Williams v. Newman et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 1/24/14. (copy mailed to pro se pltff.)(gwalk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR Tlfc ^
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
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Alexandria Division
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JM 2 4 2014
Lorenzo Dale Williams,
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Plaintiff,
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V.
Richard K. Newman, ^
Defendants.
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l:12cvl475(AJT/TRJ)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lorenzo Dale Williams, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro sq, has filed a civil rights
action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false
conviction. Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied a preliminary hearing and subjected to "false
indictment and false direct indictment." By Order dated January 3, 2013, defendants Newman,
Nye, Sylvester, Amstead, Sharrett, Humphrey, and Campbell were dismissed for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). On March 26, 2013, Officers Byrum, Pale, and
Blankenship submitted a joint Motion to Dismiss, and Ms. Barretto submitted a separate Motion
to Dismiss on April 25, 2013. By this Court's September 3, 2013 Order, Officers Byrum, Pak,
and Blankenship's joint Motion to Dismiss and Ms. Barretto's separate Motion to Dismiss were
denied, without prejudice to their abilities to move for summaryjudgment. The matter is now
before the Court on defendants' Byrum, Pak, and Blankenship's joint Motion for Summary
Judgment and defendant Barretto's separate Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffwas
provided with the notice required by Local Rule 7(k) and Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1975), dkt. nos. 55 and 58, and plaintiff filed a "Motion to Deny Summary Judgment
with Prejudice," dkt. no. 61. OnNovember 4, 2013, defendants Byrum, Pak, and Blankenship
filed a rebuttal brief Dkt. No. 62. Similarly, on November 15, 2013, defendant Barreto filed a
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reply to plaintiffs motion. Dkt. No. 65. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition.
After careful consideration of all of the foregoing submissions, defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment will be granted, and summary final judgment will be entered in defendants'
favor.
I. Factual Background
The following material facts are uncontested. On November, 27,2010, Officer Byrum
issued two traffic citations to the individual driving plaintiffs car, who claimed to be and signed
the tickets as Glenn Williams, plaintiffs brother.
CompL p.6 of 14; PL's Mot. Den. Summ.
J. Ex. 3 and 4; Byrum Dec. On December 12,2010, Officer Blankenship issued a waming to the
individual driving plaintiffs car, who identified himself as Glenn Williams.
Compl. p. 6 of
14; Pl.'s Mot. to Den. Summ. J. Ex. 1; Blankenship Dec. After learning that someone had used
his name, Glenn Williams reported to Officer Pak that he believed the person that used his name
was his brother, plaintiff, because plaintiff "has done this before about 4 or 5 years ago. He went
to jail for it."
Compl. p. 6 of 14; Pl.'s Mot. Den. Summ. J. Ex. 2; Pak Dec.
Upon this information, Officer Pak obtained an arrest warrant and arrested plaintiff
Compl. pp. 6-8; Pak Dec. On February 8,2011, the Grand Jury in the Circuit Court of the City of
Hopewell returned a true bill against Lorenzo Williams in case number CRl 1000009-00 for
unlawfiilly and feloniously forging a public record on or about December 12, 2010, the waming
issued by Officer Blankenship, in violation of § 18.2-168 of the Code of Virginia. S^ PL's Mot.
Den. Summ. J. Ex. 8. On April 12,2011, the Grand Jury in the Circuit Court of the City of
Hopewell returned two true bills against Lorenzo Williams in case numbers CRl 1000149-00 and
CRl 1000150-00 for forging a public record on November 27,2010, the two traffic citations
issued by Officer Byrum, in violation of § 18.2-168 of the Code of Virginia.
Pl.'s Mot.
Rebut Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. Ex. 19.
Lorenzo Williams failed to appear for the hearing. See Pl.'s Mot. Rebut Def.'s Mot.
Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. Ex. 15,18. A capias was issued for his failure to appear at the hearing for
the identity theft and forgery charges. ^
Pi's Mot. Rebut Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Pi's Compl. Ex.
14. On or about December 1,2011, Officer Pak arrested Lorenzo Williams.
Pl.'s Mot. Rebut
Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. Ex. 8. The charges of identity theft and forging a public
record were dismissed bv nolle proseaui. See Pl.'s Mot. Rebut Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Compl.
Ex. 17,19, 20.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that judgment on
the pleadings is appropriate. S^ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (moving
party bears the burden of persuasion on all relevant issues). To meet that burden, the moving
party must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact are present for resolution. Id at
322. Once a moving party has met its burden to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to point out the specific facts which create
disputed factual issues. Anderson v. Libertv Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Matsushita
Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In evaluating a motion
for summaryjudgment, a district court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favorof that
party. United States v- Diebold. Inc.. 369 U.S. 654,655 (1962). Those facts for which the
moving party bears the burden of proving are facts which are material. "[T]he substantive law
will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts which might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."
Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine when, "the evidence ... create[s]
[a] fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice." Ross v. Communications Satellite
Corp.. 759 F.2d 355,364 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only where no
material facts are genuinely disputed and the evidence as a whole could not lead a rational fact
finder to rule for the non-moving party. Matsushita. 475 U.S. at 587.
III. Analysis
A. Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest
"The extent to which a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one
on which there is an embarrassing diversity ofjudicial opinion." Albright v. Oliver. 510 U.S.
266, 270 n. 4 (1994). The courts of appeals hold divergent views regarding whether and under
what circumstances § 1983 provides a malicious prosecution or false arrest cause of action. See
Lambert v. Williams. 223 F.3d 257,261 (4th Cir. 2000), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 1130 (2001). In
this circuit, a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution and/or false arrest is properly understood
"as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates some of the
elements of the common lawtort."' Id.; see also. Brown v. Gilmore. 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir.
2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the
'The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of thepeople to besecure intheir persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures [.]" U.S. Const, amend. IV. The "touchstone" of the Fourth Amendment
is reasonableness. United States v. Knights. 534 U.S. 112,118 (2001). Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not bar
all searches and seizures, but only those that are "unreasonable." United States v. Reid. 929 F.2d 990, 992 (4th Cir.
1991).
officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton. 249 F.3d 279,294 (4th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 claims
of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in
violation of the Fourth Amendment."). To support a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff
must show: (1) the initiation or maintenance of a proceeding by the defendant against the
plaintiff; (2) termination of that proceeding favorable to the plaintiff; and (3) lack of probable
cause to support that proceeding. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem. 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir.
1996); Curtis v. Devlin. 2005 WL 940571 at *6, n. 11 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2005). Similarly, to
prevail on a claim of false arrest, a plaintiff must show that the defendant lacked probable cause.
Brown. 278 F.3d at 367; see also. Gatter v. Zappile. 67 F. Supp. 2d 515, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Here, it is uncontroverted that defendant Byrum and defendant Blankenship took no
action to initiate plaintiffs prosecution for identity theft and the forgery charges. Defendants
Byrum and Blankenship did not appear before the magistrate. They did not arrest plaintiff, and
they were in no way responsible for the charges that the grand jury eventually brought by true
bills. Since defendant Byrum and defendant Blankenship took no actions to initiate plaintiffs
prosecution, they cannot be liable under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. Brooks. 85 F.3d at
183.
Nor can defendant Pak be liable to plaintiff for false arrest, because ample probable cause
existed to arrest plaintiff. For probable cause to exist, the evidence need only be sufficient to
warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being committed by a
particular individual. Curtis v. Devlin. 205 WL 940571 at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2005), citing
Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). A defendant's ultimate acquittal is irrelevant
to this inquiry. The determination of whether probable cause exists in a particular situation turns
on whether the suspect's conduct is known at the time to the police officer and whether that
conduct would give rise to a reasonable belief on the part of the officer that a criminal offense
had occurred. Pritchett v. Alford. 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992). It is reasonable for a police
officer to rely on a victim's statement to establish probable cause.
Tochinskv v. Siwinksi.
942 F.2d 257,262 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that it is surely reasonable for a police officer to base
his belief in probable cause on a victim's description of the crime and noting that it is difficult to
imagine how a police officer could obtain better evidence of probable cause); McKinnev v.
Richland County Sheriffs Dept.. 431 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that there is probable
cause for an arrest for assault based upon victim's statement); Hunsbereer v. Wood. 570 F.3d
546, 556 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting there is no obligation on the part of the officer to investigate the
complaining witness's credibility).
Here, it is uncontested that defendant Pak relied on a statement made by Glenn Williams,
the victim, to secure a warrant.
Compl. p. 6 of 14; PL's Mot. Den. Summ. J. Ex. 2; Pak Dec.
Since defendant Pak had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was the one who signed his
brother's name to the November 27, 2010 traffic citations and December 12,2010 warning,
plaintiffs arrest for those offenses did not violate Fourth Amendment principles. S^ Brown.
278 F.3d at 367. Accordingly, defendants Pak, Byrum, and Blankenship are entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiffs claims offalse arrest and malicious prosecution.^
B. False Conviction
Plaintiffs allegations that he is entitled to damages under a theory of false conviction
must also be dismissed.
^ Because defendants have established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs claims of false
arrest and malicious prosecution, it is unnecessary fortheCourt to address their arguments on the question of
qualified immunity.
To recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Heck V. Humphrev. 512 U.S. 477,486-87 (1994). As it is undisputed that the identity theft and
forgery charges were dismissed by nolle prosequi. there was no conviction on those charges that
plaintiff can now challenge as unconstitutional. S^ PL's Mot. Rebut Def's Mot. Dismiss PL's
Compl. Ex. 17,19,20. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact present and
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim will be granted.
Celotex Corp..
477 U.S. at 322.
C. Challenges to his Preliminary Hearing
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was denied a preliminary hearing and accuses
Judge Sharett, who presided over his criminal trial, of getting "the court reporter to rig, make up
or fabricate the record to show plaintiff plead guilty and waived the preliminary hearing."
Compl. p 11 of 14. He goes on to state that "conspirators had denied plaintiff a preliminary
hearing so to conceal their malicious acts." In his Motion to Deny Summary Judgment, he also
argues that "the transcripts of the Court reporter cannot be relied on ... because it is not
accurately recorded, with the facts from the preliminary hearing." These conclusory allegations
cannot support a finding that defendants' are liable to plaintiff. As such, defendants motions will
be granted as to these allegations.
D. "False Indictment and False Direct Indictment"
Petitioner alleges that "the indictment for the 12.12.10 offense is false because Officer S.
Pak had falsely arrested plaintiff." He goes on to argue that he was denied a "preliminary
hearing, which means no indictment shall be returned." These bare, and at times convoluted.
arguments regarding the indictments do not support a claim for which relief can be granted under
§ 1983; thus, there is no issue of material fact genuinely disputed and defendants' motions for
summary judgment will be granted as to this claim. ^
Matsushita. 475 U.S. at 587
IV. Defendant Rackly
Defendant Kay H. Rackly never executed and returned a notice of summons and waiver
of service. By Order dated January 25,2013, the Court warned plaintiff that "if the Court is
unable to effect service on the defendants Blankenship, Byrum, Rackly, and Barreto through this
Order and they are not otherwise served within 120 days of filing, defendants Blankenship,
Byrum, Rackly, and Barreto will be dismissed from the instant action without prejudice."
Because defendant Rackly was not served within 120 days of January 25,2013, defendant
Rackly will be dismissed.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted.
Defendant Rackly will be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). An appropriate Order shall
issue.
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