Abusamhadaneh v. Taylor et al
Filing
82
MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 73 MOTION to Amend/Correct 69 Memorandum Opinion Pursuant to Rule 59(e) by Michael Aytes, Eric J. Holder, Alejandro Mayorkas, Janet Napolitano, Sarah Taylor, Kimberly Zanotti. (See Memorandum Opinion For Details). Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 7/20/12. (nhall)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
JAMAL ABUSAMHADANEH,
Plaintiff
v.
SARAH TAYLOR, et al.,
Defendants.
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1:11cv939 (JCC/TCB)
M E M O R A N D U M
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion
to Alter or Amend Certain Adverse Credibility Findings in the
Memorandum Opinion of June 5, 2012 (the Motion).
[Dkt. 73.]
For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny this motion.
I.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) governs motions
to alter or amend a judgment and states only that such a motion
“must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the
judgment.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
The Fourth Circuit has made
it clear, however, that “[a] district court has the discretion
to grant a Rule 59(e) motion only in very narrow circumstances:
(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2)
to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
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Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Collison v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
A party’s mere
disagreement with the court’s ruling does not warrant a Rule
59(e) motion, and such motions should not be used “to raise
arguments which could have been raised prior to the issuance of
the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel
legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the
first instance.”
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998).
Rather, the purpose of a Rule
59(e) motion is to allow “a district court to correct its own
errors, ‘sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden
of unnecessary appellate proceedings.’”
Id. (quoting Russell v.
Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir.
1995)).
A Rule 59(e) motion is “an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.”
II.
Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
Analysis
Defendants request this Court to alter certain adverse
credibility findings in its June 5, 2012, Memorandum Opinion in
order to “prevent manifest injustice” under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e).
(Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 74] at 1-2.)
Defendants want this Court to modify its credibility findings
regarding three witnesses and essentially request the Court to
find and state that it did not have any concerns about the
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veracity of the testimony of those witnesses.
The Court
declines to do so, believing the extensive credibility findings
in the Memorandum Opinion are clear.
The Court must make the
necessary Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 findings.
And, in
making credibility findings, “[i]t is understandable, and nonactionable, that the social atmosphere of an afternoon tea party
may not prevail . . . .”
Dale v. Bartels, 552 F. Supp. 1253,
1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 732 F.2d 278, 285 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Court notes that
each case stands on its own merits and the credibility of
witnesses in this case does not determine their credibility in
the future.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny
Defendants’ Motion.
An appropriate Order will issue.
July 20, 2012
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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