Fraternal Order of Police Metro Transit Police Labor Committee, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: Deft Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 03/27/14. (pmil, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
METRO TRANSIT POLICE LABOR

COMMITTEE,

INC.,

Plaintiff,

I:12cv01387

(LMB/JFA]

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA

TRANSIT AUTHORITY

(WMATA),

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

Before the Court is defendant Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority's

("WMATA") Motion for Reconsideration of the

June 20, 2 013 Memorandum Opinion and Order [Dkt. No.
("Motion for Reconsideration"),

46]

which asks the Court to reverse

its decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff,

denying summary judgment in favor of WMATA,
to reinstate two police officers.
WMATA's motion will

and ordering WMATA

For the reasons that follow,

be denied.

I.

Plaintiff

Fraternal

Labor Committee,

Inc.

Order of

Police Metro Transit

Police

("FOP") brought this civil action against

WMATA seeking reinstatement of two Metro Transit Police

officers, Sherman Benton ("Benton")
("Spencer"),

and Mark Spencer

whose terminations were overturned after Benton and

Spencer appealed to an Arbitration Board ("Board") under a
collective bargaining agreement.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment [Dkt.
Nos.

15, 27],

and following a hearing and supplemental briefing,

the Court denied WMATA's motion for summary judgment,
the FOP's motion for summary judgment,

granted

and ordered that WMATA

immediately comply with the Board's decisions by reinstating
Benton and Spencer as Metro Transit Police officers [Dkt. Nos.
41,

42] .

On July 8, 2013,

the Court granted WMATA's consent motion

to stay the decision pending resolution of WMATA's Motion for
Reconsideration and any ensuing appeal [Dkt. Nos.
the consent motion,

44, 45].

In

WMATA agreed to reinstate Benton and Spencer

"to pay status in job duties to be defined by the Transit
Police, at the same salaries they were receiving at the time of
their terminations," and assign Benton and Spencer "to duties of
an administrative-type nature,
[]

without the full police powers of

regular Transit Police officer[s]."
II.

Given more

20, 2013,

exhaustive

treatment of

the

facts

in the June

Memorandum Opinion, only a brief recounting of the

relevant facts is necessary here.

WMATA is an interstate

compact agency and instrumentality of Maryland, Virginia,

and

the District of Columbia that operates the Metrorail and
Metrobus systems in the greater Washington,

D.C. metropolitan

area and is authorized under its Compact to operate a police

force,

the Metro Transit Police Department ("MTPD").

MTPD

officers are charged with enforcing the laws of Maryland,
Virginia,

and the District of Columbia.

bargaining agent for all police officers.

The FOP is the
WMATA and the FOP are

parties to a collective bargaining agreement that permits
discipline of the FOP's members only "for just cause."
disputes between WMATA and the FOP,

of WMATA's disciplinary decisions,

Labor

including those arising out

are subject to binding

arbitration.

WMATA discharged Benton and Spencer for cause in March and

April 2011, and the FOP pursued grievances on their behalf
through arbitration.

The Board overturned both officers'

discharges and ordered that they be reinstated.

In response to

the Board's decision,

WMATA placed Benton and Spencer on "paid

administrative

status.

leave"

Consistent with WMATA's practice of requiring its officers
to be licensed by all three jurisdictions in which WMATA
operates,

and because Benton and Spencer had been discharged,

they had to be recertified by the Maryland Police Training

Commission ("Maryland Commission")

before they could resume

police activities in Maryland.

Virginia and the District of

Columbia did not require reinstated officers to go through
recertification.

The recertification process required that the MTPD send the
Maryland Commission materials,

including copies of the

derogatory information that led to the officers'

terminations,

as well as an application for certification verifying that
Benton and Spencer met the Maryland Commission's selection

standards for positions as police officers.
Michael A.

Taborn,

MTPD's Chief of Police at the time,

wrote letters to the Maryland Commission explaining the

respective officers'
letters,

terminations and reinstatements.

In those

Chief Taborn clearly indicated that the MTPD did not

favor recertification for either Benton or Spencer.

The

Maryland Commission denied Benton and Spencer's recertification
in July and August of 2012 and neither officer sought review of
the Commission's decisions in Maryland state court.

Because

they were not certified to act as law enforcement officers in
Maryland,

Benton and Spencer were terminated by WMATA for a

second time.

III.

WMATA moves

Procedure 59(e),

for reconsideration under Federal

Rule of

Civil

which provides that relief may be granted "(1)

to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law;
account for new evidence not available at trial;

or

(3)

(2)

to

to

correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice."
Pac.

Ins.

Cir.

1998)

Co.

v. Am.

Nat'l Fire Ins.

(citations omitted).

motion under Rule 59(e)

Co.,

148 F.3d 396,

403

(4th

Whether to grant or deny a

is left to the Court's discretion,

and

"[i]n general reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is
an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly."

Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Robinson v. Wix
Filtration Corp.,

599 F.3d 403,

411 (4th Cir.

2010).

When a motion for reconsideration "raises no new arguments,

but merely requests the district court to reconsider a legal
issue or to 'change its mind,' relief is not authorized."
Pritchard v. Wal-Mart Stores,

7, 2001)
Williams,

(unpublished opinion)
674 F.2d 310,

Shipping Co. v. Baker,

312

3 F. App'x 52, 53

(4th Cir.

Feb.

(citing United States v.

(4th Cir.

1982));

554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5

see also Exxon

(2008)

. . . may not be used to relitigate old matters,

("Rule 59(e)

or to raise

arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment."

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

IV.

A. Immunity

WMATA first argues its jurisdictional claim:

that the

Court's decision misconstrued its position as to immunity.

Specifically, WMATA argues that it "is not claiming that it is
immune to certain contract claims under § 80 of the Compact . .
. [r]ather, WMATA's position is that WMATA's discretionary
decision to require Transit Police officers to be lawfully

empowered to police in all three of its Signatories,

Maryland,
of Def.

is protected by immunity."

WMATA's Mot.

for Recons.

including

Mem. of P. & A. in Supp.

("Def.'s Mem.")

at 4.

Contrary to WMATA's argument that the immunity issue was
misunderstood in the Court's decision,
was understood and fully addressed.

WMATA's immunity argument

In resolving the conflict

between the immunity ordinarily afforded decisions involving the
operation of a police force, and a federal court's authority to
enforce arbitration awards,

the Court found that "to extend

WMATA's immunity to all employment actions regarding its police
force would render its agreement with the FOP to be bound by
arbitral decisions a nullity."
specifically,

Mem.

Op. at 18.

More

the Court concluded that "[b]y agreeing to

arbitrate its labor disputes with the FOP's members,

WMATA has

waived any immunity that might otherwise shield it from suits to

enforce the awards resulting from those arbitral proceedings."
Id.

In its motion for summary judgment,

WMATA argued that its

"decision to require its police officers to be able to conduct

police activities in all three of its Signatory jurisdictions,
including Maryland,
guessing."

is a decision immune from judicial second-

Def. WMATA's Opp'n to PI.'s Cross-Mot.

for Summ.

J.

and Reply to PL's Opp'n to WMATA's Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. No.
33]

at 2 (citing Martin v. WMATA,

1981)).

667, F.2d 435,

436

(4th Cir.

In support of its Motion for Reconsideration, WMATA

makes the same argument,

that its "discretionary decision to

require Transit Police officers to be lawfully empowered to

police in all three of its Signatories,

protected by immunity."

including Maryland, is

Def.'s Mem. at 4; see also id. at 8

("WMATA's decision to require its police officers to

[be]

able

to conduct police activities in all three jurisdictions should
be deemed a quintessential governmental function immune from
attack."

(citing Martin,

667 F.2d at 436)).

Because this

argument was fully addressed in the Memorandum Opinion,
not a new argument; accordingly,
decision is not appropriate.

it is

reconsideration of the Court's

See Pritchard,

at 486 n.5;

3 F. App'x at 53;

see also Baker,

554 U.S.

Natural Resources Defense

Council v. U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency,

806 F. Supp.

1263,

1266 n.3

(E.D.

Va.

1992),

aff'd,

16 F.3d 1395

(4th Cir.

1993)

(finding that when issues have been fully considered and

disposed of by the court, a slight alteration in a party's
argument is not proper grounds for a motion to reconsider);
Allmond v.

23784041

Sec.

8 Dep't of Hous.,

(E.D. Va. Sept.

25, 2003)

Section 8 Dep't of Hous.,

CIV.A.

03-894-A,

2003 WL

aff'd sub nom. Allmond v.

89 F. App'x 392

(4th Cir.

2004) .

B. Merits

In its second argument,

WMATA claims that the Court made a

factual error in finding that WMATA had violated the arbitration

decision by not reinstating the officers.

Specifically, WMATA

argues that the Court's decision is in error because it "in
effect assumes

issue

that

the

[reinstatement]

arbitration decisions

in Plaintiff's favor";

resolved this

however,

"[i]t is

undisputed that the arbitration decisions occurred before
Maryland Commission]
11.

denied recertification."

[the

Def.'s Mem.

at

WMATA maintains that it "had already complied with the

arbitration decisions in that the officers were on paid
administrative leave."

Id. at 13.

In sum, WMATA argues that

because it placed Benton and Spencer on paid administrative

leave following the Board's decisions and terminated them only
after the Maryland Commission denied their recertification,
complied with the Board's decisions.

8

it

This argument was also raised in the parties'

summary

judgment motions and rejected in the Memorandum Opinion.
Mem.

Op. at 22

See

("WMATA argues that it cannot reinstate Benton

and Spencer unless they can perform police activities in
Washington, D.C.,
does

not

awards

Maryland,

and Virginia,

and that this position

conflict with the arbitration awards because

those

xdid not address the issue of whether WMATA is required

to reinstate an officer who is no longer qualified to conduct
police activities in Maryland.'"

Supp. of Def. WMATA's Mot.

(quoting Mem.

of P. & A. in

for Summ. J. at 12)).

In its Memorandum Opinion, the Court found,
facts,

that through Chief Taborn's letters,

very condition, lack of certification,

among other

"WMATA sought the

that forms the basis for

its argument that it cannot comply with the arbitral awards and
reinstate

the

two officers."

Id.

at

25.

The

Court

went on to

conclude that the "letters went far beyond simply providing

'derogatory information'

and actively sought to influence the

certification process with the apparent goal of avoiding the
reinstatements ordered by arbitration."
In its Motion for Reconsideration,

Id. at 26.
WMATA argues that the

Court's concerns regarding Chief Taborn's letters are "without

any legal significance," given the MTPD's reporting requirements
and other evidence before the Maryland Commission.

9

Def.'s Mem.

at 13.

On this point,

the Court finds the supplemental

materials provided by the parties to be particularly
instructive.

After the Motion for Reconsideration was filed,

the Court asked the parties to submit evidence of how WMATA
interacted with the Maryland Commission concerning other police
officers who were reinstated after being terminated.

In

response, the FOP and WMATA submitted records of disciplinary
actions directed at WMATA police officers over the past 10

years.

Not a single record includes the type of strong,

negative rhetoric used by Chief Taborn in his letters to the
Maryland Commission concerning Benton and Spencer.

Supplemental Mem.
in Supp.

[Dkt. No. 56] at 7-9; Def.'s Supplemental Mem.

of its Mot.

WMATA's argument,

See Pi.'s

for Recons.

[Dkt. No. 57].

Contrary to

these records are "pertinent to this

litigation" because they are strong evidence of WMATA's
intention to not comply with the arbitration awards by creating
a condition that it could then use to justify not reinstating
these officers.

See Mem.

Op. at 27; see also id. at 25

(finding

that Chief Taborn's letters demonstrate that "WMATA sought the

very condition, lack of certification,

that forms the basis for

its argument that it cannot comply with the arbitral awards and
reinstate the two officers.").

Again,

10

all of these issues were

addressed in the Memorandum Opinion,

and there is no new law or

evidence in the Motion for Reconsideration justifying relief.
V.

The Court finds that WMATA has not raised any new

arguments, cited any intervening change in controlling law,
provided any new evidence, or established that reconsideration
is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest

injustice.

Instead, WMATA's motion essentially asks the Court

to "change its mind."

The Court has reviewed its original decision and is fully
satisfied

that

it

reached

the correct

conclusion.

For the

reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and the Opinion of
June 20,

2013,

WMATA's Motion for Reconsideration will be

denied.

i±

Entered this c37 day of March, 2014.
Alexandria,

Virginia

Leonie M. Brinkema

United States District Judce

11