Contreras v. Davis

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 1/26/2017. (dest, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
JASON MICHAEL CONTRERAS,
Petitioner,
v.
KEITH W. DAVIS,
Respondent.

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1:13cv772 (JCC)

M E M O R A N D U M

O P I N I O N

Petitioner Jason Michael Contreras (“Petitioner” or
“Contreras”) originally filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with this Court on June 25, 2013.
1.]

[Dkt.

In the petition, Contreras alleges that he is being held in

state custody in violation of his federal constitutional rights,
based on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

Pet. at 3-4.

Petitioner's state custody arises from a 1997 judgment of
conviction entered in Norfolk Circuit Court, following Petitioner’s
guilty plea, on charges of first degree murder, robbery, use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony, and attempted robbery.
at 4.

Pet.

This Court previously denied Petitioner’s request for a writ,

based primarily on its untimeliness.

[Dkt. 8.]

The petition is now

back before the Court on remand, with instructions to reconsider this
Court’s prior ruling in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct.

1

718 (2016).

For the reasons that follow, the petition will be

granted.
I.

Background

Petitioner’s state charges stem from his involvement in a
botched carjacking that resulted in the death of David Semko
(“Semko”).

Pet. at 13-14.

Prior to the night in question,

Petitioner’s childhood had been filled with traumatic events,
including a pattern of abuse and neglect, his mother’s drug
addiction, an absentee father, several stints in foster care, and
consistently unstable housing.

Id. at 6-13.

In fact, several weeks

before the offense occurred, Contreras’s mother had moved him into a
crack house and then abandoned him, asking her drug dealers to
supervise him.

Id. at 12.

The drug dealers interpreted this request

as giving them permission to use Petitioner to help them commit
crimes.

Id.
On the night of October 26, 1996, one of the drug dealers

made Contreras and another minor flip a coin to decide who would have
to commit a robbery.

Pet. at 13.

Petitioner lost, so the drug

dealer handed him a gun.

Id.

walking to his car.

Petitioner approached Semko, who ran.

Id.

At that moment, Semko happened to be
Id.

In order to prove to the drug dealer that Contreras had tried to rob
Semko, Petitioner fired a single shot “in[to] the pitch blackness” in
Semko’s direction.

Declaration of Jason Contreras (“Contreras

Decl.”) [Dkt. 1-1 at 27] ¶ 25.

The shot hit Semko in the back, who
2

died the next day.

Pet. at 5.

fifteen years old.

At the time, Petitioner was only

Id. at 14.

On or about October 30, 1996, Petitioner was arrested and
charged with capital murder, robbery, and several related offenses.
Pet. at 13-14.

Even though he was a minor, Petitioner was certified

and charged as an adult.

Id. at 14.

At that time, capital murder

still carried a mandatory life sentence in Virginia.

See Yarbrough

v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 366-69 (1999).
On March 27, 1997, Petitioner pled guilty to first degree
murder along with the aforementioned charges.

Pet. at 4.

Prior to

the plea, Contreras’s trial attorneys requested that the court
appoint a mental health expert to evaluate him.

Id. at 15.

One

attorney in particular worried that Petitioner was “quite immature”
and “was really incapable of making an intelligent decision” because
“[he] had no clue what was going on in his case . . . and could not
even begin to absorb what was happening to him.”

Declaration of

Attorney Kim M. Crump (“Crump Decl.”) [Dkt. 1-1 at 19] ¶ 10.

His

attorneys also noted that they had “a hard time getting information
[they] needed from him.”
request, however.

Id. ¶ 11.

Pet. at 15.

The trial court denied their

According to Petitioner, the only

reason he ultimately agreed to plead guilty was to avoid the life
sentence associated with a capital murder conviction.

Id.

On May 20, 1997, following Petitioner’s guilty plea, the
court sentenced Petitioner to seventy-seven years in prison.
3

Pet. at

4.

Because Petitioner is ineligible for parole pursuant to Va. Code

§ 53.1-165.1, which abolished parole for individuals convicted of a
felony committed after January 1, 1995, he will not be eligible for
release until 2040.

See Va. Code § 53.1-40.01 (permitting “Geriatric

Release”).

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his sentence.

Pet. at 4.

On June 10, 1999, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for

habeas relief in the Norfolk Circuit Court.
hearing, the court dismissed his motion.

Id.

Following a

Id.

On June 23, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant petition for
a federal writ of habeas corpus.

[Dkt. 1.]

Petitioner argues that

his guilty plea is invalid because it was induced by the prosecutor’s
threat of a now unconstitutional sentence: mandatory life without
parole.

Petitioner’s argument rests upon the recent Supreme Court

case Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held that
mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit homicide offenses
are unconstitutional.

Pet. at 3.

Applying Miller retroactively,

petitioner asks the Court to “discharge[] [him] from his
unconstitutional confinement and restraint and/or relieve[] [him]
from his unconstitutional sentence.”

Id. at 32.

Previously, Respondent moved to dismiss this petition on
the grounds that it is time-barred, the claims are unexhausted, and
the arguments are without merit.

Resp’t Br. at 3, 5, 17.

This Court

granted Respondent’s motion and dismissed the petition, finding that
Miller was not retroactive and, therefore, the petition was untimely.
4

[Dkt. 8.]

Petitioner appealed the Court’s ruling to the Fourth

Circuit, which affirmed.

[Dkt. 15.]

Petitioner then appealed to the

United States Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct.
718 (2016).
On December 9, 2016, Petitioner submitted a supplemental
pleading in support of his original petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
2016.

[Dkt. 22.]
[Dkt. 23.]

Respondent filed its response on December 19,
Petitioner failed to file a reply.

This petition

is now ripe for disposition.
II.
A.

Analysis

Timeliness

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”), state prisoners have a one-year period within which
they must seek federal habeas review.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Ordinarily, this limitation period begins to run from the date on
which the state court judgment becomes final. See Gonzalez v. Thaler,
132 S. Ct. 641, 652-53 (2012).

However, in some circumstances, AEPDA

expressly permits accrual of the limitations period at a later date.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

As pertinent here, AEDPA allows for a

belated commencement of the limitation period when the Supreme Court
recognizes a new constitutional right.

In that case, the limitations

period runs from the “date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
5

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review.”

28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(C).
Here, the window for Petitioner to bring a federal
challenge to his 1997 conviction expired sometime in 1998 after he
opted not to seek direct review.

See Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 653.

Consequently, the current petition, filed in 2013, should be
precluded unless Petitioner can demonstrate a belated commencement of
the limitations period.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a later accrual
date based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Miller v. Alabama.
Pet. at 4; Supp. Pleading at 6-7.

Though Petitioner fails to make

this argument himself, the Supreme Court’s remand requires
consideration of Montgomery, which held that Miller announced a
substantive rule of law that should be given retroactive effect to
cases on collateral review.

136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).

Petitioner

appears to argue that the new rule set forth in Miller, and made
retroactive by Montgomery, applies to his case, qualifying his
petition for a belated commencement under § 2244(d)(1)(C).
Court agrees.

This

Accordingly, the Court finds that the petition for a

writ of habeas corpus is timely under § 2244(d)(1)(C).
B.

State Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Before applying for federal habeas relief, a state prisoner
must also exhaust all available state remedies.
6

Breard v. Pruett,

134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

“To

exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner must fairly present the
substance of his claim to the state's highest court.”
Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997)).

Id. (citing
This means

that the petitioner must not present “new legal theories or factual
claims for the first time in his federal habeas petition,” unless he
has a valid excuse.

Id. (citing Matthews, 105 F.3d at 911.); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
exhaustion.

The petitioner bears the burden of proving

Breard, 134 F.3d at 619.

In the instant case, Petitioner filed his first and only
state habeas petition on June 9, 1999, alleging claims of trial
error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial
misconduct.

Exh. B, State Habeas Pet. [Dkt. 7] at 39, 54-55.

He

included in those claims allegations about the involuntariness of his
guilty plea, which focused on bad advice his attorneys had given him
about his possible eligibility for parole.

Id. at 32-33.

Petitioner

also included claims about his attorneys’ failure to object to the
prosecution’s decision to reinstate capital murder charges against
him prior to his plea.

Id. at 2-4.

Unsurprisingly, he did not

mention Miller in his state petition, as it had not yet been decided.
Nevertheless, Petitioner did mention the impact of his youthfulness
on the proceedings, which would become relevant post-Miller. 1

1

It is also notable that Contreras filed his state habeas petition pro se several
months after turning eighteen years old.

7

Petitioner’s request for state habeas relief was ultimately denied.
He did not appeal that ruling to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Respondent concedes that if Petitioner has a “bona-fide
Miller claim, he might legitimately argue that he had no avenue to
exhaust such a claim in state court.”
Dismiss [Dkt. 7] ¶ 14.

Resp. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to

However, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s

claim is not a true Miller claim and is instead “nothing more than an
allegation that his plea was coerced by the prosecutor’s conduct, a
claim which he certainly could have raised” in his state habeas
petition, but did not.

Resp. Repl. to Supp. Pleading [Dkt. 23] at 9.

Because Petitioner did not present this factual predicate to the
state court, and because he never appealed the state habeas ruling to
the Supreme Court of Virginia, Respondent asserts that he is now
barred from raising the claim here.

(Id.)

Respondent is correct that Petitioner would be barred from
raising a challenge to the voluntariness of his plea based solely on
prosecutorial misconduct, as his earlier involuntariness claim did
not mention threats or coercion by the prosecution.
2244(b)(2)(B).

See 28 U.S.C. §

Such a claim would also be considered procedurally

defaulted by Virginia’s statute of limitations period and its
successive writ rule.

See Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (requiring a

state habeas petition to be filed within one year after the deadline
for filing a direct appeal has expired); Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)
(“No writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts
8

of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous
petition.”).

Thus, he could not go back to the Commonwealth of

Virginia to bring his claim in the first instance.

As a result, the

only way for this Court to address Petitioner’s claim is if he can
show “that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable” to him.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).

Miller, made retroactive by Montgomery, provides such a rule.
C.

Miller’s Application to Petitioner’s Guilty Plea
and/or 77-Year Sentence

In this Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion—issued on December
11, 2013—the Court dismissed Petitioner’s federal habeas claim as
untimely, due in large part to the Court’s belief that Miller was not
retroactive.

[Dkt. 8.]

In dicta, the Court also stated that “Miller

has no bearing on [Petitioner’s] case” because Miller did not address
the legitimacy of a guilty plea entered by a juvenile offender after
the threat of a now unconstitutional life without parole sentence.
[Dkt. 8 at 5.]

Taking into consideration Miller’s retroactivity as

well as other recent developments in case law, the Court now revisits
its earlier decision.
that Miller applies.

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds
Thus, the Court grants Petitioner’s request for

a writ of habeas corpus to correct his unconstitutional sentence.
Despite the passage of three years, the crux of
Petitioner’s claim remains the same: his guilty plea is flawed
9

because the prosecution threatened to pursue a mandatory life without
parole sentence, a punishment that is now unconstitutional.
3.

Pet. at

In support of this argument, Petitioner points out that Brady v.

United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) “places a high degree of faith in
the rational knowledgeable defendant, capable of assisting in his own
defense, aided by counsel[,] and capable of assessing and weighing
the import of possible outcomes” when entering a guilty plea.
Pleading at 4.

Supp.

In contrast, Petitioner was an “immature fifteen-

year-old with no experience with the criminal justice system” whose
attorneys described him as “incapable of making an intelligent
decision” on his own.

Id. at 5.

Petitioner claims that Miller and

its antecedents established that “children are different” and, thus,
the criminal justice system must treat them differently when
considering guilty pleas entered in the shadow of cruel and unusual
punishment.

Id. (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).

Petitioner

also asserts that his sentence “falls squarely into the settled
premise that his punishment is vastly excessive in relation to his
moral culpability.”

Id. at 6 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464;

Graham, 560 U.S. at 48-50; Roper, 543 U.S. at 560).

At its essence,

then, Petitioner’s claim seeks to have this Court combine Miller and
its antecedents with Brady to craft a new rule that will invalidate
his 77-year sentence.
If the Court were to construe Miller, Graham, and Roper in
the narrowest light possible, Petitioner would have no plausible
10

claim for relief.

That is because the Supreme Court’s holdings focus

on specific sentences for juveniles, invalidating mandatory life
without parole sentences for homicide offenses, life without parole
sentences for non-homicide offenses, and the death penalty,
respectively.

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82;

Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.

According to this narrow interpretation, if

a defendant has been sentenced to anything else—such as a long termof-years sentence or multiple consecutive sentences—the trilogy
provides no avenue for federal habeas relief.

See, e.g., Bunch v.

Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that Graham was
inapplicable because petitioner was sentenced to 89 years for
multiple non-homicide offenses, rather than life without parole, even
though it was the “functional equivalent”); cf. Dingle v. Stevenson,
840 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding, without considering the unique
characteristics of juveniles, that Roper did not invalidate a guilty
plea entered by a juvenile defendant to avoid the possibility of the
death penalty).

Such a narrow interpretation, however, overlooks

important principles the Supreme Court directed states to consider
when punishing juveniles, most notably the Court’s guidance regarding
the possibility of parole.
In Graham, the Supreme Court made clear that when a state
sentences a juvenile to life in prison, “it must provide [that child]
with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of
that term.”

560 U.S. at 81.

Although Graham left it up to the
11

states to figure out how to comply with its ruling, id. at 75, the
decision nevertheless established at least three minimum requirements
for parole or early release programs.

First, the opportunity for

release must be “based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”
Id. at 75.

Second, it must be “meaningful,” which means the

opportunity must be “realistic” and more than a “remote possibility.” 2
Id. at 70, 75, 82.

Third, the state parole or early release system

must take into account the defendant’s youthfulness when the crime
was committed, a fact that makes him or her less culpable than an
adult.

Id. at 76.
Several years later, Miller expanded upon Graham’s

principles, allowing a state to impose life without parole for a
juvenile convicted of a homicide offense only after taking into
consideration the offender’s age and age-related characteristics.
132 S. Ct. at 2475.

Although Miller technically permitted such

sentences, it also made clear that “sentencing juveniles to this
harshest possible penalty [should] be uncommon.”

Id. at 2469.

Since Graham and Miller were decided, several courts have
applied these principles more broadly to invalidate lengthy term-ofyears sentences for juveniles.

See, e.g., Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d

1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (invalidating a 254 year sentence as “materially
indistinguishable” from a life sentence without parole since the

2

Importantly, the Supreme Court pointed out that executive clemency is not
“meaningful” due to its ad hoc nature. Id. at 69-70.

12

juvenile offender would not be eligible for parole during his natural
lifetime); cf. LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2016)
(holding that Virginia’s Geriatric Release program does not comply
with the requirements of Graham as it does not provide a “meaningful”
opportunity for release for juvenile offenders).

Essentially, courts

have viewed such sentences as de facto life sentences.

These

sentences, while technically in compliance with the mandates of
Miller and Graham, still subject juveniles to life behind bars, with
“no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for
reconciliation with society, no hope.”

Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.

Thus, courts have treated them as every bit as cruel and unusual as
life without parole itself.

Given the status of Virginia’s current

early release program, this Court is inclined to agree.
In LeBlanc v. Mathena, the Fourth Circuit recently held
that Virginia’s Geriatric Release program fails to meet the basic
dictates of Graham for juvenile offenders sentenced to life in
prison.

841 F.3d at 274.

The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Geriatric

Release does not provide juveniles with the opportunity to obtain
release “based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” as
required by Graham, because the Parole Board has the authority to
deny release “for any reason whatsoever.”

Id. at 268-69.

Moreover,

data provided by the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission revealed
that Geriatric Release petitions are denied “in nearly every case”
based solely on the “heinousness or depravity of the offender’s
13

crime,” a consideration that directly contradicts Graham.
270.

Id. at

In addition, the Court found that Geriatric Release does not

provide a “meaningful” opportunity for release to juveniles because,
under the program, release is the exception rather than the rule.
Id. at 271.

Moreover, there are no standards by which to govern the

denial of release petitions.

Id.

Finally, the Fourth Circuit

concluded that Geriatric Release did not require the Parole Board to
consider the “special mitigating force of youth,” thereby allowing
the Board to ignore juvenile offenders’ lesser culpability and
subject them to harsher punishments than adults by requiring them to
serve a larger percentage of their sentences.

Id. at 272.

In the instant case, Petitioner received a sentence of
seventy-seven years.

Due to Virginia’s elimination of parole in the

1990s, Petitioner will not be eligible for early release until he
turns sixty years old.

See Va. Code § 53.1-165.1 (eliminating parole

for offenses committed after January 1, 1995); see also Va. Code §
53.1-40.1 (providing for “Geriatric Release”).
have spent 45 years behind bars.

By that time, he will

And, as noted by the Fourth Circuit

in LeBlanc, there is no guarantee that his petition for early release
will ever be granted.
This Court is troubled by the practical realities of
Petitioner’s case, as Virginia has imposed a lengthy term-of-years
sentence with no realistic possibility for early release.

In effect,

Virginia has relegated Petitioner to a de facto life sentence for
14

crimes he committed when he was only fifteen years old.

For that

reason, the Court is sufficiently convinced that Petitioner’s
sentence is irreconcilable with the mandates of Graham and Miller.
Thus, the Court will grant his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and remand to the state court for re-sentencing in accordance with
the Eighth Amendment.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner’s sentence is
constitutional, the Court remains concerned with the validity of
Petitioner’s guilty plea.

Petitioner claims that the only reason he

pled guilty was to avoid the imposition of a mandatory life without
parole sentence, a punishment that has since been struck down as
cruel and unusual.

Supp. Pleading at 4.

Petitioner argues that the

standard set forth in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) to
assess the validity of a guilty plea is inadequate in this case
because it fails to address how facing a definite unconstitutional
punishment as the result of going to trial may coerce a juvenile
defendant into pleading guilty.

Id.

While Petitioner concedes that

Brady should be applied to his case, he nevertheless urges the Court
to consider it within the context of the “constitutional logic” of
Miller, Graham, and Roper.

Id.

In Brady v. United States, the petitioner challenged the
voluntariness of his guilty plea, arguing that it was coerced by a
now-unconstitutional criminal statute.

397 U.S. at 746 (citing

United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)).
15

Brady had been

charged with kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), which authorized
the death penalty only upon a jury’s recommendation.

Id. at 743.

Nearly ten years later, the Supreme Court invalidated this provision,
arguing that it discouraged the assertion of defendants’
constitutional rights to plead not guilty and to demand a jury trial.
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572, 583.

Because fear of the death penalty had

been at least one factor in Brady’s decision to plead guilty, he
argued that Jackson invalidated his plea.

Brady, 397 U.S. at 746.

The Supreme Court disagreed.
Brady first concluded that Petitioner’s plea had been
voluntary.

The Court began by clarifying that Jackson did not hold

that “every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the
Act [automatically] does so involuntarily.”

397 U.S. at 747 (citing

Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583) (internal quotations omitted).

It then

proceeded to examine the circumstances surrounding Brady’s plea,
looking for evidence that the defendant was “fully aware of the
direct consequences” of his plea and entered it without facing
threats, misrepresentation, or bribes.

Id. at 755.

In its analysis,

the Court placed great weight on the fact that Brady had decided to
plead guilty after his co-defendant confessed and agreed to testify
against him.

Id. at 749.

Furthermore, although the Court

acknowledged the possibility that facing the death penalty may have
influenced Brady’s decision, the Court reasoned that it was only one
of several factors to consider.

Id.
16

The Court also considered other

factors, finding no evidence that Brady pled guilty due to “actual or
threatened physical harm or mental coercion,” that he had competent
counsel and was able to “rationally weigh the advantages of going to
trial against [those] of pleading guilty,” and that his plea was
entered in open court before a trial judge who twice questioned its
voluntariness.

Id. at 743, 750, 754-55.

In other words, Brady’s

decision to plead guilty was his own.
In addition, the Brady Court concluded that Petitioner’s
plea was intelligently made.

The Court found no evidence that Brady

was “incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental faculties”
at the time he entered a guilty plea.

397 U.S. at 756.

The Court

went on to explain that “absent misrepresentation or other
impermissible conduct by state agents, a voluntary plea of guilty
intelligently made in light of the then applicable law does not
become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the
plea rested on a faulty premise.”

Id. at 757.

Or, to put it more

simply, “[t]he fact that Brady did not anticipate United States v.
Jackson . . . does not impugn the truth or reliability of his plea.”
Id.
Starting with Roper and continuing with Graham and Miller,
however, the Supreme Court outlined several critical differences
between juvenile and adult offenders that are relevant to the Brady
analysis.

In its trilogy, the Court noted that “juveniles have a

lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; they
17

are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure; and their characters are not as
well formed.”

Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-

70, 573) (internal quotations omitted).

In addition, the Court

pointed out that juveniles have a proclivity towards risky behavior
and an inability to assess consequences.
65.

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-

As a result, juveniles’ conduct should be viewed as less

culpable and their character as more capable of reform.

Id. at 2464.

The Court took great care to point out that “none of what it said
about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits
and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”
Nor should it be.

Id. at 2465.

The same juvenile characteristics that are

relevant at sentencing pervade every aspect of a criminal case,
including guilty pleas.

Consequently, when the criminal justice

system deals with children, the “constitutional logic” of Miller,
Graham, and Roper should apply.
In the instant case, this Court must examine all of the
relevant circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s guilty plea,
including his age at the time his plea was entered.

Brady, 397 U.S.

at 749; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 (“An offender's age is
relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that
fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed.”).

Petitioner alleges that his guilty plea was entered

solely to avoid a mandatory life without parole sentence.
18

Supp.

Pleading at 4.

This fact is confirmed by Contreras’s trial attorney.

Crump Decl. ¶ 15.

Additionally, at the time of his guilty plea,

Petitioner, who was only fifteen years old, demonstrated all of the
inherent characteristics of youth.

Supp. Pleading at 5.

For

example, although Petitioner had been forced to provide for himself
amidst a tumultuous upbringing, he remained “quite immature.”
Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.

Crump

Once abandoned by his drug-addicted mother to the

supervision of drug dealers, Petitioner followed their negative lead,
committing crimes at the drug dealers’ request.

Even after he was

arrested and charged, Petitioner seemed incapable of grasping the
consequences of his actions.

His trial attorneys describe him as

unable to absorb what was happening to him, in need of a mental
health evaluation, and unable to assist in his own defense.

Id.;

Pet. at 15.
Having considered the circumstances surrounding
Petitioner’s guilty plea, the Court is left with grave concerns that
his plea was entered “with full awareness of its consequences.”
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.

See

Moreover, Petitioner’s desire to avoid a

cruel and unusual punishment, coupled with his potential mental
health issues, suggest that his plea was not voluntary and
intelligently made.

Certainly, a later judicial decision

invalidating the punishment Contreras faced would not be enough on
its own to attack his guilty plea today.

19

See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757.

But Miller and its antecedents, in combination with the circumstances
surrounding Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty, would be.
Accordingly, as stated above, the Court will grant
Contreras’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remand to the
state court for re-sentencing in accordance with the Eighth
Amendment.
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition will be granted.
An appropriate Order shall issue.

January 26, 2017
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

20