Blackstock v. Hufford
Filing
7
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Transfer is without prejudice to petitioner reinstating the action in this court, or filing a new petition in any district of confinement, if the sentencing court denies or dismisses the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.Signed by Honorable Malcolm Muir on 6/20/11. (bw, ) [Transferred from Pennsylvania Middle on 6/21/2011.]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IAN RALPH BLACKSTOCK,
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Petitioner
vs.
H.L. HUFFORD,
Respondent
No. 4:CV-11-0791
(Petition Filed 04/25/11)
(Judge Muir)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
June 20, 2011
Petitioner,
Ian
Ralph
Blackstock,
an
inmate
currently
confined in the Schuylkill Federal Correctional Institution,
Minersville, Pennsylvania, filed this petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court will transfer the instant petition for
writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia.
Procedural Background
On December 2, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of guilty in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, to two counts of using and carrying a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§
924(c)(1)
(Doc.
1,
petition).
He
was
aggregate term of 25 years imprisonment.
Id.
of his conviction was filed.
sentenced
to
an
No direct appeal
Id.
On May 10, 2001, Blackstock filed with the sentencing court
a document entitled “motion for an order to produce books,
papers, documents, tangible objects.” (Doc. 2, Memorandum of Law
in support of petition). By Order dated June 4, 2001, the
sentencing court construed this motion as a motion to vacate,
set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
and denied the petitioner’s § 2255 motion.
On
June
18,
2001,
petitioner
Id.
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration of the sentencing court’s Order dated June 4,
2001.
Id.
By Order dated July 3, 2001, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Id.
On September 7, 2005, petitioner filed a Rule 60(b) motion,
seeking that the Court set aside the 2001 ruling for improperly
converting his motion.
Id.
Along with his Rule 60(b) motion,
petitioner filed a § 2255 motion.
Id.
By Order dated October 7, 2005, the District Court denied
the Rule 60(b) motion and dismissed the § 2255 motion as
2
successive.
Id. A timely certificate of appealability from the
denial of the Rule 60(b) motion was filed.
Id.
On January 9, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case
pursuant to United States v. Castro. See United States v.
Blackstock, 513 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Castro, 540 U.S. 375 (2003) (holding that if the district
court
fails
to
give
notice
regarding
the
consequences
of
re-characterization of a motion “the motion cannot be considered
to have become a § 2255 motion for purposes of applying to later
motions the law’s ‘second or successive’ restrictions.”)).
On remand, the district court found the section 2255 motion
untimely but opined that Blackstock had a potentially valid
argument that his convictions are invalid because they are based
on facts that do not constitute a crime in light of the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Watson v. United States, 552 U.S.
74 (2007).
The
(Doc. 2, Memorandum of Law in support of petition).
district
court
declined
to
address
the
merits
of
a
“theoretical § 2241 habeas petition that petitioner may file at
some point in the future” because the issue before the court was
Blackstock’s section 2255 motion. Id.
3
A timely certificate of
appealability was filed from the denial of the Section 2255
motion.
Id.
On December 20, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court
denying the § 2255 motion.
Id.
On April 25, 2011, Blackstock filed the instant section 2241
petition challenging his sentence pursuant to Watson, supra.
On
May
26,
2011,
respondent
filed
a
response
to
the
petition, requesting that the Court transfer the petition to the
sentencing court in the Eastern District of Virginia.
response).
(Doc. 6,
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant
the respondent’s request to transfer.
DISCUSSION
“The
federal
habeas
corpus
statute
straightforwardly
provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is 'the
person who has custody over [the petitioner].
see
also
§
2243.
.
.
.'[T]hese
28 U.S.C. § 2242,
provisions
contemplate
a
proceeding against some person who has the immediate custody of
the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such
party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no
sufficient reason is shown to the contrary.”
4
Rumsfeld v.
Padilla,
524
U.S.
426,
original)(citations omitted).
443
(2004)(emphasis
in
There is no question that under
the immediate-custodian rule set forth in Rumsfeld, this Court
has
jurisdiction
over
Blackstock’s
petition.
However,
notwithstanding the issue of jurisdiction, a court may transfer
any
civil
action
for
the
convenience
of
the
parties
or
witnesses, or in the interest of justice, to any district where
the action might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); See
also, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484
(1973).
In the instant case, there are certainly sound reasons for
transferring the 2241 petition to the district of conviction and
sentencing.
The
record
necessary witnesses.
is
there,
and
most
probably
any
Additionally, that court may have greater
flexibility in shaping any new sentence.
In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d
521, 527 (3d Cir.2001); see also United States v. Mata, 133 F.3d
200, 201-02 (2d Cir.1998). Moreover, the sentencing court would
also have “superior familiarity with the underlying conviction
and sentence,” Short v. Schultz, No. 08-186, 2008 WL 305594, at
*3 (D.N.J. Jan.28, 2008).
5
While section 1404(a) authorizes transfer only to a district
where the petition “might have been brought,” and a section 2241
petitioner challenging his present physical custody is governed
by the territorial-jurisdictional rule which requires that the
petition
be
filed
“in
the
district
of
confinement”,
see
Rumsfeld, supra, this Court finds that the government’s request
to transfer the petition to the sentencing court acts as a
waiver of the territorial-jurisdiction rule.
Before Rumsfeld was decided, the territorial-jurisdiction
rule led the Third Circuit to seriously doubt that a section
2241 petition could be transferred to the district of sentencing
since
the
petition
could
not
“have
been
brought”
in
that
district when it had to have been filed in the district of
confinement.
In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d at 525-26.
Consequently,
in In re Nwanze the court allowed such a transfer only when it
was plausible that the petitioner's claims could be entertained
in the district of sentencing in some other way. Id. at 526.
In
that case, the Third Circuit was satisfied that the district of
6
sentencing (located in the Fourth Circuit) would entertain the
claims by way of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Id.1
However, in Rumsfeld, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring
opinion (joined by Justice O'Connor) in which he stated his view
that “the proper location of a habeas petition [was] best
understood as a question of personal jurisdiction or venue.” 542
U .S. at 451.
As a venue rule, the territorial-jurisdiction
rule could be waived by the government. Id. at 452.2
Based on Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, lower courts
have ruled that the government can waive the immediate-custodian
and territorial-jurisdiction rules. See Gooden v. Gonzales, 162
Fed. Appx. 28, 29 (2d Cir.2005) (“the government does not
1.
But in the event the sentencing court denied the petition
on jurisdictional grounds, the court of appeals allowed the
petitioner to again seek relief in the district of
confinement. 242 F.3d at 527.
2.
Justice Kennedy cited Moore v. Olson, 368 F.3d 757, 759-60
(7th Cir.2004), where the Seventh Circuit likened the
immediate-custodian rule to a personal-jurisdiction rule and
the territorial jurisdiction rule to a venue rule. Petitioner
has named his immediate custodian as the respondent, but
having to do so raises issues of personal jurisdiction over
the custodian when considering a transfer of the petition from
the district of confinement to the district of sentencing.
7
contend in this appeal that the Attorney General is an improper
respondent, or that the Eastern District of New York is an
improper venue for this suit, and as such, those arguments have
been waived,” citing Justice Kennedy's concurrence); see also
McKenzie v. INS, No. 04-1001, 2005 WL 452371, at *3 (E.D.Pa.
Feb.23, 2005) (observing that an immigrant's habeas petition
should have been filed against his immediate custodian, the
warden of the York County Prison, and in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania,
which
had
territorial
jurisdiction,
but
considering the merits of the petition because under Justice
Kennedy's Rumsfeld concurrence, the government did not raise
those issues and thus waived them).
Closer to the facts of this case, it has been recognized
that the district of sentencing can adjudicate a section 2241
petition presenting a Watson claim when the government does not
object either on personal-jurisdiction or venue grounds. See Cox
v.
Holt,
No.
1:08-cv-2268
(M.D.
Pa.
2009)
(Caldwell,
J.)
(transferring a Watson claim to the sentencing court without
prejudice to Cox reinstating the action in the present district
or file a new petition in any district of confinement) (citing
Short v. Shultz, No. 08-57, 2008 WL 1984262, at *3 (W.D.Va. May
8
6, 2008), aff'd on other grounds, 298 Fed. Appx. 246 (4th
Cir.2008), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1376, 173
L.Ed.2d 631 (2009)).3 In these circumstances, courts have also
considered a government motion to transfer to the district of
sentencing
as
a
waiver
territorial-jurisdiction
of
personal-jurisdiction
objections.
Ulloa
v.
Ledezma,
or
No.
08-864, 2009 WL 2351710, at *4 n. 3 (W.D.Okla. July 28, 2009).
The Court treats respondent's request to transfer this
petition
to
the
sentencing
court
territorial-jurisdiction rule.
as
a
waiver
of
the
As such, the Court will grant
the request as the convenience of the parties and the other
factors mentioned above favor a transfer to the sentencing
court.
527,
However, in line with In re Nwanze, supra, 242 F.3d at
transfer
will
be
without
prejudice
to
petitioner's
reinstating the action in this court, or filing a new petition
3.
Short had been transferred to the District of West
Virginia, the district of sentencing, by the District of New
Jersey, the district of confinement, after the latter court
concluded in line with In re Nwanze, supra, 242 F.3d 521, that
Fourth Circuit law authorized the District of West Virginia to
entertain the petition as one for coram nobis relief. Short v.
Shultz, No. 08-186, 2008 WL 305594, at * 2-3 (D.N.J. Jan.28,
2008).
9
in any new district of confinement, if the sentencing court
denies or dismisses the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: June 20, 2011
s/Malcolm Muir
MUIR
United States District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IAN RALPH BLACKSTOCK,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Petitioner
vs.
H.L. HUFFORD,
Respondent
No. 4:CV-11-0791
(Petition Filed 04/25/11)
(Judge Muir)
ORDER
June 20, 2011
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the Clerk of Court
shall TRANSFER this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
Virginia.
2.
Transfer is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to petitioner reinstating
the action in this court, or filing a new petition in
any new district of confinement, if the sentencing
court denies or dismisses the petition for lack of
jurisdiction
3.
The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
s/Malcolm Muir
MUIR
United States District Judge
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