Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCarthy
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION: Having determined that after Stern, the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction to hear, but not decide, fraudulent conveyances actions and that the traditional factors for analyzing a motion for withdrawal of reference weigh against withdrawal, defendant's Motion to Withdraw the Reference of Adversary Proceeding will be denied by an Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 11/18/11. (yguy)
E=lxx^i
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE j "OV /
82Q\I
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
- .I
I CLERK, u
a\ ri.i
In re:
OSAMA M.
EL-ATARI,
Debtor
KEVIN R.
MCCARTHY,
l:llcvl090 (LMB/IDD)
Plaintiff,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A.,
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank,
"defendant")
N.A ("Wells Fargo" or
has filed a Motion to Withdraw the Reference of
Adversary Proceeding, in which it seeks to have a fraudulent
conveyance proceeding withdrawn from the bankruptcy court to
district court.
For the reasons discussed below,
defendant's
motion will be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
In May 2008, Wells Fargo loaned $8 million to Osama ElAtari {"El-Atari or "debtor"). See Def.
to Withdraw
{"Def.'s Mot.")
Wells Fargo Bank's Mot
at 2. A few months later,
Wells
Fargo became concerned about El-Atari after learning he was
"making false statements to Wells Fargo," and, on that basis, it
accelerated the payoff requirements and demanded immediate
repayment. Def.'s Mot. at 2.1 In October 2008, El-Atari satisfied
the Wells Fargo debt with an $8 million check. Id.
El-Atari has since been convicted of operating "a massive
fraudulent scheme," in which he obtained bank loans totaling
over $50 million by using fabricated life insurance policies as
securities for the loans. Trustee's Opp'n to Mot.
to Withdraw
("PL's Opp'n") at 3-4.2 He has been brought into involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code after three of his creditors named him in a chapter 7
petition. Id. Plaintiff Kevin R. McCarthy, who was appointed the
interim trustee for the bankruptcy estate, has filed adversary
proceedings in the bankruptcy court against Wells Fargo and over
forty other entities to recover what he alleges to be fraudulent
conveyances under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 548(a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B). Id. at
4-5.
1 Defendant adds that "[a]t the time of this demand, Wells Fargo
was unaware that the Debtor had lied about
the Loan."
Def.'s Mot.
at 2.
the collateral
for
The trustee characterizes Wells
Fargo's behavior somewhat differently: "Following its discovery
of the Debtor's fraud, Wells Fargo declared the loan in default
and pressured the Debtor to find a way to quickly repay the
money due." Trustee's Opp'n to Mot. to Withdraw ("PL's Opp'n")
at
4.
2 El-Atari pled guilty to bank fraud and other criminal charges
and is serving a twelve-year prison sentence. PL's Opp'n at 4.
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendant has moved this Court
to exercise
discretionary powers under 28 U.S.C.
its
§ 157(d) to withdraw the
trustee's fraudulent conveyance action on the grounds that,
first,
the bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority under
Stern v. Marshall,
131 S. Ct.
2594
(2011),
to hear and decide
the adversary proceeding; second, withdrawing the reference
serves the interest of judicial economy because the same facts
are at issue in Northern Trust Bank,
FSB v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. l:llcv521(CMH/JFA) (E.D. Va. May 13, 2011)3; and third,
the bankruptcy court lacks the authority to conduct a jury trial
should Wells Fargo choose to exercise its Seventh Amendment
right. See Def.'s Mot. at 3. The trustee objects to each of
defendant's stated grounds.
A. Statutory Framework
District courts "have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases under title 11" and "original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C.
3 Northern Bank is the institution from which debtor secured a
loan to repay the $8 million to Wells Fargo.
It has sued Wells
Fargo on six counts, including aiding and abetting fraud,
constructive fraud, and conversion. Complaint at 8-13, Northern
Trust Bank,
FSB v. Wells Fargo Bank,
(CMH/JFA)(E.D. Va. May 13, 2011).
N.A.,
No.
I:llcv521
§§ 1334(a),(b). The district courts have discretion to refer
"any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11" to the bankruptcy judges for that district. 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(a). Reference by the district court may permit the
bankruptcy judge both to hear and determine issues,
ultimately
"enter[ing] appropriate orders and judgments," or it may allow
that judge only to propose findings of fact and conclusions of
law,
which the district court then reviews de novo.
§§ 157(b)(1),
(c)(1). The bankruptcy court's authority to enter
a final order depends on whether the issue at hand is deemed a
"core proceeding." § 157(b)(2).
Under § 157(b)(1),
"bankruptcy courts may hear and enter
final judgments in *core proceedings' in a bankruptcy case"
while § 157(c)(1) provides that in "non-core proceedings, the
bankruptcy courts instead submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court,
for that court's
review and issuance of final judgment." Stern,
131 S. Ct. at
2601-02. Among the enumerated types of core proceedings are
fraudulent conveyance actions.
B. Effect of Stern v.
§ 157(b)(2)(H).
Marshall
Wells Fargo's primary argument is that the adversary
proceeding should be withdrawn following the Supreme Court's
decision in Stern v.
Marshall.
Stern addressed whether a
counterclaim that § 157(b)(2)(C)
defines as "core," but which
was essentially a claim under state law, could be properly
decided by a non-Article III judge. The Court held that because
the state law claim raised in the counterclaim was "in no way
derived from or dependent upon bankruptcy law" and "exists
without regard to bankruptcy proceedings," the bankruptcy court,
as a non-Article III court,
did not have the constitutional
authority to enter a final judgment on that claim. 131 S. Ct. at
2618. In light of § 157's unequivocal grant of authority to
bankruptcy courts to decide such claims, the constitutional
question could not be avoided to save the provision at issue,
and the Court held that "Congress,
in one isolated respect,
exceeded [the] limitation [of Article III] in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1984." Id^ at 2620.
Although Stern addressed a different type of "core"
adversary proceeding than the one at issue here, defendant
argues that Stern "made clear that fraudulent conveyance claims
like the one asserted in [this] Adversary Proceeding may not be
heard and determined by a non-Article III bankruptcy court,
even
though 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) designates as core proceedings
'proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances.'" Def.'s Mot. at 5. Defendant finds support for its
argument in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 4 92 U.S. 33
(1989), which addressed the right to a jury trial on a
fraudulent conveyance claim brought by the trustee against a
third party who had filed no claim against the bankruptcy
estate. Id. at 36. The Court explained that, although a core
proceeding, a fraudulent conveyance action is akin to a common
law contract suit rather than an intertwined component of
federal regulation, and the right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment therefore attaches.
Id.
at 54-56,
64-65.
The
Stern Court confirmed the Granf inane iera view in its discussion
of actions "at common law that simply attempt[]
to augment the
bankruptcy estate [which are] the very type of claim that we
held in . . . Granfinanciera must be decided by an Article III
court." Stern,
131 S. Ct. at 2616. Stern,
together with
Granfinanciera, clearly supports the conclusion that the
authority to issue a final decision in a fraudulent conveyance
action is reserved for Article III courts.
Express Co.(In re Canopy Fin.,
See Paloian v.
Am.
Inc.), No. 11 C 5360, 2011 WL
3911082, at *2 (N.D. 111. Sept. 1, 2011)("[B]y likening the
claim in question to the fraudulent conveyance claims in
Granfinanciera,
the Stern Court made clear that the Bankruptcy
Court lacks constitutional authority to enter final judgment on
the
[fraudulent conveyance]
claims presented here.").
Finding that Stern precludes bankruptcy judges from issuing
final orders in fraudulent conveyance proceedings4 does not,
however,
lead inexorably to the further conclusion that
defendant's motion for withdrawal of the reference must be
granted, because bankruptcy courts also have jurisdiction to
"hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is
otherwise related to a case under title 11."
§ 157(c)(1). Under
this provision, after overseeing discovery and taking evidence,
the bankruptcy judge submits proposed legal and factual findings
to the district court,
which then reviews the matter de novo and
issues a final decision. Id. Regardless of whether the effect of
4 Although this conclusion has been reached by all of the
district courts that have addressed the issue to date,
there is
contrary authority among the bankruptcy courts. See In re Safety
Harbor Resort and Spa, No. 8:10-bk-25886,
*10-11 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2011):
2011 WL 3849639,
at
[R]egardless of bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction over
state-law counterclaims, nothing in [Stern] actually
limits a bankruptcy court's authority to adjudicate
the
other
"core
proceedings"
identified
in
§ 157(b)(2).... [Y]ears from now, the Supreme Court
may hold that § 157 (b) (2) [(H) ] dealing with fraudulent
conveyances is unconstitutional, just as it did with
§ 157(b)(2)(C). But the job of bankruptcy courts is to
apply the law as it is written and interpreted today.
Bankruptcy
courts
should
not
invalidate
a
Congressional
statute,
such
as
§ 157(b)(2)[(H)]—or
otherwise limit its authority to finally resolve other
core
proceedings—simply
because
dicta
in
Stern
suggests the Supreme Court may do the same down the
road. The Supreme Court does not ordinarily decide
important questions of law by cursory dicta. And it
certainly did not do so in Stern.
Stern was to remove certain proceedings from the list of "core
proceedings" under § 157(b)(2) or simply to strike the phrase
"and determine" from § 157(b)(l),5 it does not follow that
bankruptcy courts have lost all power to hear a fraudulent
conveyance proceeding. Even if a fraudulent conveyance action,
such as the one brought against Wells Fargo, has lost its
vaunted status as a core proceeding, it is clearly "related to a
case under title 11." See,
e.g.,
Celotex v. Edwards,
514 U.S.
300, 308 n.5 (1995). As such, the bankruptcy court retains the
authority to "submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law" that the district court then considers before entering a
final judgment. § 157(c)(1).
Defendant objects to this approach, arguing that to permit
bankruptcy judges to hear, but not finally decide, a fraudulent
conveyance action would essentially rewrite the Bankruptcy Act.
See Def. Wells Fargo Bank's Reply Br.
Supp. Mot.
("Def.'s
Reply") at 5 ("Congress did not reassign fraudulent conveyance
claims as 'non-core'
functions under § 157(c),
sua sponte amend § 157(c)
so no court can
in 2011 by adding fraudulent
5 Under this interpretation, certain counterclaims and fraudulent
conveyance actions would still be considered "core" and could be
"heard" by a bankruptcy court but would not properly be the
subject of a final adjudication by that non-Article III court.
conveyance claims to the delineated list of non-core
functions.").
Neither the statutory framework of the Bankruptcy Act nor
the language of Stern itself supports defendant's argument. Far
from rewriting the statute, permitting bankruptcy judges to hear
and issue recommendations as to fraudulent conveyance actions
comports with the statute's language and Congressional intent.
See, e.g., Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308 ("Congress intended to grant
comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they
might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters
connected with the bankruptcy estate . . . ." (internal
»
quotations marks omitted)).6 Although Congress gave bankruptcy
courts the authority both to "hear and determine" fraudulent
conveyance proceedings,
the Supreme Court has essentially held
that the second of those two responsibilities must be carried
out by an Article III court. That decision in no respect
diminishes the authority of the bankruptcy court to "hear" a
6 Additionally, the interpretative principles animating the
statutory construction doctrine of severability are instructive
here. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678,
684 (1987)(plurality opinion) (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S.
641,
652
(1984))
("[A]
court should refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary. . . .
'[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable
provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it
is the duty of this court ... to maintain the act in so far as
it is valid.'
").
fraudulent conveyance action. Wells Fargo's overbroad
interpretation of Stern is, therefore,
rejected.
This conclusion that bankruptcy courts may still hear
fraudulent conveyance actions is consistent with the Stern
decision's repeated admonitions that the holding "is a 'narrow'
one" that "does not change all that much." 131 S. Ct. at 2619-20
(describing its holding as a "limitation[] on the authority of
bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments"). The error in Wells
Fargo's analysis is rendered clearest by a passage in Stern that
anticipates defendant's argument:
[T]he
current
district
bankruptcy
court
to
system
review
de
also
novo
requires
and
enter
the
final
judgment on any matters that are "related to" the
bankruptcy proceedings, § 157(c)(1), and permits the
district court to withdraw from the bankruptcy court
any
referred
case,
proceeding,
or
part
thereof,
§ 157(d).
[Respondent]
has
not
argued
that
the
bankruptcy courts
"are
barred
from
'hearing'
all
counterclaims"
or proposing
findings
of
fact
and
conclusions
of
law
on
those
matters,
but
rather
that
it must be the district court that "finally decide[s]"
them.
.
.
.
We
do
not
think
the
removal
of
counterclaims . . . from core bankruptcy jurisdiction
meaningfully changes the division of labor in the
current statute; we agree with the United States that
the question presented here is a "narrow" one.
Id.
at
2620.
Following the Stern decision, the majority of district
courts have also concluded that the bankruptcy courts retain the
power to hear but not decide state law claims. See In re Canopy
Fin.,
Inc., 2011 WL 3911082, at *2, 4 (Stern "explicitly limited
10
its holding to a decision that bankruptcy courts were without
constitutional authority to enter final judgment on certain
claims," so there was no reason to find it "voided any statutory
language applicable to" fraudulent conveyance actions, which
would "leav[e]
them to occupy a virtual 'no man's land'
on the
statutory landscape."); Boyd v. King Par, LLC, No. 1:11-CV1106,
2011 WL 5509873, at *2
(W.D.Mich. Nov.
10,
2011)("[E]ven
if there is uncertainty regarding the bankruptcy court's ability
to enter a final judgment . . . that does not deprive the
bankruptcy court of the power to entertain all pre-trial
proceedings, including summary judgment motions."); Field v.
Lindell et al.
(JMS/RLP),
(In re Mortgage Store,
2011 WL 5056990,
at *5-7
Inc.),
No.
(D. Haw. Oct.
11-00439
05,
"court has little difficulty in finding that Congress,
2011)(The
if faced
with the prospect that bankruptcy courts could not enter final
judgments on certain 'core' proceedings, would have intended
them to fall within 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c)(1) granting bankruptcy
courts authority to enter findings and recommendations.").
The few cases cited by Wells Fargo to support its view
merely demonstrate that uncertainty exists following Stern but
do not persuade this Court that the Supreme Court intended to
deprive the bankruptcy courts of any role in dealing with
fraudulent conveyance actions. See Def.'s Mot.
li
at 6-8; Def.'s
Reply at 3-5. For example, the first district court to address
the present issue post-Stern, and the only one to hold that
bankruptcy courts lack any jurisdiction over fraudulent
conveyance actions, decided that "[g]iven th[e]
definitive
finding by the Court in Stern" that "'Congress could not
constitutionally assign resolution of the fraudulent conveyance
action to a non-Article III court,'" a fraudulent conveyance
action could not "be adjudicated by the Bankruptcy Court since
it lacks constitutional authority to do so under the
restrictions placed by Article III." In re Sitka Enter., No. 10-
1847CCC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90243,
at *3-8 (D.P.R. Aug.
12,
2011). In re Sitka did not address whether a bankruptcy court
may continue to hear, but not finally decide, a fraudulent
conveyance claim. Id. at *8. A bankruptcy judge in In re
Blixseth also found that a non-Article III court may not decide
fraudulent conveyance claims. See In re Blixseth, No. 09-60452-
7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *11-12 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011)
(analyzing cases distinguishing between public and private
rights with respect to adjudications of state law claims by nonArticle III courts and concluding those cases barred the court
from rendering a final decision). The Blixseth court also
concluded that because it "may not constitutionally hear the
fraudulent conveyance claim as a core proceeding, and this Court
12
does not have statutory authority to hear it as a non-core
proceeding,
it may in no case hear the claim." Id. at *12. For
the reasons articulated above,
this Court finds that the
Blixseth conclusion fails to consider properly the text of the
Bankruptcy Act as well as the limiting language of Stern.
Finally, defendant's citation to In re Teleservices Group,
which exhaustively analyzed the line of cases culminating in
Stern, supports the conclusion that after Stern, the bankruptcy
court may hear but not decide fraudulent conveyance actions. See
In re Teleservices Group, No.
HG 05-00690,
2011 WL 3610050, at
*19 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2011)(in which the bankruptcy
judge submitted his findings on the fraudulent conveyance claim
in a report and recommendation to the district court for de novo
review, as he would with a non-core matter).
C. Discretionary Withdrawals of Reference
Wells Fargo's final argument focuses on the Court's
traditional discretionary authority to withdraw a reference from
the bankruptcy court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
court "may withdraw,
§ 157(d), a district
in whole or in part, any case or proceeding
referred [to the bankruptcy court], on its own motion or on
timely motion of any party,
for cause shown." 28 U.S.C.
13
§ 157(d).7 District courts in the Fourth Circuit consider six
factors when analyzing whether cause exists for a discretionary
withdrawal:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
whether the proceeding is core or non-core,
uniform administration of bankruptcy proceedings,
expediting the bankruptcy process and promoting
judicial economy,
(iv)
(v)
efficient use of debtors' and creditors'
reduction of forum shopping, and
(vi)
preservation of the right to a jury trial.
See,
e.g.,
In re QSM,
LLC,
453 B.R.
807,
809-10,
resources,
2011 WL
2161792, at *1 (E.D. Va. 2011).8 The movant has the burden to
demonstrate cause for discretionary withdrawal. Id.
Addressing each of the factors in turn,
the trustee argues
that the core versus non-core element weighs in his favor,
against a finding of cause to withdraw, because fraudulent
conveyance actions are statutorily defined as core proceedings.
PL's Opp'n at 13 (citing § 157(b)(2)(H)). Defendant relies on
its previous argument that, regardless of the statute, under
Stern,
fraudulent conveyance claims may not be heard and
determined by a bankruptcy judge. Def.'s Mot. at 9-10. Although
7 Section 157(d) also contains a provision for mandatory
withdrawal,
which is not at issue in this motion.
8 The district court developed these factors in In re U.S.
Airways Group,
Inc.,
296 B.R.
673
(E.D. Va.
2003),
surveying tests from the Second, Third, Fifth,
Ninth Circuits.
See id.
at
681-82 &
14
nn.18-21.
after
Seventh, and
the status of a fraudulent conveyance claim as a core proceeding
is unclear after Stern, as discussed in Section II.B,
presumes that such claims,
this Court
like non-core proceedings, may still
be heard, although not decided, by bankruptcy courts. Because
such claims cannot be treated as core proceedings, this factor
weighs in defendant's favor.
The trustee argues that the uniformity factor weighs
against withdrawal. Because the dispute with Wells Fargo is but
one of more than forty fraudulent conveyance proceedings being
pursued by the trustee in the El-Atari bankruptcy,
the uniform
administration of the bankruptcy proceeding is likely to be
impaired or disrupted should defendant prevail on this motion.
PL's Opp'n at 13. Defendant counters that these forty
proceedings "merely seek[] to augment the bankruptcy estate and
do[]
not raise other issues of bankruptcy law." Def.'s Mot. at
10. Even if this fraudulent conveyance action does not have the
qualities of a core bankruptcy proceeding,
there is still
significant value in having the bankruptcy court preside over
preliminary legal and discovery issues in a proceeding that is
related to this bankruptcy action.
See In re QSM,
2011 WL
2161792, at *3 (citing In re Jaritz Indus., Ltd., 151 F.3d 93,
107 (3d Cir.
1998))
(holding that "the purpose of establishing a
nationwide bankruptcy system is to alleviate the district courts
15
of excessive workloads and to provide a system where judges with
experience and expertise in bankruptcy matters can handle
bankruptcy claims"). As such, the uniformity factor weighs
against finding cause for withdrawal and in the trustee's favor.
With respect to the efficiency considerations embodied in
the third and fourth factors — promotion of judicial economy and
conservation of the debtor's and creditors'
resources —
the
defendant argues that Northern Bank's civil action against Wells
Fargo is "essentially a duplicate of the facts and legal issues"
in the proceeding at issue here. Def.'s Mot.
at 10-11; Def.'s
Reply at 7-8. Although the same $8 million may be at issue, a
review of the complaint in the Northern Bank litigation raises
legal issues different from those in the trustee's action.
Defendant also argues that,
even if Stern does not
foreclose the bankruptcy court from hearing the issue and
proposing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
bankruptcy court's decision will inevitably be re-litigated
before the district court,
resulting in needless costs for the
parties and duplicative work by the two courts. Def.'s Mot. at
10.9 The trustee responds that withdrawal of the request would
not preserve resources and would threaten the fair and equitable
9 This argument cannot be dispositive because § 157(c)(1)
contemplates the issuance of reports and recommendations and
subsequent de novo review by district courts.
16
resolution of the bankruptcy process by permitting one of the
forty targets in the trustee's fraudulent conveyance proceedings
to break off, possibly resulting in the trustee having to pursue
assets for the estate separately through forty district court
lawsuits. PL's Opp'n at 14. Such a dispersion of the trustee's
resources would significantly undermine efficiency. The Court
agrees with the trustee's position and finds that these factors
weigh heavily in the trustee's favor.
The fifth factor,
forum shopping, is inapplicable here. In
its reply brief, Wells Fargo suggests, without really arguing,
that the trustee is engaged in forum-shopping; however, there
are no facts to support such an argument. See Def.'s Reply at 9.
Preservation of the right to a jury trial is the final
factor. Although Wells Fargo correctly states that it has a
right to a jury trial on the question of whether the conveyance
was fraudulent,
it has not made a jury demand and continues to
"deliberat[e] whether to exercise its Seventh Amendment right."
Def.'s Mot. at 11. Therefore,
the need for a jury trial is
speculative. See In re O'Brien, 414 B.R.
92, 103
(S.D. W.Va.
2009)("Declining to withdraw the reference at this time
preserves the right to a jury trial because the reference may be
withdrawn if and when a jury trial becomes necessary."). Even
17
were Wells Fargo to request a jury trial,
immediate withdrawal
would not be required.
[T]he mere
fact that
the district court must conduct a
jury trial in an adversary proceeding does not mean
that
the
bankruptcy
court
immediately
loses
jurisdiction of the entire matter or that the district
court cannot delegate to the bankruptcy court the
responsibility for supervising discovery, conducting
pre-trial conferences, and other matters short of the
jury selection and trial.
In re Stansbury Poplar Place,
1993); see also In re QSM,
Inc., 13 F.3d 122,
128
(4th Cir.
2011 WL 2161792, at * 2 (denying
motion for withdrawal of reference despite timely jury demand
because bankruptcy court could still oversee discovery and hear
summary judgment motion); In re Kleinert's,
Inc., No. 04 Civ.
5286(DLC), 2004 WL 1878787, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
19, 2004)
("The right to a jury trial does not always require an immediate
withdrawal of the reference."). Accordingly,
this factor does
not strengthen Wells Fargo's position.
Weighing the six factors,
the Court finds insufficient
cause to justify the exercise of its discretion to withdraw the
reference to the bankruptcy court.
Ill.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that after Stern, the bankruptcy court
retains jurisdiction to hear, but not decide,
fraudulent
conveyances actions and that the traditional factors for
18
analyzing a motion for withdrawal of reference weigh against
i
withdrawal,
defendant's Motion to Withdraw the Reference of
Adversary Proceeding will be denied by an Order to be
issued
with this Memorandum Opinion.
Entered this
Ja day of November, 2011.
Alexandria, Virginia
Leonie M. Brinkema
United States District Judge
19
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