Negron-Bennett et al v. McCandless et al

Filing 95

MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: Two Motions to Dismiss Pltfs' pro se Complaint. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 07/24/13. (pmil)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
Luz Denise Negron-Bennett, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
v.
) 1:13cv387 (JCC/JFA)
)
Jason Lee McCandless, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
M E M O R A N D U M

O P I N I O N

This matter is before the Court upon two Motions to
Dismiss (collectively, the “Motions to Dismiss”) Plaintiffs’ pro
se Complaint.

For the following reasons, the Court will order

Plaintiffs to file a particularized amended complaint.
I. Background
1. Factual Background
Plaintiffs’ Complaint arises out of interactions with
various Arlington County and Commonwealth employees.

Plaintiffs

complain of a protracted period of injustice, allegedly
orchestrated by Defendants, spanning a period in excess of a
year.

The Complaint alleges that during this period,

Defendants, both individually and as a collective, conspired and
endeavored to wrong Plaintiffs and their children in various
ways.

As best as this Court can tell, the period about which

Plaintiffs complain began on March 22, 2011, when Plaintiff Luz
1

Denise Negron-Bennett (“Mrs. Bennett”) called the Arlington
County Police Department from the Bennett family’s residence
because her husband, Plaintiff Salim Bennett, had struck two of
their children with a belt. (Compl. ¶ 51.)

Mr. Bennett left the

scene with the children prior to the arrival of the police, and
the children were not present upon law enforcement’s arrival at
the residence. (Id.)

Mr. Bennett was arrested the next day in

connection with the incident.

(Id. at ¶ 54.)

Thus began Plaintiffs’ numerous interactions with the
Arlington County Police Department, Department of Human Services
(“DHS”), and Child Protective Services (“CPS”).

Abuse and

neglect proceedings were initiated following Mr. Bennett’s
arrest, marking the beginning of proceedings that would involve
multiple hearings and the provision of services to Plaintiffs
and their children. 1

(Id. at ¶ 54-69; 71; 87.)

On April 28,

2011, Mr. Bennett entered an Alford plea of guilty to two
charges of assault and battery in Arlington County Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.

The children were removed from Mr.

Bennett’s custody at some point after he pled guilty.

See

Bennett v. MacIsaac, 1:11CV920 JCC/JFA, 2011 WL 5357840 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 7, 2011).

Plaintiffs’ Complaint presents a prolix,

confusing narrative of the events that took place thereafter,

1

Although the Complaint regularly refers to hearings and events that took
place in “court,” context that would enable this Court to discern the purpose
or nature of a given proceeding is often lacking.

2

detailing legal processes involving various governmental
divisions and employees. 2
The Complaint enumerates nine causes of action, all of
which have been brought against all of the approximately fifty
Defendants: (1) violation of Fifth Amendment right to due
process (Count I); (2) violation of Fourteenth Amendment right
to familial association (Count II); (3) violation of Second
Amendment right to bear arms (Count III); (4) violation of Va.
Code Ann. § 16.1-251(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) and (29)
(Count IV); (5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(22) (Count V);
(6) violation of Eighth Amendment freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment (Count VI); (7) violation of Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses (Count VII); (8) violation of Fourth
Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure (Count
VIII); and (9) violation of “other Virginia statutes” (Count
IX).

In addition, the “LEGAL CLAIMS” section following Count IX

alleges various other transgressions on the part of Defendants,
couched in quasi-legal language, including “negligence and gross
negligence,” “abuse of process,” “intentional infliction of
emotional distress,” “negligent infliction of emotional
distress,” and “negligent hiring, training, supervision and

2

Although presented as a sequential narrative, Plaintiffs’ confusing factual
summary is disjointed and often employs undated references to past and future
events. Furthermore, the Complaint starts referring to the years 2011 and
2012 interchangeably beginning on page 32, adding yet another layer of
confusion.

3

retention.”

It is unclear whether the aforementioned

allegations are themselves intended to constitute additional
causes of action.
2. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed on March 25, 2013.
Two separate motions to dismiss the Complaint have been filed on
behalf of various Defendants. On May 28, 2013, a Motion to
Dismiss and Roseboro Notice [Dkt. 12] (“Arlington Motion to
Dismiss”), as well as a Memorandum in Support [Dkt. 13] of the
same, were filed by Defendants Arlington County Department of
Human Services, Arlington County Government, Arlington County
Office of the County Attorney, Arlington County Police
Department, Brynn Bennett, Sherri Brothers, Susanne Eisner,
Tammee Alsup Gaymon, Joanne Hamilton, Stephen MacIsaac, Renee
Andrea Perrier, M. Douglas Scott, Daniel Smaldore, Jeremy
Stritzinger, Ara Tramblian, and Jaque L. Tuck. 3

On the same day,

Defendants Frank Frio, Molly Hutzell Newton, Theophani Stamos,
and Richard Trodden (“Commonwealth Attorney Defendants”) filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [Dkt. 15] (“Attorney Motion to
Dismiss”), as well as a Brief in Support [Dkt. 14]. 4
3

On June 17,

The Court will refer to the motion to dismiss entitled “Motion to Dismiss
and Roseboro Notice” as the “Arlington Motion to Dismiss” simply for the sake
of brevity and convenience. The Court is not making a definitive finding or
statement as to the respective associations of the individual Defendants with
Arlington County.
4
The Court will hereafter refer to Defendants Frank Frio, Molly Hutzell
Newton, Theophani Stamos, and Richard Trodden collectively as the
“Commonwealth Attorney Defendants,” as the aforementioned Defendants

4

2013, Plaintiffs filed a Reply in Opposition [Dkt. 39] to the
Arlington Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs also filed a Reply in

Opposition [Dkt. 40] to the Attorney Motion to Dismiss.

On the

same day, Plaintiff Salim Bennett (“Mr. Bennett”) filed an
Affidavit and numerous exhibits in support of the Complaint.
[Dkt. 41.]

On June 24, 2013, a Rebuttal Brief was filed in

support of the Arlington Motion to Dismiss.

[Dkt. 44.]

On the

same day, a Rebuttal Brief was filed in support of the Attorney
Motion to Dismiss.

[Dkt. 45.]
II. Standard of Review

1. Pro Se Plaintiffs
The Court construes the pro se Complaint in this case more
liberally than those drafted by an attorney.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

See Haines v.

Further, the Court is aware

that "[h]owever inartfully pleaded by a pro se plaintiff,
allegations are sufficient to call for an opportunity to offer
supporting evidence unless it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief."

Thompson v.

Echols, No. 99-6304, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22373, 1999 WL 717280,
at *1 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972)).

Nevertheless, while pro se litigants cannot "be

ostensibly serve or previously served as Commonwealth Attorneys during the
time period germane to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. As the Commonwealth Attorney
Defendants have jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss, the Court will therefore
refer to that Motion as the “Commonwealth Attorney Motion to Dismiss” in
order to distinguish it from the Arlington Motion to Dismiss.

5

expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision
ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can
district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues
never fairly presented to them."

Beaudett v. City of Hampton,

775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).

Thus, even in cases

involving pro se litigants, as in here, the Court "cannot be
expected to construct full blown claims from sentence
fragments."

Id. at 1278.

Further, the Court may not construct

a plaintiff's legal arguments for him.

See, e.g., Small v.

Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1993).
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a
complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(d)(1) further requires that each averment "be simple, concise,
and direct."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

Courts must liberally

construe pro se civil rights complaints in order to address
constitutional deprivations.

Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,

1151 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Canty v. Richmond, Virginia Police
Dep't, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (E.D. Va. 1974)).

Nevertheless,

"[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se
complaints are not . . . without limits."

Beaudett v. City of

Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Even pro se

plaintiffs must recognize Rule 8's vision for "a system of
6

simplified pleadings that give notice of the general claim
asserted, allow for the preparation of a basic defense, narrow
the issues to be litigated, and provide a means for quick
dispositions of sham claims."

Prezzi v. Berzak, 57 F.R.D. 149,

151 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Peck v. Merletti, 64 F. Supp. 2d
599, 602 (E.D. Va. 1999); Stone v. Warfield, 184 F.R.D. 553, 555
(D. Md. 1999).

While Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual

allegations,” a plaintiff must still provide “more than labels
and conclusions” because “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citation omitted).

Statements

which are unnecessarily prolix place "'an unjustified burden on
the court and the party who must respond to [them] because they
are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of
verbiage.'"

Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)

(quoting 5 Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1281 at 365 (1969)); see also North Carolina v.
McGuirt, 114 F. App'x 555, 558-59 (4th Cir. 2004) available at
2004 WL 2603703, at *2-3.
3. Joinder
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place limits on a
plaintiff's ability to join multiple defendants in a single
pleading.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).

The Federal Rules permit

more than one claim against a single defendant to be joined in
7

the same action.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).

However, claims

against different defendants may be joined in the same if “(A)
any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

"The 'transaction or occurrence test' of the rule . . .
'permit[s] all reasonably related claims for relief by or
against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding.
Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.'"

Saval v. BL

Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting Mosley v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974)).

"But,

Rule 20 does not authorize a plaintiff to add claims 'against
different parties [that] present[ ] entirely different factual
and legal issues.'"

Sykes v. Bayer Pharms. Corp., 548 F. Supp.

2d 208, 218 (E.D. Va. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting
Lovelace v. Lee, No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77890,
2007 WL 3069660, *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2007)).

"And, a court

may 'deny joinder if it determines that the addition of the
party under Rule 20 will not foster the objectives of [promoting
convenience and expediting the resolution of disputes], but will
result in prejudice, expense, or delay.'"

8

Id (quoting Aleman v.

Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 218 n. 5 (4th Cir.
2007)).
4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41
Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order,” the court
may enter an order of involuntary dismissal.
41(b).
41.

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Pro se litigants are subject to the provisions of Rule

In assessing whether dismissal is appropriate under Rule

41(b), a court evaluates (1) the degree of the plaintiff's
personal responsibility for the failures; (2) the prejudice
caused to the defendant; (3) whether the plaintiff has a history
of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion; and (4) the
availability of a less drastic sanction.

See, e.g., Chandler

Leasing Corp. v. Lopez, 669 F.2d 919, 920 (4th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam).
5. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
9

alleged.”

Id.

However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice” to meet this standard, id., and a plaintiff’s
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level . . . .”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Moreover, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678.
III. Analysis
Although the Court has endeavored to disentangle the
Complaint’s pertinent allegations from the accompanying mass of
discursive prolixity, its numerous and flagrant pleading
deficiencies have complicated the Court’s efforts to an
excessive degree.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint represents a

disorienting mix of allegations with relevant facts, irrelevant
facts, disjointed narrative, conclusory accusations, and legal
argument written in a highly confusing manner.
Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint qualifies as neither
“short” nor “plain,” as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, but is at the same time deficient as to
required factual allegations.

The Complaint names approximately

fifty Defendants, and all Defendants are charged in each count.
Individual Defendants are charged both in their personal and
official capacities.

As to the form of the Complaint, the
10

document itself consists of forty-five single-spaced pages.

It

has been loosely divided into seven sections, and further
subdivided into numbered paragraphs, though the Complaint does
not utilize this organizational structure for internal crossreferences or citations.

Much of the Complaint consists of

discursive, confusing narrative interspersed with various
accusations of collective and individual wrongdoing by
Defendants.

Each count incorporates by reference the all of the

Complaint’s preceding allegations, which comprise at least 170
numbered paragraphs. 5

The result is that the Complaint is

replete with factual allegations that could not possibly be
material to each specific count, and that any allegations that
are material are buried beneath numerous pages of rambling
irrelevancies.

Such pleading requires the Court to cross-

reference constantly the factual narrative section and “wade
indeterminately through the morass of superfluous detail.”
McGuirt, 114 F. App'x at 558-559.

See

It is essentially impossible

to separate the legally significant from the legally
insignificant facts in this factual background and then to match
them with claims purportedly made in the Complaint.

Id.

Indeed, the Complaint is a classic example of “shotgun pleading”

5

This figure represents a minimum number of paragraphs, as each subsequent
count continues to incorporate preceding allegations. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs seemingly would like the Court to consider the allegations and
representations made in the “LEGAL CLAIMS” section beginning at paragraph 207
and terminating at paragraph 231.

11

in that it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of
fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.

See

Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Florida Cmty. Coll.,
77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Jackson v. Olsen,
CIV.A. 3:09CV43, 2010 WL 724023 (E.D. Va. 2010) (unpublished).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is in no sense the “short and plain
statement of the claim” required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and disregards Rule 10(b)'s requirement that
discrete claims should be plead in separate counts.

See Magluta

v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal of a complaint that incorporated by
reference 146 numbered paragraphs of factual allegations into
each claim, incorporated the allegations of each preceding
claim, entailed numerous immaterial and rambling factual
allegations, and charged “all defendants” in each count); see
also Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 F. App'x 274,
277 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s third
dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to comply with
Rule 8); Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674
(9th Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8).
The Court’s analysis has been complicated further by
the Affidavit that has been filed by Mr. Bennett.

The Affidavit

is similar to the Complaint in that it presents a confusing
12

combination of rambling narrative and conclusory accusations.
Although Mr. Bennett’s Affidavit introduced various exhibits and
contemporaneous documentation for the Court’s consideration, it
did so by filing in excess of one hundred pages of documents
with only minimal accompanying explanation as to each exhibit’s
significance. 6

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have made no effort to

synthesize the exhibits with the Complaint or with Mr. Bennett’s
Affidavit.

This pervasive lack of descriptive and contextual

clarity has presented a significant hindrance to the Court’s
ability to conduct proper evaluation of the associated documents
in concert with the Complaint.
There are also significant deficiencies that obfuscate
the Complaint’s purported causes of action.

The introduction of

Plaintiffs’ Complaint passingly mentions that they are bringing
suit pursuant to “42 U.S.C. §[§] 1983, 1985, and 1986” for
violations of the “First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eight[h], and
Fourteenth Amendments” and “42 U.S.C. §[§] 671(a)(19), (22), and
(29).”

(Compl. ¶ 1.)

The claims listed in the Complaints

“CAUSES OF ACTION” section, however, baldly allege violations of
various state statutes, federal statutes, and Constitutional
Amendments.

It is unclear of precise the manner in which

Plaintiffs wish to link the Complaint’s profuse allegations to
causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, as
6

The Court notes that the Complaint was filed without exhibits or
contemporaneous documentation supporting its claims.

13

Plaintiffs have made little effort to plead their claims in a
succinct or coherent fashion.

None of the counts alleging

Constitutional violations so much as mention §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986, let alone adhere to the traditional forms of pleading
causes of action under each.

Although the Complaint passingly

touches upon how Plaintiffs intend to proceed under each
statutory section in the “LEGAL CLAIMS” section, that brief
discussion offers only conclusory assurances that all Defendants
are liable under each of §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. 7

(Id. at ¶

207.)
In short, the Court is simply unable to divine the
manner in which Plaintiffs would reconcile the numerous
allegations of the Complaint with causes of action against
Defendants under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, or any of the other
statutory sections. 8

The Court simply will not make Plaintiffs’

arguments for them. 9
Compounding the Complaint’s problems, Plaintiffs have
alleged every cause of action against all of the approximately
fifty Defendants, some of which have yet to even be identified,

7

The Court also notes that the “LEGAL CLAIMS” section actually follows the
enumeration of the Complaint’s causes of action, and the purpose of the
section is not entirely clear.
8
The Court notes that this problem has been exacerbated significantly by
Plaintiffs having charged every defendant, both in their individual and
official capacities, under each claim.
9
The Court also notes that “[i]n giving liberal interpretation to a pro se
civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims
that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

14

and have done so without explanation as to why and for what
activities each defendant should be liable upon each count.

The

Complaint frequently fails to connect coherently the actions of
various Defendants to their causes of action and fails to
explain exactly how each defendant is implicated by Plaintiffs’
allegations.

Plaintiffs’ current pleading “is replete with

allegations that ‘the defendants' engaged in certain conduct,
making no distinction among the [defendants] charged, though
geographic and temporal realities make plain that all of the
defendants could not have participated in every act complained
of.”

See Magluta, 256 F.3d at 1284.

Given the number and

diversity of the Defendants, and the breadth of the allegations,
conclusory accusations of wrongdoing by “Defendants” and vague
references to liability on the part “all Defendants” will simply
not suffice.

The Court does not believe the Complaint provides

Defendants with adequate descriptions as to which of their
activities Plaintiffs’ consider to have been objectionable,
thereby impeding the ability of the Defendants to frame
responsive pleadings and prepare defenses.

See, e.g., McHenry

v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-1180 (9th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiffs

have left to the Court the task of fishing through the Complaint
to reconcile its extensive factual allegations with the various
causes of action, an endeavor considerably aggravated by the
Complaint’s indiscriminate allegation of every cause of action
15

against every one of the approximately fifty Defendants.
Court declines to undertake such a task.

The

Id.

The Court also rejects the Complaint’s improper
joinder of Defendants and claims.

The Court is mindful that

“the impulse toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of
claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).

United
This

impulse, however, does not provide a plaintiff free license to
join multiple defendants into a single lawsuit where the claims
against the defendants are unrelated.

See, e.g., George v.

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

“Furthermore, a

Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(a) with
conclusory allegations of a conspiracy.”

Jackson, 2010 WL

724023, at *3; see also Robinson v. Johnson, CIV.A. 3:07CV449,
2009 WL 874530, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2009).
Plaintiffs have named approximately fifty individuals
as Defendants.

Although Plaintiffs allege that a conspiracy

existed among the Defendants to deprive the Bennett family of
their civil rights, Plaintiffs have not stated any plausible
claim for a conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights.
Because Plaintiffs’ allegation of a conspiracy “amounts to no
more than a legal conclusion, on its face it fails to assert a
plausible claim.”

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 197 (4th
16

Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950); Gooden v. Howard
Cnty., Md., 954 F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1992).

In order to

satisfy their pleading burden with respect to a conspiracy,
Plaintiffs “needed to plead facts that would ‘reasonably lead to
the inference that [Defendants] positively or tacitly came to a
mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful
plan.’”

Ruttenberg v. Jones, 283 F.App’x 121, 132 (4th Cir.

2008) (quoting Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421
(4th Cir. 1996).

The Complaint’s “bare, conclusory

allegation[s] that the [D]efendants conspired to violate
[Plaintiffs’] constitutional rights” are insufficient.”

Id.

In the absence of a plausible claim of conspiracy,
Plaintiffs have failed to articulate a common question of law or
fact for all of the named Defendants.
20(a).

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

It is also apparent that Plaintiffs’ various causes of

action do not arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences.”

Id.

The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant's
complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.

However, this consideration does

not constitute a license for plaintiffs filing pro se to ignore
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to
decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not want to assert.
The Court declines to tolerate or endorse this form of pleading
17

“that largely ignores the letter and the spirit of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and does great disservice to the
administration of civil justice.”

Id (quoting Johnson Enters.

of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1332
(11th Cir. 1998).
them.

The Court will not make Plaintiffs case for

Furthermore, the Court believes that the aforementioned

pleading deficiencies significantly prejudice Defendants’
ability to frame responsive pleadings, formulate proper
defenses, and would likely subject the parties to excessive and
unnecessary discovery.
As Plaintiffs are pro se litigants, and dismissal is
too harsh a remedy under the circumstances, the Court directs
Plaintiffs to submit a particularized amended complaint that
comports to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The body of

the particularized complaint must set forth cogently, in
separately numbered paragraphs, a short statement of the facts
giving rise to claims for relief.

Thereafter, in separately

captioned sections, Plaintiffs must clearly identify each civil
right violated.

They should do so with the requisite

specificity, so as to give Defendants notice, plead the
involvement of each defendant, and clarify what constitutional
right has been violated.

See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp.

237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (quoting Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29
(D.C. Cir. 1984) cert. denied Brennan v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084
18

(1985)).

Under each section, Plaintiffs must list each

defendant purportedly liable under that legal theory and explain
why they believe each defendant is liable to them.

Such

explanation should reference the numbered factual paragraphs in
the body of the particularized compliant that support that
assertion.

Plaintiffs shall also include a prayer for relief.
Plaintiffs must also thoroughly review the current

Complaint and dispense with any defendants who may not be joined
pursuant to Rule 20(a).

Simply put, “a civil plaintiff may not

name more than one defendant in his original or amended
complaint unless one claim against each additional defendant is
transactionally related to the claim against the first defendant
and involves a common question of law or fact.”

Garcia v.

Munoz, No. 2:08cv01648, 2008 WL 2064476, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14,
2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)).
The particularized pleading will supplant the prior
Complaint and must stand or fall of its own accord.

Plaintiffs

may not reference statements in the prior Complaint.
Plaintiffs are warned that their failure to comply
with the Court’s instructions may result in dismissal of their
action.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Plaintiffs are also warned

that if the particularized amended complaint does not comport
with Rule 20(a), the Court will begin its analysis with the
first defendant named in the body of the amended complaint, and
19

subsequently drop every defendant who is not properly joined
with that defendant.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will order
Plaintiffs to file a particularized amended complaint.
An appropriate Order will issue.

July 24, 2013
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

20