Creed v. Commonwealth of Virginia et al
Filing
124
MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: 110 Motion for Reconsideration by John P. Creed, and 116 MOTION to Strike 109 Objection Plaintiff's Objections to Judge Cacheris' July 6, 2012, Order and Memorandum Opinion by Glendell Hill, Charles Land, Peter A. Meletis, Prince William-Manassas Regional Jail Board. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 8/24/2012. (stas) Modified on 8/24/2012 to correct the motions which the Memorandum discusses (stas).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
JOHN P. CREED,
Plaintiff,
v.
GLENDELL HILL, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:12cv317 (JCC/IDD)
M E M O R A N D U M
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John P.
Creed’s (“Plaintiff”) Objection to the Court’s July 6, 2012,
Memorandum Opinion and Order sustaining Defendants’ Objection to
Magistrate Judge Ivan Davis’ May 11, 2012, Ruling and Order
granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (the “Objection”) [Dkt.
109].
Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration [Dkt. 110] and Defendants Prince WilliamManassas Regional Jail Board, Glendell Hill, Charles Land, and
Peter Meletis’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Strike
Plaintiff’s Objection.
[Dkt. 116.]
For the following reasons,
the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Strike and deny
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
1
I. Background
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff John Creed brought this action after his
brother, William Creed (“Creed”), died while in custody at the
Prince William-Manassas Regional Adult Detention Center (the
“ADC”) on February 3, 2006.
After Creed allegedly became
combative and resistant during a medical examination, certain
jail guards restrained him.
2] ¶¶ 36-39.)
breathing.
(Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) [Dkt. 1-
Creed was placed in a choke hold and then stopped
(SAC ¶ 39.)
The autopsy report noted Creed’s cause
of death as “acute stress-induced cardiac arrhythmia due to
acute restraint-induced asphyxia and blunt trauma.”
B.
(SAC ¶ 43.)
Procedural Background
Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Circuit Court
of Prince William County on February 1, 2008.
never served with this complaint.
filed an Amended Complaint.
Defendants were
On June 30, 2008, Plaintiff
(1:08cv862 [Dkt. 1].)1
The
defendants named in the Amended Complaint included the
Commonwealth of Virginia (the “Commonwealth”), Prince William
County Sheriff Glendell Hill (“Hill”), ADC Superintendent
Charles Land (“Land”), ADC Director of Inmate Services Peter
1
This case is before the Court for a second time, having been remanded to
state court but later re-removed. On its previous sojourn in this Court, the
case had a different case number. References to filings made prior to remand
will reflect that case number.
2
Meletis (“Meletis”),2 and various unknown John Does (the “John
Doe Defendants”).
(Id. Ex. A ¶¶ 2-7.)
Plaintiff alleged
negligence pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act (“VTCA”)
against the Commonwealth of Virginia, gross negligence and
willful and wanton negligence against all defendants, and
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the John Doe Defendants
and Supervisor Defendants.
The defendants named in the Amended
Complaint were served on August 6, 2008.
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint in Prince
William County Circuit Court on April 30, 2009.
[Dkt. 1-2.]
The defendants named in the Second Amended Complaint included
the Commonwealth, the ADC, the Supervisor Defendants, the Prince
William-Manassas Regional Jail Authority (the “Jail Authority”),
the Prince William-Manassas Regional Jail Board (the “Jail
Board”), and the John Doe Defendants.
On March 10, 2010,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
to Substitute the Names of Certain Defendants (the “Motion to
Amend”).
[Dkt. 17-1.]
In this motion, Plaintiff sought to add
certain jail guards as defendants in place of the John Doe
Defendants.
On March 16, 2012, the state court entered a non-suit
order, dismissing the Commonwealth as a defendant.
[Dkt. 1-1.]
The remaining defendants removed the case to this Court on March
2
Hill, Land, and Meletis are collectively referred to herein as the
“Supervisor Defendants.”
3
21, 2012.
[Dkt. 1.]
Prior to that time, no decision had been
made on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
On April 23, 2012,
Plaintiff filed a renewed Motion to Amend in this Court.
16.]
[Dkt.
Defendants filed an opposition to the Motion to Amend on
May 1, 2012 [Dkt. 20], to which Plaintiff replied on May 4, 2012
[Dkt. 24].
On May 11, 2012, Magistrate Judge Ivan Davis granted
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
[Dkt. 27.]
Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on May 14,
2012.
[Dkt. 28.]
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
added nineteen individuals as defendants (collectively, the
“Individual Defendants”),3 at the same time continuing to name
various unknown individuals as John Doe Defendants.
He also
withdrew the ADC and the Jail Authority as defendants in this
case.
Plaintiff’s claims included: (1) negligence against the
Jail Board (Count One); (2) gross negligence and willful and
wanton negligence against all defendants (Counts Two and Three);
(3) a Section 1983 claim against the Individual Defendants and
John Doe Defendants (Count Four); and (4) a Section 1983
supervisory liability claim against the Supervisor Defendants
(Count Five).
On May 18, 2012, Defendants filed an Objection [Dkt.
33] to Judge Davis’ Ruling and Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion
3
These individuals include Otis Whitehead, Kevin Delaney, Ralph Justice,
Terry Short, Harry Sepulveda, David Beard, Mary Ann Husk, Barclay Duegaw,
Jason Lee Kohne, David Wright, Andrew Arnold, Peter Sloper, William Smith,
Jason Allen, Sonny Bettis, Robert Hendricks, Tracy Allen, Wayne Wynkoop, and
Carl Larry.
4
to Amend.
Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 31, 2012, [Dkt.
39], to which Defendants replied on June 4, 2012, [Dkt. 40].
On
July 6, 2012, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
sustaining Defendant’s Objection to Judge Davis’ Ruling and
Order and dismissing the Individual Defendants from this case.4
[Dkts. 102-03.]
On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the
Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order sustaining Defendants’
Objection to Judge Davis’ Ruling and Order as well as a Motion
for Reconsideration.
[Dkts. 109-10.]
On July 26, 2012,
Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration and a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Objection.
[Dkts. 115-16].
Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants’
opposition on July 27, 2012, [Dkt. 119], and a response to
Defendants’ Motion to Strike on August 3, 2012, [Dkt. 120].
Plaintiff’s Objection and Motion for Reconsideration,
and Defendants’ Motion to Strike are before the Court.
II.
Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a
vehicle for a “motion for reconsideration.”
Rather, they
provide for a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment or
a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.
Plaintiff does
not specify whether he is bringing his Motion for
4
That same day, the Court also issued an Amended Order dismissing the ADC and
the Jail Authority from Plaintiff’s again-operative Second Amended Complaint.
[Dkt. 104.]
5
Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b).
Pursuant to
Rule 59(e), “a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed
no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”
Civ. P. 59(e).
Fed. R.
The Fourth Circuit has interpreted a motion for
reconsideration as a motion to alter or amend a judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) where that motion has been filed within
the specified time period.
See Lee–Thomas v. Prince George's
County Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d 244, 247 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012); Katyle
v. Penn Nat'l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 n.4 (4th Cir.
2011).
Here, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed
within 28 days of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order
sustaining Defendants’ Objection to Judge Davis’ Ruling and
Order.
Accordingly, the motion will be construed as a Rule
59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e).
“A district court has the discretion to grant a Rule
59(e) motion only in very narrow circumstances: (1) to
accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Collison v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
A party’s mere
disagreement with the court’s ruling does not warrant a Rule
6
59(e) motion, and such motions should not be used “to raise
arguments which could have been raised prior to the issuance of
the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel
legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the
first instance.”
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998).
Rather, the purpose of a Rule
59(e) motion is to allow “a district court to correct its own
errors, ‘sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden
of unnecessary appellate proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Russell v.
Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir.
1995)).
A Rule 59(e) motion is “an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.”
Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
III. Analysis
A.
Objection
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Objection, brought
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46, is unnecessary.
Rule 46 provides as follows:
A formal exception to a ruling or order is
unnecessary. When the ruling or order is
requested or made, a party need only state
the action that it wants the court to take
or objects to, along with the grounds for
the request or objection. Failing to object
does not prejudice a party who had no
opportunity to do so when the ruling or
order was made.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 46.
7
Before the enactment of Rule 46, the failure to except
to a court’s ruling often meant that a party lost its right to
appeal an error made by the court in connection with that
ruling.
Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99
F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983).
In time, this practice became a
formality, with exceptions voiced at every ruling, but the
failure to do so remaining a bar to appeal.
Id.
The practice
of taking exceptions was eventually replaced by the more
sensible practice set forth in Rule 46.
Rule 46 requires only
that “a party make known to the Court the ruling it desires and
the grounds therefor.
No magic words or phrases are required”
and “[t]he words ‘exception’ or ‘objection’ need not be
uttered.”
Id.
Plaintiff, in multiple briefs, argued that the filing
of a Third Amended Complaint would not be futile and, more
specifically, that the relation-back doctrine was applicable.
Thus, Plaintiff made his position concerning amendment known,
and the requirements of Rule 46 were therefore satisfied.
id.
See
Rather than merely note his exceptions to the Court’s
Memorandum Opinion and Order sustaining Defendants’ Objection to
Judge Davis’ Ruling and Order, what Plaintiff actually seeks is
reconsideration.
(See Objection [Dkt. 109] 12 (requesting that
the Court sustain his Objection to its Memorandum Opinion and
Order and overrule Defendants’ Objection to Judge Davis’ Ruling
8
and Order).)
Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration has, of
course, been accomplished by his filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration, which also, it turns out, incorporates the
arguments made in his Objection.
for Recons. [Dkt. 111] 4.)
(Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot.
As such, Plaintiff’s Objection is
superfluous and Defendants’ Motion to Strike will be granted.5
B.
Motion for Reconsideration
In addressing Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration,
a brief review of Judge Davis’ Ruling and Order, as well as this
Court’s Memorandum and Opinion and Order sustaining Defendants’
Objection to that Ruling and Order, is necessary.
The relevant
issue before Judge Davis was whether Plaintiff’s claims against
the Individual Defendants, although asserted outside the
applicable limitations period, were nevertheless saved by the
relation-back doctrine.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c)(1)(C), an amended complaint which adds a new
party may relate back to the original complaint where three
requirements are met: (1) the claim against the new party arose
out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in
the original pleading; (2) within the period provided by Rule
4(m) for service of the summons and complaint (ordinarily 120
days from when the complaint is filed), the new defendant
5
To be clear, the Court will consider those arguments in Plaintiff’s
Objection because they are incorporated by reference in the Motion for
Reconsideration. It bears mentioning, however, that Plaintiff’s circuitous
procedure for seeking reconsideration has only served to complicate the
Court’s resolution of this matter.
9
received such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in maintaining a defense; and (3) within the same
period, the new defendant knew or should have known that, but
for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against that party.
P. 15(c)(1)(C).
Fed. R. Civ.
In finding the requirements for relation back
satisfied, Judge Davis concluded that Plaintiff had sufficiently
established an identity of interest between the Individual
Defendants and the Supervisor Defendants, such that the
Individual Defendants had constructive notice of this action.
This Court found Judge Davis’ conclusion clearly
erroneous and contrary to law.
(Mem. Op. [Dkt. 102] 9.)
The
Court’s decision was based on the fact that the Supervisor
Defendants were not served with the complaint in this case until
six months after the statute of limitations expired, i.e.,
outside the 120-day period prescribed by Rule 4(m).
10.)
(Mem. Op.
As such, there was no proper notice to the Supervisor
Defendants which could be imputed to the Individual Defendants
within the timeframe required by Rule 15(c)(1)(C). (Mem. Op.
11.)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff asks the
Court to reverse its decision or, in the alternative, remand
this matter back to Judge Davis to consider Plaintiff’s
arguments in light of “new evidence.”
10
Plaintiff argues that in
sustaining Defendants’ Objection to Judge Davis’ Ruling and
Order, this Court committed “errors of apprehension.”
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Recons. 3.)
those errors are as follows:
(Pl.’s
According to Plaintiff,
(1) the Court’s failure to
consider whether it should exercise its discretion, even in the
absence of good cause, and extend the 120-day period for
Plaintiff to serve the Supervisor Defendants; and (2) the
Court’s failure to consider whether or not good cause existed to
extend the 120-day period to provide actual notice to the
Individual Defendants and/or whether it should grant such an
extension even in the absence of good cause.
(Id.)
Plaintiff’s
argument is without merit.
First and foremost, Plaintiff himself failed to
address the Rule 4(m) issue in his briefing before the Court.
The issue was not raised in Plaintiff’s memorandum in support of
his Motion to Amend, his reply to Defendant’s opposition
thereto, or in his opposition to Defendant’s Objection.
Rather,
Plaintiff asserted, in conclusory fashion, that the Supervisor
Defendants “have been aware of the lawsuit since it was filed,”
(Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Amend [Dkt. 17] 8), thereby
skirting the Rule 4(m) issue altogether.
The Court explained in
its Memorandum Opinion why this assertion failed, (see Mem. Op.
10 n.8), and Plaintiff does not challenge the Court’s reasoning.
11
Plaintiff did not argue that Rule 4(m)’s 120-day
period should be extended until oral argument, and in an
opposition to a motion to dismiss filed by a number of the
Individual Defendants, which Plaintiff filed after oral
argument.
[Dkt. 96.]
As such, the Rule 4(m) issue was not even
properly before the Court in connection with Defendants’
Objection.
See Lucas v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F. Supp. 2d
589, 601 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2011) (declining to address argument
raised for the first time during oral argument); N.C. Alliance
for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 713 F. Supp.
2d 491, 510 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (“Raising such new arguments for the
first time at oral argument undermines the purpose of orderly
briefing and risks subjecting an opponent to an unfair
disadvantage.”).
For the sake of completeness, the Court
acknowledged that an extension of the Rule 4(m) period is
contemplated under the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 15(c),
and explained why an extension was not appropriate in this case.
(Mem. Op. 11-12.)
Given Plaintiff’s own neglect of the Rule
4(m) issue, his assertion that the Court committed an error of
apprehension by not further exploring grounds for extending the
Rule 4(m) period is not well taken.
Even if Plaintiff had properly raised the Rule 4(m)
issue, reconsideration would still be unwarranted.
Plaintiff’s
first argument is that this Court should have exercised its
12
discretion and extended the Rule 4(m) period as to the
Supervisor Defendants even in the absence of good cause.
As an
initial matter, it is important to note the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Mendez v. Elliott, 45 F.3d 75, 78-79 (4th Cir.
1995), that a court may only extend the Rule 4(m) period with a
showing of good cause.
Subsequent to Mendez, the Supreme Court
stated in dicta that “courts have been accorded discretion to
enlarge the 120-day period ‘even if there is no good cause
shown.’”
Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 662-63
(1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) Advisory Committee Notes
(1993 Amendment)).
After Henderson, courts in the Fourth
Circuit have been divided over the continuing vitality of
Mendez.
Compare Lane v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d
590, 596 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“[T]he court has discretion to allow a
plaintiff to serve a defendant outside the 120-day time period
even absent a showing of good cause.”) and Hammad v. Tate Access
Floors, 31 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527-28 (D. Md. 1999) (“[T]his court
concludes that Mendez is no longer good law and that, if given
the opportunity, the Fourth Circuit perforce would adopt the
interpretation of Rule 4(m) held by the Supreme Court . . . .”)
with In re Hall, 222 B.R. 275, 278 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998)
(“Although courts have criticized Mendez, it remains binding
precedent in this circuit.”).
13
The Court need not weigh in on this matter because,
assuming that good cause is not required, Plaintiff fails to
demonstrate that extension of the Rule 4(m) period as to the
Supervisor Defendants would be appropriate.
The one case
Plaintiff cites in support of his argument is readily
distinguishable.
In Gipson v. Wells Fargo Corp., 382 F. Supp.
2d 116, 117 (D.D.C. 2005), the plaintiff mistakenly filed her
initial employment discrimination complaint against Wells Fargo
Corporation instead of her actual employer, Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, Inc.
The identity of the plaintiff’s employer was
obscured by a corporate name change that took place after the
plaintiff filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as well as information
received by the plaintiff’s attorney from the D.C. Corporation
Commission stating that Wells Fargo was registered to conduct
business under the name “Wells Fargo Corporation.”
Id. at 118.
The plaintiff first became aware that she had named the wrong
entity in her original complaint after the Rule 4(m) period had
passed, but then promptly filed an amended complaint and served
the defendants.
Id. at 122.
Here, by contrast, there is no evidence that Plaintiff
lacked knowledge as to the identities of the Supervisor
Defendants until after the Rule 4(m) period had expired.
To the
contrary, the Supervisor Defendants were properly named in
14
Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed within the statute of
limitations.
While Plaintiff may have exercised diligence in
attempting to uncover the identities of the Individual
Defendants, the same cannot be said with respect to his efforts
to serve the Supervisor Defendants.
See Hoffman v. Baltimore
Police Dep’t, 379 F. Supp. 2d 778, 786 (D. Md. 2005) (“Were the
Court to assume that . . . a finding of good cause is not
required, the Court would still need to have some reasoned basis
to exercise its discretion and excuse the untimely service: the
Court must give some import to the rule.”).
Simply put,
Plaintiff fails to articulate a reasoned basis for extending the
Rule 4(m) period as to the Supervisor Defendants.
Plaintiff’s second argument is that the Court should
have extended the Rule 4(m) period such that actual notice to
the Individual Defendants could be considered timely rendered.
At the same time, however, Plaintiff concedes that the
Individual Defendants had no actual notice of this action as of
May 11, 2012, “as such notice could not be effectuated until the
identities of the [Individual] Defendants were known and
substituted.”
(Objection [Dkt. 109] 2 n.2.)
The statute of limitations in this case expired on
February 3, 2008, and thus the Rule 4(m) period expired on June
2, 2008.
The Individual Defendants were first served with the
Third Amended Complaint beginning on June 1, 2012.
15
[See Dkts.
58-71, 95, 108]
Thus, Plaintiff would have the Court extend the
Rule 4(m) period four years as it relates to the Individual
Defendants.
Plaintiff, however, cites no authority that
supports an extension of such magnitude.
This unsupported and
strained argument warrants neither reconsideration nor a remand
of this matter to Judge Davis.
The Court is not unsympathetic of the death of
Plaintiff’s brother, or the difficulties Plaintiff encountered
in attempting to identify the Individual Defendants.
But at the
same time, the Court must be mindful of the policy
considerations behind Rule 15(c) –- that is, to protect the
salutary purposes of statutes of limitations, certainty and
repose.
Were the Court to allow a four-year extension to the
Rule 4(m) period, those purposes would be vitiated.
Indeed, it
would be hard to envision a scenario where a plaintiff forced to
name “John Doe” defendants would not enjoy an end-run around the
rule so long as he eventually located and served them.
Under
the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 15(c), “[m]ost
parties substituted for ‘Doe’ defendants would be protected
against being added either because they were prejudiced or
because they did not have proper notice.”
Goodman v. Praxair,
Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
If a
four-year extension to the Rule 4(m) period were permissible,
16
that rule would become the exception, and John Doe defendants
would have virtually no protection at all.
IV.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration and grant Defendants’ Motion to
Strike.
An appropriate Order will issue.
August 24, 2012
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?