Braganza v. Donohoe et al

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM OPINION in re 56 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Claude M. Hilton on 07/29/2014. (jlan)

I

E Bl

JUL 29 2014
IN THE UNITED

FOR THE

STATES DISTRICT COURT
I

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

cir -.

Alexandria Division

EUGENE M.

BRAGANZA,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.

v.

PATRICK R.

l:13-cv-848

DONAHOE,

Postmaster General,
and

NATIONAL

CARRIERS'

RURAL

LETTER

ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER comes before

the Court

on

Defendant

Patrick

Donahoe's ("Donahoe") Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant
National Rural Letter Carriers'

Association's

("NRLCA") Motion

for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Eugene M. Braganza ("Braganza" or "Plaintiff")
a

former Rural Letter Carrier who worked for the

between December 10,
2011,

is

Postal Service

1994 and March 10, 2012. On December 21,

Braganza requested two and a half weeks of annual leave

from December 29, 2011 through January 22, 2012.

Braganza was

scheduled to return to work on January 24,

Braganza failed

2012.

to return to the United States and report to duty as scheduled
on January 24, 2012.

Braganza asked a friend to send an email to

his union steward to inform him that he was ill and would not
return to work until further notice.

After Braganza failed to report to work for more than three

consecutive days, Braganza's supervisor sent a letter to
Braganza informing him that he was absent without leave until
acceptable documentation was provided and instructed Braganza to
report to work by January 30, 2012. Braganza failed to report to
work on January 30, 2012. On January 31, 2012,

Braganza's

supervisor sent him a second letter ordering him to report to
work on February 3, 2012 for a pre-disciplinary interview.

Braganza failed to report to work on February 3, 2012 and missed

his pre-disciplinary interview. On February 28, 2012, the Vienna
Post Office received a letter from Braganza stating that he

planned to return to work on February 22nd. Braganza returned to
work on February 22, 2012.

Braganza's supervisor decided to discipline him for failing
to report to work on time.

The Postal Service judged the email

to the union steward to be insufficient to support Braganza's
absence and designated his time as absent without leave
("AWOL"). Braganza's supervisor issued a notice of removal on
February 11, 2012,

and the removal went into effect on March 10,

2012.

The NRCLA filed a grievance on behalf of Braganza

concerning his dismissal,

following the dispute resolution

process outlined in the National Agreement between the NRCLA and
the Postal Service regarding wages, hours, and conditions of

employment. On November 5, 2012, the Union informed Braganza
that his grievance had been denied at Step 3 and that the Union
would be making a decision as to whether to take his case to
arbitration. On March 13,

2013, after determining that

Plaintiff's cause did not yield a likelihood of success at
arbitration, the NRLCA withdrew their arbitration request.

On July 11, 2014, Braganza filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

against Defendants NRLCA and the United States Postal Service.
He filed an amended complaint on October 17, 2013. Braganza's

Amended Complaint alleges that the United States Postal Service
interfered with his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"} and disciplined him in retaliation for asking for FMLA
leave. Further,

Braganza's Complaint alleges that the NRLCA

breached its duty to provide fair representation to him and that
the Postal Service lacked just cause to remove him from his
rural carrier position. On July 24, 2014,

the parties filed a

Joint Stipulation to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint for Breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by
USPS and Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation by NRLCA

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a){1}(A)(ii).

The Court will grant summary judgment when "the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ.

P. 56(a).

Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary

judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party's case.
(1986).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

The Court construes all reasonable inferences in favor

of the non-moving party when determining whether there is a

genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc.,

The mere existence of some

477 U.S.

242,

255 (1986).

disputed facts does not merit a trial unless the disputed facts
are material to an issue necessary for proper resolution of the

case and the quality and quantity of the evidence offered to

support a question of fact are adequate to support a jury
verdict.
F.3d 1317,

Thompson Everett,
1323 (4th Cir.

Inc.

v. Nat'l Cable Adver., L.P.,

57

1995).

In order to survive summary judgment on his Family and
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") interference claim,
prove:

(1) he was an eligible employee;

was covered by the statute;
the FMLA;

Braganza must

(2) the Postal Service

(3) he was entitled to leave under

(4) he gave his employer adequate notice of his

intention to take leave;

and

(5)

the Postal Service denied FMLA

benefits to which he was entitled. Ainsworth v. Loudoun Cty.
Sch.

Bd.,

851 F. Supp. 2d 963,

975 (E.D.

Va.

2012).

Braganza cannot establish that he qualified for FMLA leave;
therefore,

the Postal Service could not have interfered with the

exercise of his FMLA rights. Rhoads v. FDIC,
Cir.

2001),

711, 713

257 F.3d 373 (4th

citing Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp.,

(7th Cir.

1997)

131 F.3d

(holding that FMLA interference suits

are to be resolved "by asking whether the plaintiff has

established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is
entitled to the benefits he claims").

First, Braganza cannot

establish that he properly notified the Postal Service of his

absence as required by the FMLA. Even when qualifying
circumstances exist,

employees cannot invoke rights under the

FMLA if they fail to provide adequate notice of their need for

leave,

29 U.S.C.

§ 2612(e), but must "provide at least verbal

notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee
needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and
duration of the leave." 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c);

257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.

Rhoads v. FDIC,

2001). Employers are "entitled to

the sort of notice that will inform them . . . when a given
employee will return to work." Collins v. NTN-Bower Corp.,

F.3d 1006,

1008 (7th Cir.

272

2001). The same notice requirement

applies when the need for leave is unforeseeable. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.303(a);

see also Collins v. NTN-Bower Corp.,

272 F.3d

1006,

1008 (7th Cir.

2001). According to the Postal Service's

written policy, employees are required to obtain approval for
leave from their supervisors.
Braganza's notice failed to meet both the FMLA's standard
and the Postal Service's Policy. On January 23, 2012,

the union

steward received an email stating "Eugene Braganza has requested
me to inform you that due to an illness he is unable to report
to work until further notice. Kindly inform the Vienna post
office on his behalf.

He intends to send a letter to his office

but has asked you do the same." This email was signed by a

third-party. The union steward forwarded this email to
Braganza's supervisor. This email does not constitute adequate
notice because it was written by a third-party, simply states
that Braganza was "unable to work", and fails to indicate an

anticipated date of return. Braganza was fired for failing to
report for duty as scheduled without explanation or appropriate
notification. Braganza has failed to establish that he properly
notified the Postal Service of his absence as required under the
FMLA.

Further,

Braganza cannot establish that he suffered from a

serious health condition as defined by the FMLA.

Braganza claims

he suffered from acute bronchitis, with symptoms to include sore
throat,

pain.

loss of appetite,

cough,

chills,

sweat,

and nondescript

Braganza alleges that his condition constituted a "serious

health condition" under the FMLA. The FMLA regulations define a
"serious health condition" as an illness,

injury,

impairment, or

physical or mental condition that involves either (1) "inpatient
care" via an overnight stay in a hospital,

hospice, or

residential medical care facility, or (2) "continuing treatment"

by a health care provider. 27 U.S.C. § 2611; 29 C.F.R. §§
825.113(a); 825.114. Braganza failed to present sufficient
medical documentation to establish that he suffered from a

serious health condition under the FMLA.

Braganza claims that

his childhood physician diagnosed him with "acute bronchitis" in
her home in India and advised him to rest until he was well.

Braganza was not hospitalized or treated in any inpatient

facility for his bronchitis. Braganza testified that his health
was much better on February 6, 2012; however, he did not return
to work until February 22, 2012. There is no evidence in the
record that would allow a reasonable jury to find that

Braganza's bronchitis or the symptoms to which he testified

could constitute a serious health condition within the meaning

of the FMLA. Braganza cannot establish that he was eligible for
FMLA benefits or entitled to additional leave during his
extended vacation from January 24, 2012 to February 22, 2012.
Thus,

Braganza cannot prevail on his claims of FMLA interference

or retaliation because there was no right with which the Postal
Service could have interfered or animus with which to retaliate.

For the aforementioned reasons,

Defendant Donahoe is

entitled to summary judgment against Plaintiff Braganza. An
appropriate order shall issue.

tsl

Claude M. Hilton

United States District Judge

Alexandria, Virginia
July 2fi , 2014