Negron-Bennett et al v. McCandless et al

Filing 140

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: Defts' Motions to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 10/08/13. (pmil)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

LUZ DENISE NEGRON-BENNETT,
et al.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
v.

JASON LEE MCCANDLESS, et al.,
Defendants.

M E M O R A N D U M

1:13cv387 (JCC/JFA)

O P I N I O N

This matter is before the Court upon several motions
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (collectively
“Motions”). 1

[Dkts. 112, 117, 128.]

For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motions.
I.
A.

Background

Factual Background

This action arises from Plaintiffs’ numerous
interactions with the Arlington County Department of Human
1
The following named defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint: Arlington County, Sarah Gortenburg, Eliseo Pilco, Jason Lee
McCandless, Jaque L. Tuck, Renee Andrea Perrier, Alyssa Green, Sherri
Brothers, Lakeisha Flores, Valerie Cuffee, Heather Carter-Stowe, Susanne
Eisner, Jonnise Conanan, Ara Tramblian, Stephen MacIsaac, Joseph Haggerty,
Michele Saupp, John Bamford, Brynn Bennett, Daniel Smaldore, Kimberly
Sweeney, Jeremy Stritzinger, M. Douglas Scott, Joanne Hamilton, Arlington
County Office of the County Attorney, Arlington County Police Department,
Arlington County Department of Human Services, Tammee Alsup Gaymon, Laura
Raggins, Stephanie Tebor, Robert Icolari, Richard E. Trodden, Theophani
K. Stamos, Molly H. Newton, Frank A. Frio, and Marjorie Brown (collectively
“Defendants”). [Dkts. 112, 117, 128.]

1

Services (“DHS”), the Arlington County Police Department
(“APD”), and the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office during a child
custody case that resulted in the removal of Plaintiffs’
children.

(Am. Compl. [Dkt. 109] ¶¶ 1-2, 19-31.)

Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants, both individually and collectively,
conspired and endeavored to wrong Plaintiffs by removing their
children and pursuing several criminal actions against Plaintiff
Salim Bennett (“Mr. Bennett”).

(Id. at ¶¶ 112-27).

As best as the Court can tell, this dispute began in
March 2011 when Plaintiff Luz Denise Negron-Bennett (“Mrs.
Bennett”) contacted APD because Mr. Bennett had struck two of
their children.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 19.)

Mr. Bennett was arrested

the next day, and on April 28, 2011, he entered an Alford plea
of guilty to charges of abuse and neglect.

(Id.)

Proceedings

were then initiated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
District Court for Arlington County, and DHS eventually
succeeded in removing the children from Mr. Bennett’s custody.
See Bennett v. MacIsaac, No. 1:11CV920 (JCC/JFA), 2011 WL
5357840, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2011).
On August 26, 2011, Mrs. Bennett suffered a
miscarriage.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 25.)

During the ensuing hospital

stay, Plaintiffs refused to provide DHS with information
regarding the children’s location.

(Id. at ¶¶ 26-30.)

DHS

repeatedly informed Plaintiffs that, pursuant to a court order,
2

they had an obligation to provide the name, address, and
telephone number of anyone watching the children.
¶¶ 26-30.)

(Am. Compl.

Plaintiffs dispute the existence of any such order.

(Id.)
On August 28, 2011, Mrs. Bennett returned home and
notified DHS that the children were again in her custody.
Compl. ¶ 31.)

(Am.

DHS then came to the home and removed the

children because “their whereabouts were unknown for 48 hours.”
(Id. at ¶ 32.)

According to Plaintiffs, DHS acted without

authority and unlawfully detained Mrs. Bennett throughout this
time.

(Id. at ¶¶ 31-38.)

Shortly thereafter, several police

officers arrested Mr. Bennett in the family home on grounds that
his presence also violated a protective order.

(Id. at ¶ 51.)

Plaintiffs, however, allege that this arrest was unlawful
because the protective order did not prohibit Mr. Bennett’s
presence when the children were absent.

(Id. at ¶ 52.)

While not entirely clear, it appears that the
Arlington County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
held a hearing regarding the children’s removal on September 1,
2011.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 76.)

Plaintiffs allege that DHS fabricated

cause to justify the removal.

(Id. at ¶ 60.)

Plaintiffs

further claim that DHS unjustifiably refused to permit the
children to stay with Mrs. Bennett’s relatives and instead
placed them in foster care.

(Id. at ¶ 43.)
3

According to

Plaintiffs, this decision was motivated by their race.

(Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 44-46.)
Between September 2011 and November 2011, the
Commonwealth Attorney’s Office filed numerous charges against
Mr. Bennett for violating his probation and failing to adhere to
the aforementioned protective orders.
75.)

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-54, 57-

Although the exact disposition of these matters is

uncertain, Plaintiffs allege that these charges were “malicious,
unreasonable and retaliatory.”

(Id. at ¶ 57.)

Tying all of their claims together, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants, individually and in their official capacities,
conspired to violate their constitutional rights and keep Mr.
Bennett out of the family home.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 112-27.)

In

support of this conspiracy, Plaintiffs point to the fact that
all of the Defendant are, or were, Arlington County employees.
(Id.)
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs first Complaint, filed on March 25, 2013,
named nearly fifty defendants and asserted nine causes of
action.

[Dkt. 1.]

On May 28, 2013, several defendants moved to

dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8, 10, 12, and 20.

[Dkts. 12, 15.]

By Order dated July 24, 2013, this Court directed
Plaintiffs to file a particularized amended complaint because
4

their initial pleading failed to comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

[Dkt. 96.]

The Court

separately denied the pending motions to dismiss as moot.

[Dkt.

111.]
Plaintiffs timely filed their Amended Complaint on
August 5, 2013.

[Dkt. 109.]

Spanning over sixty pages, the

Amended Complaint names thirty-two defendants and contains
approximately seven tenuous causes of action.

The vast majority

of these claims are asserted against “all Defendants” or “the
Defendants” without limitation.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 168-205.)

In

addition, the “Factual Allegations” section alleges various
other transgressions on the part of Defendants, couched in
quasi-legal language, including “negligence and gross
negligence,” “abuse of process,” “intentional infliction of
emotional distress,” “negligent infliction of emotional
distress,” and “negligent hiring, training, supervision and
retention.”

(Id. at ¶¶ 57, 86, 95.)

It is unclear whether

these allegations are themselves intended to constitute
additional causes of action.
Defendants have now moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8, 10, 12, and 20.

[Dkts. 112, 117, 128.]

Plaintiffs have

responded, [Dkts. 123-25, 130], and Defendants’ Motions are
before the Court.
5

II.
A.

Standard of Review

Rule 8

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This rule further

necessitates that each averment “be simple, concise, and
direct.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

While courts must liberally

construe pro se civil rights complaints to address
constitutional deprivations, see Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,
1151 (4th Cir. 1978), “[p]rinciples requiring generous
construction of pro se complaints are not . . . without limits,”
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.
1985).

“Even pro se plaintiffs must recognize Rule 8's vision

for ‘a system of simplified pleadings that give notice of the
general claim asserted, allow for the preparation of a basic
defense, narrow the issues to be litigated, and provide a means
for quick dispositions of sham claims.’”

Sewraz v. Guice, Civil

Action No. 3:08cv35, 2008 WL 3926443, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26,
2008) (citations omitted).

Protracted pleadings that consist of

confusing narrative place an unjustified burden on the court and
the party who must respond.

See North Carolina v. McGuirt, 114

F. App'x 555, 558-59 (4th Cir. 2004).

A complaint that fails to

comply with these pleading requirements is subject to dismissal

6

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

McGuirt, 114 F. App'x at 558.
B.

Rule 20

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also limit a
plaintiff's ability to join multiple defendants in a single
pleading.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.

While a plaintiff may freely

join several claims against a single defendant, see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 18(a), multiple defendants may be joined only if their
liability arises from the “same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences” and a common question of
law or fact exists as to all defendants, Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(2).

Rule 20 does not authorize a plaintiff to add claims

“against different parties [that] present[ ] entirely different
factual and legal issues.”

Lovelace v. Lee, No. 7:03CV00395,

2007 WL 3069660, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2007) (citation
omitted).

Further, a court may “deny joinder if it determines

that the addition of the party under Rule 20 will not foster the
objectives of the rule, but will result in prejudice, expense,
or delay.”

Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d

206, 218 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007) (identifying the purposes of Rule
20 as promoting convenience and expediting the resolution of
disputes).

7

III.

Analysis

The Court has carefully reviewed the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs have again submitted the type of
“mishmash” pleading that the above-mentioned rules were designed
to prevent.

See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (4th Cir.

2007).
First, despite this Court’s prior Order directing
Plaintiffs to file a particularized pleading, [Dkt. 96], the
Amended Complaint qualifies as neither “short” nor “plain” as
Rule 8 requires.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint represents a

disorienting mix of allegations with relevant facts, irrelevant
facts, disjointed narrative, conclusory accusations, and legal
argument written in a highly confusing manner.

Since any

material allegations are buried beneath numerous pages of
rambling irrelevancies, it is essentially impossible to separate
the legally significant from the legally insignificant facts.
Such pleading requires the Court to constantly cross-reference
the factual narrative section and “wade indeterminately through
the morass of superfluous detail.”

McGuirt, 114 F. App'x at

559; see also Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.
2001) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a complaint
that incorporated by reference 146 numbered paragraphs of
factual allegations into each claim, incorporated the
allegations of each preceding claim, entailed numerous
8

immaterial and rambling factual allegations, and charged “all
defendants” in each count).
Further complicating this Court’s analysis is the
organizational structure Plaintiffs employ.

The Amended

Complaint consists of at least 205 numbered paragraphs loosely
organized into several sections, and Plaintiffs have done little
to synthesize this material into a coherent configuration.

For

example, although the Amended Complaint contains a “Legal
Claims” section that identifies seven causes of action, (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 168-205), the “Factual Allegations” section alleges
various other transgressions couched in quasi-legal language,
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 86, 95.)

It is unclear whether these

allegations are themselves intended to constitute additional
causes of action.

Moreover, the vast majority of these claims

are asserted against “all Defendants” or “the Defendants”
without limitation.
While it is apparent from oral argument that Mrs.
Bennett, as a second-year law student, has significant legal
training, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint falls short even
affording it the liberal construction granted to pro se
pleadings.

2

See Thompson v. Echols, No. 99-6304, 1999 WL

717280, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 15, 1999).
2

The length and

In fact, Mrs. Bennett specifically admitted to completing a course on civil
procedure and studying the procedural rules at issue. As evident from the
discussion below, however, her purported knowledge is not on display in the
Amended Complaint.

9

confusing manner of the Amended Complaint fails to give
Defendants fair notice of Plaintiffs’ claims and the grounds
upon which they rest, thereby impeding their ability to frame
responsive pleadings and prepare defenses.

Plaintiffs have

similarly burdened the Court with fishing through the Amended
Complaint to reconcile its extensive factual allegations with
the various causes of action, an endeavor considerably
aggravated by the Amended Complaint’s indiscriminate allegation
of every cause of action against every Defendant.
declines to undertake such a task.

The Court

See Beaudett, 775 F.2d at

1277-78 (noting that if a complaint “present[s] obscure or
extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel
them,” then a court is not required to be a “mind reader[ ]” and
“conjure up questions never squarely presented to” it).

As

such, the Amended Complaint is unfit to proceed as filed.

See,

e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996).
Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not, as requested, limit
the Amended Complaint to a single defendant or a group of
defendants in compliance with Rule 20.

During the course of

events described above, Plaintiffs found themselves opposite
various government officials in several locations over a period of
more than one year.

While geographic and temporal realities make

plain that not all Defendants could have participated in every
act complained of, Plaintiffs have once again alleged every
10

cause of action against all Defendants.
205.)

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 168-

Plaintiffs’ general allegations fail to connect every

Defendant to each cause of action as required.

See Jackson v.

Olsen, Civil Action No. 3:09cv43, 2010 WL 724023, at *8 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 1, 2010) (“Plaintiff's amended complaint raises a
variety of claims against many defendants.

The claims arise

from separate events which involve interactions with Plaintiff.
‘As such, this [amended] complaint comprises multiple law suits,
rather than one suit.’” (citation omitted)).

Given the number

and diversity of Defendants, and the breadth of the allegations,
conclusory accusations of wrongdoing by “Defendants” will not
suffice.
Although Plaintiffs allege that a conspiracy existed
among the Defendants in an apparent attempt to establish some
commonality, their conspiracy claim is itself insufficient.
Plaintiffs’ argument is largely premised upon the fact that
Arlington County employed all of the Defendants.
112-27.)

(Am. Compl. ¶¶

Despite Plaintiffs’ belief otherwise, such vague

factual assertions do not “reasonably lead to the inference that
[Defendants] positively or tacitly came to a mutual
understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan.”
Ruttenberg v. Jones, 283 F. App’x 121, 132 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Because

Plaintiffs’ charge of a conspiracy “amounts to no more than a
11

legal conclusion . . . it fails to assert a plausible claim.”
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2009); see
also Jackson, 2010 WL 724023, at *3 (“[A] plaintiff cannot
satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(a) with conclusory
allegations of a conspiracy.”).
Plaintiffs’ argument that the Court should sever the
impermissible Defendants in lieu of other sanctions for their
failure to comply with Rule 20 is unavailing.
Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 125] at 7.)

(Reply Br. in

While this relief is

certainly available, see Fed. R. Civ. P 21, the aforementioned
pleading deficiencies make it impractical to attempt to sever
the Amended Complaint into discrete groups of reasonably related
claims and allow them to proceed separately.
Though dismissal with prejudice for failing to obey
the abovementioned pleading standards is generally disfavored,
the Court finds that such action is necessary given Plaintiffs’
unwillingness to comply with the Court’s prior Order and their
penchant for filing frivolous proceedings based upon these
facts. 3

See McGuirt, 114 F. App'x at 558-59 (upholding district

court's dismissal with prejudice after plaintiff's amended
complaint failed to comply with Rule 8(a)); Titan Atlas Mfg.,
Inc. v. Sisk, Nos. 1:11CV00012, 1:11CV00068, 2013 WL 3283543, at
3

Plaintiffs have filed at least two other actions in this Court stemming from
the removal of their children, both of which were dismissed for failure to
state a claim. See Bennett v. MacIsaac, 1:11-CV-920 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2011);
Manship v. Brother, 1:11-CV-1003 (E.D. Va. Dec. 27, 2011).

12

*3 (W.D. Va. June 28, 2013) (“Rule 41(b) allows for involuntary
dismissal of claims where ‘the plaintiff fails to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or a court order.’” (citation
omitted)); Hope v. Johnson, Civil Action No. 3:08CV563, 2009 WL
3805701, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2009) (dismissing
plaintiff’s suit where he failed to file an amended complaint in
accordance with the Court’s direction); see also Kuehl v. FDIC,
8 F.3d 905, 907-09 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding district court's
dismissal with prejudice after plaintiff's amended complaint
failed to comply with Rule 8(a)).
The clear lack of support for Plaintiffs’ claims
further supports this disposition.

See McHenry, 84 F.3d 1172 at

1179 (“The ‘harshness of a dismissal with prejudice is directly
proportionate to the likelihood that plaintiff would prevail if
permitted to go forward to trial.’” (citation omitted)).

Most

of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, to the extent it is
comprehensible, would be dismissed without ever reaching the
merits.

For instance, the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity

categorically bars Plainitffs’ allegations against the
Commonwealth Attorney defendants.

See Williams v. Bowen, Civil

Action No. 3:12CV139–HEH, 2013 WL 5322867, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept.
23, 2013) (“Absolute immunity protects those ‘acts undertaken by
a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial
proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his
13

role as an advocate for the State.’” (quoting Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)).

Likewise, given the

factual basis for this matter occurred in 2011, Plaintiffs’
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 falls outside the one-year statute
of limitations applicable to such actions.

See Matthews v.

Howard Cnty., Md., No. 99-2654, 2000 WL 790963, at *1 (4th Cir.
June 20, 2000) (noting that § 1986 contains its own one-year
statute of limitations).

In short, there is no likelihood that

Plaintiffs would prevail if permitted to go forward.

See

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179 (“[D]ismissal with prejudice was really
not very harsh, because if the complaint were not dismissed
under Rule 8, most of it would be dismissed anyway without ever
reaching the merits.”).
IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

Additionally, because the

analysis set forth above is equally applicable to the non-moving
defendants, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss this case
in its entirety.

See Berry v. Gorman, Civil Action No.

7:12cv00500, 2012 WL 5941488, at *1 (W.D. Va. Nov. 27, 2012)
(dismissing plaintiff's complaint sua sponte for failure to

14

comply with Rule 8 (citation omitted)).

An appropriate order

will issue.

October 8, 2013
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

15