically captioned section listing all material facts as to which she contends there
exists a genuine issue in dispute, as required Local Civil Rule 56(B). That rule states that the
"Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its listing of material facts are
admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to
the motion." See Local Civil Rule 56(B). Further, while plaintiff argues that Micron's evidencebacked factual assertions are incorrect, plaintiff did not attach a single piece of evidence or cite to
any evidence in the record in support of her opposition. The only evidence before the Court is the
evidence that supports Micron's motion. Although documents filedpro se must be "liberally
construed," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2004), plaintiff here has completely failed to
properlyoppose defendant's motion for summaryjudgment. Because plaintiff has not properly
supported any of her factual assertions, the Court will proceed by considering the defendant's facts
undisputed for purposes of the motion and analyze whether the defendant is entitled to summary
judgment based on those undisputed facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3); Local Civil Rule 56(B).
ANALYSIS
A retaliation claim in violation of Title VII is analyzed within the familiar burden-
shifting analysis established by the Supreme Court in McDonnellDouglas. Laughlin v.
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1998). First, plaintiff must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case for retaliation. Id. If
established, Micron has the burden of production to rebut the presumption of retaliation by
providing a non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If Micron is able
satisfy its burden, then the presumption of discrimination "drops from the case" and plaintiff
has the ultimate burdenof proving that she was fired in retaliation. Id. (quoting Texas Dept.
ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981))
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation "a plaintiff must prove three elements:
(1) that she engaged in protected activity; (2) that an adverse employment action was taken
against her, and (3) that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action." Id. (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 11 F.3d 745,
754 (4th Cir. 1996)). First, plaintiff has to burden to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence her prima facie case; however, plaintiff has not supported her memorandum with
any evidence so her claim fails at the outset because she cannot shift the burden to Micron.
See Celotex, All U.S. at 325. Nevertheless, the Court will look to the evidence in the record
before the Court to determine whethera prima facie case can be made out for plaintiff.
Plaintiffcomplained on January 31,2007 that (1) Masuji touched her thigh, (2) he
made a hand gesture which she found inappropriate, and (3) he was a "touchy-feely" person.
The Court will assume, withoutdeciding, that her complaint was a protected activity and
that, because she was fired in 2008, an adverse employment action was taken against her.
However, the evidence is insufficient to allow any reasonable fact finder to conclude that
there was causal link between her protected activity and her discharge.
First, plaintiffherselfadmitted during a counseling meeting with Carter in August
2007, and during her meeting with Hutchison on September 27,2007, that hercomplaint
against Mansuji had been resolved, weakening any inference that might have been otherwise
supported causality.
Second, Capron, the Micron representative that decided to discharge plaintiff, had no
knowledge of her prior complaint. If the relevant decision maker is unaware of the
protected activity, then the plaintiff cannot establish the necessary causal link between that
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Dowe v. Total Action Against
Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Since, by definition, an
employer cannot take action because of a factor of which it is unaware, the employer's
knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity is absolutely necessary to
establish the third element of the prima facie case."). Because Capron did not know that
plaintiff had engaged in an allegedly protected activity, there can be no causal link between
the activity and the discharge.4
Third, the temporal proximity between plaintiffs complaint and her discharge was
too attenuated to support a finding of causation, even if Capron had knowledge of plaintiffs
complaint against Mansuji a year earlier. Plaintiffs complaint came on January 31,2007
and her Corrective Action Notice and discharge came in late January 2008, almost exactly a
year later.5 This is simply too long a period oftime to permit an inference ofcausality. See
King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a two-month delay
between the protected activity and the adverse action is "sufficiently long so as to weaken
the inference of causation," though that fact by itself does not render a prima facie claim
unsuccessful); Pascual v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 193 F. App'x 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2006)
(finding that a period of three to four months between the complaint and the adverse
employment action was "too long to establish a causal connection by temporal proximity
4Plaintiffargues, "Contrary; to micron's statement; Mr. Gary Capron had knowledge that
pro se Plaintiff had made several complaints of harassment; since she followed through with
her supervisor's request to discuss the matter with him [sic]." PI. Br. 6. However, plaintiff
provides no citations to the record that would support this assertion and has therefore failed
to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to any material fact.
5Plaintiffargues that her six-month training rotation was an adverse employment action. However,
by her own admission, she described the rotation as a "new opportunity" that she was excited about
and that she did not regard this rotation as a change in terms of her employment. The Court
therefore concludes as a matter of law that the only adverse employment action plaintiff
experienced was her discharge. See Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253,256-57 (4th Cir. 1999).
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alone."). In short, "a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the
protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action ... negates any inference that
a causal connection exists between the two." Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. For the above reasons,
the Court finds and concludes that as a matter of law plaintiff has failed to establish a prima
facie case for a retaliatory discharge.
Even assuming that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for discrimination,
defendant has adequately rebutted that presumption as a matterof law by providinga
legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for the discharge. To meet its burden under
the McDonnell Douglas test, Micron need only make "an initial showing" that its decision to
discharge plaintiff was not for retaliatory reasons. This burden is one of production and not
of persuasion. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc, 530U.S. 133,142 (2000). If the
defendant satisfies its burden, then the plaintiffhas the ultimate burden to provethat
retaliation was the true motive in her discharge. Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 258. Micron has
provided evidence of substantial and repeated instances where coworkers complained of
plaintiffs conduct in the workplace. Beginning almost immediately upon heremployment
with Micron, and spanning the entire period of that employment, plaintiff haddifficulties
working with her peers and she continually disrupted the workplace. Her conduct led to
several meetings with supervisors to address her problems. Finally, on January 25, 2008,
Capron issued a Corrective Action Notice, which described plaintiffs conduct and what she
needed to do to avoid further disciplinary action and possibletermination. Def. Ex. 18.
Plaintiff refused to accept the corrective action and asa result of herrefusal, Capron
concluded that there was no alternative but to discharge her. Def. Ex. 24,1fl| 11-12. Based
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on these undisputed facts, the Court finds as a matter of law that Micron has established a
non-discriminatory reason for plaintiffs discharge
With the burden shifted back to plaintiff, the Court finds that she has failed to create
a genuine issue of material fact concerning whetherthese proffered legitimate business
reasons were a pretext for retaliation. Again, plaintiff has not cited to any evidence in the
record in support of a claim of pretext; and because she has not done so, there is no evidence
to demonstrate that she was discharged because she engaged in a protected activity.6 The
Court therefore concludes that, even if the Court were to find that plaintiff has made a prima
facie case for retaliatory discharge, Micron has provided a satisfactory, and well-supported,
legitimate business reason for discharging plaintiff and she has failed to raise sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to find that such reasons were a pretext for illegal
retaliation.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant defendant's motion for summary
judgment on multiple grounds. Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case for
retaliatory discharge under the McDonnell Douglas test because there is insufficient
evidence to establish a causal link between plaintiffs complaint and her discharge almost a
year later. Alternatively, the Court concludes that even if plaintiff had made out a prima
facie case, Micron has articulated a legitimate business reason for discharging plaintiff and,
with the burden shifting back to plaintiff, she has failed to carry her burden in establishing
6Plaintiffs contention that "[t]he reasons given for pro se Plaintiff['s] unlawful termination [are]
'untrue'" is insufficient, without any cited evidence, to create a material issue of fact. See PI. Br. 5,
113.
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that the real reason for her discharge was retalialion. Therefore, Micron's motion for
summary judgment is granted.
The Court will issue an appropriate Order.
The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of
record and to plaintiff Teressa Anglinmatumona,/wo se.
Anthony /. Trenga
United States District Judge
Alexandria. Virginia
June 4,2012
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