Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. B-Entrepreneur.com et al

Filing 22

OBJECTION to 21 Report and Recommendations by Entrepreneur Media, Inc.. (Zurawski, Tara)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division ENTREPRENEUR MEDIA, INC., PLAINTIFF, v. B-ENTREPRENEUR.COM & SENTREPRENEUR.COM, each an Internet Domain Name, DEFENDANTS. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-583-AJT-TCB PLAINTIFF ENTREPRENEUR MEDIA, INC.’S OBJECTION TO THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), Plaintiff Entrepreneur Media, Inc. (“EMI”) respectfully submits the following objection to footnote 2 of the Report and Recommendation issued on January 31, 2012 (Dkt. No. 21) as to Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment in the above-captioned matter. EMI contends that, contrary to footnote 2, a plaintiff can claim bad faith cyberpiracy as set forth in 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(d)(1)(A), when bringing an action in rem under 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(d)(2). EMI does not object to any other portion of the Report and Recommendation. ARGUMENT Footnote 2 of the Report and Recommendation reads as follows: Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support its of Motion for Default Judgment incorrectly asserts that plaintiff must show a violation of the 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) to prevail on its in rem claim. Section 1125(d)(1)(A) governs in personam civil actions against trademark infringers. See Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 298 (2d. Cir. 2002). When proceeding in rem, the Act requires plaintiffs to show that the Infringing Domain Names violate any rights in a registered mark, or any rights protected under subsections (a) or (c). Id. at § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i); see also Volkswagen, AG v. Volkswagentalk.com, 584 F. Supp. 2d. 879, 882 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2008). Based on the facts asserted in the Verified Complaint, the undersigned has elected to analyze plaintiff’s motion under the requirements of a trademark infringement action. Report and Recommendation at 8, n.2 (Dkt. No. 21). EMI agrees that under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2), a Plaintiff may prevail in an in rem action against a domain name by showing federal trademark infringement under Section 1125(a) or dilution under Section 1125(c). EMI also agrees that the S-Entrepreneur.com and BEntrepreneur.com domain names (“Infringing Domain Names”) infringe EMI’s federally registered trademarks under Section 1125(a). However, EMI submits that, based on the language of Section 1125(d)(2), under Fourth Circuit precedent, and consistent with the practice of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, a plaintiff may also plead a bad faith claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) in an in rem action brought pursuant to § 1125(d)(2). Section 1125(d)(2) of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (the “ACPA”) allows for in rem actions regarding domain names. Specifically, Section 1125(d)(2) provides that in rem actions can be brought when “the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c) of this section.” 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The phrase “any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office” encompasses a bad faith cyberpiracy action brought under Section 1125(d)(1)(A). In Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, an in rem action under the ACPA, the Fourth Circuit interpreted “any right of the owner of a mark” to encompass claims brought under Section 1125(d)(1)(A). Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d 214, 228 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit noted: “The broad language “any right of the owner of a mark” . . . appears to include any right a trademark owner has with respect to the mark. This language, by itself, would include rights under § 1125(d)(1) . . . [for marks registered with the USPTO].” Id. Accordingly, after 2 analyzing the statute and considering at length the claims available in an in rem action under 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(d)(2), the Fourth Circuit held: Thus, we conclude that the best interpretation of § 1125(d)(2) is that the in rem provision not only covers bad faith claims under § 1125(d)(1), but also covers infringement claims under § 1114 and § 1125(a) and dilution claims under § 1125(c). Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d 214 at 232 (emphasis added).1 Other decisions in the Eastern District of Virginia are in accord with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Harrods. This Court routinely analyzes in rem cyberpiracy claims under the bad faith standard set forth in Section 1125(d)(1)(A). See Volvo Trademark Holding AB v. Volvospares.com, 703 F.Supp.2d 563, 567, (E.D. Va. 2010) (Trenga, J.) (awarding summary judgment in in rem action based on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Continentalair.com, No. 1:09cv0770, 2009 WL 4884534, *8 (E.D. Va. 2009) (awarding default judgment in in rem action against domain name and applying test in § 1125(d)(1)(A)); AgriSupply Company, Inc. v. Agrisupply.Com, 457 F.Supp.2d 660, 663 (E.D. Va. 2006) (awarding default judgment in in rem action for cybersquatting and applying factors in § 1125(d)(1)(A)). Accordingly, EMI contends that footnote 2 of the Report and Recommendation is erroneous to the extent it suggests that in rem actions can only be brought based on federal trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) or dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 1 Footnote 2 cites Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, a Second Circuit opinion, to support the proposition that 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(A) governs in personam actions, but that case does not state or imply that an in rem plaintiff cannot also claim bad faith cyberpiracy under § 1125 (d)(1)(A). Mattel, Inc., 310 F.3d 293, 298 (2d. Cir. 2002). The other opinion cited, Volkswagen, AG v. Volkswagentalk.com, 584 F. Supp. 2d. 879, 882 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2008), is not binding on this Court, and itself does not cite any authority. 3 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, EMI respectfully requests that footnote 2 to the Report and Recommendation be omitted from the Court’s final ruling. Dated: February 7, 2012 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Tara Lynn R. Zurawski Edwin L. Fountain (Va. Bar No. 31918) Tara Lynn R. Zurawski (Va. Bar No. 73602) Lucy Jewett Wheatley (Va. Bar. No. 77459) JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 879-3939 Facsimile: (202) 626-1700 Email: elfountain@jonesday.com Email: tzurawski@jonesday.com Email: lwheatley@jonesday.com Mark A. Finkelstein JONES DAY 3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 800 Irvine, CA 92612 Telephone: (949) 553-7502 Facsimile: (949) 553-7539 Email: mafinkelstein@jonesday.com Counsel for Plaintiff Entrepreneur Media, Inc. 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 7th day of February, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the EC/ECF system and that a true and correct copy of the foregoing and a copy of the Notification of Electronic Filing (NEF) were sent to the following nonfiling users by electronic mail: Registrants: Pamela Lynn 2445 McCabe Way, Suite 400 Irvine, CA 92614 admin@b-entrepreneur.com B-ENTREPRENEUR.COM Entrepreneur Inc. Verita Powell 2445 McCabe Way, Suite 400 Irvine, CA 92614 admin@s-entrepreneur.com S-ENTREPRENEUR.COM By: /s/ Tara Lynn R. Zurawski ______________________________ Tara Lynn R. Zurawski (Va. Bar No. 73602) JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 879-3939 Facsimile: (202) 626-1700 Email: tzurawski@jonesday.com 5

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