Abusamhadaneh v. Taylor et al
Filing
71
MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 63 Second MOTION for Protective Order by Jamal Abusamhadaneh. (See Memorandum Opinion For Details). Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 6/5/12. (nhall)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
JAMAL ABUSAMHADANEH,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
SARAH TAYLOR, et al.,
Defendants.
1:11cv939 (JCC/TCB)
M E M O R A N D U M
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion
for Protective Order.
[Dkt. 63.]
For the reasons stated below,
the Court will grant in part, and deny in part, this Motion.
I.
Background
On May 25, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Protective Order seeking to seal different types of information
and restrict it from public viewing.
[Dkt. 63.]
On May 30,
2012, Defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion to Seal.
[Dkt. 66.]
This Court held a hearing on the Motion on June 1,
2012.
II.
Standard of Review
Under well-established Fourth Circuit precedent, there
is a presumption in favor of public access to judicial records
and a district court has the authority to seal court documents
1
only “if the public’s right of access is outweighed by competing
interests.”
Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th
Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235
(4th Cir. 1984)).
“The right of public access to documents or
materials filed in a district court derives from two independent
sources: the common law and the First Amendment.”
Va. Dep't of
State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004).
“The common law presumes a right to inspect and copy
judicial records and documents.”
Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med.
Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Nixon v.
Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)).
“‘This
presumption of access, however, can be rebutted if
countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests
in access,’ and ‘the party seeking to overcome the presumption
bears the burden of showing some significant interest that
outweighs the presumption.’”
Va. Dep't of State Police, 386
F.3d at 575 (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846
F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)).
The First Amendment guarantee of access, however, has
been “extended only to particular judicial records and
documents,” such as exhibits filed in connection with plea
hearings and sentencing hearings in criminal cases, and trial
proceedings and dispositive motions in civil cases.
F.2d at 180.
Stone, 855
Where the First Amendment does guarantee access,
2
the access “may be denied only on the basis of a compelling
governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.”
Id. (citing Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
Regardless of whether the right of access arises from
the First Amendment or the common law, it “may be abrogated only
in unusual circumstances.”
Stone, 855 F.2d at 182.
When
presented with a request to seal judicial records or documents,
a district court must comply with certain substantive and
procedural requirements.
Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253.
As to the
substance, the district court first “must determine the source
of the right of access with respect to each document,” because
“only then can it accurately weigh the competing interests at
stake.”
Stone, 855 F.2d at 181.
A district court must then
weigh the appropriate competing interests under the following
procedure: “it must (1) give public notice of the request to
seal and allow interested parties a reasonable opportunity to
object, (2) consider less drastic alternatives to sealing the
documents, and (3) provide specific reasons and factual findings
supporting its decision to seal the documents and for rejecting
the alternatives.”
Ashcraft, 218 F.3d at 288 (citing Stone, 855
F.2d at 181; In re the Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d at 235).
III. Analysis
3
Plaintiff essentially seeks to seal two types of
information filed in conjunction with a bench trial held before
this Court on March 13, 14, and 15, 2012: personal identifiers
and information relating to an alleged shoplifting incident that
has been expunged by the Fairfax County Circuit Court.
This Court will grant Plaintiff’s request to redact
personal identifiers, as they are subject to special local rules
for exclusion.
See E.D. Va. Civ. R. 7(C)(1)&(2).
Plaintiff’s
request to seal information related to the alleged shoplifting
incident will not, however, be granted.
Plaintiff seeks to seal information from trial
proceedings, and so the First Amendment right of access is
applicable.
Plaintiff already raised the issue of limiting
Defendants’ inquiry into the incident, or alternatively sealing
the record with regard to any testimony regarding the incident.
(March 13, 2012 Tr. [Dkt. 49] 5:25-11:15.)
In recognition of
the fact that the Fourth Circuit has strict standards and
procedures for closing a courtroom during trial,1 this Court
ruled against Plaintiff.
1
“[T]here is a strong presumption in favor of openness: Closed proceedings .
. . must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of
openness. . . . The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest
is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing
court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. . . .
Even with findings adequate to support closure, the trial court must consider
alternatives before the courtroom can be closed constitutionally. . . .
To facilitate a trial court’s case-by-case determination of closure,
representatives of the press and general public must be given an opportunity
to be heard on the question of their exclusion. When a closure motion is
4
Also, Plaintiff’s argument that the information about
his alleged arrest, including the testimony and police
investigative reports, is protected by an expungement order from
Fairfax County Circuit Court is unavailing.
In filing an
application for naturalization, Plaintiff submitted himself to
full scrutiny of his background, including his “good moral
character.”
And in the Good Moral Character section of the
naturalization application, the applicant is instructed that he
must answer the questions on the application even if his
“records were sealed or otherwise cleared or if anyone,
including a judge, law enforcement officer, or attorney, told
you that you no longer have a record.”
(See Joint Exs. 1 & 2.)
The power to naturalize an alien as a citizen of the
United States lies in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government.
See 8 U.S.C. 1421.
And, as the Supreme Court held
in Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630, 638 (1967),
“The government is entitled to know of any facts that may bear
on an applicant’s statutory eligibility for citizenship, so that
it may pursue leads and made further investigation if doubts are
raised.”
Thus, Virginia’s process for accessing expunged
information does not overcome this Court’s use of the
information in naturalization hearings.
made in open court, persons present must be given notice and an opportunity
to object before the public can be excluded.” In re Knight Pub. Co., 743
F.2d at 234 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
5
The public’s right of access is an important one.
The
ability of the press and public to watch over court proceedings
helps ensure the fair, impartial, and effective administration
of justice.
Plaintiff has not presented any compelling
government interest that warrants sealing.
And, the Court does
not find that expungement is an unusual circumstance that
compels sealing significant portions of this case.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant in
part, and deny in part, Plaintiff’s Motion in accordance with
this Memorandum Opinion.
An appropriate Order will issue.
June 5, 2012
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?