Landry v. SAIC
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 6 MOTION to Dismiss by SAIC. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 7/19/2012. (stas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
VANESSA LANDRY
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Plaintiff,
v.
SAIC,
Defendant.
1:12cv673 (JCC/TRJ)
M E M O R A N D U M
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC)’s Motion to
Dismiss.
For the following reasons, the Court will grant
Defendant’s Motion.
I.
Background
Plaintiff pro se Vanessa Landry is suing her former
employer SAIC.
On September 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Charge
of Discrimination (the Charge) with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was cross-filed with the
Fairfax County human rights agency, alleging race discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. (Title VII), and alleging age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §
620 et seq. (ADEA).
[Dkt. 10-1.]
And, on May 25, 2012,
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against SAIC in the Fairfax County
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Circuit Court, in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
[Dkt. 1-1.]
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that her employment at SAIC was
terminated because of her race.
(Compl. [Dkt. 10-1] at 1.)1
On
June 19, 2012, SAIC timely removed the case to this Court.
[Dkt. 1-3.]
On June 20, SAIC filed a Motion to Dismiss along
with a proper Roseboro notice.
[Dkts. 6, 8.]
On July 5, 2012,
Plaintiff filed a “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion Not to Dismiss.”
July 11, 2012, Defendant filed a Reply.
[Dkt. 10.]
On
[Dkt. 12.]
Defendant’s Motion is now before this Court.
II.
Standard of Review
A. Jurisdiction
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a claim may be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
12(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Defendants may attack subject matter jurisdiction in
one of two ways.
First, defendants may contend that the
complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject matter
jurisdiction may be based.
See Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213,
1219 (4th Cir. 1982); King v. Riverside Reg’l Med. Ctr., 211 F.
Supp. 2d 779, 780 (E.D. Va. 2002).
In such instances, all facts
alleged in the complaint are presumed to be true.
Adams, 697
F.2d at 1219; Virginia v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 537, 540
(E.D. Va. 1995).
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The Complaint does not contain numbered paragraphs and so references are
made to the page.
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Alternatively, defendants may argue that the
jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint are untrue.
Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219; King, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 780.
In that
situation, “the Court may ‘look beyond the jurisdictional
allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been
submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject
matter jurisdiction exists.’”
Virginia v. United States, 926 F.
Supp. at 540 (citing Capitol Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188,
191 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia,
370 F.3d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the district
court may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and
may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting
the proceeding to one for summary judgment”); Adams, 697 F.2d at
1219; Ocean Breeze Festival Park, Inc. v. Reich, 853 F. Supp.
906, 911 (E.D. Va. 1994).
In either circumstance, the burden of
proving subject matter jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff.
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936); Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219; Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs., 682 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that
“having filed this suit and thereby seeking to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction”).
B. Pro Se Plaintiff
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Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are construed
more liberally than those drafted by an attorney.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
See Haines v.
“However inartfully pleaded
by a pro se plaintiff, allegations are sufficient to call for an
opportunity to offer supporting evidence unless it is beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him
to relief.”
Thompson v. Echols, No. 99-6304, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22373, at *3 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972)).
While a court is not expected to develop
tangential claims from scant assertions in a complaint, if a pro
se complaint contains potentially cognizable claims, the
plaintiff should be allowed to particularize those claims.
Id.
(citing Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir.
1985); Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965)).
III. Analysis
Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is full of descriptions
of her work experience, it does not state any legal basis for
her claim.
The caption title of her Complaint states that she
is “filing for racial discrimination and severance pay.”
(Compl. [Dkt. 1-1] at 1.)
As best the Court can tell, the basis
for Plaintiff’s claim is Title VII.
“[A] failure by the plaintiff to exhaust
administrative remedies concerning a Title VII claim deprives
the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the
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claim.”
Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th
Cir. 2009) (citing Davis v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 48 F.3d 134,
138-40 (4th Cir. 1995)).
“42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an
individual to obtain a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC
before bringing suit in a federal court on a Title VII claim.”
Marston v. At&T Corp., 210 F.R.D. 573, 574 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Specifically, the statute states:
If a charge filed with the Commission . . .
is dismissed by the Commission, or if within
one hundred and eighty days from the filing
of such charge or the expiration of any
period of reference . . . whichever is
later, the Commission has not filed a civil
action under this Section . . ., or the
Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person
aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . .
shall so notify the person aggrieved and
within ninety days after the giving of such
notice a civil action may be brought against
the respondent named in the charge.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).2
This notice is commonly referred to
as a “right-to-sue letter.”
“To ensure that a plaintiff has exhausted all the
administrative remedies and adhered thereby to the Congressional
conciliation scheme, courts generally hold that the right-to-sue
letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit.”
White v. Fed. Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1551-52 (E.D.
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The “administrative procedures [are] contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b),
which requires an investigation and determination by the EEOC as to whether
‘reasonable cause’ exists to believe that the charge of discrimination is
valid.” Ray v. Amelia County Sheriff's Office, 302 F. App’x 209, 212 (4th
Cir. 2008).
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Va. 1990) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 798 (1973)).
“But, because Title VII is a remedial
statute, courts usually construe its provisions generously to
achieve its purpose.”
Id. (citing Henderson v. E. Freight Ways,
Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 1972)). Thus, the Fourth
Circuit has “long held that receipt of, or at least entitlement
to, a right to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite that
must be alleged in a plaintiff’s complaint.”
Davis, 48 F.3d at
140.
Here, although it appears Plaintiff filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the EEOC (see [Dkt. 10-1] at 1), nowhere in
Plaintiff’s Complaint does she represent that she received a
Dismissal and Notice of Rights Letter from the EEOC in response
to her charge.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s “Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion Not to
Dismiss,”3 which alleges additional facts, fails to establish
that Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter or was otherwise
entitled to a right-to-sue letter at the time she filed the
Complaint in this Court.
(Pl.’s Mem. [Dkt. 11] at 3.)
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts demonstrating
plausible entitlement to relief that would warrant jurisdiction
over the severance claim.
Thus, this Court finds it does not
have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint.
IV.
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Conclusion
The Court will treat this as Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion.
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For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.
An appropriate Order will issue.
July 19, 2012
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
______________
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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